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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 'The international disclosure bandwagon' 
The three decades following the Second World War were a key period in the 
development of modern financial reporting by public or 'open' companies. 
Before this period, company financial reporting in many countries, including the 
Netherlands, consisted of little more than the publication of terse abstracts from 
the accounting records. But by the beginning of the 1980's, the annual reports of 
many companies had changed into rather attractive and often voluminous booklets 
in which an expanded set of accounting data was presented in a context of non-
financial information about the company in question. By that time, annual 
reporting had acquired a substantial part of its current outward appearance. 
One explanation for this change is the introduction of more extensive regulation 
governing the contents of annual reports. Gerhard Mueller drew attention to the 
transformation of financial reporting during this period, and emphasized the 
importance of regulation. His analysis (Mueller, 1972) wil l be used to introduce 
the subject of the present study. 
Commenting on the situation in Western Europe in the late 1950's, Mueller 
observed that 'financial reporting and disclosure were generally in a sad state of 
virtual non-existence' (p. 118). In many countries, legal requirements and 
established practice were generally in favour of highly secretive financial 
reporting. Differences among countries existed, to be sure, but even the relative­
ly open British reporting standards 'tolerated [annual reports providing] almost no 
details concerning results of operations' (p. 119). At that time, only the United 
States could serve as a benchmark of openness in financial reporting because of 
the influence of the Securities Acts of the 1930's. 
A process of change began in the early 1960's, and it increased in scope as the 
decade progressed. Throughout the developed world, legislatures undertook the 
task of revising company legislation, almost as if acting on an agreed pro­
gramme1. Relevant legislation was introduced or changed in the United States 
(1964), Germany (1959, 1965), Japan (1963, 1967), France (1966), the United 
Kingdom (1967), Canada (1969), the Netherlands (1970), and somewhat later, in 
Spain (1973) and Italy (1974). During the 1960's, the Nordic countries were 
1
 Full details about the development of financial reporting legislation in the various 
European countries can be found in Walton (1995). 
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also at work at a common programme of company law reform. 
A common concern of most of these reforms was to increase annual report 
disclosure. For this reason, Mueller characterized the almost wave-like spread of 
new legislation as 'the international disclosure bandwagon'. 
A direct impetus for a disclosure wave in the 1960's came from the United States 
in the form of a campaign by the SEC for greater voluntary disclosure (see also 
Hobgood, 1969). However, a more fundamental reason for the increased 
emphasis on disclosure, and one apparent in many countries, was a growing 
demand for reporting information, resulting from increased attention for com­
panies on the part of investors and the general public. 
Increased disclosure requirements were considered at the time as a relatively easy 
approach to meet this demand, given the difficulty of obtaining agreement on 
stricter rules on income determination and valuation. Changing demands for 
financial information, and changing patterns of financial statement usage were not 
confined to the United States but could be observed in a number of countries. 
Despite differences in institutional structure, this led to a basic similarity: 
[M]odes of achieving better and more financial disclosure differed from 
country to country. (...) despite the different routes utilized for arriving at 
higher disclosure plateaus, the outcome (i.e., the disclosure rules and require­
ments instituted) brought about a fair degree of international similarity, (p. 
122) 
Mueller's analysis does not suggest that disclosure practices in the Netherlands 
were notably different from those in other continental countries. The conclusion 
regarding the Netherlands would therefore have to be that it shared in the general 
'sad state' of affairs, and that, like other countries, it had to be lifted from this 
state by means of legislation (enacted in 1970) which was part of a common 
movement of legal reform affecting wide parts of the Western world. 
However, one can also find expressions in the literature of an alternative view of 
the development of Dutch financial reporting. In contrast to Mueller's emphasis 
on regulation in bringing about improvements in disclosure, this other view 
stresses the role of voluntary improvements in Dutch financial reporting. 
1.2 Perceived importance of non-mandatory improvements in Dutch 
financial reporting 
A number of authors have emphasized that the development of Dutch financial 
reporting has been different from that in other countries. Such assertions can be 
found in the Dutch literature, and, from the 1960's onwards, in the international 
2 
literature as well. They range from the simple characterization that '[t]he 
Netherlands is a sophisticated maverick in the international accounting com­
munity' (Da Costa et al., 1978) to more elaborate attempts at international 
classifications of accounting practices. Among the latter, the well-known Nobes 
(1983) classification of the Netherlands as a distinct sub-class among other 
national accounting systems has done much to spread the view that Dutch 
financial reporting evolved along quite distinct lines. The most striking aspect of 
this difference has, of course, been the Dutch conceptual and theoretical frame­
work for asset valuation and income determination on the basis of current values. 
It has been argued that this provided an effective alternative to regulation as a 
guide towards improved financial reporting. Bindenga (1995) has described the 
Sonderweg of Dutch financial reporting by distinguishing three 'orientations' or 
'lines of development' in the history of financial reporting: an 'Anglo-Saxon 
(Commonwealth, USA), a 'Roman' (continental European) and a 'Dutch' line of 
development (See also Bindenga, 1993). The latter is characterized as follows: 
In the Netherlands, financial reporting has derived its character in particular 
from the development of business economics. As such, the Dutch situation is 
incomparable to that in other continental European countries, or to the Anglo-
Saxon line of development. Until 1970, there was no legislation on or 
regulation of financial reporting. (...) The founding of a normative and 
objective school of business economics between 1920 and 1950 has had an 
important influence on financial reporting in the Netherlands. (...) Although 
the roots of financial reporting in the Netherlands can be found in business 
economics, this tradition has been broken. Confronted with processes of 
harmonization in Europe and with influences from American regulation, the 
legal element is now clearly present in the Netherlands as well. (p. 11) 
Bindenga ascribes an important role in the application of business economic 
theory in practice to the Dutch auditing profession. Although he refers primarily 
to issues of income determination and valuation, his strong assertion that before 
1970 and before the impact of European harmonization, financial reporting 
developed under the influence of non-regulatory forces may have implications for 
disclosure as well. It would, after all, be somewhat curious to find that there 
were substantial voluntary improvements in accounting principles used while the 
issue of disclosure was neglected. 
In fact, it has been observed that the Netherlands has been different in the area of 
disclosure as well, in the sense that in this respect Dutch practice is (and has 
been) more like that in the United States and the United Kingdom than like that 
in neighbouring continental countries (Choi and Mueller, 1992:421). Further­
more, it has been noted that openness in financial reporting practice in the 
3 
Netherlands did not rest to any great extent on formal regulation, but on the same 
auditing profession to which Bindenga referred to explain the influence of 
business economics on valuation practices. A strong statement of this view can 
be found in Scott (1968), who presents the situation in the Netherlands as a goal 
to which developing countries trying to improve their accounting systems might 
want to aspire. After noting that the Dutch environment at the time was charac­
terized by relatively light regulation, he remarks that: 
Dutch firms are widely regarded as the most progressive and innovative with 
respect to external financial reporting. The Dutch accounting profession 
appears to be very effective in showing Dutch companies the advantages 
which accrue from thorough and realistic disclosure of financial affairs to the 
public and has helped to create a strong and positive attitude toward account­
ing among all elements of the business community, (p. 61) 
More recent observations on the role of voluntary action in Dutch financial 
reporting practice include the comment that *[u]ntil recently, [an] important 
feature [of Dutch accounting] has been the combination of almost extreme 
permissiveness with high professional standards' (Nobes and Parker, 1995:217). 
Furthermore, in a review of current financial reporting practices by Traas in an 
address to the 1991 Rotterdam Financial and Management Accounting (FMA) 
Congress, it was concluded that Dutch financial reporting practice had, during the 
1970's and 1980's, consisted largely of devising and complying with regulations. 
In contrast, it was argued that if financial reporting was to continue to improve, 
inspiration for the future should be drawn from an earlier period, in which 
voluntary action played a much larger role: 
(..) the necessary improvements [in financial reporting] may have to be 
brought about by voluntary action. (...) In fact, a development along these 
lines is nothing new. In the postwar period, during the 1950's and 1960's, 
this approach was used as well. And certainly not without success. (Traas, 
1991:53) 
Earlier in the same address, an appeal was made to 'revitalize the process that as 
early as the 1950's and 1960's led to a sustained improvement in reporting 
practice' (Traas, 1991:40). 
In sum, the literature provides quite definite expressions of the point of view that 
postwar Dutch reporting displayed a distinctive tendency towards voluntary 
improvements. Although the literature is usually careful enough not to assume a 
past 'golden age' of voluntary improvements in reporting, the general image of 
4 
the period is quite positive2. Although this point is generally stated with refer­
ence to valuation and income determination, one can find it applied to issues 
regarding extent of disclosure as well. 
It wi l l be noted that this view of developments in the Netherlands contrasts with 
Mueller's (1972) analysis of European financial reporting, discussed in the 
previous section. Mueller argued that improvements in European disclosure did 
not start before the wave of disclosure legislation of the late 1960's. Even 
though part of this apparent contrast may perhaps be explained by assuming that 
Mueller's observations of disclosure practices were confined mainly to the larger 
continental countries as France and Germany, this would still leave a presumed 
difference between these countries and the Netherlands which would merit further 
investigation. In short, the cursory review of the literature presented here gives 
rise to an empirical question about the actual extent of voluntary disclosure in the 
postwar Netherlands. It is this question which wil l be addressed in this book. 
1.3 Previous empirical research in the Netherlands 
There has been little previous research into the long-term growth of annual report 
disclosure in the Netherlands. A factor of obvious importance in this respect is 
the traditional emphasis among Dutch accounting academics on the development 
of normative theory in the area of valuation and income determination (see 
Klaassen and Schreuder, 1984). This has diverted some attention that might 
otherwise have been directed at empirical issues in general, and at disclosure 
issues in particular. Dijksma (1973:369) observed that before 1973, there had 
only been eight previous published surveys of (aspects of) Dutch financial 
reporting practices. Although the number of eight studies is a bit too low 3, the 
conclusion that empirical work before 1970 was remarkable primarily by its 
absence seems uncontestable. Following 1971, there have been regular but 
incompletely comparable surveys of reporting practices4. Dijksma and van 
Halem (1977) is a rare example of a cross-sectional empirical disclosure study 
modelled explicitly after foreign examples. Since 1986, a second regular series 
of empirical surveys has been published, containing much information on various 
2
 See also Burgert, van Hoepen and Joosten (1995:21-22) for the view that substantial 
accounting regulation arrived relatively late in the Netherlands (in 1970), but that, 
nevertheless, many companies had reached fairly high standards of reporting practice on a 
voluntary basis. 
3
 Munnik (1931), Polak (1933) and Sternheim (1933) can, despite their rather casual 
approach, be considered as other examples of pre-war studies of actual practice. 
4
 Onderzoek Jaarverslagen, published in the series NIvRA Geschriften (Amsterdam: 
Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants, 1973-). 
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disclosure issues5. Even more recently, other materials relevant to the develop­
ment of Dutch financial reporting have been published, including a history of 
Dutch financial reporting regulation (Zeff et al., 1992), an analysis of this 
regulation in terms of economic consequences (Maijoor, 1991) and a longitudinal 
study of the introduction of consolidated reporting in the Netherlands (Blom-
maert, 1995). 
Altogether, the available survey data do allow a reasonable reconstruction of 
post-1970 trends in disclosure. But an assessment of the differences or similar­
ities between post- and pre-1970 reporting with respect to disclosure cannot be 
made on this basis. The Blommaert study is the only study to date that has 
expressly dealt with the issue of reporting development over the entire postwar 
period (over the 20th century as a whole, in fact). 
1.4 Objectives and method of this study 
1.4.1 General 
The preceding sections have shown that within the literature, one can find support 
for the view that postwar Dutch financial reporting distinguished itself from its 
continental neighbours by a relatively large extent of voluntary improvements. In 
the absence of extensive previous empirical research, two possible interpretations 
offer themselves. It is possible that Dutch financial reporting was in fact 
somewhat different from that practised in other countries in terms of an unusually 
extensive reliance on voluntary improvements. To the extent that this is correct, 
this phenomenon would offer itself as a subject of further research in terms of its 
origins and nature. Another possibility is that there was not, in fact, a significant 
amount of voluntary disclosure in the Netherlands. 
In the light of either possibility, the research objective of this study can be stated 
as: to describe and appraise the role played by voluntary disclosure extensions in 
the development of postwar Dutch financial reporting. 
The next sections contain a further discussion of the research question, and the 
approach by which it wil l be addressed. 
1.4.2 Definitions: voluntary annual report disclosure 
In the context of financial reporting, disclosure refers to the transmission of 
information by enterprise management to recipients outside the enterprise. 
Disclosure is fundamental to financial reporting, which may be defined as 
5
 The series Jaar in — Jaar uit, initiated by the accounting faculty of Erasmus 
University, Rotterdam (Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1986-). 
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'communicating information that relates, directly or indirectly, to the information 
provided by the accounting system' (FASB Concept Statement 1, J 7). 
Despite this fundamental nature of disclosure, it is hardly ever formally defined. 
The word is generally used interchangeably with expressions as revelation, 
release, publication, making available or communication. Moreover, the English 
word 'disclosure' can be used to refer to the information being disclosed, to the 
act of disclosing and to the resulting degree of informativeness of the annual 
report as a whole. In reporting practice, the absence of an accepted definition 
and the often casual use of the word 'disclosure' generally do not pose any 
problems. For this reason, this study wil l adhere to common usage and not 
attempt to define disclosure in a very strict way. 
In general, 'disclosure' wi l l be used to refer to the capacity of an annual report to 
provide answers to questions. A n increase in 'total disclosure', or a 'new 
disclosure', or a 'decision to disclose' wil l be understood to mean that in future 
the annual report answers questions that it did not answer before. Examples of 
such new disclosures are6: 
- the breakdown of items included in financial statements that previously were 
added or netted; 
- the inclusion or expansion of notes to financial statement items commenting 
on their calculation; 
- the inclusion of figures in the notes showing the effect of alternative account­
ing treatments; 
- the inclusion of completely new statements (as consolidated statements or 
funds statements). 
This broad way of looking at disclosure helps to lessen the importance of the 
traditional distinction between disclosure on the one hand and recognition, 
valuation and income determination on the other hand. A change from historical 
cost accounting to current cost accounting in such a way that most of the histori­
cal cost information can still be retrieved from the financial statements or the 
notes might be considered as an extension of disclosure. 
The subject of most studies in voluntary disclosure is disclosures that are not 
governed by legislation or accounting standards. A more precise name for these 
disclosures would therefore be 'non-mandatory disclosure'. This latter wording 
is also strictly speaking preferable because the attribution of a ' w i l l ' to a limited 
liability company is fraught with difficulties. Nevertheless, to keep in line with 
6
 See Marth and Murphy (1994) for a considerably more elaborate classification of 
disclosure items. 
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common usage, in this study the word 'voluntary' wil l generally be used to refer 
to non-mandatory disclosures. It should be kept in mind that disclosures may be 
induced by all sorts of non-regulatory pressures which may make the decision to 
disclose anything but spontaneous to those involved in that decision. 
This study is limited to disclosure in annual reports1, as opposed to disclosure 
through other channels. This limitation is inspired by practical considerations. 
The notion that annual reports are not produced and read in a vacuum, but are 
merely an element of the total set of financial and economic information dissemi­
nated by enterprises, was to some degree current in the Netherlands during the 
period studied here (e.g. Weisglas, 1955). Additional insights might be gained 
by comparing annual report disclosures with information published through other 
sources, to assess the 'openness' of enterprises in all its aspects. This wi l l , 
however, not be attempted. 
1.4.3 Approach to empirical work 
A n important part of this study consists of an empirical investigation of published 
annual reports. In brief, the study described in this book consists of a survey of 
the published annual reports of about 30% of the companies listed on the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange over the 1945-1983 period. For these companies, a 
longitudinal study of disclosure changes in nine separate areas was conducted, 
covering a total of about 30 different disclosure positions. The details of the 
research design wil l be described and discussed in later sections of this book. 
The main reason for the choice of period (1945-1983) is that it is the widest 
interval within natural boundaries that can be drawn around the critical period at 
the end of the 1960's. As will be discussed below, the Second World War 
clearly demarcates this period from the previous period. In 1984, the adaptation 
of Dutch law to the Fourth Company Law Directive of the (then) European 
Economic Communities took effect. This ended a period during which Dutch 
financial reporting regulation was free to develop purely under the influence of 
national factors. The almost 40 years covered provide sufficient room to observe 
disclosure changes in the long run, and to appreciate the changes effected around 
1970 against their proper historical background. 
The structure of the empirical study can be envisaged as follows. The question 
as to the nature and extent of voluntary disclosure in the Netherlands can, on a 
7
 'Annual report' will be used in this study of to translate the traditional sense of the 
Dutch word jaarverslag, which refers to the entire document issued annually by enter­
prises and which includes the financial statements as its core. 
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common-sense basis, be broken down into sub-questions at three different levels: 
- The national level. Questions at this level are directly derived from the 
discussion in sections 1.1 and 1.2 on the perceived specific nature of the 
development of financial reporting in the Netherlands. But an assessment of 
the overall development of annual report disclosure during the postwar period 
also requires an investigation of the process of disclosure extension at two 
lower levels: 
The level of the disclosing company. Questions at this level are concerned 
with differences among companies in their participation in the assumed 
process of voluntary disclosure extension, and whether these differences can 
be associated with company characteristics. 
- The level of the individual disclosure item. At this level, questions are 
considered relating to the characteristics of the process by which new disclos­
ures were introduced and disseminated. 
In order to arrive at answers to these questions by means of an empirical 
investigation, points of reference are necessary that assist in designing the data 
collection process and that assist in interpreting and appreciating the findings. At 
each level, points of reference come mainly in two types (although the signifi­
cance of the types differs from level to level): 
A first set of points of reference consists of elements from the historical back­
ground. At a national level, one would have to know what kind of regulatory 
system was in place at various points in time, how it differed from or corre­
sponded to comparable systems in other countries, and how, if at all, the balance 
between regulation and free development embodied in the particular requirements 
was rationalized. At a company level, one would have to know in outline the 
composition of the population of companies that is being studied and to be aware 
of major changes in, for instance, mergers and acquisitions activity and sources 
of company finance. At the level of disclosure items, one would have to know 
some particulars about specific changes in regulation, and about the degree to 
which knowledge of potential disclosures was available, for instance in the 
professional literature. 
A second set of points of reference can be derived from the extant body of 
relevant theory and (international) empirical accounting research. 
Theories about the development of accounting at the national level are relatively 
scarce, although one might consider the Nobes (1983) framework, mentioned 
above, as an instance of this type of theory development. At the company level, 
there is a fairly rich body of empirical research linking the extent of disclosure to 
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selected company characteristics8. At the disclosure item level, theory develop­
ment has proceeded mainly on the basis of insights derived from information 
economics9. These analytical theories are supplemented by some empirical 
work 1 0. At both the company and the disclosure item level, there have been 
scattered attempts to establish links between specific theories of accounting 
development to the general framework of innovation diffusion studies. 
The combination of a research question distinguishing three levels of analysis 
with points of reference drawn from a wide variety of sources gives this study a 
rather broad character. Each of the three research levels listed above would 
merit a more thorough study than is possible within the confines of this book. 
Moreover, an extensive research literature on the subject of annual report 
disclosure is available, suggesting a number of lines along which more narrowly 
focused studies might be conducted. Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse (1992) 
in their survey of disclosure research, identified a broad range of theoretical 
perspectives on disclosure, covering 'a large number of economic, institutional, 
managerial and other forces that lie behind disclosure' (p. 2). Each of these 
perspectives might be used as the framework for the analysis of annual report 
disclosure in the Netherlands. 
Yet, given the present state of the literature on the development over time of 
financial reporting in the Netherlands, a rather broad exploratory approach was 
preferred over a more narrow approach. The focus of this study wil l therefore 
not be on a particular aspect of disclosure in general, but on the process of 
disclosure development in a given country and during a specific period. This 
study is directed at a better understanding of the development of disclosure in the 
Netherlands, rather than at the justification or elaboration of a particular theoreti­
cal perspective. 
Given this objective, it is desirable to take into account a fairly broad array of 
different aspects of disclosure by means of an eclectic use of the approaches 
suggested in the literature, to arrive at a composite picture of disclosure develop­
ment. 
8
 Typical examples include Whittred (1986), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987), Cooke 
(1989) and Wagenhofer (1990b, 1990c). 
9
 See, for instance, Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1985), Dye and Sridhar (1995). 
1 0
 See, for instance, Wong (1988), Forker (1988) and Craswell and Taylor (1992). 
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1.5 Chapter outline 
To recapitulate, the objective of this study is to arrive at an understanding of the 
extent and nature of the process of expanding voluntary annual report disclosure 
attributed to postwar Netherlands. This phenomenon will be considered by an 
empirical study of changes in disclosure of individual items and disclosure 
practices of individual companies. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 provide the background for the empirical study. Chapter 2 
provides a general introduction to the subject of annual report disclosure by 
reviewing the analytical, economics-based disclosure literature. It doing so, it 
lists the major points of reference to be derived from the analytical disclosure 
literature at the company and disclosure item level. 
Chapter 3 contains a reconstruction of the development of opinions on financial 
reporting in the Netherlands, with an emphasis on the importance attached to 
voluntary improvements in financial reporting. This chapter provides much of 
the historical background material on the national level. 
Chapter 4 reviews previous empirical research in disclosure, which is concerned 
mainly with the company and disclosure item levels. On this basis, and on the 
basis of materials provided in chapters 2 and 3, the design of the present empiri­
cal study is described. 
Chapters 5 and 6 contain a discussion of the empirical findings. Chapter 5 
presents an analysis of differences in disclosure behaviour among companies, and 
therefore coincides largely with the second level of the research question as 
described in section 1.3. Various measures of 'aggregate' disclosure over time 
are developed to test a number of hypotheses concerning the relationship between 
disclosure and company characteristics. 
In chapter 6, differences in disclosure patterns among disclosure items are 
studied. In this chapter, the most detailed level of the research question, the 
level of the individual disclosure item, wil l be discussed. Attention wi l l be paid 
to the role of various external influences on disclosure such as the law and 
accounting standards. This chapter essentially consists of a series of more 
detailed case studies of disclosure change. Each case study is set against a 
reconstruction of its context based on primary and secondary historical sources. 
The studies of the several disclosure items wil l also include a comparison with 
changes in disclosure abroad, to the extent that relevant data are available. 
Finally, chapter 7 contains a summary and discussion. 
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Chapter 2 
Theoretical views on voluntary disclosure 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a general introduction to the issue of voluntary annual 
report disclosure by means of a survey of the theoretical literature on disclosure 
of accounting information. In terms of the outline of section 1.4.3, this chapter 
is concerned mainly with establishing the points of reference at the disclosure 
item level, and, to a lesser extent, at the company level. 
The literature surveyed in this chapter is a rather specific subsection of the wider 
body of literature usually referred to as accounting theory. 
As to accounting theory, it is commonly observed that there is presently no single 
generally accepted accounting theory or approach to theory formulation. The 
1978 Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance1 identified three 
basic 'theory approaches' to accounting theory formulation that could not easily 
be reconciled one to another. More recent surveys of accounting theory, as 
Belkaoui (1992), have identified four, or, by a different classification, six 
competing or complementary 'paradigms' in accounting research. What is true 
for accounting in general is also true for the more specific area of disclosure of 
accounting data. A recent overview of the disclosure literature (Gibbins, 
Richardson and Waterhouse, 1992) identified a substantial number of theoretical 
'perspectives' in use. Nevertheless, despite apparent variety, a large part of the 
theoretical disclosure literature displays a fundamental unity. This unity is 
derived from an explicit or implicit underlying point of view, which may well be 
summarized by the following observation made by Chambers in 1951: 
The function of accounting is to convey facts. If any manager considers 
it necessary to detract from, to add to, to explain, or to belittle the 
importance of such facts, for financial or other purposes, that should be 
regarded as his affair. Disclosure is to be considered as a matter of 
managerial policy, not a matter of accounting doctrine. According to this 
view, disclosure is the outcome of the action or agitation of interested 
groups (including the managerial group) in the community; it is the 
1
 American Accounting Association, Committee on Concepts and Standards for 
External Financial Reports, Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance 
([Sarasota, Fl.:] American Accounting Association, 1978). 
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response of management to the demands of other groups.2 
This policy perspective on disclosure makes it clear that disclosure issues, i f they 
are to be considered in the accounting literature at all, need to be studied in the 
context of the interaction of the interests of company management and other 
interested parties. The contemporary accounting literature tends to analyze and 
interpret this interaction in the language and with the methods of economics, 
notably those branches of economics known as information-economics and 
contracting cost theories. In terms of Belkaoui (1992), disclosure theory has 
been developed primarily within the Information/Economics paradigm. 
This section of the accounting literature has flourished especially since the late 
1970's3, in response to the recognition of disclosure as a general economic issue 
and the development of information economics. Since the economics-based 
literature has provided the largest and most coherent body of disclosure theory in 
the accounting literature, it wi l l occupy the largest part of this chapter. Various 
other perspectives on or approaches to theory formulation have also been used in 
the literature on disclosure, but generally in more or less isolated studies. These 
wil l be discussed towards the end of the chapter, and contrasted with the more 
elementary information economics models. The result is that this chapter 
presents theories of disclosure in an order of decreasing abstraction, starting with 
the most elementary disclosure models in section 2.2. and adding complexities 
and additional considerations in subsequent sections. As wil l be seen, there is 
considerable scope for adding such complexities, especially when theoretical 
models are developed for highly specific disclosure situations. A purpose of this 
chapter is to illustrate the capacity of the disclosure literature to develop, on the 
basis of a relatively small number of basic themes, an almost limitless number of 
variations. In doing so, this chapter makes the point that, at least for the time 
being, the development of general-purpose economic theories of disclosure is not 
to be expected. However, a number of recurring themes can be identified 
accross the range of the available disclosure literature that, while not complete 
disclosure theories in themselves, can be used to interprete disclosure behaviour 
in specific situations. These basic themes, together with materials from the next 
2
 'Disclosure is a matter of managerial policy, not accounting doctrine', report of 
address by R.J. Chambers, Journal of Accountancy, August 1951, p. 223. See also 
Chambers (1955:22-27) for a fuller discussion of these issues. It is indicative of the 
development of the meaning attached to 'accounting theory' that more recently it could be 
stated that 'a manager's incentive to disclose or withhold information whose revelation is 
not required [is] arguably (...) the quintessential accounting problem' (Verrecchia, 
1990a:245). 
3
 That is, most of the theoretical literature discussed in this chapter appeared after the 
end of the period studied in this book. 
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chapter, which supplies the necessary situation-specific information concerning 
the development of financial reporting in the Netherlands, wil l form the frame of 
reference for the empirical research discussed in the latter part of this book. 
2.2 A game-theoretical approach to information disclosure 
A useful approach to voluntary disclosure at a high level of abstraction is by the 
type of economic modelling known as game theory. Game theory has been 
increasingly used during the 1970's and 1980's in disciplines such as finance and 
accounting. Its application to voluntary disclosure in a financial reporting context 
dates from the middle 1970's4. Although the literature discussed in this and 
subsequent sections is typically based on formal mathematical models, the 
discussion wi l l be confined to the assumptions, intuition and conclusions underly­
ing the different models. 
2.2.1 Setting up a disclosure game 
Game theory is a tool of economic analysis, comprising formal mathematical 
models that are examined deductively (Kreps, 1990:6). Because of the deductive 
reasoning employed, the insights gained from these models depend crucially on 
the nature of the assumptions made. In this section, a particular disclosure 
'game' is constructed, with its own set of assumptions. As wi l l be shown in 
subsequent sections, varying these assumptions wil l result in different outcomes. 
The disclosure game outlined in this section should be seen as merely a conveni­
ent starting point for the discussion of some other, related game situations 
discussed in the literature. For that purposes, the game in this section has been 
constructed to reflect as much as possible the common denominator of the games 
discussed later on 5. 
A n elementary disclosure game requires some scope for the disclosure of 
information. This entails the assumption of a multi-person world, in which 
information is not freely available to all. Instead, it is assumed that information 
endowments are not equal among actors (a situation known as information 
asymmetry). More specifically, it is assumed that firms exist, abstractly repre­
sented by streams of future cash flows. Some actors are assumed to be 'man-
4
 See Ross (1979) for an early review. 
5
 Formal representations of games resembling the one outlined here can be found, for 
instance, in Verrecchia (1983), Dye (1986), Wagenhofer (1990a) and Darrough and 
Stoughton (1990). 
15 
ager-owners\ These actors possess the right to future cash flows and informa­
tion about these cash flows that other actors do not possess. Furthermore, it is 
assumed that these rights to future cash flows can be traded between manager-
owners and other actors ('investors'). 
One possible and simple game structure would therefore be as follows. Man­
ager-owners are initially endowed with information on the value of their firm. 
This information is 'a particular, clearly circumscribed item of information 
concerning the future cash flows of the firm. In the most simple case, the 
manager-owners would know the amount of future cash flows with certainty, and 
would therefore know the value of the firm. Subsequent to receipt of the 
information, the manager-owners can decide to disclose or not to disclose that 
variable to investors. Following disclosure (or nondisclosure), claims to the 
firm's cash flows are sold to investors in a competitive market. Manager-owners 
seek to maximize the price of their ownership rights, investors seek to minimize 
the price to be paid. After trading, the cash flows are realized by the owners of 
the claims. 
Before it can be deduced what strategies wil l be chosen by the players, the model 
needs further specification on a number of points: 
(1) A n important specification is that investors and manager-owners act as if 
they had rational expectations concerning the behaviour of other parties in 
the market. Participants try to make optimizing decisions themselves, and 
they expect others to do so as well. Moreover, the expectation of rational 
behaviour is mutual. This allows the construction of so-called sequential 
equilibria6. In a game setting where players take action consecutively, a 
player wil l take action knowing that others wil l base their actions on 
inferences drawn from his observed action, and that these other players 
know that he knows that they know, and so on. 
(2) The number of participants in the market may influence the outcome. 
One could develop particular versions of this game with one firm and one 
investor, with one firm and numerous investors, or with numerous firms 
and numerous investors. The precise market mechanism may also be of 
importance7. By assuming that investors are homogeneous in their expec­
tations and utility functions, the differences between various possible 
6
 See Kreps and Wilson (1982), Postlewaite (1989). 
7
 See Fishman and Hagerty (1989) for an example of an analysis of disclosure effects 
in an explicitly defined securities market. 
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market structures wil l be reduced. It is assumed here that investors (not 
firms, nor manager-owners) are homogeneous, and that both manager-
owners and investors are price-takers. 
(3) Investors know that manager-owners possess information and can there­
fore observe whether the latter are withholding information. In other 
words, the 'information structure' (who holds what type of information) is 
common knowledge, even though the actual information is not. As wil l 
be seen, this assumption is of particular importance in determining the 
results of this type of model (see also Postlewaite, 1989). 
(4) Investors have pre-disclosure expectations concerning average returns. 
Without this assumption, there would be no basis to deduce investor 
behaviour in the case of nondisclosure. 
(5) Manager-owners cannot disclose false information. 
(6) Manager-owners can disclose information without cost. This assumption 
simplifies the analysis by restricting it to considerations of investor 
reactions to disclosure. 
(7) A one-period setting is assumed, in which all cash flows are realized after 
one round of trading. A n equivalent assumption would be that the game 
could be repeated a number of times, but that the outcomes in one period 
do not affect the expectations or outcomes in following periods. 
2.2.2 Outcome 
This game and its solution are a specific version of a more general type identified 
in Akerlof's (1970) exposition, which is the starting point for most of the 
economic disclosure literature8. Akerlof uses the example of the market for used 
cars to analyze what happens in a market in which sellers are aware of the 
quality of the goods offered, but in which buyers can only establish this quality 
after purchase. The result of this information asymmetry and the resulting 
quality uncertainty is that buyers wil l not offer more than average prices for 
goods that might, because of their individual quality, command higher prices. 
This removes the incentive to supply goods of more than average quality. When 
8
 Jovanovic (1982) provides a more formal exposition of Akerlof s theorem; Milgrom 
(1981) applies these notions to the more specific case of trade in ownership rights in 
firms. 
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these are withdrawn from the market, both average quality and prices are further 
depressed. In some circumstances, prices may fall so low as to discourage any 
trading at all. 
These somewhat pessimistic implications, usually referred to as 'adverse select­
ion', would not immediately apply to the simplified market for claims on future 
cash flows sketched above. The reason for this is the assumption that investors 
know with certainty that manager-owners are able to make verifiable claims as to 
the true value of their firms without cost. Investors would know that manager-
owners expecting above average returns would have an incentive to disclose their 
information on superior earnings expectations in order to differentiate their firms 
from firms with lower expected cashflows. In this way, these manager-owners 
could realize higher returns on sales of ownership rights. But the assumption of 
rational expectations on the part of investors would make investors adjust their 
expectations concerning the average returns of non-disclosing firms downward, 
which would in turn induce more manager-owners to disclose their now higher 
than average prospects. So instead of driving the market for ownership rights out 
of existence, the forces at work in the simple model would lead to an equilibrium 
of full disclosure. To put it differently, the scepticism of the buyers would lead 
to so negative an assessment of the nature of undisclosed data that it wi l l ulti­
mately be in the interest of all manager-owners to disclose rather than have their 
firms valued at an extremely negative value9. This mechanism leading to full 
disclosure is generally referred to as the 'revelation principle'. The body of 
theory on which it rests is frequently referred to as 'signalling theory'. 
2.2.3 Limitations 
The value of the simple model sketched above is not its ability to predict volun­
tary disclosure in annual reports. The prediction of full disclosure is at odds with 
common experience. The model can, however, through its explicit listing of 
assumptions, help to identify factors that may be relevant in explaining partial 
disclosure in practice. The effect of relaxing some of the assumptions wil l be 
discussed in subsequent sections, in which the following elements wil l be introduced10: 
9
 The specific implications in a disclosure setting of the adverse selection phenomenon 
introduced by Akerlof have been discussed by Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981) and 
Milgrom and Roberts (1986). More specifically, Grossman (1981) suggests that under 
strong assumptions competition among firms is not even necessary: even a single firm 
could be forced to disclose all the information it is known to possess. 
1 0
 A relaxation of the assumption that information must be truthfully disclosed will not 
be discussed. See, however, Newman and Sansing (1993) who allow for the deliberate 
disclosure of noisy information. The general result is that this prevents completely 
informative equilibria. 
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disclosure costs (section 2.3), 
uncertainty about the information structure, and lower quality information 
(section 2.4), 
investor heterogeneity (section 2.5), 
multi-period models (section 2.6), 
an agency-setting (section 2.7), 
disclosure of financial accounting data as opposed to hypothetical informa­
tion on the true value of the firm (section 2.8). 
The analytical literature on voluntary disclosure has not progressed to a similar 
degree in all these directions. Elaborate models have been developed to accom­
modate some of the complicating factors listed above, but other factors have been 
discussed only in qualitative form. 
2.3 Disclosure costs 
One of the most important assumptions to be relaxed is the assumption that there 
are no costs associated with disclosure. The notion that disclosure costs may 
limit the extent of disclosure has been recognized for a long time in the pro­
fessional literature11. Recent research has served to clarify concepts, to make 
more explicit a number of assumptions underlying the general notion of a cost-
benefit trade-off, and to provide a framework showing that many apparently 
different 'costs' operate in a basically similar manner. 
As indicated by Benston (1969, 1980), the determination of the parties that do 
incur the costs and reap the benefits of disclosure, and the determination to what 
extent these parties take into account the interests of others present particular 
difficulties in analyzing cost-benefit trade-offs in disclosure. One hypothesis in 
this regard might be that 'managers [act] in the best interests of stockholders (..) 
[and] provide information to them and to other investors according to their best 
estimates of how the marginal costs and benefits accrue' (Benston, 1969:516). It 
is difficult, however, to formulate decision rules for management that do take 
into account the interests of different parties, and there seems to be no compel­
ling reason (in economic terms) as to why management would consistently be 
concerned with overall welfare. 
The preferred approach in the economics-based literature is to assume that those 
making the disclosure decision do not attempt to optimize the balance of costs 
1 1
 See also chapter 3. See Elliott and Jacobson (1994) for a recent review of the 
disclosure cost issue from a professional vantage point. 
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and benefits for all parties involved. Rather, they are considered to act on behalf 
of their profit-maximizing firms, and to assume that each of the other parties 
external to the firm wil l act in its own self-interest. The situation in which the 
interests of management and the firm may deviate is discussed in a later section. 
The assumption of self-interested behaviour allows for relatively unambiguous 
decision rules, once the effects of disclosure on the economic position of the firm 
have been specified. These effects are generally discussed under the heading of 
'proprietary costs'. 
Dye (1985:123) distinguishes two types of information. Proprietary information 
is defined as information whose disclosure potentially alters a firm's future 
earnings gross of senior management's compensation. Disclosure of this type of 
information affects the value of the firm because it influences current or future 
cash flows. Examples of such effects on cash flow following the release of 
information include possible competitive damage, government intervention or a 
revision of a firm's credit rating. These costs, incurred because of the disclosure 
of proprietary information, are referred to as proprietary costs. A l l other, non­
proprietary information would not, on disclosure, affect future cash flows, 
although such disclosures might lead investors to change their expectation about 
these cash flows, and therefore might also change the market value of the 
firm12. 
It can now be argued, along the lines of section 2.2, that non-proprietary 
information wil l always be disclosed as a result of the cascade-effect induced by 
adverse selection. For proprietary information, the result is different. 
Verrecchia (1983) is one of the earliest analyses of the effect of proprietary costs 
on disclosure. His argument proceeds in the following manner. The firm is 
endowed with the realization of an informational variable, that can take on values 
on a continuum ranging from 'bad news' to 'good news'. On disclosure of this 
information, investors wil l adjust the valuation of the firm in accordance with the 
auspiciousness of the information. In addition, it is assumed that the information 
is 'proprietary' in the sense that its disclosure wi l l impose a given fixed cost on 
the firm. Incurring this cost lowers the value of the firm with the same amount, 
regardless of the actual value of the variable disclosed. Under the continued 
assumption of rational expectations, and still in the simplified one-period setting 
of the previous section, investors wil l now interpret the nondisclosure of informa­
tion more cautiously. In this case, the reason for non-disclosure might either be 
1 2
 Non-trivial real-world examples of strictly non-proprietary information are rarely 
provided in the literature. The distinction between the two types of information should 
therefore be seen as a simplification to capture what is in effect a continuum ranging from 
very low to very high proprietary costs. 
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that the information is unfavourable, or not favourable enough to warrant 
incurring disclosure costs. That is, the costs of disclosure exceed the discount in 
the share price applied by sceptical investors who infer from the fact of 
nondisclosure that the information being withheld is possibly unfavourable. This 
uncertainty about the nature of the information that is being withheld creates 
leeway for a disclosure equilibrium in which not all information is being dis­
closed as investors wil l not draw the most negative conclusion from 
nondisclosure13. Subsequent papers on this basis have used more elaborate 
assumptions regarding disclosure costs, which Verrecchia simply assumed to be 
constant, independent of the value of the variable disclosed, and incurred only on 
actual disclosure. 
Darrough and Stoughton (1990), Dontoh (1989) and Wagenhofer (1990a) have 
developed models in which proprietary costs are not simply caused by the mere 
fact of disclosure. This effect is obtained by assuming the existence of a third 
party, or third parties, beyond the firm and the investors. 
In Darrough and Stoughton (1990), this third party consists of potential competi­
tors14. The firm is assumed to receive an item of information which may be 
more or less favourable, and which it may disclose or not disclose. The entry of 
competitors into the market of the firm depends on the information being 
disclosed. The relation between entry and information is specified by a nominal 
variable 'barriers to entry': when barriers to entry are high, the competitor wil l 
not enter the market unless favourable information is disclosed. When barriers to 
entry are low, the competitor wil l always enter unless negative information is dis­
closed. Entry of the competitor wil l bring about costs to the firm considering 
disclosure. 
Competitive considerations are also studied by Dontoh (1989), who assumes that, 
in an oligopolistic setting, some firms are endowed with information about the 
total future market for output. Under the proper assumptions, such firms face a 
trade-off between using the information for their own output decisions (which is 
assumed to result in a maximal long-term value) or making the information public 
(which is assumed to maximize the short-term value of the firm i f the information 
is favourable). The uncertainty about which firms possess information, and about 
the kind of value-maximizing strategy they follow creates the opportunity for an 
1 3
 That is, instead of assuming that the value of the undisclosed variable is the most 
negative possible, investors will now assume, given the rational motive for nondisclosure 
now in existence, that the value of the undisclosed variable is the expected value condi­
tional on this value being below the known disclosure threshold. 
1 4
 Further extensions of the entry-game disclosure model are provided in Feltham and 
Xie (1992) and Newman and Sansing (1993). 
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equilibrium in which not all information is disclosed. 
Finally, in Wagenhofer (1990a), the third party is unspecified and could be a 
competitor, a regulator, a credit rating agency and so on. This third party wil l 
simply impose a cost on the firm if (a) the firm discloses information favourable 
above a certain threshold, or (b) it believes the value of undisclosed information 
to be above this threshold. 
In all three studies, the firm is shown as striking a balance between, on the one 
hand, the increase of firm value that wil l follow the disclosure of favourable 
information to investors, and on the other hand, the decrease in firm value 
resulting from adverse action that may or may not follow upon the disclosure of 
favourable information. In all three models, the result is that, under the rational 
expectations constraints, sequential equilibria exist in which firms do not necess­
arily disclose all the information they are known to possess15. 
The previous discussion can be summarized by stating that (i) nonproprietary 
information wil l always be disclosed and (ii) proprietary information wil l 
sometimes not be disclosed. This observation is useful to the extent that a 
distinction can in fact be made between proprietary and nonproprietary informa­
tion. In a model in which a firm possesses only one item of information, it can 
simply be assumed to be either proprietary or not. The same can be done for 
each item individually when the firm possesses an array of information, thus 
breaking down the problem in a number of unrelated disclosure decisions. But 
when firms have more than one item of information, it is useful to consider 
possible interdependencies among these items. Dye (1986) has considered the 
situation of a firm endowed with two items of information, x and y. It is 
assumed that knowledge of the realization of x can be used to improve estimation 
of y, because of a known relationship between the two variables. Disclosure of y 
is assumed to entail proprietary costs. Disclosure of x by itself would not be 
costly, but for its known relation with y. Therefore, x is proprietary when y is 
not disclosed, and nonproprietary otherwise. It is shown that equilibria in which 
JC but not y is disclosed are probable, while equilibria of complete nondisclosure 
are not. 
Summarizing, under a variety of assumptions the existence of disclosure related 
costs may explain why firms do not fully disclose information they are known to 
possess, and which sceptical investors might otherwise elicit through adverse 
selection. The limitations of this approach can be shown by the fact that slightly 
different assumptions may lead to different conclusions. In Teoh and Hwang 
(1991) it is demonstrated that firms may choose to withhold favourable informa-
1 5
 Similar conclusions are reached in Gal-Or (1985, 1986) and Darrough (1993). 
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tion that might be disclosed without incurring proprietary costs. This contrary 
result is based on the intuitive premise that firms may use nondisclosure of 
information to signal other information that cannot be credibly disclosed (such as 
prospects). If firms with bad prospects have an occasional piece of good news, 
they might be so eager to disclose that it may be worthwhile for firms with good 
prospects to differentiate themselves from the bad firms with nondisclosure. 
Even though these conclusions seem to be valid under fairly constrained assump­
tions only, they do show the impact that these assumptions may have in this type 
of analysis. 
2.4 Information structure 
The nature of the information that the firm is endowed with and the knowledge of 
investors about this information, are other important elements in explaining 
disclosure. 
In the most simple case (e.g. Wagenhofer, 1990a), the manager of the firm might 
receive the realization of an information variable that is with certainty equal to 
the value of the firm. That is, the manager receives a value y, investors know 
that the manager has this information, and the manager knows that, on release of 
the information, the investors wil l correctly value the firm at y. Important 
changes occur when there is uncertainty about quality of the information (its 
usefulness in assessing firm value), or even about its existence. 
Stochastic properties can easily be introduced into models of disclosure games, as 
in Verrecchia (1990b)16. It can be assumed that the information the manager 
receives is the realization of a random variable of unknown distribution with as 
mean the 'true' value of the firm and a given variance. It can be shown that the 
disclosure threshold is raised as the information becomes less precise (that is, as 
its variance increases). When the firm is known to possess information that is 
completely unreliable, the market wil l not penalize the firm with discounted share 
prices for withholding it. On the other hand, perfect information wil l not 
necessarily lead to total disclosure, since this simply reverts to the cases 
described earlier in which partial disclosure is feasible. This assumption there­
fore, does not change the overall tendencies of the more simple models. 
The reason that it does not do so is because it leaves intact a very strong assump­
tion underlying those models, that is, the assumption that the information 
1 6
 These properties were already included in the model in Verrecchia (1983), but their 
implications are only fully considered in Verrecchia (1990b). 
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structure, as opposed to the information itself, is common knowledge (see 
Myerson, 1979). Without discarding this assumption altogether, which would 
greatly hinder further analysis, its effects can be gauged by the introduction of 
more uncertainty concerning the extent of the manager's knowledge. Instead of 
assuming that the manager always receives some information at the beginning of 
the period, it can be assumed that there is a known probability that information 
wil l be received. That is, the manager either receives no information at all, or 
does receive information of the kind used in previous models. When he does not 
disclose information, this may be due to his not receiving any at all, or to its 
unfavourable nature. A model along these lines is presented in Dye (1985), with 
the conclusion that these assumptions may explain why some nonproprietary 
information (that is, information whose disclosure does not entail costs to the 
firm) may not be disclosed, thus adding to the result of the previous section. 
These results are obtained only when the manager can not, or only at great costs, 
be made to make a verifiable statement that he has not received information: to 
assume otherwise would reintroduce the possibility of adverse selection. Accord­
ing to Jung and Kwon (1988) who refined Dye's analysis, this effect is essentially 
the same as the effect of disclosure-related costs: in both cases, information can 
be withheld because investors are not sure of management's motives for doing 
so. A laboratory test of this so-called 'Informedness-dependent disclosure' (IDD) 
model is reported in King and Wallin (1991b). The general assertion that 
disclosure thresholds increase with the probability that management is not 
informed was supported by a simple disclosure game played in the course of an 
experiment. The specific thresholds predicted by the model were not observed in 
the experiment, however. In King and Wallin (1991a), it was found by means of 
a similar laboratory experiment that an increase in the number of disclosure 
options, or unawareness on the part of investors of the full range of disclosure 
options, also enabled the establishment of equilibria of less than full disclosure. 
A final step in this direction is to consider the effect of managers influencing the 
nature of their own information endowments. Whereas managers may be 
protected from the full force of investors' scepticism by the fact that their 
information endowments are of low quality (Verrecchia) or possibly non-existent 
(Dye, Jung and Kwon), this protective cover may be removed again if investors 
know that managers can exercise discretion in determining the amount and quality 
of information they receive. More concretely, investors might know that 
managers can build information systems with an almost infinite variety of output, 
or that they have access to the services of analysts and advisers. 
In an extreme case, suggested by Verrecchia (1990b), managers would be 
expected to choose to receive no information at all. If disclosure of information 
would lead a firm to incur proprietary costs, firm value would be maximized if 
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the manager would choose not to receive information that he might have to 
disclose on the basis of the revelation principle. This result can only be obtained 
under strong assumptions, though: 
Risk is not priced, that is, investors attach no positive value to the 
reduction in uncertainty as to the value of the firm caused by the disclos­
ure of information. 
Information has no intrinsic value. The reverse of this assumption can be 
envisaged as meaning that having a management information system helps 
the manager to improve management of the firm, and thereby increases its 
value1 7. 
2.5 Heterogeneous investors and risk-sharing 
In the previous sections, the group of 'investors' was considered to be homogene­
ous. A next step would be to consider the effect of more types of participants or 
of richer assumptions concerning their relationships. 
One line of research considers the role of disclosures in risk-sharing among 
investors who are endowed with different portfolios and different resources with 
regard to information acquisition and interpretation18. One of the basic findings 
of this line of inquiry is the assertion that at least some investors may prefer less 
information to more. If investors are endowed with portfolios that wil l yield 
different, independent and a priori unknown returns, investors might reduce their 
risk by trading their investments before the true value of the portfolios is revealed 
(for example: before a dividend is declared). The amount of actual trading wil l 
be influenced by the release of information. Investors holding what turn out to 
be investments with less favourable prospects wil l experience an immediate 
decrease in wealth, which might, before the release of the information, have been 
shared among all investors. In short, disclosure tends to increase consensus 
among investors, which reduces the possibility of risk-sharing. This line of 
17
 Cf. Lanen and Verrecchia (1987), where the relationship between operating 
decisions and disclosure is considered. If managers use their information to make, for 
instance, investment decisions, any observed actions can serve as rough alternatives to 
disclosure. 
1 8
 Another approach is taken by Fishman and Hagerty (1989), who take into account 
that studying firms' disclosures is costly and that investors are therefore limited in the 
number of signals that they can study. This provides (some) firms with an incentive to 
disclose information with a higher precision which is less costly to study and therefore 
attracts more traders to the firm's shares. This in turn enhances price efficiency with 
regard to these shares. 
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reasoning has been developed by Verrecchia (1982) and Hakansson, Kunkel and 
Ohlson (1982). The latter find, as a result, that from a social welfare point of 
view, no disclosure is preferable to public disclosure. However, as might be 
expected, from an individual point of view, private information gathering may 
well yield increased private results. It can be shown that, without public 
information, there will be a demand for private information, but that, ex ante, all 
investors would benefit from an enforceable ban on private information gather­
ing 1 9 . In the absence of an enforceable ban, investors wil l tend to favour 
disclosure over nondisclosure. 
Although the general effect of increased disclosure is often assumed to be an 
increase in consensus, Indjejikian (1991) has shown that there can be more subtle 
effects if it is assumed that the interpretation of disclosed data requires effort and 
a certain level of sophistication on the part of investors. In that case, increased 
information content ('quality') of disclosures increases the incentives for investors 
to invest resources in private data interpretation. This increase in individual 
activity decreases consensus among investors, which increases the possibility of 
risk-sharing. 
The results from attempts to explain disclosure on the basis of its risk-sharing 
effects are heavily dependent on the often strong assumptions required to keep the 
analysis tractable. Bushman (1991) and Indjejikian (1991) comment on the 
crucial nature of the assumption that there is no pre-disclosure trading, and on 
the effect of one-period models. 
2.6 More realistic time frames 
The usual adverse selection models present the disclosure decision as a unique 
event in the sense that the decision to disclose has to be made without considering 
similar future decisions. It is commonly assumed that soon after the disclosure 
decision is made the firm wil l be liquidated or that, if future cycles of informa­
tion endowment/disclosure/trading do occur, these are not in any way influenced 
by events in previous cycles. Correspondingly, the decision rule of management 
is assumed to be the maximization of the current market value of the firm. 
A l l of these characteristics are naturally at variance with the reality of annual 
report disclosure, but to say this does not imply that it is easy to trace the effects 
of more realistic assumptions. Nevertheless, attempts have been made in the 
1 9
 Hakansson (1981), Diamond (1985). See, however, McNichols and Trueman 
(1994) where a different setting (including pre-disclosure trading) results in different 
attitudes towards private information gathering. 
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analytical literature to make a beginning in addressing these concerns. 
The initial models presented in earlier sections have been extended to account for 
the passage of time in two ways. 
A first extension considers the possibility that disclosure decisions are not simply 
made on a 'whether or not' basis. The timing of the disclosure is included as a 
part of the disclosure decision. If firms are not confined to one particular moment 
in time at which they either may or may not disclose a part of their information 
endowment, they can influence the informational content, or relevance, of their 
disclosures by exercising discretion in selecting the moment of disclosure. In his 
1983 study, Verrecchia has indicated a possible way of incorporating this element 
in his adverse selection model. The model specified a fixed, exogenous propri­
etary cost, which might be assumed to decrease with time. The consequence 
would be that 'good news' would be disclosed earlier than 'bad news' and that, i f 
proprietary costs eventually tend towards zero, investors wil l in the end force the 
firm to disclose all information it is known to possess20. This aspect is of some 
importance in bridging the gap between theoretical modelling and the practice of 
financial reporting. The latter tends to be dominated by accounting information 
with an essentially historical character, losing much of its relevance with the 
passage of time. 
A second temporal extension consists in adding more periods to the essentially 
one-period models described above. Dye and Sridhar (1995) have analyzed the 
effect of a two-period model on what was described earlier as knowledge of the 
information structure. It was argued in section 2.4 that uncertainty on the part of 
investors as to the information endowments of firms could lead to lower levels of 
disclosure. This uncertainty, however, can be reduced by observing firms' 
disclosure behaviour in successive periods. Dye and Sridhar assume a two-
period world in which firms receive information with a certain probability at the 
beginning of the first period. The receipt (not the content) of the information by 
the various firms is imperfectly correlated. According to the general logic 
explained earlier, some firms wil l decide to disclose their information in the first 
period. The number of disclosing firms wil l lead investors to revise their 
estimates of the likelihood that nondisclosing firms have received information, 
which in turn may lead to a second round of disclosures by previously non-
disclosing firms in the second period. This model of 'herding behaviour' 
provides a first step towards the analysis of dynamic disclosure behaviour within 
2 0
 However, Skinner (1994) found that there is a tendency for companies to disclose 
extreme bad news early. This effect was attributed to attempts to prevent negative 
reputation effects and the possibility of legal action in the US setting. 
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a group of companies. 
A n essential feature of both the Dontoh and Dye and Sridhar approach is, 
however, that they still deal with a single cycle in which all disclosure and 
trading decisions revolve around one item of information. Following trading, 
there is a new generation of owner-managers which may be faced with a similar 
disclosure decision, but this sequencing of single-cycle models does not amount 
to an explanation of long-term disclosures. 
Suggestions for developing a truly long-term theory have been advanced by 
Wagenhofer (1990a), who raises the possibility that firms do not base their 
decision to disclose on the value of a particular item of information but instead 
commit themselves in advance to disclosure policies for future realizations of this 
variable. This notion of precommitment is not further developed. The results of 
adding this complication seem to depend to a very large extent on highly specific 
assumptions. On the whole, precommitments would seem to take away the 
uncertainty underlying the partial disclosure results: whereas in the basic case 
nondisclosure was tolerated because of ambiguity concerning management's 
motivation, this would now be reduced to uncertainty about management's 
reasons for choosing a strategy of full nondisclosure. 
2.7 Agency relationships 
Whereas a game-theoretical approach has not yet resulted in a model of long-term 
aspects of voluntary disclosure, a slightly different approach based on the notion 
of agency relationships has to some extent filled this gap. As indicated above, 
the simpler disclosure games rested on the assumption that residual interests in 
the firm (ownership rights) would be sold. This provided the mechanism by 
which owner-managers sought to maximize the price of these ownership rights 
whereas investors sought to minimize the price to be paid. The models ended 
with the transfer of ownership rights, and modelling successive periods amounted 
to modelling the behaviour of successive generations of owner-managers. 
Alternatively, it might be supposed that the original owner-managers remain in 
charge as managers after all or some of the ownership rights have been sold to 
investors. This assumption provides a truly long-term setting for an analysis of 
disclosure in which subsequent periods are not repetitions of the first period. 
The framework of analysis based on agency relations has received widespread 
attention since the study of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Leftwich, Watts and 
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Zimmerman (1981) contained a first application to disclosure issues21. 
A situation can be assumed in which owner-managers sell their ownership rights 
to investors, but remain in charge as managers. The original sale of ownership 
rights is governed by the revelation principle outlined earlier: the investors wil l 
discount the share price for all information they know or suspect the manager-
owners to have but do not disclose. Hence, there is an incentive for full disclos­
ure. But the assumption that the original owners wil l be retained as 'agents' 
provides a complicating factor. This introduces an unknown variable in the 
future cash flows of the firms: the extent to which agents wil l in future engage in 
self-interested behaviour22 to the detriment of the investors (the 'principals'). 
Because this variable is indeterminate, and hence cannot be truthfully dis­
closed 2 3, investors wil l react similarly as in other situations of nondisclosure. 
That is, they wil l make a pessimistic assessment of the extent of future self-
interested behaviour and apply a large discount to the share price offered. 
Analogous to the full disclosure of the earlier models, the manager-owners wil l 
attempt to prevent discounts by introducing monitoring and bonding arrange­
ments. These fulfil a similar role as a truthful disclosure that the value of the 
variable 'self-interested behaviour' wil l remain within certain limits. The 
monitoring arrangements may take several forms, but one frequently suggested 
mechanism is the regular supply of information. In this way, the assumption of 
an agency setting provides a rationale for disclosure in a multi-period setting, but 
it should be noted that there is no guarantee that an agency setting wil l result in 
the actual adoption of regular public disclosure as a monitoring device. This 
depends on the availability of alternative monitoring devices, and their cost 
relative to the cost of disclosure. 
Costs of disclosure can be interpreted in the same way as in the earlier models, 
and proprietary costs are again an important component of the costs of disclos­
ure. That is, if certain items of information that are useful for monitoring 
2 1
 It will be noted that the Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Leftwich, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1981) papers appeared before the development of an extensive game-
theoretical disclosure literature. Therefore, the exposition of the agency approach 
provided here contains some anachronisms. Other studies on the relationship between 
signalling and derived demand approaches include Morris (1987) and Craswell and Taylor 
(1992). Ronen and Yaari (1993) provide a signalling model based on an agency setting. 
2 2
 'Self-interested behaviour' captures a wide variety of phenomena. In terms of the 
initial model of the firm as a series of future cash flows, one can think of these cash flows 
as given and interpret self-interested behaviour as attempts by managers to appropriate 
some of these cash flows for private consumption. One can also assume that cash flows 
are dependent on management performance in which case managers might have an 
incentive to choose lower levels of exertion. 
2 3
 See assumption (5) in section 2.2.1. 
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purposes entail the likelihood of adverse action by competitors, the government 
or other parties, it is likely that choosing alternative monitoring devices wil l lead 
to a higher firm value. The contribution of the agency approach is to point out 
that the choice of a committed disclosure strategy is a part of a comprehensive 
endogenous solution to the problem of optimizing the contracting network among 
the various interested parties in the firm. It can, in general, be hypothesized that 
in firms with a higher potential for conflicts of interest between agents and 
principals, there is a''rationale for incurring higher monitoring costs, and hence 
the likelihood of a greater extent of regular disclosure. 
Once it is assumed that firms exist indefinitely, the model can be extended to 
include the disclosure of incidental information (of the 'good news/bad news' 
type) to which the earlier models were largely confined. Several assumptions are 
possible. One set of assumptions would be that there is a continuous secondary 
market in ownership rights, and that the managers (agents) are allowed to 
participate in this trading. These two assumptions together provide an incentive 
for insider trading on the part of management. Rather than disclosing either 
good news or bad news, managers wil l use this information to trade on their own 
account. These assumptions on their own wil l therefore lead to a nondisclosure 
equilibrium (with regard to incidental information). However, to the extent that 
insider trading transfers wealth from current to prospective shareholders, 
contractual arrangements wil l be set up as part of the general bonding arrange­
ments that prevent managers to engage in insider trading (see Ross, 1979). It is 
conceivable that the bonding arrangements wil l take a form in which management 
rewards are positively tied to share prices without the possibility of direct trading 
by managers (either through stock options or bonus arrangements). The model 
wil l then revert to the earlier case in which management has an interest in 
maximizing share price, and in which the management's disclosure decision wil l 
be based on a trade-off between the effect of a disclosure on investors and the 
possibility of adverse action. 
It can be concluded that an agency or derived demand approach is especially 
useful to extend the more elementary signalling approach to cover long-term 
disclosure practices. 
2.8 Relevance to annual financial reporting and implications for the 
present study 
The previous sections have outlined the current state of theory development in the 
area of economics-based models of disclosure behaviour. This section contains 
an evaluation of this body of theory, looking at its applicability to annual report 
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disclosure, its consistency with the professional literature, its comprehensiveness 
and its implications for the present study. 
As indicated above, applications of signalling theory in the accounting literature 
have tended to be restricted to disclosure decisions in which the decision to 
disclose is based on the particular value of the variable to be disclosed. That is, 
the routine disclosure of a variable regardless of its particular value is not treated 
explicitly by this literature. In that respect, the applicability to annual financial 
report disclosures appears to be limited. It is possible to envisage an extension of 
the applicability of signalling models by reasoning that firms for which a particu­
lar variable is on average higher than the average across all firms would have an 
incentive to disclose this variable on a routine basis, thus triggering a familiar 
cascade-effect. This extension, although not implausible in the form of a casual 
argument, has not yet been attempted in the research literature. 
As has been shown, the introduction of an agency setting, interpreted in terms of 
its adverse selection implications, does to some extent provide a formal explana­
tion of routine disclosure. It provided a rationale for routine disclosures, even 
though it was concluded that such disclosures were a likely but not a necessary 
consequence of the assumptions inherent in such a setting. Any routine disclos­
ures derived from an agency perspective are restricted to monitoring information. 
The framework does not provide an explicit explanation for the routine provision 
of information that may not serve any monitoring purposes but is aimed, instead, 
at facilitating investment decisions. 
But even though a number of steps are still lacking in the formal analysis before 
the models discussed in this chapter can be applied to annual report disclosure, 
their general conclusions are quite compatible with those to be found in the more 
general, or professional literature on disclosure. The findings of this chapter can 
be compared with some of the observations in a review of practical disclosure 
issues in the mid-1950's by Horngren (1957). In his review, one can find the 
following elements: 
the relationship between a company and its investors as the primary force 
driving disclosure extension; 
the importance of tying management interest to share price (either through 
stock options or the threat of proxy contests) as an explanatory factor of 
increased disclosure; 
the need to consider the costs of disclosure in terms of competitive 
damage or government intervention; 
the impossibility of withholding information that the public knows is 
probably available to the company and the disclosure of which is unlikely 
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to cause substantial competitive damage; 
the importance of disclosure by other companies in assisting the investing 
public to revise its estimates of the probability that a nondisclosing holds 
that type of information as well. 
This conformity of theoretical models with observations in the practice-oriented 
literature is not surprising. After all, such models set out to explain facts that are 
already familiar by demonstrating that there is a logical economic explanation for 
these familiar phenomena. The fact remains, however, that this correspondence 
between theoretical results and professional opinions is achieved despite the fact 
that the theoretical approaches outlined here ignore or do not address explicitly a 
number of factors that play a role in shaping the contents of financial reporting. 
One of these factors is that disclosure decisions are not necessarily taken by 
single individuals. Rather, disclosure is the result of a group process within 
firms in which economic and non-economic factors may form a complex mixture. 
The introduction of bounded rationality in particular may seriously affect of the 
results of the rational expectations models described above. 
The idea that the internal workings of firms with respect to the production of 
annual reports may be fairly complex is not new, although studies along these 
lines are scarce. Sorter et al. (1966) have formulated this idea in terms of 
'corporate personality', and suggested that accounting practice may reflect aspects 
of personality as 'conservatism'. Their empirical study focused on measurement, 
not disclosure, and does not seem to have established a more permanent line of 
research. Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse (1990, 1992) is indicative of the 
current state of the literature on this point in that it still professes to be no more 
than an exploratory study, providing a tentative framework and vocabulary for 
analyzing the disclosure process within firms. On the basis of a relatively small 
number of detailed case studies, they conclude that firms have distinct 'disclosure 
positions', or stable preferences for the way disclosure is managed. These 
positions can usually be clearly identified by participants in the disclosure process 
and can be described by the dimensions of 'ritualism' (uncritical or routine 
adherence to norms believed to apply to particular classes of disclosures) and 
'opportunism' (active consideration of specific advantages in the disclosure of 
information). Disclosure positions are formed under the influence of a variety of 
influences in which less tangibles factors like company history and personal 
preferences as expressed in internal political processes are mingled with more 
objective factors as direct disclosure regulation, norms used by the financial press 
and the desire to maintain access to the capital markets. The handling of specific 
disclosure issues is influenced not only by the general disclosure position, but 
also by the way the issue is brought to the attention of and perceived by the firm, 
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and by organizational structures for handling disclosure issues. 
If the internal disclosure process within a firm contains a number of elements that 
are not immediately accessible to formal economic analysis, the same is true for 
the external environment of the firm. When one considers the process in which 
new norms for annual financial reporting are developed, questions are raised as 
to how new disclosures originate. At least to some extent, new disclosures are 
the product of a process of 'technological innovation' of which the earlier stages 
such as the inception of new ideas and their propagation by means of persuasion, 
education and imitation, are highly qualitative by nature24. In chapter 4, it wi l l 
be discussed to what extent general theories of innovation-diffusion can be used 
to supplement the approach to disclosure outlined in this chapter. 
Casting the net even wider, one may see disclosure and reporting issues in the 
light of the texture of the entire social system. Illustrations of this approach are 
the analysis of the introduction of the value added statement in Britain in the 
context of the contemporary socio-political situation by Burchell et ah (1985) and 
the interpretation of the annual reports of General Motors in the light of a 
changing pattern of gender relations (Tinker and Neimark, 1987). In the latter 
paper, the analysis is again explicitly based on an economic framework, but one 
radically different from micro-economic rational expectations approach described 
previously in this chapter25. Chapter 3 wil l document the historical context of 
financial reporting in the Netherlands, in order to identify factors of this kind. 
On the basis of this chapter, it can be concluded that the economic approach to 
disclosure theory formulation discussed in this chapter is as yet incomplete. The 
formal steps leading from incidental disclosure to routine annual report disclosure 
have only begun to be addressed. Given the almost limitless scope for citing 
factors and variables that may have an influence on the highly complex disclosure 
process, it is not to be expected that comprehensive disclosure theories wil l soon 
appear. Rather, the literature appears to develop in the direction of ever more 
2 4
 Examples of financial reporting research that explicitly take into account factors as 
group behaviour, knowledge generation and propagation and the influence of persuasion 
include Tritschler (1970), Comiskey and Groves (1972) and Edwards (1991). Chandra 
and Greenball (1977) is an attempt to chart the consequences of differences in perceptions 
between management and investors of potential disclosures and their costs and benefits. 
2 5
 'The political economy approach [to accounting] is concerned with explaining and 
assessing the ways various social protagonists use accounting information and corporate 
reporting to mediate, suppress, mystify and transform social conflict. The approach 
places class relations at the forefront of the analysis and is, accordingly, concerned with 
the effects of accounting information and corporate reporting on the distribution of 
income, wealth and power' (Tinker and Neimark, 1987:71-72). 
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specialized models, dealing with highly specific situations and assumptions. 
Yet, it appears equally justified to assert that a fairly limited number of key 
features of the disclosure process has been identified in the theoretical disclosure 
literature. Even though some or all of these features have been known in the 
professional literature for some time, they have been shown to be amenable to 
rigorous theoretical justification. They include: 
The importance of the determination of the contents of the 'disclosure 
array'. Even though the existence of potential disclosures is often simply 
assumed, attention has been drawn to the importance of the process by 
which new disclosure options become available. 
The importance of knowledge of the 'information structure'. New 
disclosures do not only have to be available as options to management. 
Awareness of these options among outsiders to the firm has been shown 
to be a vital part of the mechanism of disclosure expansion. 
The vital importance of disclosure costs in preventing situations of 
complete disclosure. Moreover, the literature has begun to address the 
issue of the endogenous nature of disclosure costs, by considering the 
effects on disclosure costs of interaction between firms and between firms 
and third parties. 
These elementary principles (and their underlying reasoning as outlined in this 
chapter) wi l l play an important role as points of reference in the development of 
the empirical section of this book and the interpretation of its results. However, 
as indicated by the discussion in this section, they cannot be judged sufficient by 
themselves to explain and interpret the development of disclosure practice over 
time. For that reason, the next chapter adds to the frame of reference in this 
study by considering in more detail the historical background of annual report 
disclosure in the Netherlands. 
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Chapter 3 
Views on voluntary financial reporting in the 
Netherlands 
3.1 The notion of a 'Dutch system' of financial reporting 
In this chapter, attention shifts from the generalized, abstract discussion of 
disclosure in the previous chapter towards the more specific topic of annual 
report disclosure in the postwar Netherlands. Whereas the previous chapter 
identified a number of general factors influencing disclosure, this chapter outlines 
the context in which such factors may have operated in the concrete historical 
period studied here. In this way, this chapter adds to the frame of reference 
required for the empirical investigation of Dutch reporting practices in subsequent 
chapters. 
This chapter could be rather short, if its sole purpose were to demonstrate that 
there was in fact ample scope for voluntary annual report disclosure in the 
postwar Netherlands. Such a demonstration would merely consist of an 
enumeration of the rather modest legal disclosure provisions in force in the 
Netherlands during this period. Such a short description of legal provisions 
would not, however, do full justice to the subject of voluntary disclosure in the 
postwar Netherlands. The reason for this is that the absence of major regulation 
did not occur by default. Rather, it came about in a climate of intensive 
reflection on what could and could not be achieved by means of company law in 
the area of financial reporting. 
There is a definite relationship between the light regulatory regime in the 
Netherlands and the perception, sketched in chapter 1, that financial reporting in 
the Netherlands evolved along different lines from that in other countries. As 
indicated there, an important element in the perceived 'otherness' of Dutch 
financial reporting was a favourable development of reporting practice in an 
environment that was relatively free from regulation. 
This chapter attempts to capture this intellectual background of Dutch financial 
reporting by describing the history of Dutch accounting regulation in the light of 
the development of thought and opinion on the respective roles of regulation and 
voluntary action. 
The intellectual climate that this chapter aims to describe was made up of many 
different, changing and frequently conflicting visions. Yet one particular point of 
view seems to stand out. Many participants in or observers of Dutch financial 
reporting during the middle years of this century shared a similar perception of a 
mechanism by which Dutch financial reporting could hope to do without the 
degree of disclosure regulation considered necessary elsewhere. This notion that 
there was or might be a distinct 'Dutch system' or 'Dutch model' of reporting 
and reporting regulation represented the optimistic end of the spectrum of opinion 
on financial reporting. At the other end of this spectrum, one could find the 
opinion that Dutch financial reporting was of a low quality, and would not 
substantially improve without regulation. This view was less common, however, 
that its counterpart. For that reason, the notion of a 'Dutch system' has been 
adopted as the organizing theme of this chapter. By tracing its development, it 
can be used as a yardstick with which alternative, more pessimistic views that 
existed as well in the Netherlands can be compared. 
A second note on the nature of this chapter relates to the definition of disclosure. 
Even though disclosure issues can generally be distinguished from issues of 
valuation and income determination, at the general level of 'national reporting 
systems' and 'reporting regulation', this distinction cannot always be maintained. 
In issues like secret reserve accounting, disclosure and valuation become 
inextricably mixed. Although the emphasis in this chapter is clearly on 
disclosure issues, the discussion will inevitably touch upon reporting issues of a 
broader kind. 
This chapter is mainly based on the Dutch professional auditing literature. As 
indicated in chapter 1, auditors played a key role in the perceived mechanism of 
disclosure improvement. A second important source on which this chapter draws 
is the (professional) legal literature, mainly in the area of company law. 
This chapter precedes the empirical chapters later in this book, and it was 
presented in chapter 1 as part of the framework required for understanding the 
development of reporting practice. In a way, this ordering of chapters is 
artificial as it is just as true that one needs knowledge of the development of 
reporting practice in order to understand the development of regulation of and 
opinion on financial reporting. One might, in fact, think in terms of a triangular 
relationship between reporting practice, reporting regulation and opinion on 
reporting in which developments in each area influenced the other two areas. In 
particular, as wil l be seen, the perception that there were substantial voluntary 
improvements in reporting practice played an important role in justifying the 
continued reliance on a light regulatory system. This chapter deals primarily 
with the interaction between regulation and opinion, while a discussion of 
reporting practice is deferred until chapters 5 and 6. Yet, for a better 
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understanding of the present chapter, it is useful to point out that these later 
chapters do provide empirical support for the view that there were substantial 
voluntary disclosure extensions throughout the postwar period. 
A final note on the nature of this chapter deals with demarcation in time. In 
order to appreciate fully the origins and development of the notion of a Dutch 
approach to financial reporting, it is necessary to go back before the beginnings 
of the postwar period covered by the empirical study in later chapters. This 
chapter wil l take as its starting point the similarity in much of 19th century 
European company law, and sketch how, from this common basis, the 
Netherlands moved towards a distinctive position characterized by a rather light 
set of accounting regulations. 
The chapter consists of three chronological parts, covering the period up to 1940, 
the 1945-1970 period and the period from 1970 to the middle 1980's. This 
breakdown roughly corresponds to the rise, the attainment of maturity and the 
start of the gradual disappearance of the notion of a 'Dutch system' of reporting 
and reporting regulation. 
3.2 Developments prior to 1940 
3.2.1 The company law reform movement in Europe (1800-1930) 
It has frequently been observed that the development of company law, of the 
limited liability company and, more particular, of financial reporting has followed 
broadly similar paths in the various countries of nineteenth century Europe (see 
Walton, 1995:chapter 1). The national histories of financial reporting regulation 
for that period can be seen as variations on a few common themes: the 
widespread influence of French codified law, the consequences of the industrial 
revolution which made the first generation of company legislation obsolete, and 
the attempts at remedial legislation in which mandatory financial statement 
publication and disclosure regulation played an important role. 
The French Code de Commerce of 1807 had an important influence on company 
law throughout western Europe. The regulation of the limited liability company 
in the Code had two important characteristics. On the one hand, the limited 
liability company as seen by the Code was an instrument of private economic 
initiative. The structure of a particular company was to be determined primarily 
by the contract entered into by the participants in its capital. On the other hand, 
the Code specified that the articles of incorporation of a new company had to 
obtain state approval before a new company could be created. This system of 
preventive supervision was aimed at preventing private agreements to the 
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detriment of creditors or the general interest through the abuse of limited 
liability. 
The growing number and size of limited liability companies in the second half of 
the nineteenth century ushered in a period of reflection on the nature of the firm, 
and especially about means of controlling the economic power that began to be 
concentrated within limited liability companies. Thinking on the nature and use 
of financial reporting developed as part of this wider reflection. This background 
that explains why financial reporting was initially seen as primarily a legal issue. 
Throughout Western Europe, company laws were repeatedly changed during the 
period 1850-1914 to reflect the changing nature of businesses carried out in 
limited liability companies. A common feature of these revisions was the 
growing emphasis on the mandatory provision of information, financial and 
otherwise, to those with a financial interest in the doings of company 
managements (Van Slooten, 1900: 39). This was seen as a more effective 
control mechanism than preventive state supervision, and one that happened to be 
more suited to an age in which the notion of laissez-faire still played an important 
role. 
This 'publicity principle' spread like a wave throughout Europe. Changes in 
French, British and German company laws1 mutually influenced each other and 
provided the inspiration for a variety of regulations in minor European countries 
and overseas dependencies2. As a result, the various European companies acts 
all shifted the focus of regulation from preventive state supervision to publicity, 
but the particulars of these new regulations differed considerably among 
countries. European company law began to display a wide spectrum of 
regulations concerning the type of information to be disclosed, the audience to 
which the information was to be disclosed, the medium of disclosure and 
enforcement mechanisms and sanctions. 
Developments in the Netherlands can be fitted into this general outline. The 
Code de Commerce was imposed on the country in 1811 and remained in force 
until 1838, when it was replaced by a domestic Commercial Code (Wetboek van 
Koophandel). This Dutch Commercial Code closely followed its French 
predecessor. Even though the system of preventive state supervision did attract 
some criticism at the time, it was retained in the 1838 Code as the principal 
safeguard of the public interest. The possible alternative of using audited 
1
 The key points of reference were the French Act of 1867; the General (North) 
German Commercial Code of 1861, modified in 1870 and 1884, and its 1897 successor; 
and the British Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 and Companies Acts 1862 and 1900. 
2
 See, for instance, Walton (1986). 
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financial statement information for such purposes was only dimly perceived (e.g. 
Van Hall , 1834: 73). 
A next stage in the development of Dutch company law began when neighbouring 
countries started to introduce reforms in the 1860's and 1870's. Stimulated by 
this foreign example, company law reform, including the possible application of 
the publicity principle, began to be debated in the Netherlands from the 1870's 
onwards. However, the Netherlands distinguished itself from almost every other 
European country by the fact that despite intensive debate, no new company law 
was enacted between 1838 and 1928. Rather than quickly adapting its legislation 
in line with the international trend, the Netherlands 'let the psychological moment 
slip' (Van der Heijden, 1925(a):34). Instead, a long process of attempted 
company law reform was set in motion in 1871 with the submission to Parliament 
of the first of a series of draft laws to revise the sections of the Commercial 
Code dealing with the limited liability company (naamloze vennootschap or NV). 
Difficulties in formulating reporting requirements were a major cause of the fact 
that a reform law to modify the Commercial Code was passed only as late as 
1928/1929s. This reform made publication of financial statements mandatory for 
large and/or listed limited liability companies and included some elementary 
disclosure requirements. 
The Netherlands was not the last European country to require publication of 
financial statements4, but it took longer than neighbouring countries to make up 
its mind about the type of regulation it wanted. In many other countries, 
company law reform was achieved in stages. A typical sequence of events would 
be for a first act to prescribe the publication of details of incorporation, and the 
presentation of an annual balance sheet to shareholders. Subsequent legislation 
could expand on these provisions by requiring general publication of the balance 
sheet, for example through a commercial register or a national newspaper, and 
by imposing certain minimum disclosure rules on the balance sheet. In a similar 
way, publication requirements might in later stages be extended to cover the 
profit and loss account5. In the Netherlands, however, no such intermediary 
3
 The date 1928/1929 refers to the fact that the main part of the law was passed in 
1928, and that an amendment dealing specifically with financial reporting was inserted in 
1929. An outline of the reform process with emphasis on the drafting of financial 
reporting requirements can be found in Zeff et al. (1992: chapter 2). See also Walton 
(1995: chapter 10). 
4
 Austrian companies were not required to publish financial statements until 1938. 
Finland introduced mandatory publication in the same year as the Netherlands, in 1928. 
5
 In Denmark, for instance, a business act was introduced in 1862 (and revised in 
1899), requiring disclosure of details of incorporation. A book-keeping act was 
introduced in 1912, and a limited companies act, requiring publication of a balance sheet, 
in 1917. Minimum disclosure requirements and the requirement to publish a profit- and 
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stages occurred. A complete basic companies act (publication of balance sheet 
and profit- and loss account and some minimum disclosure requirements) was 
introduced in 1928/29, replacing the relevant sections of the Commercial Code 
(1838) that were, at that time, the most ancient set of regulations in force in 
Western Europe. 
A reason that is occasionally advanced (see Zeff et al., 1992:33) for this relative 
tardiness is that the economic development of the Netherlands was relatively 
slow. This factor might help to explain why Belgium, one of earliest European 
countries to industrialize, introduced important modernizations in its company 
law as early as 1873, including mandatory publication of financial statements. 
But although it is true that the transition to a modern economy started rather late 
in the Netherlands, a period of rapid change at the close of the nineteenth century 
resulted in an economic structure that could compare with that of the larger 
European countries in all respects except scale (Van Zanden and Griffiths, 
1989:5-9). Even though there had been only 137 N V ' s in the Netherlands in 
1850, their number had grown to almost 7000 in 1910 (Valkhoff, 1938:152). In 
addition, a growing number of N V ' s acquired a stock-market listing. In the 20 
years up to 1900, the number of listed N V ' s grew at the remarkable average rate 
of 13 to 14 new listings a year6. In all, the economic structure of the 
Netherlands around 1900 seems to offer no compelling reason why the 
Netherlands should not modernize its company law, as countries like Spain 
(1869, 1885) and Switzerland (1881) had already done before. 
A second possibility would be that the Netherlands was not affected by the sort of 
financial scandals that triggered company law reform in other countries7. This, 
however, was not true. A number of major financial scandals erupted between 
1880 and 1910 that had wide repercussions. In 1905, the government was 
explicitly asked by parliament to speed up the process of company law reform for 
this reason8. In the end, though, scandals as these were apparently not a 
sufficient stimulus to complete the reform process. 
loss account were introduced in 1930 (Walton, 1995: chapter 5). 
6
 See Valkhoff, loc. cit., and De Vries (1983:127). The number of listings is reported 
in Koert (1934:53-55), and De Vries (1976:33, 87). The latter counts securities rather 
than companies. Numbers refer to the total of Dutch and Dutch East-Indian companies. 
7
 Such as the massive company failures in Germany during the period 1870-1873 
(Schroer, 1993), the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 (Edwards, 1989:144) 
and the Danish Alberti-affair of 1908 (Walton, 1995:57). 
8
 For the relation between scandals and reform, see Visser (1926). De Vries (1983:9-
11) contains a short discussion of some of the more celebrated scandals. 
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It is presumably possible to ascribe part of the slowness to extraneous factors, as 
in the disparaging comment, made near the end of the fifty-year reform process, 
that 'the legislative machinery works hardly anywhere as slowly as in the 
Netherlands' 9 . However, it is more likely that the reasons for the long delay in 
making effective changes in the law should be sought primarily at a more 
conceptual level, in the existence of a strong and articulate opposition against the 
involvement of the law in publications by limited companies. The next section 
contains a closer analysis of the debate of company law reform in the 
Netherlands during the 1870-1930 period. Such an analysis is important, because 
during this period the ground was prepared on which a voluntary system of 
reporting was to be constructed. During this period, the role of the law in 
financial reporting was a question faced in all countries in Europe, including the 
Netherlands. In the Netherlands, it was eventually determined that the law 
should not play an important role in determining the contents of financial reports. 
This negative decision, which moved the issue of financial reporting largely 
outside the legal sphere in which it had originated, cleared the way for the 
emergence of an alternative view in which financial reporting was based on 
voluntary action. 
3.2.2 The emergence of liberal reporting regulation in the Netherlands10 
Throughout the period 1871-1928/1929, the debate on company law reform, in 
particular on legal regulation of financial reporting, was carried on with varying 
intensity among lawyers, businessmen, the government and parliament, and, 
beginning in the late 1890's, the emerging auditing profession. As elsewhere in 
Europe, a key issue in this debate was whether government supervision could be 
replaced by mandatory publicity, and if so, how the latter should be regulated. 
The traditional argument in favour of government supervision had been that 
limited liability represented an economic privilege. In that light, it would be 
improper to allow the creation of such privileges by private agreement, and 
government had not merely the right but also the duty to impose some form of 
supervision in order to prevent abuse (e.g. Van Tricht, 1880). Now it might be 
argued that government supervision, especially if it was limited to preventive 
9
 Advies over het gewijzigd ontwerp van wet op de naamlooze vennootschappen ('s-
Gravenhage: Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, 1926), p. 4. See also Zeff et 
fl/.(1992:44-45). 
1 0
 General sources used for this section include Cosman (1872), Mees (1872), Van 
Slooten (1900), Beerenborg (1907), Van Slooten (1912-13), Volmer (1914), Van Hasselt 
(1919), Van der Heijden (1925a and 1925b), Lampe (1925), Huussen-de Groot (1976), De 
Vries (1983 and 1985) and Zeff et al. (1992:chapter 2). 
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supervision exercised at the inception of an N V , was not the most effective 
approach to supervision. Mandatory publicity might be a more effective 
alternative. But the justification for imposing publicity would be the same: public 
availability of financial statement information was a price to be paid for limited 
liability. In this view, a case for mandatory publication of financial statements 
(or of at least a balance sheet) could be made on the basis of the nature of the 
legal form of the limited company per se11. The view of financial reporting as a 
corrective or a price formed the basis of the first two draft laws to be produced 
on the subject of company law reform in 1871 and 1890. 
Given this view of financial reporting as an alternative safeguard against abuse of 
the limited liability company, it is natural that early interest in financial reporting 
deals to a large extent with its effectiveness as such, that is, with the possibility 
that this safeguard itself is abused. Some12 believed that it would not be 
sufficient merely to prescribe the publication of financial statements, but that it 
would be necessary as well to regulate their contents in order to prevent the 
publication of meaningless or even misleading financial statements. This negative 
approach implied that the possibility of 'voluntary disclosure' was seen as rather 
remote, or at least not as a reliable assumption for regulatory activity. The 1890 
draft law did, for this reason, indeed contain a list of minimum balance sheet 
disclosures, allegedly based on the example of the Swiss 1881 Obligationenrecht. 
Gradually, however, an opinion gained strength that placed less emphasis on the 
need for the public to be protected against abuse by the limited liability company, 
and more on the right of the limited liability company to be free from the 
imposition of the costs of publicity. This view would seem to be part of a 
broader trend towards liberalism and deregulation that persisted throughout the 
period 1870-1930. Government intervention in the affairs of the limited company 
could be seen as a phenomenon from an earlier age, or even as 'reactionary'13. 
The most extreme position in this direction had been taken as early as the 1830's 
by Van Hall (1834) who had argued that a limited liability company ought to be 
free from any state interference since it arose from private agreement between 
free men, and since no one was obliged to engage in transactions with such a 
company. This view would continue to be promulgated, especially in business 
1 1
 For this view especially Déking Dura (1886:149n), but also Van Slooten (1900, 
1912-13), Beerenborg (1907), and Van der Heijden (1929:15). 
1 2
 The main exponent of this view was G. Van Slooten, whose 1900 dissertation 
remained the point of reference in discussions on reporting regulation until well in the 
1920's. 
1 3
 Zeff et al. (1992:47). See also Zeylemaker ([1946]: 15) for the view that the 
period before 1870 was characterized by a greater inclination to interfere with the limited 
liability company. 
42 
circles, right until the 1928 Commercial Code revision1 4. 
Usually, however, a more balanced approach was adopted, aimed at reconciling 
the lawful interests of both the company and third parties. It was recognized that 
publishing financial statements might be detrimental to the welfare of the 
company, as it might provide actual and potential competitors with vital 
information (this corresponds to the notion of proprietary costs developed in the 
previous chapter). If it was assumed that the interests involved were substantial, 
and might actually involve the life or death of the publishing company15, it 
would not be correct for the state to attach conditions to its gift of limited liability 
without proper grounds. Such grounds might be found in specific activities or 
types of company finance. A common proposition was that companies could be 
required to publish financial statements only if they publicly floated securities, 
took savings deposits or sold insurance policies1 6. Although this more balanced 
point of view provided a middle ground on which most Dutch theorists were able 
to accept the usefulness of mandatory public financial reporting as an alternative 
to state supervision17, implementing this idea in concrete legal provisions proved 
to be a difficult problem. 
In the early 1870's, it was apparently often assumed that matters of valuation and 
presentation of information in balance sheets were so self-evident as not to 
require further regulation18, or that they might be regulated satisfactorily by a 
few relatively simple rules. However, the development of accounting thought, 
notably the development of the idea of depreciation and the elaboration of accrual 
concepts eroded faith in unambiguous and 'true' balance sheets based on exit 
values19. Besides the growing complexity of valuation and income 
determination, disclosure became a practical issue. During the later part of the 
nineteenth century, a growing number of listed companies voluntarily started to 
publish summary balance sheets in the newspapers or as separate brochures20. 
This prompted the question to what extent the balance sheet to be required by law 
1 4
 As in Advies over het gewijzigd ontwerp van wet op de naamlooze vennootschappen 
('s-Gravenhage: Verbond van Nederlandsche Werkgevers, 1926), notably p. 23-24. 
1 5
 So J. Heemskerk Azn, cited in debates following Cosman (1872) and Mees (1872), 
p. 102. 
1 6
 See, for instance, Volmer (1897). A similar view was expressed by Th.Limperg jr. 
See transcript of debate recorded in Van Slooten (1912-13:6). 
1 7
 Van Slooten (1900: 85) hardly raised the issue of Royal Consent Jaute de 
combatants'. Some, however, did not want to dispense with Royal Consent altogether 
(See Volmer, 1914:110-111). In a modified form, it has survived up to the present. 
1 8
 See Cosman (1872:108). 
1 9
 Volmer (1914:32-33); Schmalenbach (1933:64-68). 
2 0
 Van Tricht (1880:39), de Vries (1983:128). Data concerning the extent of this 
phenomenon seem to be lacking. 
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might be such an abbreviated balance sheet (one, for instance, in which all the 
receivables were grouped under one heading instead of listing each individual 
debtor)21. And if so, what should be included in an abbreviated balance sheet 
and what might be omitted? 
Gradually, it became an established fact that proper financial reporting was so 
complex and required such care in taking into account the circumstances of the 
individual company that it was impossible to give meaningful rules by law 2 2 . 
This point was duly reflected in the third attempt at company law reform. A 
1910 draft law, though building in general on the attempts of 1871 and 1890, 
dispensed for this reason with the regulation of the contents of balance sheets 
included in the 1890 draft23. 
In this way the position that regulation of the contents of financial statements was 
'necessary and possible' developed into the view that it was 'necessary but 
impossible'. But the latter view began almost immediately to give way to the 
position that regulation, was 'neither possible nor necessary'. 
The basis for this development was the discovery of two additional safeguards 
against misleading financial statements that could replace detailed regulation24. 
One was the nascent auditing profession that since the late 1890's offered the 
possibility of independent audits. The earlier Dutch association of auditors, the 
NIvA (Nederlands Instituut van Accountants), had been founded in 1895. By 
1920, it had consolidated its position as the leading professional organization25. 
As might be expected, the auditing profession appeared to be especially inclined 
to espouse the argument of industrial diversity against detailed regulation, as it 
could be used to argue for legal recognition of the audit profession and 
mandatory audits in which the auditor would determine wether or not financial 
statements were 'true' (juist), in relation to the circumstances of the company, 
both in valuation and disclosure26. The profession was therefore not at all 
unwilling to assume this burden declined by the Legislator. 
The other safeguard was the force of public opinion. It began to be assumed that 
the investing public would on the whole at least be able to distinguish informative 
2 1
 See Cosman (1872), Mees (1872). 
2 2
 Van Slooten, who had in 1900 argued for publication by all NV according to a 
generally prescribed balance sheet format, later modified his position by conceding that 
regulation, if necessary, should proceed by industry (Van Slooten, 1912). 
2 3
 (Bijlagen) Handelingen Tweede Kamer, zitting 1909-1910, 217.3 p. 32. 
2 4
 Both to be found in 1910 draft, for the first time. 
2 5
 References to the auditing profession in this chapter can therefore be understood as 
referring primarily to the NIvA, and, occasionally, to the associations with which it 
merged during the 1960's into the NIvRA (Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants). 
2 6
 See, for instance, Reiman and Nijst (1906:68-70). 
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from uninformative financial statements so that it might be expected to take care 
of its own interests by abstaining from investment in unduly secretive companies. 
These two safeguards together formed a quite convincing framework, that fitted 
the mood of the times, the more permanent aversion of companies against 
interference and the aspirations to professionalism of the auditing profession. It 
was also the conception of financial reporting that was finally enacted in the 
1928/1929 legal reform. 
According to the revised law of 1928/29, large companies and companies with 
listed or bearer securities would have to publish both a balance sheet and an 
income statement by depositing these documents at a commercial register. 
Shareholders had the right to appoint an auditor. Furthermore, the law required 
a note on the valuation principles used, but companies were free in their choice 
of such principles. As to financial statement disclosure, the law as amended in 
1929 listed 12 items that had to be disclosed, subject to applicability, on the debit 
side of the balance sheet. There were no mandatory disclosures regarding the 
credit side of the balance sheet or the income statement. 
The commission charged with preparing the draft amendment in which these 
disclosure requirements were contained, motivated its recommendation by an 
argument that summarized the traditional, nineteenth century view on nature of 
reporting regulation. It was stated that there was a risk that mandatory 
publication of financial statements without regulation of contents might lead to 
uninformative statements. However, it would be difficult to extend any such 
regulation beyond 'a few generalities' without confining companies in too narrow 
a strait-jacket. The committee was able to resolve this problem by stating that 
the purpose of regulation was not to make financial statements give a more or 
less complete insight into the position of the firm, but 'the protection of the 
public' which could, apparently, be achieved with a minimum of information27. 
From this point of view, it is not surprising that balance sheet disclosure 
requirements were added almost as an afterthought at the end of a 50-year reform 
process. Nor is it surprising that their effectiveness was doubted by critics2 8. 
The course of developments in thought on reporting regulation outlined above 
differentiated the Netherlands from its continental neighbours. As indicated, the 
Netherlands shared a common heritage of the Napoleonic legal codes with other 
27
 Verslag van de Commissie benoemd bij Ministerieel besluit van 26 juli 1928, 
reproduced in De Naamlooze Vennootschap, vol. 7 no 11, February 1929, p. 346-347. 
2 8
 Sternheim (1929), repeated in Munnik (1931:37); Volmer (1929) and, at a 
somewhat later date, Jacobs (1932). 
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continental countries. The attempt to regulate financial reporting within the 
context of an overall revision of the Dutch commercial code is therefore 
reminiscent of, for instance, the approach to regulation in Germany. But here 
the similarity ended. Germany and Belgium, another close neighbour, introduced 
rather more strict regulation at an earlier stage. In Belgium, mandatory 
publication was introduced as early as 1873, and minimum disclosure 
requirements were added in 1913. By the end of the 1910's, the differences 
between the Netherlands and other continental countries had become quite 
apparent. Van Hasselt (1919:8) cites a number of critical Belgian and German 
comments on Dutch company law, indicating that regulation of limited companies 
in the Netherlands was perceived as virtually nonexistent, on a level with that in 
countries like Greece and Turkey and providing no serious protection for 
investors. 
Despite its continental legal tradition, the Netherlands began, because of its 
inability or unwillingness to change its company legislation during the 1870-1930 
period, to resemble the United Kingdom rather than its continental neighbours in 
the area of company and reporting regulation. During this period, U K company 
law was actively moving in a more liberal direction. 
The United Kingdom had not been influenced by the French movement towards 
codification. Nevertheless it started the 19th century with a strong tradition of 
state involvement in the creation of limited liability companies, which, on the 
basis of the 1720 'Bubble Act ' , could only be created by Royal Charter or Act of 
Parliament. In the mid-19th century, economic development prompted a 
reconsideration of company law, in which the basic tendency was to lessen or 
abolish the influence of the state in the creation of limited liability companies. 
Published accounting information was seen as an important alternative, and the 
view that 'the price of limited liability is the publication of accounts' was put 
forward (Napier, 1995:265). The position adopted under the Joint Stock 
Companies Act of 1856 (consolidated in the Companies Act 1862, which 
remained in force until 1900) combined the view that accounting information was 
important with a high degree of liberalism. Mandatory publication was not 
introduced, yet a model set of articles of association included in the 1856 Act 
contained extensive and rather modern accounting and reporting clauses that were 
available for voluntary adoption. 
General financial reporting requirements remained in force during the first 
decades of the twentieth century. Mandatory publication of balance sheets was 
imposed on public companies in 1907, but the contents of the balance sheet were 
not specified. Some elementary disclosure requirements were introduced in 
1928, and at the same time the presentation of an (unspecified) income statement 
to shareholders was made mandatory (though not its publication). 
In all, the arguments for and against extension of mandatory disclosure used in 
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England during the run-up to the 1928 Companies Act revision were quite similar 
to those used in the Netherlands at the same time2 9. The result, in terms of the 
extent of mandatory disclosure and the types of company to which publication 
requirements applied, were also quite comparable. The main difference was that 
in the United Kingdom there was apparently a greater willingness to issue partial 
legislation. In the Netherlands, attempts were made from 1870 onwards to 
regulate all aspects of the limited liability company with one comprehensive 
revision of the Commercial Code, which greatly increased the difficulty of 
arriving speedily at a satisfactory outcome. In the United Kingdom greater use 
was made of partial regulations for specific groups of companies. The 
accounting and reporting of companies with a definite public responsibility, such 
as railways, utilities and insurance companies were regulated by a series of Acts 
from the 1860's onwards. The 1907 Act introduced a distinction between 
'public' and 'private' limited companies, which greatly facilitated the introduction 
of publication requirements for the former. Otherwise, differences between the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom are slight indeed, and the more or less 
simultaneous company law reforms of 1928/29 brought the two countries in a 
virtually identical position. 
By 1928/29, the decision had been made in the Netherlands that company law did 
not play an important role in ordering the contents of financial statements, even 
though it might play a role in their publication. This question originated and was 
solved as a legal question. The arguments used were primarily of a legal nature 
and were concerned with questions of what the law ought to do or could hope to 
achieve. The basis of what would later be seen as a 'Dutch system' of reporting 
regulation must therefore be sought in the area of company law development 
rather than the auditing profession or business economics. 
The position reflected in the 1928/29 law was not exclusively Dutch. Despite 
contemporary perceptions of the 'national character' of Dutch company law (Van 
der Heijden, 1929:13-14), it differed in degree rather than kind from approaches 
to company law formulation elsewhere. Compared to the United Kingdom, 
where a similar abstinence of the law could be observed, the degree of difference 
was rather small. 
Regardless of its origins or uniqueness, however, the abstention of the law in 
influencing the contents of financial statements left scope for other forces to play 
a role in the development of financial reporting. In the next section it wi l l be 
shown that during the 1930's a clearer perception began to grow of the sort of 
2 9
 Compare Edwards (1976), on UK opinions on financial reporting regulation, with 
those documented in Van Hasselt (1919:118-132), Zeff et al (1992: chapter 2). 
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forces that might or would play a role in this area. 
3.2.3 The 1930's 
In a stylized way, it might be said that around 1930, the first round of company 
law reform in Europe was drawing to a close. This first round, starting in the 
mid-19th century, had resulted in the insertion of a publication requirement and 
some rudimentary disclosure requirements into most European systems of 
company law. By 1928/29, the Netherlands had also completed, as one of the 
last European countries, a process of company law reform that belonged to this 
first age of reform. As indicated above, this brought the Netherlands to a 
position roughly comparable to that of the United Kingdom. The position was 
characterized by the recognition that the law could require publication, but did 
not have an active role to play in directing the contents of published financial 
statements. 
It can be argued that the 1930's saw the initial stages of a new, second round of 
financial reporting regulation, or, more general, financial reporting change, that 
extended disclosure practices and disclosure regulations considerably beyond the 
limits of what was considered possible in the 19th century. This gave rise to the 
question of whether the Dutch decision to minimize the role of the law in 
financial reporting could be maintained in the light of these changing 
circumstances. 
In 1931, the publication requirements of German company law were modified, 
partly in response to a number of financial collapses connected with the 
worldwide economic crisis. This resulted in a considerable expansion of required 
financial statement disclosure. Standardized schedules for the profit and loss 
account and the balance sheet were introduced which contained rigid and rather 
detailed requirements concerning the separate disclosure of various financial 
statement items. For instance, the 1931 schedules required separate disclosure in 
the profit- and loss account of both employment costs and social security 
contributions. As wil l be seen in chapter 6, this disclosure issue remained 
controversial in the Netherlands until the end of the 1960's. 
In 1934, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was created with a 
mandate to determine the standards of financial disclosure in financial statements 
issued for listing purposes. Subsequent legislation extended these powers to 
annual financial reporting to stockholders. The result was the introduction of 
rather extensive and, by contemporary standards, quite controversial disclosure 
regulation in the United States. As wil l be documented more fully in chapter 6, 
the introduction of mandatory sales disclosure in the US preceded a similar 
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development in the Netherlands by more than 35 years30. 
In the United Kingdom, no changes occurred in reporting legislation during the 
1930's. The company law amendments introduced in 1928/9 did not impose a 
strict regime of disclosure regulation, and hence did little to counter a tendency 
towards less disclosure that had become evident during the 1920's. However, 
even in the absence of legal spurs to increased disclosure, stagnation in the 
development of financial reporting was prevented by the impact of the Royal 
Mai l case. According to Edwards (1989:127) the commotion caused by the 
revelation of the dubious reporting practices of the Royal Mai l Steam Packet 
Company in a notorious 1931 criminal case 'probably had a greater impact on the 
quality of published data than all the Companies Acts passed up to that date'31. 
The Royal Mai l case strongly reinforced an embryonic tendency among a small 
minority of British companies, among which the Dunlop Rubber Co. Ltd was the 
most well-known, to follow voluntarily the trend towards fuller disclosure that 
could be discerned in the United States (see de Paula, 1948:265). 
These developments abroad did not go unnoticed in the Netherlands. The 
remainder of this section wil l explore how thought on reporting, disclosure and 
disclosure regulation evolved in the Netherlands during this period. 
In the Netherlands, the completion of the 1928/9 company law reform after a 
tortuous process of more than half a century more or less ruled out any major 
revisions of the law during the foreseeable future. The law brought little that 
was new for companies that did already publish their financial statements before 
1928, since the scanty disclosure requirements could be reconciled with most 
previous reporting practices (Jacobs, 1932). In the absence of the kind of major 
scandals that occurred in the United Kingdom or Germany, financial reporting 
practice was therefore left to develop in a context of relative calm 3 2. At this 
stage, attention to financial reporting issues tended to shift from the legal to the 
auditing literature. 
As seen above, the Dutch auditing profession had been assigned an important role 
3 0
 Strictly speaking, the difference was almost 50 years. It was not until 1983 that the 
sales disclosure requirement was made strictly binding, rather than strongly suggestive as 
it had been since 1970. 
3 1
 The most important defect of the Royal Mail financial statements was that, during 
the 1920's, undisclosed reserves were released into income without clear disclosure of this 
fact. In this way, operating losses were transformed in apparent profits. Discussions of 
the Royal Mail case in the Dutch literature include Hageman (1932) and Spinosa Cattela 
(1948b:113-118). 
3 2
 See Van der Grinten (1953:67) for the contrast between the extensive debate on 
publication by limited companies prior to the 1928/29 reform and the relative quiet 
afterwards. 
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in the revised Commercial Code. The absence of detailed regulation had in part 
been justified by granting shareholders the right to appoint an auditor. The 
auditing profession was faced with the task of determining the exact scope of its 
responsibility under the new law. In general, auditor attention during this period 
was focused on issues of valuation and income determination rather than on 
financial reporting. To the extent that disclosure issues were discussed, three 
points of view can, with some simplification, be distinguished in the professional 
literature of the 1930's: a traditionalist view, a view aimed at quite radical 
renewal of financial reporting, and a moderate view aiming to balance the two 
extremes. 
The traditional view adhered closely to the letter of the law, which was based on 
the view that the role of financial statements was limited to safeguarding the 
interests of outsiders with a financial interest in the company. For this purpose, 
it was sufficient if the financial statements included a minimum of information 
only. The role of the auditor was to establish that the financial statements did not 
present an unduly favourable picture of the financial position of the company. 
Whether the extent of disclosure was sufficient was to be settled between 
management and its shareholders, and therefore not a primary concern of the 
auditor. Some auditors expressly defended the rather secretive reporting 
practices of the time. For example, J .G.Ch. Volmer, a senior figure in the 
Dutch auditing profession, repeatedly voiced his opinion that publication of a 
profit and loss account ought not to be imposed on companies, that secrecy as 
reflected in contemporary practice was quite beneficial for business life, and that 
if shareholders did want more information, they could and should change the 
articles of incorporation of their company to impose such a requirement on 
management33. 
In contrast, other auditors displayed an awareness of changes in thought on 
financial reporting abroad, and advocated a more active stance of the auditor in 
improving levels of disclosure. One of the best publicized expressions of this 
point of view came from future NIvA-president H . Munnik at an annual NIvA 
study meeting in 1931. In a paper on 'the rendering of a public account by the 
limited liability company by means of the financial statements', Munnik presented 
a vision of financial reporting in which financial statements were 'to give such 
information, that the state of the business and the course of affairs, as recently as 
possible, can be appreciated, even by outsiders' (p. 34). Munnik called this 'full 
publicity' (volledige openbaarheid). On the basis of an extensive survey, he 
3 3
 For instance, Volmer (1925, 1926, 1927). A similarly restricted view of financial 
reporting is displayed in the Leerboek der Accountancy, a textbook on auditing published 
during the 1920's and 1930's (see Nijst, 1929, chapters 2 and 3). 
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concluded that many financial statements failed to meet this standard. Munnik 
did not believe in detailed regulation of the contents of financial statements, and 
thought that the auditor had a task in ensuring fuller disclosure by refusing to 
approve financial statements deficient in this respect34. In addition, the 
literature of the 1930's contained other pleas for an active role of the auditor in 
modernizing financial reporting. A point of view that began to be aired during 
this period was the notion of comparability of financial statements. This notion 
assumed that financial statement information ought to serve more purposes than 
the simple guarantee of a minimum position. Janssens (1927) and especially Van 
Doorne (1935) argued that financial statement should contain the information 
necessary for a variety of decision-making purposes. There were other 
individuals arguing for a broader view of financial reporting, such as Knap 
(1931) advocating 'openness' and 'honesty' through the provision of more 
extensive data, and Koppenberg (1935) who pleaded for 'honest and complete', 
and preferably uniform reporting, a subject to which auditors payed 'too little 
attention'. To end this series of examples, J .E. Spinosa Cattela (1931) argued 
for an extension of financial reporting information (notably through interim 
financial statements) on the basis of the American example. 
Between the more extreme positions, there was scope for moderation. During 
the 1930's, one can observe the development of a view of financial reporting that 
was to play a significant role in the postwar period. This view acknowledged the 
possibility of improvement in financial statements, while maintaining that the 
primary stimulus for changes in reporting had to arise from the interplay between 
company managements and the readers of financial statements, rather than from 
the auditor. There was nevertheless a role for the auditor, however, since in this 
view the 'readers of financial statements' were considered in the aggregate, as the 
public at large, for whom the auditors played the role of representative, 
interpreter and educator. 
A basis for this view was laid in the course of the 1928 Commercial Code 
revision. Even though the law enshrined a rather traditional view of reporting 
3 4
 Munnik's views were opposed by other senior members of the profession present at 
the meeting. E. Van Dien and A. Sternheim restated the position that the most that could 
be demanded from financial statements was that they were not misleadingly optimistic. 
'Full publicity' as demanded by Munnik was said to be impractical, and would soon 
become detrimental to the interests of the company. Moreover, it was not part of the 
elementary task of the auditor (Munnik, 1931:37, 38-39). 
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regulation, it also contained the seeds of a new departure35. The 1925 draft law 
that formed the basis for the law enacted in 1928 did not contain any specific 
disclosure requirements and was in this respect simply the successor to the 1910 
draft law. When, in the course of the parliamentary debates on the 1925 draft, 
members of parliament produced the traditional argument that required 
publication without specified disclosure would lead to misleading or 
uninformative financial statements, an amendment calling for the disclosure of a 
number of balance sheet items was submitted. The minister in charge of the 
commercial code reform replied, however, that it would not be necessary to 
specify by law what a balance sheet ought to look like. He argued that this was 
well enough known in the 'economic and social climate' (maatschappelijk 
verkeer) in which the company in question operated36. The consequence of this 
argument was that the law did not need to contain explicit mandatory disclosures, 
but could rely on easily observable norms that did not draw their existence from 
and were not defined by the law. 
The point to note is that this argument raised, in a careful way, the possibility 
that these unwritten norms would become part of the legal obligation imposed on 
companies. That is, the possibility was suggested that in a conflict between 
shareholders and company management over financial reporting a court of law 
might have recourse to general norms of accounting and disclosure in order to 
decide the issue in question. The words used by the minister on this occasion 
evoke a similar departure in civil law about a decade earlier. In a landmark case 
of 1919, it had been established that obligations in civil law could arise not only 
from damage caused by transgressing the literal clauses of the law, but also from 
damage caused by violations of unwritten norms of justice prevailing in the 
maatschappelijk verkeer31. 
It would take some time before this notion began to develop and to gain wider 
acceptance. During the enactment process of the 1928 law, it was mentioned 
only in the margin of the debates, and to begin with, the minister's use of the 
argument appeared to be unsuccessful since the 1929 amendment did result in 
3 5
 According to current opinion, the 1928/29 Act is certainly not regarded as a 
milestone in the development of thought on accounting regulation. Burgert, Van Hoepen 
and Joosten (1995:21), dismiss the law as 'insignificant' ('stelde niet veel voor'); Klaassen 
and Bak (1993:16) ignore the law altogether and start their description of legislative 
history in 1970. 
3 6
 Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 1924-1925, no. 69; Handelingen Tweede 
Kamer, 1928-1929, p. 1828-1829, p. 1832-1833. Both the phrase maatschappelijk verkeer 
and the more simple verkeer were used. 
3 7
 See Usselmuiden (1972:73) for the reference to the 1919 Lindenbaum/Cohen case 
implied in the maatschappelijk verkeer clause as used in financial reporting. 
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some explicit disclosure requirements38. However, the fact that the disclosure 
requirements were presented as a minimum left the idea of unwritten norms 
governing the contents of financial statements ample scope. Shortly after its 
initial expression in parliament, the idea began to be echoed in the literature. In 
handbooks on company law, the unwritten norms to which financial statements 
had to adhere were referred to in interpreting the scant explicit disclosure 
requirements39. The explicit requirements could be and were presented as 
minimum requirements that might, on the basis of the law rather than at the 
requests of the current shareholders of the company, have to be exceeded 
according to the circumstances of the firm in question. 
The notion of general, uncodified reporting norms also began to spread in circles 
of auditors (Nijst, 1929; Knol, 1936; Van Gruisen, 1937), for whom it 
potentially had significant implications. From this point of view, the auditor 
could now no longer judge the adequacy of a set of financial statements with 
reference to a real or implicit agreement between the company and its actual 
shareholders, but he had to consider what would be expected of such a balance 
sheet by the public in general. This notion developed in close relationship with 
contemporary views on auditing. In that area, it began to be accepted under the 
influence of the views of Th. Limperg that it was not possible to limit the 
responsibility of the auditor by specific agreements between the auditor and his 
client, but that, instead, the auditor was bound by the expectations of the 
'economic and social climate' with regard to the nature and scope of audits (see 
Camfferman and Zeff, 1994). As argued more fully in Camfferman (1994a), it 
became customary among auditors during the 1930's to refer to these general, 
uncodified norms for financial reporting by the name of 'sound business practice' 
(goed koopmansgebruik). 'Goed koopmansgebruik', initially used 
interchangeably with the notion of the 'maatschappelijk verkeer' later was used as 
the name for the specific application to financial reporting of the more general 
3 8
 Although the amendment which provoked the ministerial statement about the 
maatschappelijk verkeer was not carried when the reform act was passed in 1928, its 
contents were contained, more or less unchanged, in an amending law passed in 1929, 
which brought the 12 disclosure items referred to earlier into the law. The confused 
history of the amendment provides ample illustration of the variety of opinions held on 
reporting regulation at the time. The original amendment was based on a petition to 
parliament by the NIvA. Given that before and after the event the general position of 
Dutch auditors was against formal disclosure regulations, it is not surprising that this 
action by the NIvA evoked some controversy among its own members (See also 
Sternheim, 1929 and Zeff et ai, 1992:54). 
3 9
 Visser (1929:139), Van der Heijden (1929:354-356), cf. Van der Heijden/Van der 
Grinten (1955:551-552). In Van der Heijden (1929), the 'eischen van het verkeer' are 
connected directly to the penal sanctions governing publication of financial statements. 
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concept of 'norms of the economic and social climate'4 0. 
The immediate practical effect of the introduction of these views on the nature of 
financial reporting was slight. As long as it was accepted that the 'economic and 
social climate' was content with the minimum information required to let 
financial statements play a role as safeguard against fraud, the practical effect 
would be that financial reporting could continue to use balance sheet and income 
statement formats dating back to the turn of the century. Criticism of secretive 
reporting practices therefore continued unabated until the end of the decade (e.g. 
Schoepp, 1939:212). 
Nevertheless, two important consequences were to flow from the introduction of 
these concepts. 
First, they blurred the dividing line between voluntary and mandatory disclosure. 
It could be and was argued that the small list of mandatory disclosures contained 
in the 1928/9 Commercial Code were only the most visible part of the total set of 
legal disclosure requirements. On the basis of this concept, therefore, those 
engaged in financial reporting practice were taught not to equate 'mandatory' 
disclosure with explicitly listed requirements. 
Second, the notion of 'norms of the economic and social climate' had a distinctly 
dynamic potential. The unspecified demands of this 'climate' as represented by 
the combination of best practice, the theoretical and professional literature and 
the views of informed financial statement users, could presumably change over 
time, opening the possibility of progress and of ever higher demands placed on 
financial statements. As wil l be seen in the next section, exactly such a 
development occurred after the war: the differential between what 'ought' to be 
reported and the explicit minimum requirements of the law started to widen, 
giving rise to fairly extensive non-mandatory improvements in the information 
contents of financial statements. 
3.2.4 Review of position around 1940 
By 1940, a number of elements that might serve to justify the assumption of the 
existence of a particular 'Dutch' approach towards financial reporting and 
reporting regulation had begun to emerge. Most importantly, the question of 
4 0
 See Hartog (1933:468) and Van Gruisen (1937) for the synonymous use of 'sound 
business practice' and norms of the economic and social climate with reference to 
accounting. See Keuzenkamp (1938:180) for the relation between the theory of inspired 
confidence and 'sound business practice'. In 1947 this usage was formalized when the 
phrase 'according to sound business practice' was introduced into the NIvA's rules of 
professional conduct to describe the meaning of an auditor's certificate (see Camfferman, 
1994a). 
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whether or not the law ought to govern the contents of financial statements 
through formal disclosure clauses had been answered negatively. When 
legislation was finally introduced in 1928/9, the Netherlands positioned itself 
alongside the United Kingdom rather than next to its continental neighbours 
where a greater role had been accorded to the law. The opening thus created by 
the withdrawal of the law began to be filled in a rudimentary way by the doctrine 
that reporting in general and disclosure in particular need and can be governed 
not by specific legal requirements, but by reference to generally accepted, 
uncodified norms. For this reason, an important feature of Dutch financial 
reporting, at least in the eyes of Dutch auditors, was that the rather liberal legal 
requirements presupposed the existence of a strong and competent auditing 
profession. 
At this stage, a growing consciousness can be discerned in the Dutch auditing 
literature of the differences between the Netherlands and other countries, even 
though the latter were for practical purposes mainly restricted to Germany, the 
United States and the United Kingdom 4 1. 
With regard to Germany, it was not too difficult to stress the differences. Not 
only did German legislation precede its Dutch counterparts by several decades, 
the 1931 reporting regulations introduced an extent of disclosure that went well 
beyond anything contemplated in the Netherlands. The German requirements 
found few defenders in the Netherlands, and complaints in the German literature 
could be cited in the Netherlands during the 1930's to illustrate that such 
discontentment was only what might have been expected from excessive strictness 
in disclosure regulation (Van Rietschoten, 1934). 
The United States began to figure more prominently in the Dutch auditing 
literature during the 1930's, but the emphasis was mainly on auditing technique. 
WTien US reporting was discussed, as in Munnik (1931), there is a tendency to 
mix admiration of certain outstanding qualities (such as the early date of 
publication) with the amused rejection of other aspects considered typical for US 
society (such as the extent of advertising in US annual reports). It should be 
noted that prior to the enactment of federal securities legislation in the 1930's, 
the approach to reporting regulation in the United States differed considerably 
4 1
 As a general indication of the geographical spread of attention to foreign 
developments in the Netherlands, one might look at the items discussed in the 'From 
Abroad' (Uit het buitenland) section in the journal Maandblad voor Accountancy en 
Bedrijfshuishoudkunde. This section contained extracts from foreign journals, news items 
and short comments. From 1930 to 1939, the section included a total of 154 items: 66 on 
the United Kingdom, 41 on the United States, 34 on Germany and 13 on other countries. 
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from that in Europe. As seen above, European legislation had accepted the 
publicity principle as its main element. Until the 1930's, however, the relevant 
US regulations consisted mainly of state legislation in which a 'paternalistic' form 
of preventive supervision played an important role4 2. In most European 
countries, this type of regulation played at best a secondary role since the late 
19th century. The heavy emphasis on disclosure in the Securities Acts, however, 
made US reporting regulation potentially more relevant to the European situation. 
Among other countries, the United Kingdom played the most important role in 
the perception of Dutch auditors. British reporting was considered by Munnik 
(1931) as the standard to which Dutch reporting might aspire. The Royal Mai l 
case, however, which was quite extensively covered in the Dutch literature, gave 
rise to comments that at least in the area of proper disclosure of releases from 
secret reserves, Dutch auditors adhered to stricter standards than their British 
colleagues (Hageman, 1932). During the 1930's the conviction grew in the 
Netherlands that Dutch accounting and auditing were at least on a level with their 
British counterparts and were developing in the same direction. In the United 
Kingdom, an evolution comparable to that discernible in the Netherlands occurred 
from a strictly legal interpretation of the responsibility of the auditor with regard 
to financial reporting, to an interpretation in which less formal criteria, notably 
the 'true and fair' 4 3 criterion, began to play an important role 4 4. Moreover, 
one can find in the British literature of the 1940's that increasing attention was 
being paid to the role of voluntary actions as opposed to regulation in bringing 
about improvements in financial reporting. F . R . M . de Paula, a senior British 
accountant, commented on the U K Companies Act 1947 in the following manner: 
The development on the movement towards the improvement in the form of 
presentation of accounts and the establishment of an agreed code of basic 
accounting principles can be traced back some twenty years or more. In 
those far-off days, there was a small minority that was not satisfied with the 
general and accepted practices of the time. (...) It was the [Royal Mai l case], 
in the writer's judgment, that gave this whole movement its first great 
4 2
 See Hawkins (1986:chapter 4) on these so-called 'blue sky laws', and in particular 
for the notion that they 'were based on a paternalistic regulation philosophy rather than 
the (...) disclosure philosophy embodied in the 1900 British Companies Act' (p. 128). 
4 3
 Or 'true and correct', as it was used until 1947. Parker and Nobes (1994:1-4), 
Napier and Noke (1992: 40-41). 
4 4
 See Nijst (1929:117-120) and Edwards (1976:297). 
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impulse. Directors and auditors of companies immediately commenced to 
reconsider their methods and practices in the light of the lessons to be learned 
from that grim case. (...) The fundamental change [in financial reporting] 
has come about, it is submitted, in the most desirable way. It has not been 
imposed from above by law upon an unwilling public, but the law has 
followed the existing best practice. Practical men of affairs had read the 
lessons of the [Royal Mail] case and voluntarily and immediately commenced 
to evolve accounting principles and practices to comply with them, (de Paula, 
1948:265) 
This statement would presumably have met with the wholehearted approval of 
many Dutch auditors. Rather than speaking of a 'Dutch' approach to financial 
reporting at this stage, it would be more appropriate to refer to a common 
British/Dutch attitude. As wil l be seen in the next section, however, a certain 
divergence between the situation in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
began to appear with the passage of the Companies Act 1947 in the latter 
country. 
Of course, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom could also be compared 
from a different point of view. Rather than interpreting the light touch of legal 
regulation of disclosure as the result of an enlightened form of liberalism, it 
might as well be argued that in both countries the Legislator had been unduly 
tentative if not simply negligent by continuing to condone reporting practices that 
were evidently inadequate45. This negative interpretation shows that at this time 
only the first, tentative steps had been set in the development of a convincing 
alternative to formal regulation. Whereas in the United Kingdom some proof of 
the effectiveness of such an approach had been forthcoming in the improved 
financial reporting in the wake of the Royal Mai l case, in the Netherlands such 
proofs would not be seen until after the Second World War. 
3.3 1945-1970 
3.3.1 Overview 
During the quarter century following the Second World War, significant changes 
occurred in the practice of financial reporting in many developed countries. As 
indicated in chapter 1, a striking aspect of financial reporting change during this 
period was the extension of financial statement disclosure. This tendency was 
4 5
 See, for instance, Schoepp (1939:212), Knol (1948), Edwards (1989:141-142), 
Napier (1995:272-273). 
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discernible in many countries, even though the pace, extent and mechanism of 
change differed considerably among countries. 
In the United States, the securities legislation of 1933 and 1934 was strongly 
concerned with the extension of disclosure, as is apparent from the subtitle of the 
1933 Securities Act: ' A n act to provide full and fair disclosure...' (Bevis, 
1965:17). The acts marked the beginning of a significant increase in both 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure for US companies, and were followed by a 
distinct change in views on the nature and purpose of published financial 
statements46. From 1936 onwards, this process of disclosure expansion 
involved the participation of the US auditing profession through the AICPA's 
Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP), to which the SEC had granted a 
derived authority in this area. The intensity of the standard-setting effort 
continuously increased during the 1950's and 1960's as the C A P gave way to the 
Accounting Principles Board (APB). Ultimately, growing concern over financial 
reporting and the standard setting process during the 1960's would prepare the 
way for the creation of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) in 
1973. As a result, at the beginning of the 1970's, the extent of disclosure in US 
annual reports was far ahead of that in annual reports in the United Kingdom, its 
closest rival in this respect (Benston, 1976a, 1976b; cf Barret, 1977). 
In Europe, however, tendencies towards greater disclosure were apparent as well. 
A n area of difference was that in Europe the notion of accounting standards did 
not develop to any great extent before 197047. Hence, company law reform 
continued to be the main focus of efforts to expand disclosure. In this respect, 
Germany and the United Kingdom were the two most important European points 
of reference for Dutch financial reporting48. 
In the United Kingdom, 
4 6
 Tn recent years the annual reports of large corporations have changed from formal, 
technical documents to attractive and interesting reading matter. Instead of being directed 
merely to stockholders, the modern reports are also prepared to interest employees and the 
general public. In fact, they constitute part of the company's public relations program.' 
(Myer, 1952:64) 
4 7
 Even though the Recommendations on Accounting Principles issued on behalf of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) between 1942 and 
1969 did constitute a form of standard setting, they differed fundamentally from the 
Statements of Standard Accounting Practice issued since 1970, as the latter were, for 
practical purposes, mandatory (Zeff, 1972:76). 
4 8
 Although among auditors, attention for the United States and the United Kingdom 
was far more intense than for Germany (Van Viegen, 1956:257). 
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[t]he Companies Act 1947 (consolidated into the Companies Act 1948) 
marked the beginning of the 'modern era'. In contrast with most previous 
Companies Acts, its provisions were concerned more with the needs and 
rights of stockholders and investors with respect to a management over which 
they were presumed to have little control than with protection of creditors or 
a reaction to a specific scandal. The Cohen report, on which the Act was 
based, stressed the desirability of disclosure for stockholders and society in 
general, and rejected the earlier (predominantly nineteenth century) 
philosophy that a company's affairs were primarily a matter of contract 
among shareholders. (Benston, 1976:16). 
Among the significant changes brought by the Companies Act 1947 was the 
introduction of disclosure requirements concerning the income statement, and the 
requirement to produce a consolidated balance sheet. For the first time, the 'true 
and fair view' requirement received substantial support from a set of mandatory 
disclosures (De Paula, 1957:148-150). The Companies Act 1947 therefore 
marked the end of the long period during which a direct influence of the law on 
the contents of financial statements had been largely ruled out. In contrast to the 
Netherlands, company law began to be recognized as a 'major progressive factor 
in the development of British financial reporting' (Napier, 1995:275). Company 
law continued to be a focal point in U K financial reporting change, as in the 
1962 Jenkins report and the Companies Act 1967. As in 1947, considerations 
concerning accountability of the enterprise to society at large played an important 
part in the 1967 Act 4 9 . 
In Germany, the Companies Act was changed in stages. In 1959, a preliminary 
stage was completed in which the requirements concerning the published profit 
and loss account were modernized. In 1965, the main body of company law was 
revised. As in the (UK) Companies Act 1947, perceptions of a changing social 
role of the enterprise played a role in prompting German company law reform 
(Schoenfeld, 1970). In both countries, increased social accountability was cited 
to justify an extension of disclosure. The resulting expansion of mandatory 
disclosure further widened the gap between Germany and the Netherlands. 
Whereas, in 1959, the Dutch Commercial Code still included no disclosure 
requirements at all with regard to the profit and loss account, the new German 
law specified an impressive 32 line items to be disclosed (subject to applicability) 
in the income statement, including the controversial disclosure of gross sales. 
4 9
 Hendriksen (1969:22,31-32). See also Sewart (1991) for a discussion of the 
tendency towards greater public accountability in the United Kingdom. 
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In the Netherlands, there was considerable awareness of occurrences abroad, and 
these played an important role both in reporting practice and in debate on 
reporting regulation. Although there was some advocacy of a US-style approach 
to reporting regulation during the 1950's, the main focus of attempts to reform 
financial reporting was, in line with developments elsewhere in Europe, on 
changes in company law. The debate on the role of the law in financial 
reporting, considered closed in 1928/29, was therefore opened once again. 
A n important feature of the attempts to introduce new financial reporting 
regulation was that they were part of a wider legal reform movement. At first, 
changes in reporting legislation were considered in the context of the revision of 
the entire Civ i l Code. Later, such changes were treated as part of an integral 
revision of the provisions on corporate governance in the Commercial Code. As 
a result of this apparent desire for comprehensive reform, the enactment of any 
new reporting legislation had to await the settlement of a range of controversial 
issues ranging from worker participation to the structure of the board of 
supervisory directors. It was not until 1970 that a new reporting law came into 
effect. Apparently, no partial or interim legislation on financial reporting (as 
used, for instance, in Germany in both 1931 and 1959) was ever seriously 
considered in the Netherlands. 
A key feature of postwar Dutch reporting is therefore that the relatively slow 
pace with which accounting law was enacted provided a 'grace period' during 
which a system of voluntary reporting improvements, as dimly envisaged at the 
end of the 1930's, obtained a rather unique chance to prove itself. Those who 
advocated that financial reporting could develop best in freedom were given the 
opportunity to prove that Dutch practice could develop in line with practices in 
the United States and the United Kingdom, but without the imposition of the 
relatively strict requirements in both countries. 
The next two sections wi l l analyze in greater detail how (a) developments in 
reporting practice provided the necessary support for the notion that there was in 
fact a viable 'Dutch' approach to financial reporting in which heavy regulation 
could be avoided, and (b) how the advocates of voluntariness attempted to carry 
as much of this 'Dutch system' forward into law when, after 1960, company law 
reform was finally under way. 
3.3.2 1945-1960: Further development of a voluntary system 
As seen in section 3.2, the prewar Dutch auditing profession had, on the basis of 
notions advanced during the period of Commercial Code reform in the first 
decades of the century, gradually developed a relatively simple theoretical 
framework that acknowledged, in principle, the possibility of progress in 
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financial reporting. It was admitted in theory that reporting practices were likely 
to vary over time, and that once acceptable standards of reporting and disclosure 
might become unacceptable. In practice, however, the principle of adhering to 
norms of the 'economic and social climate' (maatschappelijk verkeer) or 'sound 
business practice' (goed koopmansgebruik) was applied in a way that equated 
such norms rather strictly with actual practice, precluding significant change 
(Burgert, 1953). Following the war, however, the dynamic potential of the 
notion of norms of the 'economic and social climate' began, to some extent, to 
be realized. A n important underlying factor for this change was the influence of 
foreign example that began to make itself felt through various channels. 
As argued in Zeff et al. (1992), the fact that a number of large Dutch companies 
acquired foreign (US) listings in the early 1950's was an important mechanism to 
confront Dutch companies and auditors with US reporting practices. The 
growing presence of US companies in Europe had a similar effect. According to 
Brands (1954), the growing volume of international capital flows implied that 
Dutch auditors would do well to take note of foreign practices. Van Viegen 
(1956) made a similar case and noted approvingly that the NIvA had, in fact, 
recently installed a committee on documenting foreign practices. 
Awareness of foreign examples was not enough, however. A crucial issue was 
whether or not Dutch company managements would be willing to copy the more 
open financial reporting practices of the United States and, to a lesser extent, the 
United Kingdom. 
Measured by the volume of criticism from the financial press, the amount of 
change in company financial reporting during the first postwar decade was not 
extensive50. However, such criticism was now strengthened by the fact that 
small numbers of companies did in fact begin to improve their financial 
statements, especially in terms of increasing disclosure. Among these companies, 
the handful of multinationals that acquired or contemplated foreign listings 
occupied an important place. But some smaller, purely domestic companies also 
began to pay more attention to their financial reporting practices. Those 
companies that made voluntary improvements to their financial reporting could be 
held up as an example to others, and as proof of the proposition that fear of 
competitive damage was used too easily as an argument against fuller disclosure. 
The creation, in 1953, of the Henri Sijthoff award for the best annual financial 
report is symptomatic for the attempts in the financial press to foster a spirit of 
5 0
 See Knol (1948:97), who 'recently observed rather frequent remarks concerning 
financial statements in the press', and, rather late in the postwar period, a remark by 
Vecht (1954:97), that 'one can hardly read a discourse [on the NV] without encountering 
the complaint that the reporting by NV's is seriously deficient.' 
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competitive improvement in financial reporting practice. A notion that received 
growing attention was the belief that financial statements, rather than present a 
minimum of information for the benefit of creditors, ought to give 'insight' into 
the financial position and the results of the company. 
The most significant contribution to the cause of voluntary reporting was made by 
a report on recommended financial reporting practices issued in 1955 by the joint 
Dutch employers' organizations51, and usually referred to, after the chairman of 
the drafting committee, as the Rijkens report. Up to the publication of the 
report, other parties interested in the improvement of financial reporting could 
only announce their wishes or complaints on the subject, and at best use 
inducements like the Henri Sijthoff award for the best annual report in order to 
encourage improvements. No unambiguous sign had been forthcoming, however, 
to show that this concern for improvements was shared by company managements 
on any large scale. The 1955 report could be seen as such a signal, and its 
publication could well support an optimistic view regarding the future of financial 
reporting. 
To contemporaries, one of the most arresting features of the Rijkens report was 
its quite outspoken disapproval of secret reserve accounting52. But the report 
also contained numerous recommendations on disclosure issues, which were 
presented as a consequence of the primary demand that financial statements ought 
to give 'insight'. Among the more conspicuous were recommendations to publish 
sales and cost of sales, comparative figures and multi-year summaries, 
information on pension and deferred tax liabilities, off-balance sheet liabilities, 
information on market developments, research and development activities, 
employment, and general expectations for the current financial year. The gap 
between these recommendations and general practice was stressed in a number of 
comments53. Indeed, the contrast between the recommendations and current 
practice was so great that some commentators believed that without some form of 
compulsion, possibly from the Stock Exchange, the majority of companies would 
51
 Het Jaarverslag, Rapport van de Commissie Jaarverslaggeving van het Verbond van 
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never reach the minimum standard of reporting described in the report54. 
The Rijkens report appeared at a critical moment in the post-war development of 
thinking on accounting regulation. The initially somewhat unfocused concern 
about the quality of financial statements as apparent from the financial press and 
parts of the professional literature had in the early 1950's begun to crystallize 
around the notion of a companies' commission. Sanders (1952), a publication 
that received much attention at the time, contained a plea for a 
vennootschapskamer or companies' commission, modelled on the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission. At least to some members of the sponsoring 
employers' bodies, the Rijkens report was primarily an attempt to forestall 
government interference in financial reporting. From this point of view, the 
Rijkens report would serve as evidence that organized business was capable of 
taking care of financial reporting itself 5. If this was in fact attempted, the 
attempt was highly successful. The publication of the Rijkens report turned out 
to be a strong argument in favour of the opinion that legal interference in 
financial reporting was not only undesirable but also unnecessary. It could be 
argued that experience had proven that companies could voluntarily improve their 
reporting, aided by non-binding guidance as provided by the employers' 
associations. 
Neither the Rijkens report itself nor the accompanying statements of committee 
members to the press contained a hint that the report was the beginning of a more 
or less regular system of guidance on financial reporting. Nevertheless, the view 
that a kind of semi-regulatory system along these lines could be established began 
to be aired shortly after its publication. A clear statement of the belief that the 
Rijkens report was not an incident but the foundation of a 'system' of accounting 
regulation can be found in a discussion of the report for a German audience 
(Geertman, 1955). The author contrasted the English and German systems of 
accounting regulation, both of which were characterized by rather extensive 
regulation, with the Dutch environment, virtually free of legal interference. This 
regulatory vacuum was not to be seen as a weakness, but as a strength, as it left 
room for a more informal and flexible system of regulation: 
Recent developments appear to go in the direction that the statements of the 
employers' association are interpreted as a sort of law. Since the publication 
of the report of the employers' association, several newspapers have criticized 
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 See v.Zw., 'Het Jaarverslag', Handels & Transport Courant, 4 April 1955, p. 1; 
J(ustus) M(eyer), 'Het goede jaarverslag', Haagse Post, 16 april 1955, p. 11. 
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departures from the recommendations. 
The Dutch system has produced the result that managements of all holding 
companies have taken care that consolidated balance sheets are prepared and 
published (...). In our view, the advantage of the Dutch system is that on the 
basis of a few legal requirements and the recommendations of the employers' 
associations a much greater degree of flexibility can be achieved than in other 
systems based on case-specific prescriptions. (...) Furthermore, it should be 
pointed out that this arrangement always allows the easy adaptation to new 
scientific insights, practical concerns and considerations from a Commercial 
Law point of view. (Geertman, 1955:368) 
Geertman may have presented things in a more favourable light than he would 
have done if he had written for Dutch readers, but his feelings are only slightly 
stronger than those of others writing at the same time, when empirical evidence 
of the Report's effects could not have been extensive56. 
The Dutch auditing profession was not left unaffected by the developments 
outlined in the previous paragraphs, even though disclosure issues remained for 
some time in the shadow of the more traditional concerns of income 
determination and valuation57. In 1953, G . L . Groeneveld addressed an audience 
of auditors with a speech on 'new tendencies in published financial statements'. 
In his speech, Groeneveld discussed two recent developments in financial 
reporting: the increasing use of current cost accounting and a shift towards earlier 
publication of financial statements. On the whole, the impression conveyed by 
his speech was positive: due to a combination of developments in domestic 
thinking (elaboration and acceptance of Limpergian current cost theory) and of 
the increased importance of the American example, Dutch financial reporting was 
moving in the right direction. Groeneveld concluded that Munnik's (1931) 
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employers' unions proceed forcefully on the road chosen [in the Rijkens report], in 
cooperation with the Stock Exchange Association, which, as one of the most appropriate 
organizations in this areas, should do much more than it is doing now. This cooperation 
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demand for 'full publicity' would be fulfilled by the adoption of current cost 
accounting in financial statements. However, in a published reaction J .C. Brezet 
commented on this latter statement that it was not so much changes in income 
determination that were required, but rather a more complete disclosure, 
especially of income statement items. Since tendencies in that direction were still 
very weak, as witnessed by a recent crop of deficient financial statements, Brezet 
urged auditors to remember the spirit of Munnik's 1931 paper (Brezet, 1953). 
Following the Rijkens report, the notion that concepts such as the 'economic and 
social climate' and 'sound business practice' also had implications for financial 
statement disclosure became more apparent among auditors. In the opening 
paragraphs of a 1956 report on disclosure of information on commitments 
(obligo's) the NIvA, by way of its Advisory Committee on Professional 
Matters5 8, gave what amounted to its first statement on the development of 
financial reporting over time: 
In forming an opinion on the specific question laid before the Committee, it is 
important to draw attention to the historical development of the demands that 
the economic and social climate places on information to be provided by 
means of the annual report. Data, disclosure of which in the annual report 
was initially just considered useful, but that might just as well be omitted, 
were later considered of such significance that their disclosure became 
necessary. (...) 
With the progression of the demands of the economic and social climate the 
borderline between what is considered as useful and what is classified as 
necessary in forming a picture of the enterprise has shifted. This has 
gradually resulted in an ongoing clarification of the picture given by financial 
statements, (p. 399)5 9 
The Rijkens report was cited as one of the most important among contemporary 
documents that could be used to determine the extent of the shift from 'useful' 
towards 'necessary' disclosure. 
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The position taken by the NIvA confirmed that the line dividing 'mandatory' 
from 'voluntary' disclosure was in fact blurred. Auditors were encouraged not to 
expect a clear set of prescribed disclosures with which to check financial 
statements. Rather, they were to exercise their professional judgement to 
determine what the circumstances of the case in question required. This was 
confirmed in a series of cases brought before the NIvA's disciplinary board 
(Raad van Tucht) in the latter half of the 1950's60. 
Around 1960, the feeling was well-established among Dutch auditors that the 
approach to financial reporting in the Netherlands was different, but sound. 
'Freedom is good for the strong' was the way in which F. Van Amerongen 
(1963:497) described the hallmark of Dutch accounting for the benefit of English 
readers. And on the whole, the Dutch auditing profession did indeed feel itself 
to be strong enough to produce, in cooperation with company managements, 
reports of anglo-american quality without anglo-american regulation. 
Around 1960, therefore, it was possible to formulate a coherent view of why and 
how Dutch financial reporting was different through its reliance on voluntary 
behaviour. At the core of such a view was the idea that largely uncodified but 
nevertheless recognizable norms for financial reporting could be applied by 
competent auditors. These norms were formally indicated by the notions of 
'(norms of the) economic and social climate' and 'sound business practice', and 
materially by the requirement of 'insight'. Attached to these notions was an idea 
of dynamism and progress, of continually increasing demands that would be met 
by the basic willingness of company managements to comply with them. And 
most importantly, there was empirical vindication in the obvious improvements 
witnessed in the financial statements of a number of well-known companies61 
and in the expressed commitment of the employers' organizations to creditable 
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Board dealt with financial accounting issues included 1956-7, 1958-11 and 1959-6. In 
these cases the concept of goed koopmansgebruik was further interpreted, and explicitly 
applied to disclosure and presentation. In short, the Board confirmed that the 
circumstances of the case (among which potential competitive damage figured 
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freely in practice, it refused to specify a definite minimum of disclosure. According to 
one of its rulings (1958-8), an income statement showing net income as a single item 
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reporting62. 
This view, of course, was an ideal. It was often pointed out that the rather 
roseate assumptions underlying it did not always correspond with reality. For 
instance, in discussing the Rijkens report, a cornerstone of any such 'Dutch 
system', one could either stress the impressive disclosure recommendations, or 
the numerous escape clauses, offering companies all kinds of reasons for not 
complying with the demands (Knol, 1955). One could argue that even the 'best' 
annual report (at least according to the panel of judges of the Henri Sijthoff 
award) showed serious deficiencies (Slot, 1958). In a similar vein, one could 
either see the distinctness of the Dutch approach to financial reporting as a source 
of pride, or one could warn that 'we [the Dutch auditing profession] have to be 
careful when we judge what is done abroad, and we must not be blinded by the 
conviction of our own superiority' (Van Viegen, 1956:257). Even Van 
Amerongen (1963), quoted above on the strength of the Dutch auditing 
profession, conceded that there were 'weak brethren' among his colleagues and 
among company managements for whom a tightening of regulation might prove 
beneficial. Sobering thoughts like these played an important role in initiating a 
new round of company law reform at the beginning of the 1960's. 
3.3.3 Financial reporting change again associated with company law reform 
Following the completion of the Commercial Code reform in 1928, company 
law, at least as far as it affected financial reporting, entered a period of relative 
calm which lasted until the 1950's. As indicated above, during this period the 
field was left to practitioners of financial reporting, that is, to company managers 
and their auditors, to show that satisfactory levels of reporting quality could be 
achieved without strong legal backing. 
From the late 1950's onward, however, forces external to the domain of financial 
reporting instigated a period of renewed attention for company law reform. As 
in the period 1870-1930, financial reporting was again caught up in a wider 
current moving towards legal reform. As in Germany and the United Kingdom, 
a concern for what might be called social issues was a central feature in demands 
for company law reform. Concerns like these could introduce a note of urgency 
in what might otherwise be a detached discussion among accounting and legal 
experts: 
Publication of fuller accounts is no narrow matter of company law, but a 
pressing social issue. In the long run, the question is not 'Shall we tell or 
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conceal?', but 'Shall we tell the shareholders or the planners?' Tell we must. 
(Baxter, 1956:41) 
In a similar way, financial reporting began to be linked in the Netherlands with 
the broader question of 'the socialization of enterprise' (vermaatschappelijking 
van de onderneming). This question largely corresponded with the issues arising 
out of the separation of ownership and control analyzed in the US context by 
Berle and Means (1932). 
The idea that there was or ought to be a degree of 'socialization' implied a 
negation or at least a relaxation of the traditional assumption that a firm was an 
item of property, to be disposed of according to the wishes of the owners. 
Although this view might still be valid for small firms, it was considered obsolete 
for large, open N V ' s of which the shares were widely distributed. Such 
companies had gained immense social and economic influence, while at the same 
time the disappearance of recognizable owners had created a power vacuum to be 
filled by more or less unaccountable managers. 
Under the catchword of 'vermaatschappelijking', a variety of solutions to this 
apparent problem were offered from various parts of the political spectrum. In 
general, these solutions entailed setting up mechanisms to ensure that company 
managements would take into account the social ramifications of decisions taken 
in leading their companies. From the late 1940's onward, political discussions on 
representation of labour on supervisory boards or the institution of works' 
councils were carried on with varied intensity. In this context, more informative 
financial reporting appeared as a possible instrument to make managements more 
susceptible to social control, or, conversely, as a concession made in order to 
prevent more consequential intrusions into managerial autonomy. 
The debate on 'vermaatschappelijking', including the issue of financial reporting, 
received a strong stimulus by a 1959 report on 'The reform of enterprise' by the 
Dr Wiardi Beekman Foundation, the scientific bureau of the labour party63. 
This report emphasized the relationship between corporate publicity and the 
broader social responsibility of the enterprise that had played an important role in 
the reform of British company law about a decade earlier64. 
In the wider context of a discussion of company law reform, the committee 
responsible for the report stated that, because of the very limited nature of the 
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 De hervorming van de onderneming, Herziening van het vennootschapsrecht in 
verband met medezeggenschap in en toezicht op de onderneming (Amsterdam: De 
Arbeiderspers, 1959). A more extensive discussion of contents, background and 
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1929 regulation 'most financial statements of our large N . V ' s , banning some 
favourable exceptions, excel in vagueness.' (p. 46) According to the report, 
neither the complaints of the financial press nor the commendable initiative of the 
Rijkens report had materially altered this situation. The committee repeated the 
call for a companies commission (vennootschapskamer) to supervise financial 
reporting. 
The report stirred up debate in the legal literature and the press, and it played a 
role in the installation, in 1960, of a governmental commission to draft proposals 
for reform of company law. The charge of this commission, referred to after the 
name of its chairman as the Verdam Commission, included an investigation into 
the necessity and possibility of revising the legal regulation of financial reporting. 
The justice minister, at the occasion of the installation of the Verdam 
Commission, had carefully formulated the doubts raised by the Wiardi Beckman 
report on the effectiveness of a system that left much if not all responsibility for 
the improvement of the quality of financial reporting to the initiative of the 
business sector: 
In connection with the important role that the larger enterprises in particular 
play in the economic life of our country, it is of great importance that the 
annual financial documents — especially the balance sheet and the profit and 
loss account — give a clear picture of the state of affairs in the N . V . A 
committee established by the four employers' unions has made some 
suggestions in that regard a few years ago. It is, however, open to question 
whether it is possible to rely entirely on the views of business in this matter, 
and whether there is no task for the legislature.65 
That, indeed, was the question. It was up to the committee to decide whether the 
virtual absence of regulation, partially compensated by the Rijkens initiative, had 
led or would in due course lead to an acceptable quality of financial reporting. 
There was no lack of published opinion on the subject, and the installation of the 
Commission gave rise to a new outpouring of views. But few if any of these 
opinions rested on demonstrable systematic surveys of published accounts. 
The Wiardi Beckman report chose to describe reporting quality in sombre 
colours, and others subscribed to this view with varying degrees of approval66. 
However, the Wiardi Beckman report also prompted publications of more 
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cheerful views of financial reporting quality. 
The installation of the Verdam Commission, and especially rumours of its quick 
progress in drafting a proposed law on financial reporting, made the question of 
whether or not there should be a new law on the subject somewhat academic67. 
Attention therefore focused on the nature of a new financial reporting law: should 
it merely give actual practice a legal footing, or should the law be an attempt to 
force changes in reporting practice? 
The joint employers' associations stated their opinion in a revision of the Rijkens 
report, drafted by a committee chaired by J .A. Hamburger and published in 
October 196268. The actual recommendations of the report differed little from 
those of the 1955 report, but they were now embedded in an extensive treatise on 
the position of the firm, on communication between the firm and interested 
parties and on the possible role of legislation. The committee clearly expressed 
its views on the relative roles of reporting regulation and private initiative: 
In practice the contents of financial statements have grown in a pleasing way 
beyond the minimum requirements [of the law]. It can be said that in general 
the working of social forces — new insights on the part of company 
managements themselves, but also more in particular the public discussion 
and especially that in the financial press — is an important stimulus for the 
level of reporting. 
The development of this new spirit concerning the accountability process wil l 
certainly progress even further. (...) It is of the utmost importance that this 
development can take place in freedom, (p. 24) 
The report acknowledged that it might be useful to incorporate such new opinions 
on reporting in the law, but maintained that regulation of the kind of information 
to be disclosed in financial statements should always be of a global nature. The 
committee evoked the picture of a formalized reporting process in which 
companies would not disclose more than required and in which reporting practice 
would be forced in a strait-jacket of inflexible rules reflecting old and possibly 
obsolete views on financial accounting. The word it used to describe such 
degeneration was verstarring (stiffening, with the overtones of 'ossification'). 
For the next decade, it was to become an often-used argument that any law had 
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to be so flexible that the ill-defined but grim prospect of verstarring was 
avoided6 9. Not unnaturally, the word also began to play a role in stressing the 
dutchness of the 'Dutch system': verstarring was often presented as the result of 
deficiencies in foreign systems of reporting regulation70. 
A similar voice was heard from the Liberal party's scientific bureau in a 
report71 intended to provide a counterweight to the Wiardi Beckman report. On 
the subject of financial reporting, this report saw some merit in adapting the law 
'to what has become established practice' (p. 319). The law should not, 
however, attempt to effect significant changes in reporting practice. The authors 
of the report arrived at this conclusion both because they attached considerable 
force to the argument that disclosure might weaken competitive positions, and 
because they asserted that actual reporting quality was quite acceptable. They 
alleged that proponents of increased legal requirements 'project, without any 
ground, certain abuses in other Western countries on the situation in the 
Netherlands'. In fact, owing to the stimulus of social forces in the Netherlands 
[t]he voluntary publication of data that exceed the legally prescribed minima, 
often presented in an attractive and easily accessible format, has, especially 
since the Second World War, been strongly developed by many N . V . ' s . If 
one compares the average content of the annual reports and prospectuses that 
are published today, one sees a remarkable improvement, both regarding 
contents and format. It is our impression that this development still continues 
with increasing pace. (p. 316) 
In short, even though numerous opinions were offered on the quality of financial 
reporting, few authors referred to the necessity of evaluating the actual state of 
financial reporting72. A n exception to this general trend is J . M . Vecht's 
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suggestion that a committee be appointed to investigate on a sound empirical 
basis what had been the actual effects of the Rijkens report, and to what extent 
financial reporting was still deficient (Vecht, 1963:121). 
Among auditors, as represented in the NIvA leadership, it was perceived quite 
early that legislation of some sort was probably unavoidable, but the NIvA 
refrained from taking a public position on the subject of company law reform73. 
3.3.4 The 1970 Act on Annual Financial Statements of Enterprises 
The Verdam Commission installed in 1960 produced a report in 1965, which 
included a proposed draft law on the annual financial statements of enterprises. 
A modified draft law based on this report was submitted to parliament in 1968, 
and in 1970 an Act on Annual Financial Statements of Enterprises was passed. 
Given that previous legislation dated back to 1929 and represented in effect the 
conclusion of a late 19th-century debate, the introduction of a new and modern 
system of regulation could rightly be described as a 'breakthrough' (Nathans, 
1969:76). 
The developments surrounding the enactment of the 1970 Act are relatively well 
documented74. Here, attention wil l be focused on some aspects of the law that 
shed light on thinking on voluntary disclosure. Essentially, it wi l l be argued that 
the new law included and clarified many of the elements that in the previous 
sections were said to be coalescing into a perceived 'Dutch system' of reporting 
regulation. Without denying the character of a 'breakthrough' to the 1970 Act, 
this section therefore primarily stresses its continuity with preceding lines of 
voorlichting', in: De Onderneming, vol. 12 no. 19, 15 September 1962, p. 624-625; 
Philips (1961), Smulders (1965), Bloembergen (1961), 'Voor betere verslaggeving en 
voorlichting — Nieuwe aanbevelingen van commissie der werkgeversverbonden', Handels 
& Transport Courant, 13 September 1962, p. 3 
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thought. 
The proposed law on annual financial statements included in the Verdam report 
contained a considerable number of clauses on disclosure. Most were taken over 
in slightly amended form into the 1970 Act. The requirements as contained in 
the final law consisted of an array of about 80 items to be disclosed in the 
balance sheet and income statements. This represented a substantial extension of 
disclosure regulation, especially in comparison with the scanty regulation of the 
1928/29 Commercial Code (which included on the same count some 12 items). 
By international standards, however, the extent of required disclosure was 
relatively modest. The 1970 Act resembled the U K Companies Act 1948 rather 
than the German 1965 Company Law 7 5 . 
The status of the new disclosure requirements within the framework of the law 
cannot, however, be assessed entirely by their number. The law was clearly 
aimed at greater openness on the part of companies, but its approach was not 
based on the enumeration of required disclosures. 'Openness' was broadly 
interpreted, and included the use of more acceptable principles for valuation and 
income determination76. Specifically, the law was aimed at ending the practice 
of using secret and hidden reserves77. But even to the extent that the law was 
intended to bring about improved disclosure, its specific disclosure requirements 
definitely occupied a secondary place in the law. This was already envisaged in 
the Verdam Commission's report (p. 35), and taken over in the new law. Much 
stress was placed on the requirement that the financial statements provide 
'insight', a phrase equivalent in its effect to the British 'true and fair override' 
and referring back to views on reporting developed in the 1950's. Those articles 
of the new law (articles 2 and 3) that contained the 'insight' requirement were 
placed at a level different from the other articles, containing mainly the 
disclosure requirements. This latter part of the law contained merely an 
elaboration of the general principle of 'insight'. In order to convey such insight, 
financial statements would probably have to contain the information listed in the 
sections on disclosure, but it was not improbable that providing 'insight' might 
7 5
 In the Verdam report, the German and US systems of regulations are cited as 
extremes to be avoided (p. 35). British legislation is not mentioned, even though, for 
instance, the proposed arrangement of the income statement in the Verdam report quite 
closely resembled that in Schedule 8 of the 1948 Companies Act. 
7 6
 The somewhat dismissive opinion expressed by Beekhuizen and FrishkofT (1975:14, 
21) that the law dealt mainly with disclosure seems to rest on a too superficial analysis. 
7 7
 See J. Kraayenhof s remark in Handelingen Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1969-1970, p. 
2913. 
73 
require more, different or perhaps less information78. 
This feature helps to understand why the disclosure requirements, especially as 
listed in the Verdam Commission's report, could make a rather haphazard 
impression at the time7 9. These listed disclosures were to be seen as 
suggestions rather than strict rules, 'giving guidance' in the application of the 
general principles80. Although in the final law the lists of disclosure 
requirements were given a more systematic look, they retained the appearance of 
being suggestions rather than requirements. The interpretation of the disclosure 
requirements as 'recommendations' or 'examples' was taken over by 
commentators on the law 8 1. In this way, the blurring of the distinction between 
mandatory and non-mandatory disclosure that had already become a standard 
notion in circles of auditors, and that was at least embryonically part of the 
1928/29 law, was now firmly enshrined in the legal provisions on financial 
reporting. 
Another familiar element introduced into the law was the notion that financial 
reporting norms, rather than being detailed in the law, might instead be derived 
from the 'economic and social climate'. The law contained few explicit 
prescriptions on valuation and income determination, but instead contained a 
general clause (article 5) that the 'principles on which the valuation of assets and 
liabilities, and the determination of income are based [shall] adhere to norms that 
are considered acceptable in the economic and social climate'. Subsequently, it 
has been understood that this clause, even though in its literal sense it referred to 
balance sheet valuation and income determination only, was understood to subject 
disclosure issues to the 'norms of the economic and social climate' as well (See 
Dsselmuiden, 1972:75). 
A n important aspect of this clause was that it provided a link with another 
important development from the past, as it provided the framework for a 
continued involvement of business in the development of reporting norms8 2. 
While the draft law was debated in parliament, the minister in charge publicly 
invited the accountancy profession and 'organized business' to prepare an 
7 8
 Memorie van Toelichting, Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1967-1968, 
9595 no. 3, p. 8. The possibility of providing less information was added by amendment 
in parliament. See also Boukema (1975:80). 
7 9
 See Coelingh (1965:5) and Van der Schroeff (1965:229). 
8 0
 Memorie van Antwoord, Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer Zitting 1989-1969, 
9595 nr 6, p. 2. 
8 1
 On the Verdam proposals: Tempelaar (1965:39); on the final law: Sanders, 
Groeneveld and Burgert (1975:131). 
8 2
 See Schoonderbeek (1981:4). 
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inventory of reporting practices and to pronounce on their acceptability. This 
invitation resulted in the creation of the so-called 'Tripartite Study Group' 
(Tripartiete Overleg), a private sector body issuing recommendations on financial 
reporting83. In this way, of course, a mechanism rather closely resembling the 
system of regular guidance on reporting envisaged at the time of the publication 
of the Rijkens report was brought into existence. A modification introduced at 
this time was the participation of representatives from the labour unions, who 
now formed a third delegation next to the representatives of business and the 
auditing profession. 
In all, the 1970 Act could be seen as the embodiment of continuity rather than 
change. Even though extensive legislation in the area of financial reporting was 
in itself a novelty, the new law was in agreement with many earlier ideas on the 
nature of reporting and reporting regulation. The process of legal change may 
even have helped to strengthen these ideas. It seems likely that for those who 
thought in terms of an actual or ideal 'Dutch system', the entire process of 
preparing and discussing the new law did result in a much clearer perception of 
what such a system did or ought to stand for. This appears from the number of 
publications appearing at the time that list or discuss in a rather consistent 
manner the perceived features of Dutch financial reporting. On the basis of such 
publications84, it becomes possible to construct the following ideal notion of the 
Dutch reporting environment. Its key elements, of which the antecedents have 
been sketched in the previous sections, can be listed as: 
- A national, Dutch character: there was awareness of other approaches to 
reporting and regulation abroad, but it was nevertheless believed that the own 
approach was superior or at least the most suitable for the national 
circumstances. 
The absence of a clear boundary between mandatory and voluntary 
behaviour: beyond the requirements of a law that were deliberately kept to a 
minimum, there existed an outer area within the circumference of the 
required 'insight'. 
- Progress: the circumference of 'insight' was not fixed, but expanded in the 
course of time, as indicated by the reference to the presumably dynamic 
8 3
 The organization of the group and the arrangement of its pronouncements were 
changed in 1981 without materially affecting the status of its pronouncements. The group 
is currently known as 'Council on Annual Reporting' (Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving), 
and its pronouncements as 'Guidelines on annual reporting'. See Zeff et al. (1992: 
chapter 5) on the origins and development of the Tripartite Study Group. 
8 4
 See Tempelaar (1966, 1968), Laterveer (1967), Scott (1968), Nathans (1969), 
Louwers (1970), Los (quoted in Zeff et al, 1992:189), Tyra (1970), Frederiks (1974). 
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'norms of the economic and social climate'. 
- Auditor competence: to infer in each situation how the insight requirement 
resulted in concrete demands for the financial statements. 
Voluntary participation: entrepreneurs would willingly accept the 
requirements determined in this way with a view to their own interests. This 
willingness would extend to experimentation with new forms of reporting, 
providing the basis for Progress. 
- Proven by use: the viability of the approach was considered proven by the 
quality of Dutch reporting, which was assumed to be by and large of a level 
equal to or exceeding that indicated by the minimum requirements of the law, 
and comparable to that in other major developed countries. 
The sense of continuity conveyed by the law presumably was one of the reasons 
why the law was accepted in parliament without great controversy. There was, 
to be sure, extensive argument over particular arrangements (especially the 
compliance mechanism), but debate was on the whole pragmatic and devoid of 
sharp conflict. It was with apparent justification that the justice minister 
expressed his satisfaction that 'there is such wide-spread agreement about the 
fundamentals of [this draft law]. ' 8 5 
It appears possible as well, however, to explain the absence of major controversy 
in part by the fact that a number of important features of the law contained 
ambiguities that could support a variety of interpretations and expectations. 
Approval of the law could be based on quite different expectations as to its 
necessity or its actual effects. Among the more important uncertainties were the 
impact of the compliance mechanism in the form of the Enterprise Chamber and 
the role that the Tripartite Study Group and its publications would play. The 
actual influence of the new legal settlement would depend to a considerable extent 
on the activity of these two bodies. 
The next section wil l outline the course of events following the 1970 Act, to 
show how subsequent developments affected perceptions of the existence and 
desirability of a 'Dutch system'. 
3.4 1970 to the present. 
In the years following 1970, the ideal of a 'Dutch system' of reporting and 
reporting regulation gradually began to lose some of its hold over the imagination 
8 5
 Memorie van Antwoord, Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1968-1569, 
9595/9596 nr. 6, p. 1. For an expression of similar feeling: Handelingen Tweede Kamer, 
Zitting 1969-1970, p. 2901. 
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of those who shared in this vision. However, to trace this gradual waning of the 
ideal of a 'Dutch system' after 1970 is not a straightforward task. Since it was 
never universally shared, let alone formally adopted, it never was formally 
abjured or repealed either. It is undeniable, though, that views on financial 
reporting current during the first half of the 1990's differ considerably from the 
picture outlined in the previous paragraphs. Between 1970 and the present, a 
variety of circumstances and developments have affected and continue to affect 
the constituent key elements of the 'Dutch system' enumerated in the previous 
section. None of these elements was ever completely renounced or invalidated, 
but each of them has suffered in relevance, clarity or acceptability. The overall 
result has been that the composite ideal of the 'Dutch system' was left to fade 
away more or less unconsciously in the dissolution of its components. 
In the following sections, the effects of some of the more important events and 
circumstances wil l be briefly discussed in order to assess their effect on elements 
of the 'ideal' system and so on the ideal as a whole. 
3.4.1 Developments among auditors 
Enthusiasm for a particular Dutch approach to financial reporting had been 
strongest among auditors. It is therefore useful to start with a review of some of 
the general trends in the auditing profession. 
At the end of the 1960's, the professional auditor literature was characterized by 
self-confidence. The auditing profession had achieved its lifelong goal of legal 
recognition in 1967. From that year onwards, all certifying auditors were united 
in one officially recognized body known as NIvRA (Nederlands Instituut van 
Registeraccountants). The united profession could look forward to the 
introduction of an obligatory audit for a significant number of companies. It took 
pride in the knowledge that the high standards of professional life carried forward 
into the legal settlement were nothing more than what it had achieved already for 
itself in the days without legal protection. The sentiment was optimistic, and 
there was an eagerness to scale new heights86. 
Unfortunately, determining what new directions were to be taken in the course of 
further progress turned out to be a rather intractable problem. From the early 
1970's onwards and lasting roughly throughout the decade, the auditing 
profession experienced growing uncertainty about its identity and about the 
proper response to new challenges. Two related developments disturbed the 
profession in particular. The most clearly felt, though perhaps not the most 
8 6
 One of the clearest expressions of this sentiment is the speech of A.F. Tempelaar, 
NIvRA chairman, at the inaugural meeting of the reconstituted profession (Tempelaar, 
1967). 
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lasting, was the fact that the trend towards vermaatschappelijking that had 
resulted, among other things, in the 1970 Act on Annual Financial Statements, 
began to be felt within auditing profession. It was believed that a growing 
participation of employees and the general public in corporate affairs required a 
fundamental reconsideration of the role and responsibility of the auditor. Issues 
such as involvement of the auditor in management audits or the possibility of 
auditors serving as semi-officials on behalf of the public interest began to appear 
in the literature87. On a more practical level, it resulted in much attention being 
paid to the auditor's involvement with interim financial statements and 
prospective information88. 
At the same time, the profession and its clients were confronted with rapidly 
expanding regulation in many areas, and of financial reporting in particular. This 
trend towards regulation resulted from the same general trend towards 
'vermaatschappelijking', and it is not surprising that some members of the 
profession embraced regulation as a necessary or desirable way of coping with or 
clarifying what was seen as a proliferation of new demands89. 
3.4.2 Empirical indications of reporting quality 
The 1970 Act inspired curiosity about the extent of compliance with the new 
regulations, which in turn led to an empirical approach to financial reporting. 
During the 1970's, systematically gathered data on the actual state of financial 
reporting in the Netherlands became available for the first time. The NIvRA 
started to publish the results of biennial surveys of financial reporting from 1973 
onwards. The aspects of financial statements surveyed corresponded, at least in 
the earlier years of the series, largely with the clauses of the 1970 Act. The 
image of Dutch reporting as revealed in this series of empirical studies did not 
correspond completely to the ideal of continuous voluntary progress in financial 
8 7
 This development is marked by three study reports commissioned by the NIvRA 
(De accountant, morgen? rapport van de commissie toekomstverkenning aan het bestuur 
van de orde nederlands instituut van registeraccountants (Amsterdam: Nederlands Instituut 
van Registeraccountants, 1971); E. Zahn, De organisatie van het accountantsberoep onder 
de loep (Amsterdam: Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants, 1975) and Neutraal, 
maar niet passief, Discussierapport van de Werkgroep Dynamische Functieanalyse 
(Amsterdam: Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants, 1980). Two accountantsdagen 
were devoted to issues of change facing the profession (Het beroep onder de loep (1975) 
and Stormen rond normen (1976). A guide to this literature is Coret (1977). 
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 A critical review of the trend towards a more widely defined audit function can be 
found in Groeneveld (1976:139-159). 
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 On the development and impact of regulation: Berendsen (1990:95-99). A 
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reporting. On the whole, compliance was satisfactory. But the expansion of 
reporting practices beyond the legal minimum proceeded by a slow and 
occasionally halting process. An academic study by R. Slot investigated 
compliance with the law and with a set of extra requirements90. The 
conclusions of this study were on the whole rather negative. And although 
extensive criticism of the study's methodological weaknesses in the professional 
literature helped to soften the impact of the report, it did manage to introduce a 
sourer note into a hitherto rather optimistic literature. Together with the anxiety 
caused by the first pronouncements of the Enterprise Chamber (see section 
3.4.4), the overall result of the greater availability of empirical material 
concerning the actual quality of financial reporting was a rather more subdued 
tone, replacing some of the optimism from the late 1960's, and removing some 
of the assumed empirical foundations of the 'Dutch system'. 
3.4.3 Internationalization 
As noted in previous sections, attention to other countries has never been absent 
from the Dutch accounting literature. Nevertheless, until the 1960's, Dutch 
auditors had been rather eclectic in their reception of foreign ideas and 
practices91. It has been argued, in fact, that the postwar Dutch auditing 
profession maintained a conscious distance towards foreign organizations of 
auditors. This was based on the perception that professional standards in the 
Netherlands were distinctly superior to those abroad, with the possible exception 
of the United States and the United Kingdom (De Hen, Berendsen and 
Schoonderbeek, 1995:18-21). By the latter half of the 1960's, elements of a 
different attitude towards foreign practices began to emerge. In the professional 
literature, there were increasing signs of a realization that foreign approaches to 
accountancy and auditing in general, and to financial reporting in particular, 
might, after all, be relevant. In the Netherlands, the changing appreciation of the 
value of foreign example coincided, and became inextricably mixed, with the 
internationally observable shift of attention from accounting 'principles' to 
accounting 'standards'. 
The term 'standards' emerged in Britain, where the Accounting Standards 
Steering Committee was launched at the beginning of 1970. The first Statement 
90
 Vijftig jaarverslagen — Gewogen en te licht bevonden, Economisch Instituut der 
Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht (Leiden: H.E. Stenfert Kroese B.V., 1975). 
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of Standard Accounting Practice was issued in 1971. In the United States, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board succeeded the Accounting Principles Board 
in 1973. Even though the word 'standards' did not originate in the United States, 
the Wheat Committee, which proposed the creation of the F A S B , argued that in 
retrospect the work of the APB could be described more aptly in terms of 
'standards' than of 'principles' (Solomons, 1986:41-42). In all, the advent of 
accounting standards represented a 'profound change' affecting financial reporting 
practices worldwide (Baxter, 1981:282). 
During the second half of the 1960's, the Dutch professional literature displayed 
a clear awareness of trends in US accounting regulation, and of the possible 
implications for Dutch financial reporting92. Especially the work by Paul 
Grady, Inventory of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles for Business 
Enterprises (APB Accounting Research Study #7), drew much attention as it was 
seen to epitomize a new approach to financial reporting. Two issues of the main 
professional journal, Maandblad voor Accountancy en Bedrijfshuishoudkunde 
were devoted to this study in 1966, and it was an important influence during the 
early years of the Dutch Tripartite Study Group. 
During the 1970's, international influences made themselves more strongly felt in 
the Netherlands. These included the International Accounting Standards issued 
by the IASC, the rudimentary attempts at regulation by the O E C D and the U N 
and attempts at harmonization on the part of the E E C . In all, by the later half of 
that decade it could be remarked that foreign example had not only gained in 
importance due to the 'torrent' of international developments, but that the Dutch 
accounting profession had without noticeable reflection embraced the principle of 
codification underlying the work of the IASC that was in marked contrast with 
traditional and strongly held attitudes93. 
Increased attention for foreign developments resulted in this way in a reduced 
emphasis on the necessity or even desirability of having a 'Dutch' approach. At 
the same time, increased international attention provided a climate in which 
acceptance of more elaborate 'accounting standards' was reasonably natural. 
These trends continue to make themselves felt up to the present (Van der Wei, 
1992). 
3.4.4 Impact of the Enterprise Chamber 
A n important source of disparity in expectations regarding the 1970 Act was the 
uncertainty about the effects of the new compliance mechanism introduced by the 
See especially Smulders (1965), Kruisbrink (1965) and Karelse (1965). 
Bindenga (1976); 'torrent': Steenmeijer (1976:17). 
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Act. This took the form of an Enterprise Chamber (Ondernemingskamer), a 
court created to investigate complaints by interested parties relating to the Act on 
financial statements, and empowered to give directions to companies regarding 
the drafting of financial statements. If the court were to be activated by frequent 
complaints, the accumulation of jurisprudence might result in a system 
characterized by a much higher degree of formal reporting regulation than would 
appear from the text of the underlying law. Consequently, liberal representatives 
in parliament professed to believe that the law would not result in major changes 
for many companies, since previous voluntary developments had already resulted 
in a general level of reporting as envisaged by the law 9 4. On the other hand, a 
labour representative expressed the view that the law would be a 'first step', to 
be continued by an active role on the part of the Enterprise Chamber in the 
process of improving financial reporting95. The uncertainty was characterized 
by Groeneveld (1968:143) in the following way: 
the development of a major body of jurisprudence cannot be ruled out, given 
that (...) the requirements [of the law] are to be considered as minimum 
requirements. The Enterprise Chamber is charged with the difficult task of 
determining exactly, in a particular situation, what the requirements, 
formulated in general terms and as minimum requirements, amount to. 
According to analysis by Burgert (1982), the direct impact of the Enterprise 
Chamber on financial reporting has been quite marginal. This is true both for 
valuation and income determination and for disclosure. This is attributed, by 
Burgert, to the combined result of an already 'reasonable' level of disclosure by 
the larger companies, and the cumbersome procedures of the Enterprise Chamber 
which deter interested parties from filing complaints in all but the most flagrant 
cases of noncompliance with the law. Similar conclusions have been reached by 
Berendsen (1990: 56-59), and by Klaassen (1991). 
Hence, the Enterprise Chamber has not done much to alter the balance between 
voluntary and mandatory disclosure in favour of the latter by producing clear and 
generally applicable pronouncements. However, the Enterprise Chamber has had 
a more general and presumably unforeseen effect on views on the desirability of 
9 4
 Handelingen Tweede Kamer, zitting 1969-1970, p. 2863. 
9 5
 Handelingen Tweede Kamer, zitting 1969-1970, p. 2860, 2861. Further instances 
of different expectations include the following. On the one hand, the investors' 
association 'Vereniging Effectenbescherming' expressed the view that lack of clarity in 
the law might well result in the Enterprise Chamber being 'flooded' with cases (Bijlagen 
Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1968-1969, 9595 no. 4, p. 2). On the other hand, Van 
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explicit regulation of accounting. Its mere existence as an avenue to legal action 
has produced a rationale for reporting regulation that was unknown before. 
Whereas previously, from the point of view of companies, reporting regulation 
had few if any positive benefits, the existence of the Enterprise chamber made 
certainty concerning the actual contents of the legal requirements a positive good. 
That is, for the first time it was no longer necessarily in the interest of the 
companies to maintain the large and blurred border area between voluntary and 
mandatory disclosure so characteristic of the 'Dutch system'. 
A similar development occurred among auditors. Whereas before 1970 the 
expressed fear had been that a detailed spelling out of accounting and reporting 
principles might lead to verstarring, now the problem emerged that without such 
an explicit regulation companies (and by implication, their auditors) might be 
subjected to judgements that were perceived as unpredictable if not arbitrary. 
Auditors, hitherto largely unaccustomed to courtroom practice in the context of 
financial reporting, experienced this new development as disagreeable or even 
threatening96, especially when the new activity of the Enterprise Chamber 
resulted in serious negative publicity about the auditing profession in the national 
press97. The next section wil l argue that this affected attitudes towards another 
by-product of the 1970 Act, the Tripartite Study Group on accounting. 
3.4.5 The Tripartite Study Group and disclosure issues 
As discussed above, a private-sector Tripartite Study Group (Tripartiet Overleg) 
was set up in 1970 to make an inventory of the 'norms of the economic and 
social climate' referred to in the 1970 Act. By common consent, these norms 
were understood to refer to disclosure issues as well. The publications of the 
study group, issued since 1971, 
therefore contained (and still contain) numerous discussions of disclosure issues. 
The significance of the study group for the further development of the views on 
voluntary disclosure underlying the 1970 Act is quite complex, as it represents a 
mixture of continuity and change. 
Continuity was most evident when the study group was seen as a continuation of 
the voluntary system based on recommendations by the employer's organizations. 
The study group was seen as a natural consequence of the involvement of the 
employers' unions with improving financial reporting in 1955 and 1962. In this 
9 6
 Meijer and Van Tilburg (1979:398). 
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sense it was a belated realization of what Geertman (1956) had already dubbed 
the 'Dutch system' (see also Smulders, 1965). 
However, the study group could also be interpreted as a first step towards the 
introduction of a system of accounting standard-setting similar to that evolving at 
that time in the US, or similar to the standard-setting system installed in the 
United Kingdom in 1969. Such an interpretation could easily develop on the 
basis of the interest displayed in the Netherlands of around 1970 in US 
approaches to the codification of accounting principles. Moreover, the reference 
to norms considered 'acceptable' in the economic and social climate invited 
comparison with the notion of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles as used 
in the US (see IJsselmuiden, 1972:73). 
The difference between these two ways of looking at the study group came to 
light during the 1970's and 1980's in recurrent discussions on the 'status' of the 
publications of the study group. It had to be determined whether or not these 
publications (known since 1980 as 'Guidelines on Annual Financial Reporting') 
contained binding accounting standards. Ultimately, the literature on this subject 
achieved a consensus, according to which the Guidelines are not binding, but 
derive their authority from their 'intrinsic worth'. What this means, in effect, is 
that they contain the norms that an individual company, with the help of its 
auditor, could and ought to have derived itself from its knowledge of the 
'economic and social climate'. A company and its auditor could, at least in 
theory, apply the same process of reasoning, referring to the literature and 
reliance on experience as the study group would use in its drafting of Guidelines. 
Compliance is therefore at least theoretically ensured because the Guidelines are 
seen to represent norms that, even if unwritten, would have been equally binding 
on the company and its auditor. In this way the Guidelines represented a 
continuation of the blurred distinction between mandatory and voluntary elements 
in financial reporting that was indicated above as a key element in a 'Dutch 
system' of reporting. The fact, however, that this view could only be established 
(or re-established) after extensive discussion within the study group, in the 
literature and in the NIvRA indicates that, around 1980, support for a system of 
more authoritative guidance was rather widespread. 
Such support came from organized business and was also manifest within the 
auditing profession that had for a long time contained the more outspoken 
supporters of a voluntary system. Some of the more general reasons for a 
change in attitude have already been indicated: it is likely that changing general 
attitudes towards regulation and an ever growing awareness of foreign practices 
in the area of standard setting may have accustomed auditors and business to 
expect more strict guidance from the study group. A more specific reason can 
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be found in the role of the Enterprise Chamber. Calls for more authoritative 
Guidelines coincided roughly with uncertainty about Enterprise Chamber activity. 
Before the enactment of the 1970 law, when it was as yet unclear what role the 
Enterprise Chamber would play, there were calls for the audit profession to exert 
itself in the codification of accounting principles in order to prevent this area 
from being occupied by the new court (Kraayenhof, 1967:18). Comparable 
voices were heard in the later part of the 1970's when the court had actually 
become active: by then one could hear that the status of the Tripartite Study 
Group with regard to standard setting should be upgraded at the expense of the 
Enterprise Chamber (Meijer and Van Tilburg, 1979:400), or to provide the 
auditor with more viable defences in court (Klaassen, 1980:338). From a 
business point of view it was remarked that many company managements had 
'become increasingly disquieted by the fact that agreement with the auditor does 
not offer a guarantee of the correct interpretations within the fairly wide margin 
allowed in many legal regulations and in areas not regulated by law' (Van Putten, 
1980:11). 
In addition, there was the need to come to terms with the International 
Accounting Standards being issued since 1974 and the desire to present the 
Tripartite Study Group as a viable alternative to a strict implementation of the 
Fourth Directive. 
Even though, therefore, the work of the study group represented on balance 
continuity rather than change, it was nevertheless a focus for thought on change. 
In this way, the mere existence of the guidelines, coupled with the uncertainty 
introduced by the debate concerning their status, has tended to obscure some of 
the notions forming the 'Dutch system', or to change their perceived significance. 
One of these effects is that the study group has shifted the emphasis in thinking 
on voluntary behaviour. Instead of looking for beneficial effects of the 
harmonious cooperation of management and auditor in preparing the financial 
statements of the individual companies, attention shifted to cooperation in 
determining accounting standards. Whereas in the late 1960's the uniqueness of 
the Dutch system was sought in the fact that voluntary behaviour at the level of 
the individual firm had resulted in informative reporting, in the 1970's such 
uniqueness was found in the fact that accounting standards were being set in a 
system of voluntary cooperation (Frijns, 1979:659). 
Although this shift of emphasis left the importance of voluntary action intact, it 
did have some consequences. For the individual firm and the individual auditor 
engaged in drafting a specific set of financial statements, the existence of a set of 
standards, whether voluntarily issued by their representatives or not, served to 
make the idea of voluntary reporting more remote. If such standards were to 
some extent binding, it meant that compliance with such standards, rather than 
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professional determination of proper reporting, became a more characteristic part 
of the accounting process. 
The study group has also served to bring to light some of the limits of a 
voluntary system. The assumption of willing cooperation has occasionally been 
put severely to the test by the inability of the delegations to reach consensus on 
important accounting issues. In one of the few disclosure areas where the study 
group has attempted to go significantly beyond legal requirements, segment 
reporting, issuance of clear guidance was prevented by strong disagreement (Zeff 
etal, 1992:327-328). 
In short, the study group has been set up in harmony with the notions of the 
'Dutch system'. Seen in this light, it is natural that its structure and status began 
to be questioned and perhaps even misunderstood as the ideal of the 'Dutch 
system' itself began to recede from the minds of those involved. But the study 
group itself has been a factor as well in bringing about this dissolution of the 
composite 'Dutch system', by leading to changes of attitude towards some of its 
important elements, notably the idea of a blurred distinction between voluntary 
and mandatory reporting practices. 
3.4.6 The Fourth Directive 
A further reduction of the 'Dutchness' of Dutch financial reporting was caused 
by the adaptation of Dutch law to the Fourth E E C Directive on Company Law, 
which was made effective in 1983. 
Given that the 1970 Act had deliberately avoided a strict framework of disclosure 
requirements, one would expect some resentment in the Netherlands because of 
the significant changes in disclosure regulation required by the Fourth Directive. 
The Fourth Directive, especially in its earlier drafts, was based on principles that 
were quite different from those of the Dutch 1970 Act. The Fourth Directive 
assumed strict compliance with its disclosure requirements. The Dutch 1970 Act, 
on the other hand, was drafted in a way that consistently played down the 
importance of the formal disclosure requirements. The disclosure aspects of the 
Directive were contained in a set of mandatory balance sheet and income 
statement schedules, as used in German company law since the 1930's. In the 
Netherlands, the last time that such rigid schedules had been seriously considered 
as a legislative option was in the literature responding to Van Slooten's (1900) 
thesis. The Fourth Directive therefore represented a return of Dutch accounting 
legislation to a continental European mould. As indicated above, the Netherlands 
had since the days in which the 1928/29 Commercial Code revision was 
prepared, been orientated towards U K accounting legislation. 
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The act adapting Dutch company law to the directive, passed in 1983, 
represented a significant expansion of legal disclosure requirements. The amount 
of detail introduced was quite opposed to the spirit of earlier legislation, which 
consisted of a few bold outlines within which companies were given freedom to 
work out the details according to their own circumstances. 
Some resentment because of this change was voiced in auditing circles 9 8, but not 
nearly to the extent that might be expected given the pleas for vigilance against 
verstarring that had accompanied the passage of the 1970 Act. Apart from the 
inevitability of the process of European harmonization, a major explanation for 
this seems to be the changing attitude towards regulation in general noted in 
section 3.4.1. Besides, it could be argued that the introduction of the Fourth 
Directive was not a change in principle. In the accompanying memorandum to 
the implementation act, it was claimed that the Fourth Directive was implemented 
'while attempting to conserve what has already been achieved in the 
Netherlands'. Since 'the Directive implies that the draft law has a much more 
detailed character than the [1970 Act] ' , a guiding principle was that '[w]herever 
the Directive presents the member-states with an option, this has generally been 
used on behalf of the flexibility that practice requires in applying [legal] 
prescriptions'99. 
As a practical consequence of conserving previous Dutch achievements, both the 
'insight'-override and the reference to the 'norms of the economic and social 
climate' were retained. Nevertheless, the reduced scope for exercise of the 
'insight' criterion because of the large increase in formal disclosure requirements 
represents another instance of an element of the 'Dutch system' that was not 
formally renounced, but that was allowed to diminish in importance. 
A n important effect of the Fourth Directive was that it weakened, to a certain 
extent, the assumption of auditor competence in determining proper disclosure. 
The introduction of extensive formal norms carried the risk that the judgmental 
aspects of the auditor's work would be replaced by mere checking of compliance 
(Bindenga, 1976). But there was a further effect. Much more than the 1970 
Act, the Fourth Directive expanded the influence of Law in the area of financial 
reporting. Whereas the Dutch auditing profession could justifiably claim 
expertise in auditing and business economics, the structure of its education and 
the nature of past experience could not justify serious claims to expertise in legal 
9 8
 An item by item criticism from a NIvRA point of view appeared as '(Gewijzigd) 
voorstel voor vierde EEG-richtlijn - Rapport van de Commissie Ondernemingsrecht', De 
Accountant, vol. 81 no. 5, January 1975, p. 313-323. See also Pruijt (1971:40-41), 
Sanders (1972:15). 
9 9
 Bijlagen Handelingen Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1979-1980, 16236 no. 3, p.3. 
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affairs. This had already come to light in connection with the first cases before 
the Enterprise Chamber, but the Fourth Directive prompted even more activity in 
the nature of conferences, study meetings and articles aimed at preparing the 
auditor for this hitherto unknown dimension of his profession (Degenkamp, 
1983:10). 
3.4.7 Gradual change in views on voluntary reporting 
The previous sections have indicated how various elements of the 'Dutch system' 
gradually came under pressure, were questioned or lost some of their validity in 
the course of the 1970-1985 period. To review some of these developments: 
- The notion that there was or ought to be a particular 'Dutch' approach to 
reporting and reporting regulation came under pressure through the increasing 
importance attached to developments abroad. Especially in recent years, the 
desirability of having a purely national approach to reporting regulation has 
been questioned. The Fourth (and later Seventh) Directive constituted an 
immediate imposition of foreign reporting principles on Dutch law, which 
could therefore to a far lesser extent be seen as 'Dutch'. 
The practical significance of the idea of a wide border area between 
mandatory and purely voluntary disclosure has decreased because of the 
significant extension of legal requirements. 
- The idea of specific auditor competence in determining reporting 
requirements specific to the circumstances has decreased somewhat in 
prominence by increased reliance on formalized rules and the increased 
importance of legal skills. 
- The assumption of willingness among managements to provide information or 
to work for consensus with auditors has lost some of its validity in the light 
of occasional difficulties in reaching agreement in the Tripartite Study Group. 
The empirical validity of the 'Dutch system' could be questioned by its mixed 
results in providing good financial reporting as indicated by both domestic 
and international surveys. 
The net effect of these developments on the role of an abstraction as the 'Dutch 
system' cannot be determined exactly. Participants in the financial reporting 
process would tend to perceive such an ideal with varying degrees of clarity, and 
would differ in their interpretation of such a view. 
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Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to conclude that the overall effect of the trends 
and factors enumerated in the previous sections has been that, at present, there 
would be considerably less support for the view that there is or ought to be a 
distinctly 'Dutch' approach to financial reporting relying to a large extent on 
unregulated action. 
3.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has provided a description of the rise and gradual disappearance of 
the practice of interpreting Dutch financial reporting in terms of a 'Dutch system' 
of financial reporting and reporting regulation. On the basis of the materials 
provided in this chapter, it is now possible to arrive at an appreciation of the 
view of 'Dutch system' as applied to voluntary disclosure extension. The period 
during which a 'Dutch system' was seen to exist was a period (1) during which 
the exogenous development of company law in the Netherlands left the area of 
the contents of financial statements temporarily untouched, and (2) during which 
other factors, such as the auditing profession and company managements, were 
given a relatively free rein. 
Taking a long-term perspective, it may be said that Dutch company law has 
changed in response to the same forces or influences that were active in Germany 
and the United Kingdom. In the late 19th century, financial reporting legislation 
was changed to replace preventive state supervision. In the period following the 
Second World War, change resulted from calls for wider corporate 
accountability. In both cases, the direction of change was identical across 
countries. Nevertheless, an important difference separated the Netherlands from 
both the United Kingdom and Germany in that the slower pace of legislation in 
the Netherlands resulted in a longer period during which financial reporting could 
develop autonomously. This provided an environment in a which the notion of a 
'Dutch system' could develop. 
That a 'Dutch system' could exist in this way by the grace of the law can be seen 
both at its beginning and at its ending. During the preparation of the 1928/29 
Commercial Code revision, the decision to leave the contents of financial 
statements largely unregulated, despite foreign precedent, was arrived at on the 
basis of arguments on the proper role of the law. Such arguments could and 
were also used to determine the contents of company law outside the area of 
financial reporting. At end of the period studied here, the scope for a specific 
'Dutch system' was considerably narrowed by the introduction of the Fourth 
Directive, which represented above all a change in the approach to legislation, 
rather than a change in views on financial reporting. It was this changing 
approach to legislation that reverted financial reporting regulation to a pattern of 
legislation renounced in the context of the 1928 Commercial Code revision. 
Given that the law temporarily maintained an attitude of abstinence in the area of 
financial reporting, other forces were allowed to determine the shape of financial 
statements. As seen, the most important of these forces was the interplay 
between auditor competence and the willingness of company managements to 
innovate. To rely on these forces to bring about improvements in financial 
reporting, or to advocate reliance on them, was not unique to the Netherlands, 
however. As indicated, prior to the passage of the Companies Act 1947 in the 
United Kingdom, similar views were expressed concerning the importance of 
voluntary action in the development of financial reporting. Outside the 
Netherlands, men were definitely aware of the attractions of a voluntary system. 
However, in most countries the working of voluntary forces was inhibited or 
obscured by systems of regulations that were or became more elaborate and 
binding than in the Netherlands. Even in the United Kingdom, the country that 
for the longest time remained close to the Netherlands in the area of accounting 
legislation, the Companies Acts 1947 and 1967 introduced restrictions not felt in 
the Netherlands until 1970 or even 1983. 
Rather than concluding, therefore, that a specifically 'Dutch' line of development 
in financial reporting can be distinguished, it is more useful, at least with regard 
to the development of financial statement disclosure, to position the Netherlands 
at one of the more extreme ends of a continuum of approaches. On this 
continuum, the situation in the Netherlands most closely resembled, and was in 
fact for some time substantially identical to, the United Kingdom. 
The discussion in this chapter established that there was a widespread perception 
in the Netherlands of the importance of voluntary improvements in disclosure. In 
addition, this chapter has offered an interpretation of how such a point of view 
could develop in the context of the history of financial reporting regulation in the 
Netherlands and in other countries. The main task of the empirical section of 
this book is now to demonstrate that important voluntary disclosure extensions 
did in fact take place, and to determine in more detail how these were brought 
about. 
It has been shown that an important role was attributed to company managements 
in initiating improvements in financial statements. The particulars of this role 
have been largely left unspecified, though. The two specific factors that have 
been mentioned are the alleged role of the multinational companies in leading 
improvements in reporting practices, and the role attributed to the 1955 and 1962 
employers' reports. Apart from establishing the influence of these two factors, 
an empirical investigation could also shed light on the question of whether all 
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companies participated equally in the improvements in disclosure, or whether 
specific companies or types of companies were left out. 
Another question suggested by the discussion in this chapter is whether the 
change in attitude towards regulation during the post-1970 period translated itself 
into a different pattern of voluntary disclosure. Finally, given the close 
correspondence in the development of thought on financial reporting and 
reporting regulation between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, a 
comparison between disclosure levels in the two countries appears to be in order. 
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Chapter 4 
Approaches to empirical disclosure research 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the empirical section of this study. Section 4.2 reviews 
the existing empirical literature. Section 4.3 discusses the main choices underly­
ing the research approach adopted here. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 discuss the 
selection of disclosure items to be studied and the sample of company financial 
statements in more detail. 
4.2 Survey of previous empirical research 
Interest in extent and form of disclosure in financial reporting practice is a long­
standing feature of the accounting literature. Reports on studies of reporting and 
disclosure practices appeared well before the Second World War. Munnik's 
(1931) report on Dutch reporting practices, discussed in chapter 3, can be cited 
as an example. It is, however, not until after the war that the literature on this 
subject acquires a more systematic character, with sequences of studies starting to 
form a coherent body of research. At present, the empirical disclosure literature 
is rather well developed, even though not all potential avenues of research have 
been explored with the same degree of thoroughness. Table 4.1 shows an 
overview of recent publications with their main characteristics. 
For the purposes of this chapter, the variety of approaches within the total body 
of published empirical research on financial statement disclosure can be ordered 
by means of two elementary dimensions. These are the level of aggregation with 
which disclosure is measured (single-item versus multi-item studies) and the num­
ber of periods studied (single-period versus multi-period studies). Section 4.2.1 
discusses issues regarding the level of aggregation. Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 
review the analytical approaches used in single-period studies and multi-period 
studies, respectively. 
4.2.1 Aggregation levels in disclosure studies 
As indicated in chapter 1, the word 'disclosure' has a number of meanings, 
ranging from the act of making a marginal addition to the contents of a set of 
financial statements, to the total extent of information included in an annual 
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report. Similarly, disclosure studies can take as their subject the disclosure of 
specific items of information, or the total extent of disclosure. 
Hence, three basic types of disclosure study can be distinguished: 
Single item studies. 
Multi-item studies, not including a measure of aggregate disclosure. 
Aggregated multi-item studies. 
Single-item studies do not pose specific issues with regard to the measurement of 
disclosure. Such measurement either involves a binary scoring (e.g. Wong, 
1988, on the disclosure of current cost data, and Bazley, Brown and Izan, 1985, 
on lease disclosures) or the use of an ordinal scale with which various disclosure 
alternatives can be ranked (e.g. Bradbury, 1992, distinguishing four levels of 
segment reporting). A number of these studies are shown in the upper half 
(panel A) of table 4.1. 
The group of multi-item studies without aggregation includes regular surveys of 
public reporting practices, such as Accounting Trends & Techniques. In addition, 
there are unaggregated multi-item studies that include more substantial analyses, 
such as Murphy (1988) on the development of Canadian financial reporting. 
Unaggregated studies tend to rely on qualitative interpretations of observed data. 
Aggregated multi-item studies are characterized by the use of 'disclosure indexes' 
to measure total extent of disclosure. The origin of index-type studies is by 
common consent traced to the work of Cerf (1961). Typically, a disclosure 
index is used to capture in a single number the 'disclosure' aspect of a set of 
financial statements. This involves compiling a list of topics about which a 
company might provide information, assigning scores to a particular set of 
financial statements for each topic or item about which information is disclosed, 
summing individual scores to a single number and dividing this by the maximum 
total score that might have been obtained. 
Marston and Shrives (1991), reviewing the disclosure index literature, report that 
disclosure indexes are used in a rather wide variety of studies. Apart from 
relatively straightforward descriptive studies (e.g. Tonkin, 1984), disclosure 
indexes are used in cross-sectional analytical studies and comparative static 
studies. Table 4.1 (panel B) contains a list of studies using disclosure indexes. 
As the table shows, the use of disclosure indexes in the literature has, if any­
thing, increased during the early 1990's, despite the fact that the index method 
suffers from a number of weaknesses. As indicated by Marston and Shrives, 
these consist mainly of the inevitability of subjective judgements, both in select­
ing items for inclusion in the index and in assigning scores to companies1. 
1
 See also Dhaliwal (1980) for a critical commentary on cross-sectional disclosure 
research by means of the index method. 
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Table 4.1 
Cross-sectional empirical disclosure studies 
Study: Country/year: Object: covariates of disclosure: 
Panel A; selected single-item studies: 
Salamon & Dhaliwal US, 1967-1970 segmental information asset size 
(1981) new issues 
Leftwich, Watts & US, 1937,1948 interim reporting assets in place 
Zimmerman (1981) firm value 
debt/firm value 
outside directors 
listing status 
inertia 
industry 
dividend frequency 
auditor 
Bazley, Brown & Izan Australia, 1979 lease commitments net assets 
(1985) auditor 
industry 
fin.rep. competition 
foreign affiliation 
leverage 
bonus schemes 
Whittred (1986) Australia, 1930's, 
1950's. 
consolidated reports cross-guarantees 
management share in 
parent equity 
# of subsidiaries 
Wong (1988) New Zealand, 1980-81 current cost data effective tax rate 
leverage 
market dominance 
historical cost ROA 
capital intensity 
size (net income) 
Bradbury (1992a) New Zealand, 1983 segmental information firm value 
leverage 
assets in place 
earnings volatility 
foreign affiliation 
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
Bradbury (1992b) New Zealand, 1973-76 semiannual reporting earnings volatility 
unexpected earnings 
size 
Craswell & Taylor 
(1992) 
Roberts (1992) 
Australia, 1984 oil & gas reserves 
US, mid-1980's corporate social 
responsibility 
disclosure 
Forker(1992) UK, 1988 directors' share 
options 
Lang & Lundholm 
(1993) 
USA, 1985-89 analysts' ratings 
of disclosure 
auditor 
log assets 
leverage 
cash-flow variance 
dispersion of ownership 
high profile industry 
contributions to PAC's 
age of corporation 
size of public affairs staff 
return on equity 
average revenue 
ownership concentration 
market beta 
philanthropic donations 
debt/equity ratio 
size 
equity held by directors 
options held by directors 
auditors 
audit committee 
dominant personality 
size 
returns 
variability of returns 
abnormal returns 
unexpected earnings 
earnings/returns 
correlation 
issues of securities 
Wallace et al. (1994) Spain, 1991 extent of disclosure 
on 16 items 
size 
gearing 
return on equity 
profit margin 
current ratio 
manufact/nonmanufact 
listing status 
big-6 auditor 
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Table 4.1 (continued) 
Panel B: Studies using disclosure indexes 
Singhvi (1968) India, 1963-65 weighted index 
of 34 items 
asset size 
rate of return 
earnings margin 
auditor 
foreign affiliation 
# shareholders 
Singhvi &Desai (1971) USA, 1965/66 weighted index 
of 34 items 
Entrants Eurobond 
market 1954-1970 
Choi (1973) 
Buzby (1974, 1975) US, 1971/72 
Barrett (1977) seven countries, 
1963-1972 
Dijksma & Van Halem Netherlands, 1970-74 
(1977) 
Firth (1979) 
Firth (1980) 
UK, 1976 
UK, 1973 
Kahl & Belkaoui (1981) Banks from 18 
countries, 1975 
McNally, Eng New Zealand, 1979 
& Hasseldine (1982) 
(un)weighted index 
of 47 items 
weighted index 
of 39 items 
(un)weighted index 
of 17 item 
index derived from 
Singhvi & Desai 
(1971) 
(un)weighted index 
of 48 items 
(un)weighted index 
of 48 items 
weighted index 
of 30 items 
weighted index 
of 41 items 
asset size 
# shareholders 
listing status 
auditor 
rate of return 
earnings margin 
entry in Eurobond 
market 
asset size 
listing status 
country 
year 
share price volatility 
listing status 
size 
big-8 auditor 
market capitalization 
rights-/new issues 
total assets 
net income/total assets 
growth total assets 
industry 
auditor 
Cowen et al. (1987) US, mid-1970's unweighted index of 
social responsibility 
disclosures 
of 27 items 
size 
industry 
return on equity 
existence of social 
responsibility committee 
95 
Table 4.1 (continued) 
Chow & Wong-Boren 
(1987) 
Wallace (1988) 
Cooke (1989) 
Wagenhofer 
(1990b, 1990c) 
Hossain et al. (1994) 
Hossain et al. (1995) 
Mexico, 1982 
Nigeria, 1982-86 
Sweden, 1985 
Austria, 1990 
Malaysia, 1991 
New Zealand, 1991 
(un)weighted index 
of 24 items 
weighted indexes 
comprising 185 items 
on six disclosure areas 
unweighted index 
of 224 items 
unweighted index 
of 14 items 
unweighted index 
of 106 items 
unweighted indices 
of 24 and 30 items 
unweighted index 
of 78 items 
unweighted index 
of 95 items 
unweighted index 
of 80 items 
unweighted indices 
of 108 and 112 items 
firm value 
leverage 
assets in place 
perceived importance 
of areas according 
to survey 
listing status 
size (various measures) 
affiliation 
log capital 
industry 
return on investment 
leverage 
size 
listing status 
industry 
size (various measures) 
profitability 
ownership of shares 
leverage 
assets in place 
export to sales ratio 
size 
ownership dispersal 
foreign listing 
leverage 
assets in place 
big-6 auditor 
size 
leverage 
assets in place ratio 
big-6 auditor 
listing status 
size 
leverage 
assets in place 
big-6 auditor 
foreign listing 
country 
listing status 
Hossain & Adams Australia, 1991 
(1995) 
Gray, Meek & Roberts US/UK, 1989 
(1995) 
Cooke(1991, 1992) Japan, 1987 
Raffournier (1994) Switzerland, 1991 
Note: covariates are classified as significant or not significant according to the conclusions reached in 
the various studies rather than on the basis of a uniform criterion. 
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From table 4.1 (panel B), it appears that the number of items used in disclosure 
indexes varies from 14 to more than 200 elements. The typical number, how­
ever, is between 30 and 50 elements, with a tendency for larger numbers of 
variables in more recent studies. Various approaches have been used to select 
items for an index (apart from replicating earlier studies). Choi (1973) based his 
research on an explicit model of decision-making for investments from which he 
derived a list of required information. Interviews with investment analysts have 
been used to refine or calibrate such lists (Firth, 1980)2. On the other hand, 
Cooke (1989) is an attempt to construct as wide-ranging a list as possible, not 
limited to a single group of users of financial statements. 
A criterion used in a number of studies (Buzby, 1975; Barrett, 1977; Firth, 1980; 
Wallace et aL, 1994) is to select only those items that are applicable to all 
companies. This solves the problem that, when a company does not disclose a 
particular item, it is not always possible to tell if that follows from a reluctance 
to disclose or whether the particular item simply is not relevant for the company 
in question. Where appropriateness is not guaranteed by the selection of items, 
scoring involves judgement (as in Cooke, 1989) or the problem is simply ignored 
(as in McNally, Eng and Hasseldine, 1982). 
4.2.2 Issues in cross-sectional analysis 
In both single-item studies and in studies of aggregate disclosure, the extent of 
disclosure can be related to selected company characteristics or other circum­
stances. A typical approach is to use a form of multivariate analysis such as 
linear regression (in the case of disclosure indexes) or logit regression (in the 
case of single-item studies). Table 4.1 lists the covariates of disclosure investi­
gated in the multi-item studies discussed in the previous section (panel B) and in 
a number of single-item studies (panel A) . 
Ideally, the selection of relevant company characteristics should proceed in the 
context of a theoretical framework, for instance as developed in the literature 
discussed in chapter 2. The studies listed in table 4.1 differ considerably, 
however, in the extent to which they base themselves on existing theoretical 
literature on voluntary disclosure. Evidently, this in part merely reflects the 
relatively late development of such a theoretical literature over time. For this 
reason, earlier studies like Singhvi (1968) tend to base their research design to a 
considerable extent on common sense. Reliance on practical reasoning continues 
2
 A meta-analysis by Courtis (1992) has shown that a non-trivial degree of consensus 
can be established across temporal and national divides with regard to the perceived 
importance of disclosure items. 
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to play an important role in many later studies. 
Another way of arriving at a set of explanatory variables is by following earlier 
empirical studies. In McNally, Eng and Hasseldine (1982), explanatory factors 
are selected simply because previous empirical studies have shown them to have 
a certain explanatory power. Regarding the selection of items to be included in 
disclosure indices, a similar perpetuating effect is visible. The studies by Cerf 
(1961) and Cooke (1989) have played an important role as examples for other 
studies. 
In contrast, Wagenhofer (1990c) contains an elaborate attempt to derive a set of 
explanatory variables from an information-economics model. Interestingly, his 
selection of explanatory variables (size, rate of return, listing status, leverage, 
industry, degree of state ownership) is to a large extent identical to the selection 
used in the earlier 'common sense' models. 
Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) explicitly derived their hypotheses from 
a body of analytical literature (in this case, agency theory). The agency 
approach has resulted in a number of typical explanatory variables, notably 
'assets in place' and 'leverage'. 
Finally, in the case of single-item studies, explanatory variables can be selected 
that are expected to be relevant for that particular disclosure decision. For 
instance, the factor 'cross-guarantees' was used by Whittred (1987) to analyze the 
incidence of consolidated reporting. 
Despite the various approaches to selecting explanatory variables, the general 
tendency in the literature is to adhere to a relatively small number of variables 
that recur across studies. The general pattern of results obtained with these 
variables wil l be briefly discussed below. 
Explanatory variables: Size 
Size appears to be the single most important variable in explaining disclosure. A 
large majority of studies that have included measures of size have found a degree 
of statistical significance in the association between size and disclosure. It 
appears that this result is more or less impervious to variations in the size 
measure used. Total assets, assets in place, sales, number of shareholders, 
market value of equity, market value of equity and loan capital and logarithmic 
transformations of some of these variables have been used, singly or in combina­
tion, in many studies, and usually with consistent results. In general, a high 
degree of correlation between such measures as total assets, sales and market-
based measures of firm value may be assumed, which can account for the 
identical results obtained with different size measures (see Newbould and Wilson, 
1977). 
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Explanatory variables: Listing status and capital market activity 
A more intense relation with the capital market has been found to be an important 
indicator of the extent of disclosure in a number of studies. Some authors 
(Singhvi and Desai, 1971; Cooke, 1989; and Gray, Meek and Roberts, 1991) 
have found that listing on more than one stock exchange, or on an official market 
as opposed to an over-the-counter market, coincides with more extensive disclos­
ure. New demands on the capital markets, for instance new issues, can be the 
occasion for increases in disclosure (Firth, 1980). Despite the contrary findings 
in Buzby (1975), capital market activity appears to be, with size, one of the 
strongest explanatory variables. 
Explanatory variables: Industry 
Somewhat surprisingly, industry has not received much attention in the empirical 
literature surveyed. Given that possible competitive damage is one of the most 
important determinants of disclosure mentioned in both the analytical and the 
'casual' literature, one would expect more attention to be directed to this factor, 
as industry may be a proxy for competitive pressure or possible competitive dam­
age. 
However, McNally, Eng and Hasseldine (1982) included industry among their 
explanatory factors without discussion. Bazley, Brown and Izan (1985) did so 
merely because empirical research had shown an association between industry 
and accounting method choice. Wagenhofer (1990b) includes industry as a proxy 
measure for proprietary costs. 
Empirical results of the few studies that did include industry as an explanatory 
factor have been mixed. Drawing conclusions from these limited results is 
hindered by the fact that industry is not easily defined and that classifying 
companies according to industries is to a large extent a matter of judgement. 
Explanatory variables derived from an agency perspective 
Leftwich, Watts and Zimmerman (1981) is the most elaborate attempt published 
to date to test the usefulness of agency theory as an explanatory framework for 
voluntary disclosure. Specifically, they have tested for such variables as assets in 
place (fixed assets/firm value), leverage and existence of outside directors. 
These factors are assumed to be proxies for a higher incidence of agency costs 
(and hence positively related to extent of disclosure), or indicators that alternative 
monitoring systems are used. None of these factors was strongly related to 
disclosure, at least not in ways predicted by the underlying theory3. Incon-
3
 It should be noted that most empirical studies of financial reporting from an agency 
perspective have dealt with accounting method choice rather than with disclosure issues. 
As argued in Watts and Zimmerman (1990), empirical work in these areas has generally 
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elusive results on assets in place and leverage have resulted from other studies as 
well (Bazley, Brown and Izan, 1985; Chow and Wong-Boren, 1987; Wagen-
hofer, 1990c; Craswell and Taylor, 1992 and Bradbury, 1992, although the last 
does have a positive result on leverage). 
A primary reason for this lack of results might be that the effects predicted by 
the agency framework are concerned with such a level of detail that their 
occurrence cannot be established because of noise (Burton, 1981). However, it is 
not certain that more detailed studies will yield better results. Forker (1992) is a 
detailed study of the relation between corporate governance and disclosure on 
share options held by directors. Although the agency framework might be 
expected to be useful in this case, very few of the predicted associations could be 
demonstrated. 
Explanatory variables: Auditor 
The impact of auditor is typically investigated by a binary variable: big-six/eight 
firms versus other audit firms. The rationale behind this approach is that larger 
audit firms are more likely to have the technical competence required to identify 
possible disclosure extensions. 
Most studies aiming to associate different disclosure practices with the external 
audit firm giving an opinion on the financial statements have not found significant 
effects (Singhvi, 1968; Singhvi and Desai, 1971; McNally et al, 1982; Bazley et 
al., 1985; Forker, 1992). Studies that did find some association are Leftwich et 
al. (1981) and Craswell and Taylor (1992). On the whole, the evidence for a 
relationship between auditor and disclosure is weak. 
Explanatory variables: Nationality 
A few studies have analyzed differences in disclosure among companies from 
different countries (Barrett, 1976 and 1977; Tyra, 1977; Gray, Meek and Ro­
berts, 1991). 'Nationality' itself should presumably be seen as a dummy variable 
covering a number of factors such as differences in capital markets, company law 
and auditing profession. 
'Nationality' can make an impact in two ways. The most straightforward is the 
effect that companies in one country tend, in general, to be more open than 
companies in another. Barrett (1977) specifically addressed this kind of differen­
ces. In studies dealing with one country, such an effect may also occur when 
companies with foreign affiliations show differences in disclosure (i.e. Singhvi ( 
1968) and Bazley, Brown and Izan (1985) on foreign-affiliated companies in 
India and Australian, respectively). 
yielded results in support of the hypotheses suggested by the agency framework. 
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Another possible effect is that disclosure may be associated with different 
explanatory factors among different countries. For instance, in the English-
language literature, size is very often reported to be strongly associated with 
fuller disclosure. However, Coenenberg, Moller and Schmidt (1984) report on 
the basis of a survey of German empirical literature that in Germany it is 
industry rather than size that is most consistently associated with differences in 
disclosure. A similar effect has been found by Gray, Meek and Roberts (1991) 
who indicate that for US multinationals, disclosure is associated with multiple 
listings while such an association cannot be established for U K multinationals. 
4.2.3 Issues in multi-period analysis 
In the literature, three approaches can be distinguished to extend the time-frame 
of the analysis beyond the single period: 
Pooling of observations from different periods in event studies. 
Comparative static studies. 
Studies of change processes in absolute time. 
Pooled-observation studies 
Studies of this type focus on disclosure change rather than extent of disclosure, 
and therefore tend to be single-item studies. Whittred (1987) and Blommaert 
(1995) contain examples of this approach. Both studies deal with the inclusion of 
consolidated financial statements in the annual report. In this approach, data are 
collected on first consolidations occurring within a given period for a number of 
companies. The decision to consolidate is related to financial or other charac­
teristics of the company in the year of its first consolidation. In this way, the 
calendar year in which first consolidation occurs plays no role in the analysis, 
and observations across a number of years are pooled in a single analysis. 
Comparative static studies 
These studies compare disclosure practices at two more or less distant points in 
time, without observing the year-on-year changes by which disclosure changed 
during the intervening period. This approach can be used for single-item studies 
(Bircher 1988), multi-item but unaggregated studies (Murphy, 1988) and for 
index-type studies (Barrett, 1977). In all three examples cited, the analysis is 
qualitatively orientated, and relies largely on a discussion of changes in the 
environment in which financial reporting takes place. Leftwich, Watts and 
Zimmerman (1981), however, includes a statistical analysis of changes in 
disclosure practice described in terms of comparative statics. 
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Change process studies 
Studies in this category would take into account the absolute time at which 
disclosure change occurs, or at any rate the timing of disclosure change by one 
company relative to that of other companies. As a framework for such studies, 
Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse (1992:51-52) suggest the body of literature 
known as 'innovation diffusion' studies. This framework has been used in a 
number of studies in financial reporting change4, but most of these studies, 
including the examples cited by Gibbins et al. (1992), deal with valuation and 
income determination (e.g. the dissemination of LIFO) rather than disclosure. 
4.3 Outline of present empirical study 
This section outlines the approach to be used in the present study. This approach 
should be seen as a rather pragmatic continuation of some lines discernible in 
previous studies. In this section, the general framework of the analysis is 
discussed first, followed by a discussion of the main choices made in data 
collection. 
4.3.1 Framework of analysis 
As a general framework for this study, the body of theory referring to 'diffusion 
of innovations' has been chosen. As indicated in the review of previous empiri­
cal work, the use of a 'diffusion of innovation' perspective has characterized 
some previous research in the area of financial reporting. The present study, 
which was introduced in chapter 1 as an exploration of the characteristics of the 
process of disclosure change in the Netherlands, can be structured along the lines 
suggested by the more general model of innovation diffusion. 
As described in Rogers (1983), 'diffusion' or 'innovation diffusion' processes can 
be observed in areas studied by a variety of scientific disciplines. These pro­
cesses share some fundamental properties across discipline boundaries. Hence, 
recognizing a process in any area of research as a diffusion process gives access 
to a body of terminology, questions and hypotheses that help to structure an 
analysis of that process. 
4
 See Rogers (1983). The earliest suggestion of the usefulness of this framework in 
financial accounting is Tritschler (1970). Empirical studies on this basis include Copeland 
and Shank (1971, on LIFO accounting), Comiskey and Groves (1972, on accounting for 
installment sales), Parker (1977, on consolidated financial reporting), Bao and Bao (1989, 
on LIFO accounting). 
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Diffusion can be described as the process by which (1) an innovation (2) is 
communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4) among the members of 
a social system (Rogers, 1983). Closely related to the notion of 'diffusion' is the 
concept of 'adoption'. Adoption relates to the demand side of innovation, to the 
question of whether or not individuals wil l accept or reject an innovation when it 
is brought to their attention. A diffusion process can therefore be envisaged as 
the result of numerous individual adoption decisions. On the basis of this defini­
tion, the change of financial statement disclosure in the Netherlands during the 
post-war period can be interpreted as an innovation diffusion process. 
In general terms, an innovation is defined by Rogers (1983:11) as 'an idea, 
practice or object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of 
adoption'. In the context of financial statement disclosure, this implies that, as is 
frequently the case in diffusion studies, the boundaries of the innovation are not 
necessarily clear-cut. One might interpret every extension of financial statement 
disclosure as an innovation in its own right, or, conversely, one might consider 
the notion of 'openness in financial reporting' as a single innovation that was 
diffused in the Netherlands during the entire post-war period. This question wil l 
be addressed later in this book, after the characteristics of a number of disclosure 
extension processes have been studied. For the present it suffices to recognize 
that the change in financial reporting during the post-war period represents at 
least one innovation in the sense of the word used here. 
That this innovation occurred in the context of a definite social system was shown 
in chapter 3. By documenting the importance attached in the Netherlands to the 
notion referred to in that chapter as the 'Dutch system' of financial reporting and 
reporting regulation, it was made clear that financial reporting was not an activity 
undertaken by a collection of isolated reporting entities. Rather, it was observed 
that the population of companies formed a group that was clearly demarcated (by 
nationality and company law), where norms and values concerning financial 
reporting were communicated and to some extent shared, and which contained 
potential role models (large companies) and potential change agents (the financial 
press, the auditing profession). 
To complete the discussion of the definition of 'diffusion', attention is drawn to 
the obvious facts that disclosure change, seen as a diffusion process, was charac­
terized by a definite time dimension and relied largely (though not necessarily 
exclusively) on the use of communication channels rather than on repeated and 
independent invention by each individual adopter. 
A change process that is recognized as a diffusion process becomes amenable to 
analysis along a number of lines, including (Rogers, 1983:chapter 2): 
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1. The source of the innovation and the timing of its first and subsequent 
adoptions. 
2. The rate of adoption of different innovations in a single social system and the 
characteristics of innovations that are related to the rate of adoption. Such 
characteristics can include the relative advantages, complexity and 
observability of innovations. 
3. Correlates of innovativeness, that is, characteristics of adopters that are 
associated with their propensity to adopt. 
4. Tracing interadopter communication channels or communication networks and 
identifying change agents. 
5. Use of communication channels at different stages of the individual adoption 
process. 
6. The rate of adoption of similar innovations in different systems. 
7. Consequences of innovation. 
In this study, these questions wil l be addressed under two main headings (which 
correspond to chapters 5 and 6). 
Chapter 5 wil l discuss issues related to adopter characteristics. This corresponds 
mainly to question 3 listed above, although elements of question 4 wil l be dealt 
with as well. Relevant adopter characteristics can be derived from three sources. 
First, the general diffusion literature has identified a number of adopter charac­
teristics that tend to be associated with propensity to adopt across research 
disciplines. Second, the cross-sectional disclosure literature discussed in this 
chapter has produced a degree of consensus on company characteristics associated 
with propensity to disclose. Third, the historical background of developments in 
the Netherlands, outlined in chapter 3, suggests a number of relevant characte­
ristics. 
Chapter 6 can be characterized in terms of innovation characteristics. The 
discussion in that chapter revolves primarily around the questions 1 and 2 listed 
above. Question 6 wi l l be addressed in terms of a comparison with disclosure 
development abroad. Elements of questions 4 and 5 wil l be discussed as well. 
Question 7 is by and large beyond the scope of the present study. 
4.3.2 Outline of data collection 
The general framework outlined above, combined with the inevitable resource 
constraints, implies a trade-off to be resolved in the collection of the required 
data. This trade-off involves the number of disclosure items, the number of 
years within the 1945-1983 period and the number of companies to be studied. 
In this study, this trade-off has been resolved by the selection of a relatively 
small number of disclosure areas, to be studied on a year-by-year basis for a 
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substantial fraction of the population of listed companies. In other words, 
quantity in terms of disclosure items has to some extent been sacrificed in 
exchange for quantity terms of the number of years and the number of compa­
nies. While emphasizing that the choice as outlined here cannot rigorously be 
shown to be the most appropriate in the circumstances, some arguments can be 
cited to justify this approach. This takes up the remainder of this section. 
Sections 4.4 and 4.5 discuss the details of the company and the disclosure item 
sample. 
The objectives of this study might be attained by both a comparative static study 
and a study of year-on-year changes in disclosure. A year-by-year study was 
chosen because of the scarcity of this type of study in the literature. As a result, 
data had to be collected for a relatively large number of years, which was 
compensated for by a reduction in the number of disclosure items. A positive 
rationale for limiting the number of items to be studied is the need for detailed 
studies by item. To understand the process of disclosure change, the circum­
stances in which each disclosure item was introduced and adopted in the Nether­
lands should be known in some detail. It was found in chapter 2 that, next to 
proprietary costs, the information structure was a vital determinant of disclosure. 
In order for a company to consider a disclosure, this disclosure must be part of 
the array of available disclosures. Moreover, one would not expect substantial 
disclosures if parties outside the firm were not aware of the fact that the item in 
question was part of the disclosure array. In other words, a disclosure must be 
'discovered' and accepted as a potential disclosure, either by domestic invention 
or by observation of foreign practices. To understand the adoption of a particu­
lar disclosure requires that one knows the extent to which that disclosure was or 
became part of the common body of knowledge in financial reporting. 
4.4 Sample of disclosure items 
The quality of financial statements often referred to as 'extent of disclosure' 
defies attempts at exact measurement. Disclosure, as a characteristic of an entire 
annual report, can reasonably be assumed to be more or less equivalent to the 
sum of a collection of parts, but neither the identification of these parts nor the 
evaluation of the role they play in the determination of the total extent of 
disclosure are easily resolved issues. 
Breaking down total disclosure into a collection of individual disclosures is 
hindered by the fact that there is no obvious downward limit of disaggregation in 
financial statement data. Obviously, financial reporting practice has coped with 
this difficulty by developing some commonly accepted data groupings that can be 
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considered as basic disclosure units, such as 'cost of sales' or 'provision for 
pension liabilities'. This study will basically adhere to common usage, but it 
should be realized that such usage can cover considerable variation in meaning. 
Even if disclosure elements can be identified and compared among different sets 
of financial statements, the contributions of such individual elements to 'total 
disclosure' are not easily assessed. Again, in financial reporting practice the 
different importance of various disclosure items is readily accepted. This is true 
even though empirical research into the perceived importance of various disclos­
ure elements has rarely proceeded beyond the precision of five-point ordinal 
scales and has fairly consistently shown considerable differences among various 
groups of parties involved in financial reporting5. 
This background indicates the margin of uncertainty involved in both the demar­
cation of disclosure items and the assessment of their importance. The following 
listing of disclosure items to be studied here is therefore the product of a selec­
tion process that relies to a substantial degree on a subjective assessment of 
developments in postwar Dutch disclosure. The considerations, criteria and 
constraints that played a role in this selection are discussed following the list of 
items. In this study, a total of 13 disclosure items were selected6. These items 
can be grouped into the following 9 disclosure areas: 
1. disclosure of sales (or turnover); 
2. inclusion of comparative figures; 
3. disclosure of tax costs and tax liabilities (2 items); 
4. employment-related disclosures (2 items); 
5. inclusion of consolidated financial statements; 
6. inclusion of a funds statement; 
7. disclosure of current cost data (2 items); 
8. disclosure of earnings per share. 
9. disclosure of segmented sales and operating income (2 items); 
A number of criteria have been applied to arrive at this selection. Materials 
regarding the substantial correctness of the application of these criteria to the nine 
selected items wil l be found in chapter 6, where all of the items are discussed in 
5
 A number of studies on differing perceptions of disclosure are available from the 
period studied here, such as Chandra (1974), Benjamin and Stanga (1977) and Firth 
(1978). Lang and Lundholm (1993) contains more recent indications of varying percep­
tions of disclosure quality among financial analysts. 
6
 Appendix A contains a full listing of these items and a description of the disclosure 
data gathered with regard to these items. 
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detail. The criteria used are: 
a. The disclosure should be an 'innovation' of the 1945-1983 period. There 
should be no or only limited disclosure in 1945, and a substantial degree of 
disclosure in the subsequent period. Universal disclosure need not be 
achieved during this period. 
b. There should be sufficient scope for voluntary disclosure of the selected 
items. Since major regulation was not introduced until 1970, this require­
ment says in fact that a large proportion of the selected disclosures should 
remain non-mandatory following the 1970 Act. 
c. The disclosures must be applicable to all or most companies. Otherwise (in 
the case of consolidated and segment reporting), it should be possible to 
decide on (in)applicability by means of relatively objective decision rules. 
d. The disclosures should represent balanced diversity in the temporal patterns 
of their diffusion (ie: some disclosures should be selected that are already 
being disclosed early in the period, and the selected disclosures should not all 
have reached universal adoption well before 1983). 
e. Given the importance attached to costs of disclosure in the theoretical 
disclosure literature, an analysis of the relationship between the character­
istics of a disclosure and the rapidity of its diffusion wil l have to take at least 
this factor into account. The disclosures included in the sample should 
therefore differ to some extent in their associated costs. A crude approxima­
tion of this characteristic can be found in the degree to which the mandatory 
disclosure of an item is opposed in the literature. 
f. Some empirical material on the disclosure over time in other countries should 
be available. 
On the basis of these criteria, a set of disclosures can be selected to serve as the 
basis for meaningful item-by-item comparisons among companies and for 
comparisons with developments in other countries. The operationalization of 
criterium e. is of course a major determinant in the confidence with which results 
from these individual item studies can be generalized to disclosure in general. As 
indicated above, assessing the importance of items, especially during the course 
of a 40-year period, is necessarily a subjective process. This criterion has been 
operationalized largely on the basis of a survey of the Dutch professional 
literature as used in chapter 3. The items selected are among those that played 
an important role in the 1955 and 1962 employers' reports discussed in that 
chapter, as well as in a number of other reports and studies on financial reporting 
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practice during the postwar period7. In all, the selection of items would appear 
to capture a sizeable portion of improvements in disclosure during the 1945-1983 
period. The number of items chosen for this study still places this study within 
the band-width of multi-item disclosure studies listed in table 4.1 8. 
4.5 Company sample 
Chapter 3 has provided no compelling reason why a study of voluntary disclosure 
in the post-war Netherlands should be restricted to listed companies. In fact, the 
voluntary publication of financial statements by some large non-listed companies 
was occasionally cited as yet more evidence of the suitability of a voluntary 
approach to financial reporting in the Netherlands9. Yet the relative scarcity of 
accessible collections of financial statements of non-listed companies has resulted 
in a restriction of this study to listed companies. 
A 'broad' definition of the population to be sampled has been defined as all 
companies with shares listed at the Amsterdam stock exchange at any moment 
between January 1945 and december 1983. Companies meeting this requirement 
have been identified by means of Van Oss' Effectenboek10, supplemented by data 
from the financial daily Het Financieele Dagblad and the annual Stock Exchange 
guide commonly referred to as De Effectengids11. Figure 4.1 shows the de­
velopment of the population of listed companies over time. As wil l be evident, 
the population has changed considerably during the post-war period. Whereas 
the 1950's saw a substantial increase in the number of listed companies, the total 
number was reduced rather dramatically by a wave of mergers and acquisitions 
starting in the late 1960's. As a result of mergers and acquisitions, the iden-
7
 Notably Otten (1954), the published norms of the Henri Sijthoff award; Open Boek, 
Een nota over de behoefte van werknemers aan informatie over hun onderneming 
(Amsterdam: Federatie Nederlandse Vakvereniging, 1976), the Beschouwingen naar 
aanleiding van de Wet op de Jaarrekening van Ondernemingen (Considered Views) 
published by the Tripartite Study Group from 1971 onwards. 
8
 In fact, the number of disclosure items is approximately equal to that used in 
Wagenhofer (1990) when the effect of combining disclosure 'items' into disclosure 'areas' 
is taken into account. 
9
 E.g. 'Waarom publiceerde Honig N.V. haar jaarverslag?' (Honig, 1963), and 
'Openheid bij de naamloze vennootschap: Het jaarverslag 1968 van de Steenkolen-
Handelsvereeniging N.V. te Utrecht' (Brands, 1969). 
10
 Van Oss' Effectenboek (Groningen: Noordhoff, 1903-1955; Den Haag: Leopold, 
1956-1978). 
11
 Gids bij de Prijscourant van de Vereniging voor de Effectenhandel te Amsterdam 
(Amsterdam: de Bussy, 1888- ). 
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Figure 4.1 Listed companies 
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tification of individual companies is not always straightforward. As a general 
rule, the continued existence of the legal entity, that is, the limited liability 
company of which the shares are listed, is assumed to imply the continued 
existence of the company. Changes in name or in the nature of the enterprise 
carried out within the limited liability company are, in general, assumed not to 
affect the continued existence of the company in question. 
Exceptions to this rule have been made in cases of amalgamations of companies. 
For this purpose, a distinction is made between mergers and take-overs. This 
distinction is usually supported by indications such as the relative size of the 
companies involved, the type of process used in amalgamation and the name of 
the new combination. 
In the case of a merger, rather than a take-over, the listing of both companies is 
assumed to have ended, and a third company is assumed to be newly listed. In 
the year of the merger, the population decreases by two and increases by one. 
When one company is acquired by another, the acquired company is removed 
from the population. The status of the acquiring company is unaffected. 
These rules apply, with some modifications, to the situation in which only one of 
the companies involved is listed. The possible outcomes of these amalgamations 
are: 
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The listed company is considered the acquiring company; its status within the 
population is unaffected by the acquisition. 
The listed company is considered the acquired company and therefore remo­
ved from the population. 
The company resulting from a merger obtains a listing, in which case it is 
considered as a new listing replacing the merged companies to the extent that 
they were listed. 
The company resulting from a merger is not listed, in which case any 
merging companies that were listed are removed from the population. 
The 'broad' population of companies defined in the way outlined above has been 
narrowed down by excluding companies whose financial reporting, with regard to 
extent of disclosure, was expected to be imperfectly comparable with that of the 
main body of listed companies. Eliminations on the basis of this criterion 
included investment companies, companies whose activities were largely confined 
to the Netherlands East Indies and companies active in the financial sector. 
Investment companies 
Companies whose activities are limited to holding securities of other companies 
were excluded since their most relevant disclosures are incomparable to those of 
operating companies. This group excludes recognized investment funds, but also 
ordinary limited liability companies that are dedicated to holding securities of 
specified listed companies (e.g. 'Calvé-Delft', 'Moeara Enim' and 'Dordtsche 
Petroleum'). 
Evidently, companies may change categories. A number of investment compa­
nies started life as operating companies (e.g. 'Moluksche Handelsvennootschap'). 
Their removal from the narrow population required an element of judgement. 
East-Indian/Indonesian companies 
Companies with activities and assets exclusively or almost exclusively in the 
Netherlands East Indies/Indonesia have been removed from this population. The 
rationale for excluding this rather substantial number of companies is that, for the 
majority of these companies, normal operations were impossible during all but a 
few years of the period under study. Hence, their reporting practices were 
affected by overriding concerns that did not apply to the European companies. 
From early 1942 until late in 1945, no operations were possible at all, due to the 
removal of European personnel during the Japanese occupation. From 1945 until 
1950, operations of most companies were made impossible or seriously hindered 
by the hostilities preceding Indonesia's independence. After independence, a 
brief period of relative tranquillity allowed some companies to recuperate. In 
1957, however, all Dutch investments in Indonesia were nationalized. What was 
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left was a group of approximately 150 listed Dutch companies whose assets 
consisted almost exclusively of claims on the Indonesian government. Most of 
these companies continued a slumbering existence until 1970, when a final 
settlement was reached. 
For these reasons, a considerable proportion of companies listed at the Amster­
dam stock exchange from 1945 until 1970 are disregarded in this study. Evident­
ly, there is no clear-cut distinction between colonial and non-colonial companies. 
A number of indian companies have been retained in the population, as they 
managed by diversification to survive the nationalizations of 1957. On this basis, 
companies like 'Deli Maatschappij , and 'Rubbercultuurmaatschappij "Amster­
dam"' have been retained in the population. 
Banks and insurance companies 
Empirical disclosure studies tend to leave out banks and insurance companies for 
the reason that at least part of their disclosures are incomparable with those of 
other industries. In this study, in which disclosure of individual items figures as 
prominently as the study of aggregate disclosure, banks and insurance companies 
could have been included in investigations of those companies that apply to all 
types of industries (number of employees, tax costs). However, these companies 
have been subject to a different regulatory regime than ordinary listed companies. 
Their disclosure choices may therefore have been affected by different forces. 
This study does not address this issue. 
From the population as defined by the three exclusions listed above, a sample of 
companies has been drawn, according to the following procedure: 
1. As indicated above, the sample should reflect the size of the population in the 
sense that for each year, the proportion of sample to population size should 
be constant. This proportion has been set at 30%. With this percentage, the 
absolute sample size varies between 45 and 101 companies, which corre­
sponds to sample sizes in earlier studies12. 
2. From the population of companies that were listed on December 31st, 1945, 
a random sample is drawn of 30%. 
3. Similar samples of 30% are drawn from the four subgroups of companies 
newly listed during the periods 1946-1955, 1956-1965, 1966-1975, 1976-
1983. 'Newly listed' companies that are in effect the product of a merger 
including at least one previously listed company are not included in these 
subsamples. 
12
 E.g. Chow and Wong-Boren (1987): n = 52; Cooke (1989): n = 90. 
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4. The five chronological subsamples (or cohorts) are combined to form one 
sample. Each company sampled in any of the five cohorts remains part of 
the sample for each year from 1945 or its first listing until its delisting. 
This sample is then modified in the following manner: 
5. The listing of some sampled companies may end because of a merger. In that 
case, the company resulting from the merger, i f listed, is included in the 
sample for the years following the merger. 
6. The multinational companies Philips, Royal Dutch Petroleum/Shell, Unilever 
and A K U / A k z o have been selected regardless of the outcome of the pro­
cedure sketched above. These companies were selected because their foreign 
listings have traditionally led to the perception that they played an role in 
transmitting overseas reporting practices to the Netherlands13. 
7. Companies whose financial statements were not available in the collections of 
the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam; the Katholieke Universiteit Brabant, 
Tilburg and Erasmus Universiteit, Rotterdam were replaced by random draws 
from their respective cohorts (that is, a company listed in 1956-1965 is 
replaced by a company from the same age-group)14. 
The companies sampled according to this procedure are listed in Appendix B. 
The relation between the size of the sample as actually drawn and the total 
population is shown in figure 4.2. It appears that the ratio of sample to popula­
tion size fluctuates for most years between 30% and 35%. Two remarks are in 
order: 
First, for 1945-1948, the sample fraction falls below 30%. This is mainly due to 
the fact that for a considerable number of companies the resumption of normal 
reporting practices after the war was slowed down by such hindrances as 
destroyed records or inaccessibility of assets. 
Second, from the late 1960's onward, there is a distinctly upward trend in 
1 3
 See also section 3.3.2. 
1 4
 In all, the financial statements of 24 companies could not be retrieved, at least not 
for all the years during which they were listed. All three university libraries have 
attempted in the past to maintain complete collections of financial statements of listed 
companies. Gaps in the collections should therefore in principle reflect random causes. 
However, it is conceivable that library staff will go to greater lengths to obtain financial 
reports of large and well-known companies. Since size is bound to be related to disclos­
ure, this may be a cause for bias in the sample. Whenever possible, results of the present 
sample will be related to results of such previous Dutch disclosure studies as are available 
in order to asses the extent of any possible bias. 
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Figure 4.2 Sample size 
relative to population 
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'total listed1 excludes financial 
and colonial companies (see section 4.5) 
relative sample size to 35% or more. This increase in relative sample size 
indicates that the companies included in the sample are, on average slightly 
longer-lived than the population as a whole. However, such deviations from 
population characteristics can probably be classified as acceptable sampling error. 
Given the precipitous decline in the size of the population (falling at a compound 
annual rate of 5.7% between 1965 and 1975), it would seem that, by and large, 
sample size has followed population size in an acceptable manner. 
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Chapter 5 
Company characteristics and disclosure 
5.1 Introduction 
In chapters 5 and 6 the data, gathered according to the procedures defined in 
chapter 4, wil l be analyzed. This chapter discusses the extent to which differ­
ences in disclosure behaviour within the sample of companies can be associated 
with company characteristics. As opposed to the next chapter, which investigates 
differences in disclosure among items, this chapter is therefore concerned with 
differences in 'total' disclosure among companies. 
Although 'total disclosure' is an elusive concept, it can be captured in a practical 
and relatively simple by a disclosure index as discussed in chapter 4. The 'total 
disclosure' by a particular company in a particular year can be approximated by 
the number of items disclosed by that company out of the total list of thirteen 
disclosure items (see Appendix A) . Figure 5.1 shows the yearly average levels 
of disclosure (expressed as a fraction of the total number of applicable items) for 
the entire sample of companies. 
The image conveyed by this figure is that of a steady increase in disclosure. The 
increase slightly accelerates in 1969 and 1970, but otherwise progresses at a 
fairly constant rate throughout the postwar period. Figure 5.1 appears to be a 
good summary of the contemporary mental image of the development of Dutch 
financial reporting discussed in chapter 3. In particular, it appears to support the 
more positive views on the effectiveness of the voluntary system in use in the 
Netherlands: an overall tendency to increased disclosure that is only marginally 
affected by the introduction of the 1970 Act. Contemporaries were aware of 
differences in the extent to which companies participated in this process of 
overall improvement. Tempelaar (1966:272) observed 
(...) the results [of an informal survey of 1964 financial reports] wil l not be 
surprising to many, and, as confirmed in the comments of the financial press, 
display a tendency that can presumably be seen with listed companies in 
general: an interesting group of front runners, including the "internationals" 
that aim to provide shareholders and other interested parties with very good 
information; a tail-end of companies of which the boards apparently subscribe 
to Talleyrand's dictum that man has been given speech to hide his thoughts. 
And between these extremes one can see a large middle group aiming for 
improvements that are gradually being realized. 
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Figure 5.1 Total disclosure by year 
(average across all companies) 
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This chapter attempts to enlarge upon Tempelaar's observation by addressing 
questions as: how wide is the gap between the front runners and the companies 
making up the rear? Is there more to be said about company characteristics1 in 
relation to disclosure than that the multinational companies tend to lead the way ? 
In order to answer these questions, this chapter takes the following steps: 
Section 5.2 explores the extent of variance in disclosure among companies; that 
is, it characterizes the differences in disclosure among companies that 
subsequently have to be explained. 
Section 5.3 demonstrates that there is in fact a certain consistency in the disclos­
ure behaviour of individual companies: without consistency, there would be no 
point in trying to investigate systematic differences among companies by relating 
essentially fixed company characteristics to disclosure. On this basis, section 
5.4 introduces various measures that can be used to summarize disclosure 
practices over longer periods of time. 
Analyses of the relationships between these measures and various company 
characteristics are reported in section 5.5, which is the core of the chapter. 
Section 5.6 contains concluding remarks. 
1
 Even though 'firm characteristics' is a more common indicator of the qualities 
referred to, the word 'company characteristics' will be used here because in this chapter 
the word 'firm' will be reserved for 'audit firms'. 
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Figure 5.2 Dispersion of disclosure 
(Total disclosure, all companies) 
fraction of applicable items disclosed 
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
Average disclosure 10% decile + 90% decile 
Worst discloser —" Best discloser 
5.2 Variance in disclosure among companies 
This section discusses in general terms the nature and extent of the differences in 
disclosures among companies and over time. Its main purpose is to assist in 
conceptualizing and envisaging the complexities involved in describing and 
analyzing the process of disclosure expansion witnessed in the sample of com­
panies. 
A first indication of differences in disclosure behaviour among companies can be 
obtained by adding more detail to the graphical representation of average annual 
disclosure, as in figure 5.2. Apart from the upward sloping curve of average 
disclosure for the entire sample (already shown in figure 5.1), some indications 
of the dispersion around this average have been added. 
The two 'decile' lines shown in figure 5.2. represent the levels of disclosure not 
exceeded by 10% and 90%, respectively, of sample companies. Therefore, the 
area included between these two lines shows the variation in disclosure displayed 
by 80% of companies in the sample. As shown in this figure, this area or 
corridor gradually widens from about 15 percentage points in 1945 to a maxi­
mum of around 60 percentage points (equivalent to 6 to 8 disclosure items) in the 
late 1960's. After 1970, the differential declines again to about 20 percentage 
points. 
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Beyond the two decile lines, the best and worst disclosure scores for each year 
have been added to indicate the maximum disclosure difference between any two 
companies at a given point in time. The difference between the best and worst 
disclosing company in any year rarely falls below 50 percentage points and 
reaches a maximum of more than 80% in the late 1960's. At that point in time, 
some companies disclose almost all of the 13 disclosure elements considered 
here, whereas other companies disclose only one of the relevant items. 
From figure 5.2, the influence of the 1970 Act can be clearly seen from the 
strong increases in disclosure in or immediately before 1970. It may be noted 
that improvements in disclosure vary with the previous disclosure level: improve­
ments are very large for the worst disclosing company, and imperceptible for the 
best disclosing companies. 
A n important point to note is that this pattern of widening and then narrowing 
disclosure differentials is to a large extent due to the choice made in selecting the 
disclosure items to be considered in this study. For all of the thirteen items, a 
substantial part of the introduction cycle from first to universal adoption falls 
within the 1945-1983 period. Hence, it is only to be expected that in the early 
years, disclosure differences are small since only few of the companies disclose 
any of the items at all. In the same way, at the end of the period when many 
companies disclose most or all of the items, there is little scope left for diversity. 
In other words, merely owing to the selection of disclosure items, the frequency 
distribution of total disclosure scores changes from sharply positively skewed in 
1945 to a more or less symmetrical distribution in the mid-1960' s, and finally to 
one that is negatively skewed in 1983. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that, 
with respect to the items studied here, there have, in fact, been large differences 
in disclosure among companies throughout most of the postwar period. 
Within the total range of variation, one can envisage the disclosure histories of 
individual companies in the way as indicated in figure 5.3. In this figure, the 
'disclosure trajectories' of three companies, H E I N E K E N , D E S S E A U X and H V A 2 
are shown relative to the 10-90% interval described earlier. These companies 
were chosen because they illustrate the various ways in which disclosure by 
individual companies can change over time. In particular, this figure illustrates 
that companies need not maintain a constant position relative to other companies. 
D E S S E A U X managed to maintain a position roughly around the average level of 
disclosure. H V A , on the other hand, did not increase its disclosure at all from 
2
 Companies included in the sample will be referred to in the text by labels in S M A L L 
CAPITALS. These labels are used to avoid ambiguities caused by name changes and 
mergers. Appendix B relates these labels to full company names. 
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Figure 5.3 Disclosure trajectories 
(Illustrative companies) 
fraction of applicable items disclosed 
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
"10% decile " 9 0 % decile ~°~HVA + Dessaux ^ Heineken 
Figure 5.4. Disclosure deciles 
(illustrative companies) 
disclosure decile (0:lowest 9: highest) 
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
+ Dessaux ^~HVA ^ Heineken 
119 
1950 to 1967 and hence, despite a promising start, was overtaken by most other 
companies. H E I N E K E N started at a low level but sharply increased its disclosure 
over the period 1949-1956 and, from that time onwards, managed to maintain its 
position within the top 10% of disclosers. 
A n alternative way to represent the histories of these individual companies is by 
means of 'disclosure deciles'. These can be obtained by ordering, for each year, 
all companies according to their disclosure scores and dividing them in groups 
that each contain 10% of the total number of companies. 
For the three companies shown in fig. 5.3, the decile profiles over time have 
been charted in figure 5.4. This way of envisaging the data clearly illustrates 
that 'good disclosure' is very much a relative concept. The failure of H V A to 
improve its initially good disclosure resulted in a gradual relative decline. 
The fact that companies do not necessarily maintain their relative disclosure 
position implies that there may not be a group of individual companies that can 
unambiguously be classified as 'best' or 'worst' disclosers. Instead, companies 
may change status a number of times and may, in different periods, belong to 
different disclosure categories. For the group of best disclosing companies, this 
fact is illustrated by figure 5.5 which shows the disclosure experience of all 
companies that at one time or another during the 1945-1975s period have 
belonged to the top disclosure decile. 
As expected, the large multinational companies ( A K U ( A K Z O ) , PHILIPS, K O N I N K ­
LIJKE P E T R O L E U M (Royal/Dutch Shell) and U N I L E V E R ) belonged to the group of 
best disclosing companies for all or most of the period. More interesting, 
because less well attested in the Dutch literature, is the apparent fact that among 
the other companies that appeared in the decile of best disclosing companies, 
there is a clear 'generational' pattern. These other companies succeed each other 
to occupy for relatively short periods positions among the best disclosing com­
panies. During the late 1940's, one can see some ephemeral top disclosers 
( Z E E V A A R T , D O M A N I A L E M Í J N ) . These companies presumably profited from the 
fact that during these years most companies disclosed no items from the list at 
all, which means that one or two chance disclosures could bring a company to a 
position in the top decile. These companies are soon eclipsed by more consistent 
disclosers, such as the multinational companies. More remarkable is a group of 
four or five smaller companies that consistently appear as top disclosers during 
3
 For the preparation of figure 5.5, companies with identical scores have been 
assigned to the same decile with the result that deciles do not always contain exactly 10% 
of the observations. From 1975 onward, the number of companies with identical scores 
of 100% disclosure becomes too large to be grouped into one decile. Therefore, figure 
5.5 does not extend beyond 1975. 
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Figure 5.5 
Partial disclosure histories of best disclosing companies 
l l 
9 9 
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0 5 
AKU/Akzo 
Philips 
Kon. Petroleum 
Unilever 
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Heineken 
Albert Heyn 
Verto 
VMF 
Textiel Unie 
ACF 
Byenkorf 
Gamma 
Nijverdal 
AUDET 
::::::E899Hi Period of listing 
Company belongs to highest disclosure decile 
HUH Company belongs to second highest disclosure decile 
:::::: Company belongs to any of eight lower disclosure deciles 
Annual disclosure deciles are obtained by ranking companies according to their disclosure 
score for that year (number of items disclosed/total number of applicable items). Only 
those companies are included in this figure that at any one time during the period were 
part of the top disclosure decile. 
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the period to about 1960 ( K R O M H O U T , L O H U I Z E N , D R U , A R M and perhaps V A N 
O M M E R E N ) . In later sections, these companies wil l receive further attention. 
For the time being, it can be observed that some of these companies disappeared 
from among the top disclosers through delisting, while others were gradually 
replaced by companies that were already listed for some time, as H E I N E K E N , 
A L B E R T H E Y N and V M F , or by new listings, as A C F and A U D E T . The H V A 
and H E I N E K E N examples mentioned above indicate that an absolute decrease in 
disclosure is not required for a company to disappear from among the top 
disclosers. Rather, companies that do not expand their disclosure wil l be over­
taken by companies that do. 
The point that companies may change their relative disclosure status over time 
has been made with some emphasis in this section, in order to provide a caution­
ary note regarding the results presented in the next sections. The remainder of 
this chapter relies to a large extent on measures of disclosure that try to capture 
companies' overall disclosure performance throughout the period in a single 
number. Given the sometimes large changes in relative disclosure, this wil l 
inevitably result in data loss. Against this background, the next section considers 
in more detail to what extent companies can be considered as consistently strong 
or weak disclosers, despite the fact that the relative disclosure status of individual 
companies can and does vary over time. 
5.3 Consistent disclosure 
Consistent disclosure occurs when companies that are among the early disclosers 
of one particular item are among the early disclosers with regard to other items 
as well. This section demonstrates the existence of at least a minimum degree of 
overall consistency, which is important in an investigation of the relation between 
fixed company characteristics and disclosure as measured by an all-period 
statistic. 
To describe whether a company is an early or a late discloser, the most obvious 
measure is simply the year in which an item is first disclosed by the company in 
question. This measure wil l be used in principle to assess the degree of consist­
ency among various disclosures, but with two modifications to take into account 
two complications in the set of observed disclosure data. 
First, there is the problem that the data are censored. Companies enter the 
sample in 1945 or at the time of their listing and leave the sample in 1983 or at 
the time of their delisting. This implies that their disclosure history (if any) 
previous or subsequent to the sample period is not observed. Companies for 
which the critical event of first disclosure falls outside the observation period 
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must be considered as left-censored (right-censored) cases. These companies 
have to be excluded from this analysis. 
A second complicating factor is that companies may disclose some items 
incidentally. A particular item might be disclosed in one year because of special 
circumstances, but not in subsequent years. During the 1940's and 1950's, 
round-number anniversaries frequently prompted historical reviews including 
current data that were not regularly published4. To control for this effect, items 
are not considered as effective 'first disclosures' unless they were disclosed for a 
minimum of two consecutive years. 
With these two modifications, 'observed first disclosure' (OFD) can for present 
and subsequent purposes be defined simply as the financial year in which a 
company first discloses a particular item5. 
Table 5.1 shows the correlation coefficients for the OFD's of all pairs of 
disclosure items. Inspection of this table suggests at first sight a degree of 
consistency. Only four of the 78 correlation coefficients are negative, and none 
of these negative coefficients differ significantly from zero. On the other hand, 
the overall degree of consistency is not extremely high since, in total, 34 
correlation coefficients do not (taken individually) differ significantly from zero. 
To test the hypothesis that all correlation coefficients are zero (implying that 
individually significant correlations are due to chance and hence implying a 
complete lack of consistency), a test proposed in Steiger (1980) is used. This 
hypothesis can be rejected at the .001 confidence level 6. Repetitions of this test 
4
 Examples of this 'jubilee-effect' are documented in the next chapter. See also 
Munnik (1931:30) for a pre-war reference to this phenomenon. 
5
 More formally, OFD is defined by the following operations: 
For each company and each disclosure item, the years are identified in which 
companies switch from nondisclosure to disclosure. 
'Disclosure' is defined dichotomously, following the definition in Appendix A. 
Firms are to continue the disclose for at least two consecutive years before a first 
disclosure is recognized. 
Firms already disclosing in 1945 are assumed to show an observed first disclosure 
in 1945. Similarly, firms not disclosing in 1983 are assumed to start disclosing in 
1984. The requirement of two consecutive disclosures does not apply here. 
'Observed first disclosure' is not defined when a company is right- or left cen­
sored with respect to a particular item in years other than 1945 and 1983. 
6
 This involves the statistic E (n - 3) * (z')2, in which z' is the Fisher transformation 
of the correlation coefficient and n is the number of observations on which that particular 
correlation coefficient is based. The summation is taken over all k possible pairs of 
correlations, and the statistic is Chi 2 distributed with df = k. The value found is 455 with 
df = 78, which is highly significant. Owing to censored data, the several correlation 
coefficients are based on different subsamples of the total sample of 140 firms. 
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Table 5.1 Correlation Matrix of years of observed first disclosure 
SALES 
EPS .3692" 
(51) . 
SEGGEO .5112" 
(35) 
SEGIND .5108" 
(37) 
FUNDS .3969" 
(47) 
COMPF .3621" 
(60) 
CCBLNC .1494 
(65) 
CCINC .2885 
(46) 
TAXBLN .3367" 
(59) 
TAXINC .3389* 
(56) 
CONSOL .4110" 
(54) 
EMPLOY .4396'" 
(64) 
WAGES EMPLOY 
.1957 .3182' 
(52) (51) 
.3504' .4158' 
(38) (36) 
.1638 .1610 
(38) (36) 
.2071 .4494" 
(50) (50) 
.4102" .3341' 
(50) (57) 
.2800' .2392 
(63) (68) 
.2432 .2682 
(50) (53) 
.2697' .3630" 
(57) (62) 
.3194' .2593 
(50) (54) 
.5326"" .3461' 
(48) (51) 
.4824"" 
(69) 
CONSOL TAXINC 
.5164" .1503 
(40) (34) 
-.0706 .0834 
(24) (30) 
.4965" .2112 
(31) (27) 
.3314" .3781* 
(36) (31) 
.3375' .2922' 
(55) " (76) 
-.0132 -.0068 
(54) (64) 
-.0258 .2809 
(38) (40) 
.0435 .4914" 
(57) (69) 
.2675 
(53) 
TAXBLNC CCINC 
.1212 .2334 
(42) (42) 
.1850 .5327 
(27) (38) 
.1956 .4180 
(32) (37) 
.3411' .3787 
(38) (47) 
.1156 .1322 
(72) (45) 
.0541 .5497 
(65) (60) 
.5101" ' 
(46) 
WAGES .4532' 
(62) 
CCBLNC COMPF 
.0471 .4092" 
(48) (35) 
.4988*" .5329" 
(41) (28) 
.0854 .2374 
(39) (27) 
.0825 .4406" 
(46) (32) 
.1182 
(67) 
two-tailed significance levels: 
"" p < .001, " p < .01 , ' p < .05 
(): number of pairwise comparisons 
disclosure items: 
SALES sales 
WAGES wage costs 
EMPLOY number of employees 
CONSOL consolidated statements 
TAXINC tax costs 
TAXBLNC tax liabilities 
CCINC current cost income statement 
CCBLNC current cost asset values 
COMPF comparative figures 
FUNDS funds statement 
SEGIND industry segment data 
SEGGEO geographical segment data 
EPS earnings per share 
FUNDS SEGIND SEGGEO 
.6537"" .3087" .3414 
(51) (42) (31) 
.4155" .2717 
(34) (33) 
.3509" 
(43) 
for subsets of disclosure items showed that for all subsets with seven or more 
items, the hypothesis had to be rejected at the .001 probability level. The 
conclusion that companies behave consistently is therefore not based on a small 
number of highly correlated disclosure items. To the extent that consistency 
exists, it is a phenomenon that involves (presumably to varying degrees) a 
substantial subsection of disclosure items. 
5.4 Measurement of multi-year total disclosure 
This section introduces a number descriptive techniques for characterizing overall 
disclosure performance over longer periods of time. * Overall multi-year dis­
closure' wi l l be approached from a number of perspectives in order to compare 
the results of these various approaches and, as a result, to establish a degree of 
confidence in their validity on the basis of their correspondence. The measures 
of disclosure developed in this section will provide the basis for the analysis of 
differences in disclosure among companies in section 5.5. 
5.4.1 Describing disclosure in terms of adopter categories 
Innovation-diffusion terminology (see chapter 4) can be used to convert Observed 
First Disclosure scores to an overall measure of propensity to disclose. It has 
been found that innovation diffusion processes typically follow an 'S ' shaped 
curve. If, in a graphical representation, time is plotted at the horizontal axis and 
the cumulative number of adopters of an innovation within a population is plotted 
at the vertical axis, it is generally found that the number of adopters rises slowly 
at first, then increases rapidly and finally levels of again. If the number of new 
(rather than cumulative) adoptions is plotted, the result wil l be a bell-shaped 
curve resembling that of the normal distribution. 
This pattern of presumably normal distributions in diffusion patterns can be used 
to define a number of 'adopter categories'. Normal distributions are symmetrical 
and characterized by their mean and standard deviation. This suggests a classifi­
cation based on average moment of adoption (pt) and standard deviation of the 
moment of adoption (a). A commonly used ordering of adopter categories 
distinguishes five categories: 
1. 'Innovators': those adopting before t = JJL - 2a 
2. 'Early adopters': adopting before t = ft - o 
3. 'Early majority': adopting before t = fi 
4. 'Late majority': adopting before t = fi + o 
5. 'Laggards': adopting after t = /x + 2a 
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To the extent that disclosure changes do follow the S-curve pattern typical for 
innovation diffusion, it makes sense to classify companies according to their 
relative innovativeness following Rogers's classification scheme. 
The adoption curves as observed in this study are not quite symmetrical (see also 
chapter 6). Hence, a classification scheme is used that is based somewhat loosely 
on Rogers' classification. The starting point is the cumulative frequency of 
adoptions implicit in Rogers classification. In normal distributions, the categories 
1 to 5 correspond to the following cumulative frequencies: 
1. the first 2,3% to adopt 
2. those among the 2,4 - 18,2% to adopt 
3. those among the 18,3 - 50% to adopt 
4. those among the 50,1 - 84,1% to adopt 
5. those among the 84,2 - 100% to adopt. 
These percentages can be applied to asymmetrical distributions as well. When 
applied to the thirteen disclosure items, the results are as indicated in figure 
5.67. This figure shows how each company with an OFD for a particular item 
can be classified with regard to that item. For instance, a company starting to 
disclose wage costs in 1965 would be regarded as an 'early majority' discloser. 
A n simple indicative overall classification of companies is obtained by taking the 
numbers ' 1 ' to '5 ' of the various adopter classes at their numerical value, one 
can calculate an average across all categories. The resulting averages should be 
7
 Figure 5.6 is based on the following procedure: 
All instances of observed first disclosure (OFD) are ranked, by disclosure item, in 
order of occurrence. OFD is defined as in footnote 2 to this chapter. 
The ordered OFD's are divided into the five percentage segments listed above. This 
in turn establishes the cut-off years for the five groups. All companies first disclosing 
in a particular year are assigned to the same category, while the number of wrongly 
classified companies is minimized. When two consecutive first disclosures crossing a 
percentage boundary are separated by more than one year, the boundary year is 
assumed to lie in the middle. 
Finally, a correction is applied. On the basis of the cut-off years determined in the 
previous step, certain companies are added to the (1), (2) and (5) groups. Left-
censored disclosing companies whose year of entry falls within the (1) and (2) groups 
are assigned to those groups; right-censored nondisclosing companies whose year of 
exit falls in the (5) group are assigned to that group. The total number of corrections 
arising out of this procedure is less than 5% of the total number of observed switches. 
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Figure 5.6 Adopter categories by item 
(company characterization according to 
year of first disclosure) 
Sales 
Wage costs 
Nu. employees 
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Tax costs 
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Current cost (Blnce) 
Comparative figures 
Funds statement 
Industry segments 
Geogr. segments 
Earnings per share 
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I Innovators H Early adopters B Early majority 
H Late majority EH Laggards 
treated with some caution, not only because of the rather crude nature of the 
procedure in general, but also because the averages of some companies may be 
based on only one or on a small number of OFD's . An arbitrary threshold can 
be introduced requiring that for an individual company at least 7 OFD's must be 
available before a score for overall 'innovativeness' is calculated following this 
procedure. The 72 companies that meet this requirement are listed with their 
average scores in table 5.2. 
A general assessment of the validity of the ordering shown in table 5.2 can be 
obtained by comparing the top of that table with figure 5.5. As might be 
expected, the highest-ranking companies in table 5.2 are also the companies that 
occupy the top disclosure decile for longer periods of time. The large multi­
national companies appear near the top of the list, as well as a number of smaller 
companies like K R O M H O U T , D R U and L O H U I Z E N that, as shown in figure 5.5, 
were among the best disclosers during the 1950's. 
The three companies discussed in section 5.2, H E I N E K E N , D E S S E A U X and H V A 
also appear at appropriate locations in table 5.2. H E I N E K E N appears on a (shared) 
tenth place, slightly below the top because of its low disclosures in the late 
1940's which cannot quite make up for its excellent disclosures after 1953. 
H E I N E K E N ' s score is almost equal to that of A R M , a smaller company with a 
reverse disclosure experience (see figure 5.5): A R M disclosed very well in the 
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Table 5.2 
Companies ranked according to first disclosure across all items 
Based on observed switches from nondisclosure to disclosure ( O F D ) 
Observations/ Average score 2-Group 
Name based on 5-group clustering 
classification 
8 KROMHOUT 1.8 1 
9 D R U 2.2 1 
9 LOHUIZEN 2.2 1 
13 UNILEVER 2.2 1 
12 A K U 2.3 1 
12 PHILIPS 2.3 1 
7 IJSFABRIEKEN 2.3 1 
13 KONINKLIJKE PETROLEUM 2.6 1 
8 B L I K M A N SARTORIUS 2.6 1 
9 THOMASSEN DRIJVER 2.7 1 
13 HEINEKEN 2.7 1 
10 N K F 2.8 1 
10 VLISSINGENS K A T O E N 2.8 1 
12 A R M 2.8 1 
10 M U L L E R 2.9 1 
11 ALBERT H E Y N 2.9 1 
8 A S W 3.0 1 
7 APELDOORN ZEPPELIN 3.0 1 
13 V A N OMMEREN 3.1 1 
12 O G E M 3.1 1 
10 V M F 3.1 1 
10 H V ROTTERDAM 3.2 1 
t \ i / r \ f T T T\iir\ r*i 11—rx'Pf LWU g l U U p WUL U l l 
13 VERTO 3.2 2 
12 NlJVERDAL 3.3 2 
7 TWENTSCHE H A N D E L 3.3 1 
10 GROFSMEDERIJ 3.3 2 
13 DORP 3.3 2 
13 K N P 3.3 2 
8 B A L L A S T - N E D A M 3.8 2 
12 BIJENKORF 3.4 2 
7 BLAAUWHOED 3.4 2 
7 NlEAF 3.4 2 
9 N E T A M 3.4 2 
8 H B M 3.5 2 
7 VULCAANSOORD 3.6 1 
13 FURNESS 3.6 2 
8 GlESSEN 3.6 2 
128 
Table 5.2 (continued) 
11 SCHOKBETON 3.6 2 
9 BATENBURG 3.7 2 
10 DESSEAUX 3.7 2 
10 REINEVELD 3.7 2 
7 E N O T 3.7 1 
11 K E Y 3.7 2 
12 NlERSTRASZ 3.8 2 
13 ROMMENHÖLLER 3.8 2 
10 H V A 3.8 2 
11 LlNDETEVES 3.8 2 
8 ZEEVAART 3.9 2 
9 A I R 3.9 2 
9 B E G E M A N N 3.9 2 
9 REISS 3.9 2 
10 REESINK 3.9 2 
10 STOOMVAART Z E E L A N D 3.9 2 
13 CETECO 3.9 2 
13 PONT 3.9 2 
9 BERGOSS 4.0 2 
7 DUIKER 4.0 2 
13 H O E K 4.0 2 
7 JONGENEEL 4.0 2 
11 WERNINK 4.1 2 
9 KOUDIJS 4.1 2. 
8 SCHUITEMA 4.1 2 
11 TWENTSCHE K A B E L 4.2 2 
8 BEERS 4.3 2 
8 HOUTVAART 4.3 2 
8 OOSTZEE 4.3 2 
10 REEUWIJK 4.3 2 
9 WIJK & HERINGA 4.3 2 
7 MARIJNEN 4.4 2 
9 HOLDOH 4.4 2 
7 ASSELBERG 4.6 2 
11 K L E N E 4.6 2 
Note: 'Average score based on 5-group classification' is the average of scores across the 
13 disclosure items. Companies are assigned scores ranging from 1 (early disclosure) to 5 
(late disclosure) based on the timing of their disclosure relative to the average year of 
disclosure. 
'2-Group clustering' is a nonhierarchial clustering of companies based on the years of 
observed disclosure for all items with pairwise deletion of missing data. 
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1950's but fell towards the rear in the late 1960's. 
D E S S E A U X and H V A provide other examples of similar scores hiding different 
disclosure developments. Both companies score close to average (3.8 and 3.7 
respectively). D E S S E A U X did in fact maintain its disclosure at a truly average 
level (see figure 5.3 and 5.4), but the average score of H V A is the result of good 
initial disclosures and a long subsequent decline. 
In order to establish more formally whether the ranking of table 5.2 represents 
significantly consistent behaviour, a randomization test was carried out. For each 
disclosure item, the company classification scores (1 to 5) were randomly 
redistributed among companies. New average scores were calculated for each 
company. These data were reduced to a frequency distribution with eight 
categories. This procedure was repeated a number of times, and average 
frequencies calculated until these average frequencies were fairly stable. 
These randomized frequencies were then compared to the data of table 5.2. The 
hypothesis that the actual data might have been obtained by means of a random 
sample from the averaged distribution was tested by means of a Chi 2 test, and 
was rejected at confidence levels of p< .001 (Chi 2 = 27.6, df = 5). Hence, it 
can be concluded that the companies listed at the upper (lower) end of table 5.2 
did, with some degree of consistency, disclose earlier (later) than those at the 
lower (upper) end of the table. 
A clustering approach was used to determine a boundary between the 'upper' and 
'lower' end of table 5.2. The 72 companies were clustered on the basis of the 
actual years of observed first disclosures. In a two-group clustering, the com­
panies are divided in a group of 'early disclosers' consisting of 25 companies, 
and a group of 47 'late disclosers'. Cluster membership is shown in the second 
column of table 5.2. The clustering approach and the ranking on the basis of the 
1-5 scores in the previous section produce almost exactly identical results. If the 
boundary between early and late disclosers is drawn at 3.21 (in terms of the 
average 5-point score), the clustering approach results in a minimum of three 
deviant classifications. 
As a final indication of the validity of the ranking depicted in table 5.2, it can be 
shown that companies belonging to the upper half of the table were significantly 
more likely to win the annual Henri Sijthoff prize, awarded since 1953 for 
excellent financial reporting by listed companies (see chapter 3)8. 
8
 Among the 72 companies in table 5.2 were 19 award winners, 16 with an average 
OFD score < 3.5. Of the 53 non-winning companies, 17 had an OFD score < 3.5. 
Chi 2 = 15,2 (13,3 with cont. com); p < .001 
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5.4.2. Average Normalized Disclosure/Average Excess Disclosure 
Using Observed First Disclosure has two advantages. The procedure relies on 
common-sense notions of disclosure timing, and can be interpreted in terms of 
innovation-diffusion. As discussed in the previous section, it produces results 
that appear to be quite plausible. An inherent disadvantage is that the method 
requires the actual observation of a first disclosure. Since observations on many 
companies are right- or left censored, OFD-measures utilise a subset of the 
available disclosure data only. This section therefore proposes a pair of alterna­
tive measures based on all disclosure data for all companies. These alternatives 
are based on the total annual disclosure scores as depicted in figures 5.1-5.3. 
In order to reduce the series of yearly disclosure scores of a given company to a 
single 'life-time' disclosure score, two approaches suggest themselves: 
- The average over the life of the company of the differences between the 
annual disclosure scores and annual average disclosures can be calculated, 
resulting in a measure called Average Excess Disclosure (AED). 
- Alternatively, the annual disclosure scores can be normalized before they are 
averaged, resulting in a measure called Average Normalized Disclosure 
(AND). 
More formally: 
AED^ Y (dlt-dt) 
1
 (YrOut-Yrln)^, " ' 
AND.= - Y -2—L 
1
 (YrOutrYrIn) ^ o, 
Where Yrlnt and YrOutt are the first and last years during which company / is 
listed; dt and dit are, respectively, the average disclosure scores over all com­
panies and company i disclosure scores for year t; and ot is the standard deviation 
of disclosure scores in year t. 
The a priori rationale of using A N D rather than the more simple A E D is that 
A N D takes into account that the margin of variation of disclosure scores (com­
pare the 10%-90% interval in figure 5.2) is not constant over time. In practice, 
however, the two scores differ little and are highly correlated. In the remainder 
of this study, the two measures wil l be used interchangeably. It should be noted 
that A N D / A E D is always calculated over a particular time period. Without 
further indication, this wi l l be the 1945-1983 period. When A E D / A N D are 
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calculated for subperiods, abbreviations like AED5564 wil l be used to indicate 
A E D for the 1955-1964 period. 
A E D and A N D can be compared with the scores based on observed first disclos­
ure (OFD). Table 5.3 shows that the three disclosure measures are highly 
correlated, which provides a reasonable confidence that a classification of 
companies according to any of these measures wil l have sufficient validity to 
enable a meaningful analysis of the relationship between company characteristics 
and disclosure. As already indicated, however, OFD (and hence A E D and A N D ) 
cannot distinguish between companies with identical average disclosure scores but 
with different trends in disclosure. Whether a company's disclosures improve or 
decline relative to other companies is not indicated by these measures. The next 
section discusses an additional measure to capture these differences in relative 
disclosure patterns. 
Table 5.3 
Correlation of measures of overall disclosure 
number of required 
observations of 
first disclosure : > 0 > 6 > 9 13 
number of companies: 139 72 38 12 
correlation coefficients: 
AND/AED .9930 .9978 .9986 .9984 
AND/OFD - .6410 - .8737 - .9246 - .9845 
AED/OFD - .6335 - .8743 - .9288 - .9859 
All coefficients significant at p < . 0 1 . 
'Number of required observations' sets a threshold for the number of uncensored 
observations of disclosure by a company. 'Number of companies' is the number meeting 
each threshold level. 
5.4.3 AED/AND and changes in relative disclosure 
For reasons indicated in the earlier discussions of the H V A and D E S S E A U X 
examples, it is useful to combine the A E D / A N D measure with a second measure 
reflecting changes in the relative disclosure position over time. Referring to 
figure 5.4, one can image that trend lines are fitted for each company through the 
graph of disclosure deciles. The gradient of this trend line provides a simple 
indication of whether a company's relative disclosure position improves or 
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deteriorates. This measure of the direction and speed of disclosure change can 
be plotted against the average level of disclosure in a scatterplot. 
Figure 5.7 shows in general terms how such a diagram would have to be 
interpreted, while figure 5.8 shows the actual data for a selection9 of companies. 
Figure 5.8 shows that there is considerable diversity among companies with 
similar A E D scores. Naturally, companies with very high or very low A E D 
scores tend to have gradients close to zero (if a company is already in the top 
decile, it is impossible to improve any further, and vice versa). Companies with 
A E D ' s close to zero display a wide range of gradients, indicating that their 
disclosure can be strongly improving, or deteriorating rapidly. 
With this final extension, the descriptive apparatus required for the analysis of 
the relationship between company characteristics and disclosure is sufficiently 
developed. The actual analysis is the subject matter of the next section. 
5.5 Company characteristics and disclosure 
5.5.1 Selection of relevant characteristics 
This section briefly discusses the selection of company characteristics to be 
investigated in the remainder of this chapter. The factors selected here do not 
exhaust the possibilities in this respect. They do, however, represent a fairly 
wide range of company characteristics related to more than a single theoretical 
perspective. The selection of items should be appreciated, therefore, in the light 
of the exploratory nature of this study as outlined in chapter 1. 
There are three sources suggesting company characteristics that may be associ­
ated with disclosure. First, there is the disclosure research literature discussed in 
chapters 2 and 4. Second, there is the literature on disclosure developments in 
the Netherlands discussed in chapter 3. Finally, the general diffusion literature 
has produced a number of frequently recurring characteristics of early (late) 
adopters. 
On the basis of the previous disclosure research literature, company size and 
capital market activity are obvious avenues of investigation. Company size has 
been found to be significantly related to disclosure in nearly all previous empiri­
cal studies, an effect that can be explained in a number of ways. In terms of 
chapter 2, it might be argued that for larger companies the proprietary costs 
9
 Figure 5.8. includes companies which were part of the sample for 17 or more years. 
This restriction was imposed to exclude companies for which a disclosure trend line would 
be based on a small number of observations. 
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Fig 5.7. Types of disclosure histories 
Change in relative 
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AED: Average excess disclosure (section 5.3.2) 
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associated with certain disclosures are less because their data tend to be aggre­
gated at a higher level. This lack of precision in the data may prevent or hinder 
some forms of adverse action. From an agency perspective, it has been argued 
that larger companies are faced with larger agency costs, which may justify 
incurring higher disclosure costs. 
From an innovation diffusion perspective, it may be pointed out that, in general, 
size has been found to be an important covariate of innovative behaviour among 
companies (Brown, 1981: 156). Again, there may be more than one reason for 
these findings. One of these is that large companies have some advantages over 
smaller ones in adopting new innovations, such as greater command over 
specialist knowledge. The relationship between size and disclosure wil l be 
examined in section 5.5.2. 
A second important factor suggested by previous empirical disclosure research is 
capital market activity. It may be argued that financial reporting information can 
play a role in facilitating capital market transactions. As seen in chapter 2, the 
sale of ownership rights was one of the fundamental conditions necessary to 
create a simple disclosure game. More elaborate theoretical relationships 
between capital market activity and disclosure can be developed on the basis of 
agency considerations. Section 5.5.3 will address these issues in the context of 
the present study. 
In previous empirical work, the relationship between industry and disclosure has 
not been shown to be as strong as that with size and capital market activity. 
Nevertheless, it does merit investigation. From a disclosure research perspec­
tive, industry can well be argued to be a potentially important factor in explaining 
differences in proprietary costs among firms. From an innovation diffusion 
perspective, industry can divide, to some extent, the total population in social 
subsystems with different patterns of communication and imitative behaviour. 
Industry effects are examined in section 5.5.4. 
Size, capital market activity and industry have all been considered in previous 
cross-sectional disclosure studies. The present, longitudinal study offers the 
possibility of adding an additional dimension to these factors. It now becomes 
possible to see how these factors operate in the long run. As regards size, 
section 5.5.2 considers how company growth rates, that is, changes in size over 
time, are related to disclosure. Section 5.5.5 extends the analysis of capital 
market activity by considering the disclosure characteristics of newly listed and 
delisting companies. In section 5.5.4, dynamic aspects of the relationship 
between disclosure and industry investigated by considering the disclosure 
characteristics of growing and declining industries. 
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The innovation diffusion framework suggests that communication processes play 
an important role in innovation diffusion. Communication may take place 
through mass-media type channels, or through interaction among adopters and 
potential adopters. Both types of communication may play a role in disclosure 
improvements. A typical example of a potential 'mass medium' influence is the 
1955 Employers report on financial reporting practices (see chapter 3). This type 
of influence wil l be considered in more detail in chapter 6. Communication 
between individual companies wil l be considered in this chapter. Section 5.5.6 
discusses intercompany links through multiple board memberships. Section 5.5.5 
considers the possible role of auditing firms in communicating new disclosures 
among companies. Even though this 'audit firm' was not found to be an import­
ant explanatory factor in previous studies, the important role ascribed to the 
Dutch auditing profession (see chapter 3) would appear to warrant its inclusion. 
5.5.2 Disclosure and size 
Measurement of size 
Several possibilities have been suggested in the research literature regarding the 
choice of a company characteristic to represent 'size'. Gross sales, total book 
value of assets, combined market value of debt and equity and other measures 
have been proposed (see Newbould and Wilson (1977) for a review). From the 
studies listed in table 4.1, it follows that sales or measures related to sales are the 
most frequently used size measures, but that other measures tend to be correlated 
with sales (see also Cooke, 1989; Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). 
Lack of data prevents the use of sales as a size measure in this study for a large 
part of the period. It was not until 1969 that over one-half of the companies in 
the sample disclosed their sales. For this reason, total assets rather than sales are 
chosen to represent size, even though there are some problems associated with 
this measure. A potential problem is that it is not always possible to compare 
companies in industries of differing capital intensity. Another, and presumably 
more serious problem, is that, especially during the 1950's and 1960's, com­
panies employed widely different accounting policies with respect to tangible 
assets. On the one hand one can find companies using highly conservative 
accounting policies, including accelerated depreciation of fixed assets to notional 
amounts and use of the base-stock method for inventories. At the other end of 
the spectrum one finds companies valuing some or all of their tangible assets at 
actual or approximate current cost. Despite these shortcomings, and mainly 
because of the lack of a feasible alternative, total assets wil l be used as the basic 
measure of size. 
To take into account changes in size over time, one would ideally collect size 
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data for each year during which a company is included in the sample. For 
practical reasons, size data were only collected at four set dates: 1950, 1960, 
1970 and 1983, or the closest year for which data were available on censored 
companies10. This results in at least one and at most four size observations for 
each of the 140 companies in the sample. Sales data were collected for 1970 and 
1980 as well, to provide support for the choice of total assets. For these two 
dates, total assets can be correlated with sales for most companies. Assets and 
sales are virtually equivalent in ranking companies according to size 1 1. 
Table 5.4 
Correlation of various size and disclosure measures 
Disclosure n Assets Ln(Assets) Sales Ln(Sales) ANS4583 
AED4554 100 . 3 9 6 2 " . 4 4 3 1 " 
AED5564 117 . 3 7 6 0 " . 4 1 6 9 " 
AED6574 60 .2516 . 5 6 2 5 " .2671 . 5 7 2 2 " 
AED7583 58 .2301 . 6 4 0 8 " .2424 . 6 6 6 9 " 
AED4583 72 . 5 3 0 8 " 
OFD 72 - . 5 4 4 1 " 
Notes: p < .001 
Subperiod correlations are based on all available companies; AED4583 and OFD correla­
tions are based on all companies w i th seven or more observed first disclosures. 
ANS4583 is the weighted average of the normalized size data over all appropriate 
subperiods. 
Overall relationship between disclosure and size 
Table 5.4 shows a clear correlation between various size and disclosure 
measures. In the table, 'Size' is expressed in terms of (1) total assets and sales, 
(2) in terms of the commonly used logarithic transformation of assets and sales 
1 0
 Total assets have been used as presented in the balance sheet. The only systematic 
adjustment carried out consisted in adding back current liabilities when working capital 
was included on a net basis in total assets. Consolidated figures have been used when 
available. In a few instances this implied that data for years other than the set dates have 
been used. 
1 1
 correlation coefficients of assets with sales are 0.9795 for 1970 (n = 60) and 
0.9932 for 1980 (n = 58). 
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and (3) in terms of 'normalized sales'. The latter, indicated as average normal­
ized sales (ANS) is calculated in the same way as average normalized disclosure 
( A N D ; see section 5.4.2). 
As in other studies, using the logarithm of assets and sales results in stronger 
correlations than using the untransformed data. The absence of significant 
correlations between disclosure and untransformed size measures following 1965 
represent the increasing skewness of the size distribution as the largest (multi­
national) companies grow more rapidly than the other companies. For logar­
ithmic size measures, the relationship between disclosure and size measures is 
stronger for later periods. This may reflect an actual difference between the 
earlier and later periods regarding disclosure behaviour, or it may simply reflect 
the larger amount of 'noise' in the early size data because of disparate accounting 
practices12. For the years following 1975, size-measures based on sales and 
assets give similar results, which is not surprising given the high correlation 
between assets and sales. 
The relationship between size and disclosure identified in table 5.4 can be 
visualized in terms of cumulative adoption curves. One would expect that the 
adoption curve representing smaller companies lies below and to the right of the 
curve representing larger companies, as in the stylized representation in figure 
5.9. This ideal picture can be compared with figure 5.10 which shows the 
development of average total disclosure in the sample. In order to prepare figure 
5.10, all companies were ordered into four size quartiles at each of the four set 
dates for which size data were collected. 
Figure 5.10 adheres by and large to the pattern sketched in figure 5.9. The 
pattern is clear for the largest and smallest size groups. For the two middle size 
groups, the picture is slightly more complex: during the period 1945-1954, the 
curves coincide and for the 1955-1964 period, the order is reversed with the third 
largest size group disclosing on average better than the second size group. The 
significance of differences in disclosure between the second and third size group 
are hard to determine, if only because of the weaknesses of the size criterion 
used1 3. 
1 2
 Notably the contrast between the very conservative valuations practiced by some 
companies and the valuations based on current cost used by other companies. 
1 3
 Apart from issues of significance, order reversals as observed in figures 5.10 are 
not necessarily anomalous. In fact, general diffusion theory has recognized this phenom­
enon as the so-called 'Cancian dip' (Rogers, 1983). In many innovation diffusion 
situations, there is a positive relationship between socio-economic status and propensity to 
disclose. But for the middle ranges of 'socio-economic status' it frequently appears from 
empirical studies that the order of adoption is partially reversed. 
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Figure 5.9 Assumed relationship between disclosure and size 
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Size growth 
A n alternative relationship between size and disclosure is that levels of disclosure 
are related to size growth. A growing company can be envisaged as engaged in a 
continuous expansion and reordering of the relationships between the various 
parties interested in the company. This process might be facilitated by the 
publication of high-quality general purpose financial statements. A general 
hypothesis might therefore be that growth, other things being equal, is associated 
with higher levels of disclosure. 
Determining growth rates of size is hampered by a disclosure problem similar to 
that plaguing the determination of yearly size figures, as companies may change 
their accounting policies without disclosing this fact. Therefore, a company 
exhibiting a high rate of asset growth may simply be one that is eliminating its 
secret reserves. On the basis of published information, one can do little more 
than taking note of the existence of this problem. 
It wi l l be recalled that figure 5.8 contains a scatterplot of average disclosure 
scores against the direction of change in disclosure. In this way, companies with 
equal 'average' disclosure scores over the period could be divided in groups of 
companies with stable, improving or deteriorating relative disclosure. Within this 
scatterplot, one can attempt to identify subgroups of companies defined in terms 
of size ans size growth. One way to do this is to use size and size growth as 
dichotomous criteria by which companies can be divided in four groups: 
- large, rapidly growing companies (1+) 
- small, rapidly growing companies (s+) 
- large, slowly growing (or declining) companies (1-) 
- small, slowly growing (or declining) companies (s-)14. 
This classification of companies can be superimposed on the classification of 
companies in terms of average disclosure and disclosure change. The result is 
shown in the series of figures 5.11a-d, in which the relationship between average 
relative disclosure and trend of change in relative disclosure are plotted for each 
of the four size/size change groups defined here. 
Although the data are not well suited to a formal analysis, it seems nevertheless 
1 4
 The following definitions have been used. Large (small) firms are firms with ANS 
> 0 (ANS <0; for ANS: see note to table 5.4). Growth is determined by average yearly 
growth over the period for which data are available, which may evidently differ for 
different firms. Firms are classified as rapid-(slow-)growth firms if their average growth 
rates exceeds (falls short of) the average across all firms. In the preparation of graphs 
5.11a-d, only firms for which data on 17 or more years are available have been included. 
140 
Fig 5.11a: small/low-growth companies 
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Fig 5.11c: large/high-growth companies 
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appropriate to draw some conclusions on the relationship between size and 
disclosure. While it remains true that the companies with high relative disclosure 
scores are mostly large companies, it appears that maintaining or improving such 
a high relative position (upper right quadrant) is almost exclusively reserved to 
large, growing companies (1+). Large companies with slow growth (1-) tend to 
be companies with higher than average disclosure, but for most of these com­
panies this average represents the average of a declining trend. These companies 
start with relatively high disclosure, but are incapable of maintaining their 
advantage. Small companies with slow or negative growth (s-) are, with two 
conspicuous exceptions, all concentrated in the lower left quadrant, with a low 
and/or deteriorating relative disclosure position. Small but rapidly growing 
companies (s+) display a rather wide variety of experiences. Although many of 
them are located in the same position as small size/slow growth companies, 
others figure prominently in the upper left quadrant (worse than average but 
improving disclosure). 
5.5.3 Capital market activity 
The existence of a relationship between disclosure and the extent to which 
companies rely on the public capital market has frequently been mentioned or 
suggested in the literature. Examples of previous empirical work include Choi 
(1973), Firth (1980), Dahliwal (1979) and Meek, Roberts and Gray (1995). 
On this issue, two types hypotheses can be formulated (cf. Frankel et al., 1995), 
which wil l be investigated in this section: 
- There is a general relationship between capital market activity and disclosure, 
in the sense that, over time, companies that rely more on the capital markets 
tend to disclose more. 
- There is a specific relationship in the sense that increases in disclosure tend to 
coincide in time with new demands on the capital markets (eg: Firth, 1980). 
General relation between disclosure and capital market activity 
In order to test the general hypothesis, companies have to be characterized as to 
their capital market activity over a longer period of time. This is done by means 
of two variables, share issues and use of bond financing. 
Share issues The extent to which Dutch companies have raised capital by means 
of stock issues has varied considerably over time. In the immediate postwar 
years, notably in 1947, the number and volume of new issues was very large, so 
that (temporary) concerns were voiced about the ability of the capital market to 
continue to supply these large amounts of risk-bearing capital (Lentz and Ozinga, 
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1956). At the other end, Rietkerk (1986) has indicated that from the middle 
1970's to the end of the period studied here, the net domestic supply of risk-
bearing capital to Dutch companies virtually stopped. This shift away from 
share capital is said to have been induced by a number of factors including low 
real returns on equity holdings and unfavourable treatment of equity for tax 
purposes. 
The decreasing reliance on share issues can be illustrated for the companies 
included in the present sample. For these companies, a complete listing of all 
their issues of common stock during the 1945-1983 period was compiled1 5. 
As indicated in figure 5.12, the percentage of sample companies issuing shares 
dropped from a peak of 15% in 1950 to 2-3% in the late 1970's. Combined with 
the falling number of listed companies over the same period (see figure 4.1), this 
meant a sharp fall in the total number of share issues. 
As a result, the classification of companies as frequent or infrequent issuers 
depends on the period during which they were listed. Hence, for each company 
the expected or 'normative' number of share issues in any year is defined as the 
annual share issue percentage as displayed in figure 5.12. On this basis, a 
company listed in 1950 would be expected to have .15 issues that year, and a 
company listed throughout the period from 1945 to 1983 would be expected to 
have a total of 1.72 issues. Subtracting the expected number of issues from the 
actual number results in the number of excess issues (EXISS) of each company. 
Use of bond financing As an alternative to issuing shares, companies can issue 
bonds. Owing to data availability, the characterization of companies in terms of 
their reliance on bond financing is rather less elaborate than that regarding share 
issues. A binary variable is used, indicating whether or not companies had bonds 
listed on the exchange at any moment during the relevant period. 
Excess issues and bond financing are related to average normalized disclosure by 
means of multiple regression, with the results shown in table 5.5. 
It appears that capital market activity is significantly related to (excess) disclos­
ure, although the explanatory power of this factor, as indicated by R 2 , is low. 
This might be caused by the division into subperiods, which may divide share 
issues from their disclosure effects: an issue towards the end of a subperiod may 
lead to increased disclosure in the following years, which wi l l , however, not be 
related to the previous issue. This issue wil l be discussed further in the next 
section which deals with the concentration of share issues and disclosure 
increases in time. 
1 5
 Based on Van Oss' Effectenboek, and the Effectengids (various volumes 1945-1983), 
and on company financial statements. 
144 
Figure 5.12 Share issues 
(140 sample companies) 
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Table 5.5 
Multiple Regression coefficients of Excess issues and bonds 
n R 2 p (F) Coefficients (probabilities) 
EXISS* BONDS Constant 
A N D 4 5 5 4 100 .0785 .02 .2765 
(.01) 
.0313 
(.87) 
.0161 
(.85) 
A N D 5 5 6 4 117 .0619 .01 .2883 
(.00) 
.0782 
(.68) 
.0065 
(.95) 
A N D 6 5 7 4 115 .0606 .01 .3016 
(.16) 
.4715 
(.01) 
.1835 
(.09) 
A N D 7 5 8 3 66 .0824 .02 .3828 
(.31) 
.5846 
(.02) 
.4038 
(.02) 
A N D 4 5 8 3 140 .0985 .00 .1820 
(.00) 
.1764 
(.22) 
.1115 
(.56) 
Exiss* :Excess issues during the appropriate subperiods 
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One interesting, though not quite surprising aspect of the regression results is that 
in the course of the period significance shifts from share issues to bonds. In the 
two later sub-periods, from 1965 onwards, the fall in total share issues apparently 
diminishes the usefulness of share issues as a predictor of disclosure. For the 
entire period 1945-1983, though, share issues dominate use of bond financing as 
the explanatory variable. 
Relation of disclosure changes with specific share issues 
A next step is to see whether increases in disclosure tend to concentrate around 
years in which shares are actually issued. If companies do at all review their 
financial reporting policies in connection with share issues, one would intuitively 
expect that they do so before the actual issue. Doing otherwise would leave the 
company with the same additional disclosure costs (if any) without the benefit of 
facilitating the share issue by means of more extensive information. However, 
this leaves open the quite conceivable scenario that more extensive disclosures 
due to a share issue wil l initially be reflected in the prospectus accompanying the 
offering, and wil l only afterwards become part of normal reporting policy. 
Hence, in the following analysis, an increase in disclosure wil l be considered to 
coincide with a share issue in year t if the new disclosure appears in the financial 
statements covering year t-1 or t. 
Given this definition, we can state the following hypothesis in the null-form: for 
each company, the proportion of observed first disclosures coinciding with share 
issues is equal to the proportion of years containing or preceding a share issue 
relative to a company's life span within the sample. 
'Observed first disclosure' is used as defined in section 5.2 1 6. On this basis, the 
data shown in table 5.6 were compiled. 
If first disclosures are uniformly distributed, the number of disclosures coinciding 
with issues would follow a binomial distribution with p = 235/2984 and n = 
792. Under this hypothesis, the probability of observing 94 or more coinciding 
first disclosures is negligible17. Hence, it can be concluded that a certain 
concentration of first disclosures around new issues did in fact take place. 
However, owing to the relatively small numbers of issues, share issues could 
never be expected to figure very prominently in an explanation of the timing of 
disclosure increases. In fact, about half of the companies in the sample did not 
issue any shares at all, and since the disclosure of all companies tended towards 
1 6
 However, for this particular purpose, disclosures made in first available financial 
statements over 1945-1948 were not counted as observed first disclosures. 
1 7
 The normal approximation results in a z-value of 4.17, p < .0002. 
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Table 5.6 
Concurrence of share issues and first disclosures 
number: % 
All observed financial years: 
of wh ich : 
years preceding or containing issues: 
2984 18 100 
235 7.88 
observed first disclosures: 792 100 
of wh ich : 
observed f irst disclosures 
coinciding w i th issues: 94 11.87 
the same ultimate level, a large fraction of new disclosures could never be related 
at all to share issues. 
Nevertheless, the results permit the conclusion that for those companies that did 
issue shares, disclosure increases tended to concentrate around share issues19. 
Multiple listings and multinational companies 
Exposure to foreign capital markets can be an important influence on disclosure 
(Choi, 1973; Gray and Roberts, 1989). During most of the period, only four of 
the companies in the sample were listed on other exchanges. In a way, U N I ­
L E V E R and K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M had already been exposed to the British 
capital market before the war. In 1953 and 1954, PHILIPS, A K U and K O N I N K ­
LIJKE P E T R O L E U M entered the New York capital market, followed by U N I L E V E R 
in 1961. Only in the second half of the 1970's did the practice of listing shares 
(or certificates of shares) on other, continental european exchanges become more 
common. Among the sampled companies, H E I N E K E N , K N P , O G E M , V A N 
O M M E R E N , P A K H O E D and V M F began to be traded on exchanges like Brussels, 
Paris, Frankfurt, Diisseldorf and Antwerp. 
There are no indications that the listing on continental European exchanges did 
have any systematic effect on the disclosure of these last six companies. None of 
1 8
 This is equal to the total number of financial statements sampled (3124) reduced by 
140. For all companies, data considering the first year of listing were ignored since these 
years cannot contain observed first disclosures. 
1 9
 For issuing companies only, 18.9% of observed first disclosures occurred during the 
13.7% of financial years during or following which a share issue occurred. The probabil­
ity of this occurrence under the null-hypothesis is similarly small as for the entire sample. 
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the companies, with the possible exception of K N P , shows any discernible 
increase in disclosure in the years surrounding their listing. On the contrary, the 
relative disclosure of O G E M and V A N O M M E R E N continued to decline after their 
listing. V A N O M M E R E N , being listed on four foreign exchanges, fell from the 
third highest to the fourth lowest decile in terms of total disclosure ranking. 
Some of these companies were among the best disclosers in the sample ( H E I N E -
K E N and V M F being in the top decile for most of the time), but in all the record 
seems to be very mixed. The fact that these six companies disclosed on average 
markedly more than average seems to be related primarily to their size. 
Though there may be doubts about the impact of international listings among the 
next largest companies, it is clear that the four largest multinationals did figure 
prominently among the top disclosers (compare figure 5.5), a fact frequently 
ascribed to their foreign listings. 
This raises the question to what extent they can be identified with the 'innovators' 
in the Rogers' framework of innovation diffusion, that is, whether the multi­
nationals were always the first to disclose new items of information. Table 5.7 
lists the rankings of the four multinational companies on the five-point scale 
introduced in section 5.3.1. 
Table 5.7 
Disclosure characterization of multinational companies by item 
UNILEVER KONINKLIJKE PHILIPS A K U / A K Z O 
PETROLEUM 
Sales 1 2 2 2 
Labour costs 3 2 2 4 
# Employees 4 2 1 2 
Consolidated 1 2 2 3 
Tax costs 2 3 3 3 
Tax liabilities 3 3 3 2 
Current cost (Inc) 4 4 1 2 
Current cost (Bine) 5 5 1 2 
Comp. figures 1 2 2 2 
Funds Statement 1 1 3 2 
Ind. segments 1 4 3 2 
Geo. segments 1 3 3 3 
Earnings p. share 2 1 2 2 
Note: f ive-point rating as defined in section 5.3, w i th ' 1 ' referring to an early disclosure 
and ' 5 ' to a late disclosure. 
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According to table 5.7, for most items one out of the four multinational com­
panies was among the very first to disclose. It is, however, a rare occurrence to 
find more than one of the multinationals among the three to five (the number 
varies across items) 'innovators' with a score of ' 1 ' . U N I L E V E R appears to be 
the most consistent innovator, being among the first with important items as sales 
disclosure, consolidated financial statements, funds statement and segmental 
disclosure. A K U / A K Z O on the other hand is never an innovator' although it 
figures prominently among the 'early disclosers'. The results for PHILIPS and 
K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M are like those of A K U / A K Z O with as most important 
examples the (not surprising) current cost disclosures of PHILIPS and the Earnings 
per share and Funds statement of K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M with which it was 
clearly ahead of the rest. Especially with regard to these last two items, the 
influence of the foreign listings of K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M appears most 
marked (the role of foreign influence on disclosure of individual items wil l be 
discussed more extensively in chapter 6). 
In short, although PHILIPS, U N I L E V E R and K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M are undeni­
ably the most important 'innovators' in the sample, this conclusion can be 
qualified by the following two observations: 
First, they appear to take turns in innovating, rather than being collectively at the 
forefront. In more than one instance, one of the three is among the 'innovators' 
while the other two follow with the 'early adopters', the 'early majority' or even 
later. Timing differences between the three can be material. 
Second, and as an inevitable consequence of the previous observation, the three 
companies share the status of 'innovator' with a number of other companies with 
respect to a number of items. Other companies that occasionally or repeatedly 
share this role are K R O M H O U T (5 times), A R M (4 times), D O M A N I A L E M Í J N , 
M U L L E R (twice) B E Y N E S , D O R P , D R U , N D S M , H O E K , S T O O M V A A R T N E D E R ­
L A N D , S T O O M V A A R T Z E E L A N D , L O H U I Z E N , N K F , R O T T E R D A M S C H E L L O Y D , 
V A N O M M E R E N and V E R T O (once each). It is only to be expected that among the 
two-thirds of listed companies not included in the sample, there wil l be other 
companies with similar occasional early disclosures. 
5.5.4 Disclosure and industry 
A relationship between disclosure and industry can be explained in two ways. 
First, it may be that disclosure is primarily related to characteristics of individual 
companies (such as size, growth and capital market activitities), and that industry 
effects are in fact the reflection on the concentration of companies of particular 
types in particular industries. Second, industry effects may be explained in terms 
of the interaction of companies within an industry. On the basis of the cost-
benefit analysis of incremental disclosures explored in chapter 2, it might be 
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argued that, if some disclosures are accompanied by costs because of adverse 
action by competitors, such competitive effects wil l be more severe in industries 
characterized by more intense competition. From an innovation-diffusion 
perspective, it might be argued that companies take their cue to adopt certain 
innovations primarily from other companies with which they are closely involved, 
i.e. from companies within the same industry. 
When taken together, these arguments do not yield an unambiguous overall 
hypothesis concerning the relationship between industry and disclosure. The 
various effects may to a certain extent balance each other: an internationally 
exposed industry may also be one that is more competitive, so that the overall 
effect on disclosure is unpredictable. 
Added to the difficulty of formulating unambiguous hypotheses is the problem 
that 'industry' is hard to define. The C B S 2 0 standard industry classification 
(SBI 1974) provides some guidance, but offers little assistance in classifying com­
panies with mixed activities. 
These two difficulties combined make it difficult to proceed beyond a general 
exploration of the relationship between industry and disclosure. In order to make 
this attempt, companies have been classified on the basis of annual report 
information following the CBS-classification with a precision of at most two 
digits. These data allow conclusions with regard to the two particular industry 
effects discussed in the next subsections. Manufacturing versus trading companies 
It appears that the disclosure pattern of manufacturing companies (CBI code 20 
through 39) differs from that of trading (wholesale) companies (CBI code 61-64). 
This is illustrated by figure 5.13a-b, which is based on the scatterplot of average 
disclosure and change in relative disclosure introduced in section 5.3.3. Manu­
facturing companies appear to be evenly distributed through all quadrants. 
Trading companies are by and large limited to the lower-than-average disclosure 
positions in the left-hand part of the diagram, and tend to decline in terms of 
relative disclosure (lower-left quadrant). This result is comparable to that in 
Wagenhofer (1990:253), where manufacturing companies were found to attain 
higher levels of disclosure than nonmanufacturing companies. As in that study, 
though, it is difficult to advance compelling arguments for the present result. It 
might be argued that barriers to entry in trading are generally lower than in 
manufacturing, and hence the possible competitive losses due to more extensive 
disclosure may be larger for the latter class of companies. 
CBS: Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics. 
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Fig. 5.13a Disclosure types by industry 
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'Strong' versus 'weak' manufacturing companies 
The group of manufacturing companies can be divided according to 'industry 
strength'. Van Zanden and Griffiths (1989: 223-231) observe that major changes 
took place in the Dutch manufacturing sector during the postwar period. A 
number of industries came into being or grew rapidly, while other industries 
declined or even disappeared. 
Given this distinction, it might be hypothesized that in 'strong' industries there 
would be a preponderance of companies with characteristics associated with good 
disclosure. Strong industries included the chemical, electrotechnical, 
metal working and machine industries. Weak industries included textiles, clothing 
and food. When manufacturing companies in the sample are divided along these 
lines, the excess disclosures (see section 5.3) of each group can be compared. 
When this is done for the 1951-1973 period covered by the data in Van Zanden 
and Griffiths, it appears that the 'strong' industries do in fact manifest slightly 
higher levels of disclosure, although the difference is not great21. 
The weakness of the result is caused to a large extent by the textile industry. 
Although a 'weak' industry, the companies from that sector included in the 
sample distinguish themselves, on average, with quite high levels of disclosure. 
The 'weak' food industry, with the exception of H E I N E K E N , adheres quite well to 
the pattern of a largely lower than average and declining disclosure. 
In all, industry effects, i f they exist, are not very strong. The data available for 
the present study do not allow very forceful conclusions (apart from the difficulty 
of arriving at a satisfactory industry classification, there is the problem that some 
industries are represented by only one or two companies), but it appears likely 
that i f industry effects do exist, they are mainly company effects that happen to 
dominate particular industries. 
5.5.5 Disclosure of newly listed versus delisting companies 
The overall, or average level of disclosure in the sample of companies can 
change in two ways. On the one hand, there may be changes in the disclosures 
of listed companies. On the other hand, companies may be added or removed 
from the sample whose disclosure differs from that of the sample as a whole. If 
newly listed or delisting companies differ consistently from the average disclosure 
profile, either by disclosing less or by disclosing more, there may be a discern­
ible effect on average disclosure. Reasons for expecting consistent differences 
2 1
 Strong (36 companies): AED5173 = .07658 ; weak (20 companies): AED5173 = 
.00334. Differences are significant (one-tailed) at the 5% level (t = 1.7147). The four 
multinationals were excluded from this analysis. Their inclusion would have increased the 
disclosure differential. 
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include the following. 
In the literature, it has often been asserted and confirmed by empirical studies 
that the extent of disclosure of unlisted companies is below that of listed com­
panies (e.g. Cooke, 1989). As a rule, one would expect that at the time of 
listing, unlisted companies would have to revise their reporting policies and to 
extend their annual report disclosures. This is nothing more than a specific 
instance of the general association between capital market activity and extent of 
disclosure noted in section 5.5.3. For this reason, one would expect that the 
extent of disclosure of newly listed companies tends to be equal to the average 
level of disclosure in the year of their first listing. Alternatively, it is conceiv­
able that newly listed companies disclose better than average. This might be 
caused by: 
- 'Overshooting': since the 'average' extent to disclosure is hard to observe, 
companies may consider it prudent to disclose more rather than less in 
doubtful cases in order not to jeopardize the success of their public offering. 
- Influence of role models: in deciding on an appropriate level of disclosure, 
the financial reports of the most prominent, or largest companies within the 
industry may receive relatively much weight. 
- Industry effects: newly listed companies wi l l tend to be active in growing 
rather than declining industries. Since the former tend to disclose slightly 
better than the latter (see section 5.5.4), this difference may be reflected in 
the disclosure practices of newly listed companies. 
In all, for newly listed companies one would expect disclosure that is at least as 
good as average disclosure at the time of listing. 
For delisting companies, the above argument can not simply be reversed, nor can 
it be expected that, in general, delisting companies tend to disclose less than the 
remaining listed companies. The reason for this is that companies may delist for 
two quite different reasons. One of these is financial distress leading to insol­
vency or even bankruptcy, the other being the opposite: financial health and good 
prospects, making a company an attractive candidate for acquisition or merger. 
One would not, as a rule, expect companies in distress to be among the very 
largest (since spectacular failures were comparatively rare during the period), nor 
to have been very active in the capital market in the period preceding their 
failure, nor to belong to thriving industries. But it is also possible that com­
panies that are taken over belong in fact to the 'financial distress' group, and that 
their buy-out is a form of reorganization. For the group ending its listing by 
insolvency, lower than average disclosures are therefore expected. For the 'buy­
out' group, no unambiguous prediction can be made. 
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In order to observe the actual relation between disclosure and changes in sample 
composition, companies are classified according to their mode of entry or exit 
from the sample. As in section 4.5, the main distinctions made are between 
mergers and acquisitions, and, within the group of acquisitions, between acquisi­
tions by listed companies and acquisitions by unlisted companies and individuals 
(buy-outs). 
For each company, the average disclosure score (percentage of applicable items 
disclosed) was calculated for the first and the last year of its inclusion in the 
sample. The difference between these scores and the average score across all 
companies in these years ('excess disclosure') is averaged for each entry and exit 
group, with the result shown in table 5.8. 
Table 5.8 
Disclosure by mode of entry/exit compared with average disclosure 
A. Addit ions to sample 
type of change n average excess t 
disclosure 
new listing 54 .00773 0 .57072 
merger 16 .08299 1.91630* 
B. Removals f rom sample 
type of change n average excess t 
disclosure 
acquired by non-listed entity 28 -0 .12432 
acquired by listed company 30 -0 .01931 
merger 23 0 .02606 
insolvency or bankruptcy 13 -0 .09009 
significance levels: # # * p < . 0 1 , # # p < .05, * p < .10 
The data in table 5.8 allow the following conclusions. Newly listed companies 
apparently model their disclosure on the average disclosure level in the year of 
entry. That is, they do not systematically seek to present more extensive 
- 4 . 0 1 1 9 * " 
-0 .7010 
0 .6604 
- 2 . 9 9 6 9 < # 
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disclosure than is common with companies that are already listed2 2. 
The reverse is not true for delisted companies. Companies that end their listing 
by severing all links with the stock exchange, either by insolvency or by takeover 
by an unlisted entity, have significantly lower levels of disclosure than the 
remaining listed companies. For the 'financial distress' group, this result is as 
expected. For the 'buy-out' group, this result may be interpreted as a dominance 
of negative reasons for take-over. It is also possible, however, that their lower 
disclosures represent, in effect, a size effect. It is only likely that smaller 
companies predominate in the group of delisted companies. 
There appears to be only a slight merger effect in the sense that merging com­
panies do not differ significantly from average, whereas the resulting combination 
discloses slightly better than average. This may be the result of combining the 
best accounting policies of the combined companies. 
5.5.6 Intercompany links 
The influence from individuals in top position in the organization has not 
received much attention in the disclosure literature (with the exception of 
Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse, 1989, 1990, 1992: chapter 5). Data 
availability limits investigation of these effects during the period studied here to 
two classes of people: members of the management board (directie, (raad van) 
bestuur) and members of the supervisory board (raad van commissarissen). 
A rationale for investigating the influence of directors and supervisors can be 
derived from their legal function within the company. Throughout the period, 
preparing the financial statements has been the formal responsibility of the 
management board. Until 1970, the responsibility of the supervisory board was 
stated as 'supervising the drafting of the balance sheet and profit and loss 
account', before these were presented to the shareholders for approval, whereas 
subsequently (for large companies), the approbation of financial statements 
devolved on the supervisory board itself. 
2 2
 This conclusion is not without interest since imitative effects are not always 
accepted as satisfactory explanations of accounting practice: 
...in many studies [of the positive accounting school], the explanatory power of the 
models is low (...) The alternative predictive model is that each firm uses the most 
common combination of accounting methods, a model with little explanatory appeal. 
The alternative model begs the question of what determines the majority accounting 
choice. Many accounting teachers would be uncomfortable with the explanation that 
managers choose their accounting procedures based on what most other firms are 
doing. (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990:10) 
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The joint responsibility for the contents of the financial statements has been 
symbolized by the signing of the financial statements by all individual members 
of the management and supervisory boards23. The (legal) literature attests to the 
decisive role that directors and supervisors were expected to play in formulating 
the financial reporting policy of their company. This included the opinion that 'it 
is the task of the supervisory board to encourage the tendency towards a more 
open financial reporting' (Vecht, 1977: 167). 
From the perspective of innovation diffusion, individuals can play an important 
role in transmitting knowledge of new disclosure options among companies. 
Instead of assuming that knowledge of contemporary disclosure practices is 
transmitted to all companies simultaneously and in a similar way (for instance, 
through mass media like the financial press), it may be assumed that each 
company is provided with information through its own individual network of 
contacts. Moreover, even if individuals in top positions do not play an active 
role themselves in transmitting information on disclosure options and practices, 
the fact that a company recruits 'cosmopolitan' directors may represent an 
outward-looking stance within the organization as a whole. 
Throughout the period, although decreasingly so, there were numerous personal 
links among listed companies. Members of the management board of one 
company acted as supervisors with other companies, and many supervisors acted 
in that capacity for more than one company. Concern over cumulations of 
managerial or supervisory responsibilities in one person repeatedly surfaced in 
the postwar Dutch literature on company law and business administration. 
It is conceivable that functioning in more than one company may have led to 
direct transmission of information on disclosure options. However, it is also 
possible to envisage the relationship between multiple directorships and disclosure 
in more general terms. Having directors or supervisors that serve with other 
companies as well may be an expression of a more fundamental quality of 
'cosmopolitanness' that is frequently associated with innovativeness in the 
innovation-diffusion literature (Rogers, 1983:chapter 10). Appointing supervisors 
with broader experience may indicate a general willingness to stay involved with 
contemporary developments. 'Cosmopolitan' directors and supervisors need not 
necessarily be active in looking for improvements in financial reporting, but they 
2 3
 Articles 42 and 52 of the pre-1970 Commercial Code; articles 42 and 52m of the 
post-1970 Commercial Code. Strictly speaking, the pre-1970 situation allowed for 
companies without supervisory boards and for supervisory board members without 
responsibility for the financial statements. In practice, it appears that nearly all listed 
companies had supervisory boards and that only a tiny minority of supervisors was not 
designated as so-called balanscommissaris (De Boer, 1957:24). See also the 1962 
Hamburger committee report (op.cit.), p. 16. 
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may well be more willing to adopt changes in financial reporting suggested by 
others, such as the company's auditor. 
Multiple board memberships as indication of 'cosmopolitanism' 
A first way of looking at multiple board memberships is to see them simply as 
indications of interconnectedness with the world at large. The mere fact of being 
linked through multiple directorships to another company, regardless of which 
company it is, can serve from this point of view as an indication that a company 
is interested in drawing on the experience of other companies. 
We can therefore define the variable LINKS as the number of other listed 
companies24 with which a particular company shares (supervisory) directors. 
The values of LINKS have been calculated for sampled companies for 1957 and 
19732 5. For 1957, values of LINKS range from zero to 65. For 1973, there is 
a tendency towards smaller numbers of multiple directorships. The maximum 
number of links falls to 41 (see figure 5.14). For both 1957 and 1973, correla­
tions between LINKS and disclosure (measured by AND) are quite high 2 6. 
Before the conclusion is drawn that there is in fact a relationship between the 
two, a closer investigation is in order. A particular point to notice is that LINKS 
is distinctly correlated with size. 
Multiple board memberships as communication channels 
Rather than looking at the total number of links that a particular company, 
through its board members, has with the outside world, it is also possible to 
consider to which particular other companies a company is connected. This can 
be relevant, since a group of companies may have close links among each other, 
but few outside contacts, and be therefore, in effect, isolated. 
If board members did play a role in communicating information on reporting 
practices, one would expect to find that board members link companies that are 
relatively homogeneous with regard to disclosure. In other words, the prediction 
of the disclosure of a particular company is improved if one knows the disclosure 
of the companies to which it is linked by multiple board memberships. 
This is investigated for the years 1957 and 1973. For these years, a predicted 
disclosure can be computed for each company by calculating the average disclos­
ure of all companies to which it is related by multiple board memberships. The 
2 4
 For this purpose data on all listed companies, not just those included in the sample, 
have been used. 
2 5
 These years were chosen as being sufficiently removed from the beginning and 
ending dates of 1945 and 1983. 
2 6
 The correlation coefficients are .3919 for 1957 and .5145 for 1973 (both signifi­
cant at p < .001). 
157 
Figure 5.14 Multiple board membership 
(Frequency distribution) 
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Note: 'Number of companies linked with1 
refers to the number of listed companies 
with which directors are shared 
same data for 1957 and 1973 linkages are used as in the previous section, with 
the added proviso that only companies with links by means of more than one 
director are included. In addition, to control for a possible size effect, companies 
in the upper size quartile were excluded as well. This leaves a total of 26 (17) 
companies for 1957 (1973), for which both actual and predicted disclosure are 
plotted in figure 5.15a-b. The dotted line in these graphs indicates the theoreti­
cally perfect relationship that would obtain if each company's disclosure were a 
perfect composite image of the disclosure of all companies that it was directly 
linked with. 
As indicated by figure 5.15a, there is some correlation between actual and 
predicted disclosure for the 1955-1964 period, but also a clear overestimation of 
higher than average disclosure, and vice versa. For 1973, the picture is different 
and no clear relation between actual and predicted disclosure is apparent. When 
compared with the 1957 results, it can be observed that in 1973 there are hardly 
any companies with lower-than-average predicted disclosure. This implies that 
companies that are involved in multiple directorships are mostly related to good 
disclosers. 
158 
Fig. 5.15a 1957 Multiple directorships 
as predictor of '55-64 disclosure 
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Fig. 5.15b 1973 Multiple directorships 
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Figure 5.15a can serve as a starting point in a further discussion of the disclosure 
practices of those smaller companies that were identified above as unexpectedly 
good disclosers (see also figure 5.5 and section 5.4.3). For some of these 
companies, the composition of their boards may help to explain their sometimes 
quite exceptional disclosure practices. Owing to the virtual absence of retrievable 
archival materials, discussing the influence of specific individuals on disclosure 
practices is limited to making informed guesses. 
A closer inspection of the best disclosing companies in 1957 (19 companies out 
of 99.with a total disclosure score of 40% or more) reveals that many, though 
not all of them, had linkages that may have played a role in their disclosure 
behaviour. 
Apart from the large multinational companies, a number of smaller companies 
appear at or near the top of that list, notably a number of companies in what may 
loosely be described as the metal-working industries: D R U , K R O M H O U T , L O -
H U I Z E N and in the second echelon T H O M A S S E N D R U V E R , G R O F S M E D E R U and 
B E G E M A N N . 
K R O M H O U T , a shipbuilding company, had a relatively small board (two directors, 
three supervisors). The two directors had no outside positions, but each of the 
three supervisors did, bringing the company in contact with other high-disclosing 
boards. One of the supervisors was F . Q . H . den Hollander, former president of 
the national railways, a prominent member of the business establishment and a 
supervisory board member of K O N I N K L U K E P E T R O L E U M . Another supervisor 
was P . Goedkoop Dzn, a member of the founding family who was also a 
supervisor with T H O M A S S E N D R U V E R , a manufacturer of metal packagings and 
also a company with quite good disclosure. At the T H O M A S S E N D R U V E R board 
(also fairly small, consisting of five supervisors) the K R O M H O U T director would 
meet E . L . Schiff, a supervisor on the boards of PHILIPS and D R U , both high 
disclosers. D R U (heating equipment and other metal appliances) also had a small 
board of three supervisors, including P . W . Kamphuisen, a supervisory board 
member of A K U . 
In a slightly different group were B E G E M A N N , L O H U I Z E N and G R O F S M E D E R U . 
Both B E G E M A N N (machine building) and G R O F S M E D E R U (specialist forge) had on 
their board of supervisors A . H . Ingen Housz, president of Hoogovens (not in the 
sample, but with a reputation for good disclosure27). Ingen Housz had been a 
2 7
 One factor underlying Hoogovens' disclosure may have been the European 
Community for Coal and Steel (EGKS). Among other things, the Community ran an 
extensive statistical programme, the results of which were generally presented as aggre­
gates by country. Since Hoogovens was virtually the only Dutch steel mill, extensive 
information on the company could be extracted from EGKS-publications. Publication of 
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member of the 1955 Rijkens committee on financial reporting, and would 
therefore have brought awareness of the report's recommendations to those 
company boards of which he was a member. B E G E M A N N shared T . H . Ligthart 
as supervisor with L O H U I Z E N (cast-iron productions), which shared another 
supervisor with Hoogovens. 
At the risk of unduly complicating the picture, it can further be pointed out that 
the two groups outlined here were also interconnected. F . Q . H . den Hollander, 
of K R O M H O U T and K O N I N K L U K E P E T R O L E U M was also a supervisor with B E Y -
N E S , a rolling-stock manufacturer, and of V M F , a large machine-building firm. 
Both B E Y N E S and V M F shared supervisors with L O H U I Z E N , while Ingen Housz 
was a supervisor on the board of V M F . Both B E Y N E S and V M F were quite good 
disclosers (ranking 27th and 36th out of 99). 
The overall picture that emerges is that of a group of five or six smaller yet well-
disclosing companies in the same industry. They had in common that their 
management and supervisory boards were quite small, and that a large fraction, 
usually a majority of their supervisors served with one or more of the large 
multinationals and/or with one or more of the other five. The fact that their 
boards were small appears to be of some importance. This factor sets them apart 
from other companies that were equally well connected, but where any board 
members with experience with well-disclosing companies were definitely outnum­
bered by others. This appears to apply in particular to the shipping sector. In 
that sector, networks in terms of multiple directorships were even more tight than 
in the metallurgical sector, but the shipping sector did not distinguish itself by its 
disclosure. 
The previous discussion does not exhaust the possible roles that personal links 
may have played in furthering increased disclosure. The list of the twenty best 
disclosing companies of 1957 contained a rather small and local Amsterdam 
company, A R M . A R M ' s financial statements of the early 1950's are quite 
remarkable, the company being among the very first to use photographs and full-
colour printing. In addition to these outward embellishments, the information 
content of the A R M financial statements was rather high. A n explanation offers 
itself in the person of its supervisory board member A .Th .E . Kastein, a well-
known Amsterdam solicitor and member of the NIvA. His interest in financial 
reporting can be gauged from the fact that during the 1950's and 1960's he was 
the chairman of a NIvA study committee that served as the main focus of the 
NIvA's activities in the area of financial reporting. The hypothesis that the 
personal influence of Kastein played an important role in shaping A R M ' s 
these data in the company's annual report would therefore result in few additional 
proprietary costs (See Dankers and Verheul, 1993: 220). 
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reporting policies is reasonable28. 
As a final note, it should be observed that three of best disclosing companies in 
1957 were not linked to any listed company at all. Evidently, being linked to 
other companies, especially multinational companies, in this particular manner 
was at this point in time by no means a necessary condition to reach higher levels 
of disclosure. 
5.5.7 Auditors and early disclosure 
Although not strictly a characteristic of the disclosing company, * audit firm' has 
frequently been employed in cross-sectional studies as a possible covariate of 
extent of disclosure. As indicated in section 5.5.1., the potential influence of 
audit firms on disclosure may also be envisaged in terms of the communication 
channel they provide among companies, or in terms of their possible roles as 
•change agents'. The Dutch auditing profession has frequently been credited with 
playing an important role in the development of financial reporting. Alternative­
ly, it has been alleged about the prewar and immediately postwar auditing 
profession that *[t]he auditors have followed practice faithfully, they didn't 
protest against insufficient publications and issued their certificates of correctness 
without qualifications', and 'it is certain that the Dutch auditor has contributed 
little or nothing to the improvement of published [financial statements]' (Burgert, 
1953: 51, 56). 
Even though an external audit was not legally required until the Act on Annual 
Financial Statements of 1970, most listed companies, though not all, were audited 
well before 1970. The data are therefore not suitable for conclusions on differ­
ences between audited and unaudited companies. Any differences among audit 
firms can be observed, however. A null-hypothesis can be formulated that the 
number of early new disclosures by clients of a particular audit firm is propor­
tional to that audit firm's market share. This involves the following steps: 
1. Identify all observed switches from nondisclosure to disclosure (OFD; see 
footnote 2 to this chapter). 
2. Identify all first disclosures falling into adopter categories 1-3 (pre-median 
disclosures) as defined in table 5.5 (total: 480 first disclosures). 
2 8
 According to J.W. Schoonderbeek, erstwhile secretary to the 'Kastein Committee', 
it is 'very plausible that Kastein has played a considerable role in reporting by A R M ' 
(Letter from J.W. Schoonderbeek to the author, 1 February 1995). 
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3. Attribute first disclosures to the audit firm signing the financial statements in 
the year of first disclosure. A total of 94 different audit firms were involved 
with these first disclosures. 
4. Calculate expected OFD for each audit firm as: 
^ ( market share.*total OFDt ) 
t 
In which market share is defined as the number of companies audited by firm 
j in year t divided by the total number of companies in the sample in year t 
(including companies that were not audited). 
Total observed first disclosure is calculated across all disclosure items, but 
only, as indicated above, for pre-median switches. 
5. Expected and observed first disclosures by audit firm are compared by means 
of a Ch i 2 test (grouping all audit firms with expected observations < 5 into 
one group). The results are not significant at the 10% level (see table 5.9). 
Strictly speaking, table 5.9 does not address the question to what extent either 
claim is warranted. The fact that there are hardly any differences among audit 
firms regarding timing of disclosure suggests that all firms have had, by and 
large, the same influence, regardless of how large that influence was. It is 
interesting to note, though, that the group of 'no auditor' does not differ in extent 
of disclosure from the other companies29. This fact, coupled with the absence 
of systematic guidance on financial reporting practice within the auditing pro­
fession before 1971, suggests the preliminary conclusion that the role of the 
auditing firms in furthering disclosure has in general not been large. 
2 9
 See however Zeff et al. (1992:82-83) for the fact that, during the 1950's, companies 
might retain an auditor even though his opinion was not published in the financial 
statements. 
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Table 5.9 
Audit firms and observed first disclosures 
Firm New disclosures by clients 
Actual Expected 
Bianchi & Co 19 18.8 
W m K. de Brey 2 6.3 
Burgmans 7 12.1 
Dijker & Belt 4 5.4 
Dijker, Bianchi & Co 18 12.6 
Dijker, de Boer & Vink 8 5.9 
Elles, Hamelberg & Co 5 6.8 
Frese, Hogeweg, Meyer & Hörchner 13 11.4 
Jonkers & De Jong 5 8.2 
Van Kampen 7 8.1 
Keuzenkamp & Co 10 9.9 
Klynveld, Kraayenhof & Co 48 49 .6 
Th. & L. Limperg 7 5.2 
Meyer & Hörchner 21 16.0 
Moret, De Jong & Starke 11 8.4 
Moret & Limperg 5 5.4 
Moret & Starke 24 20.1 
Nederlandse Accountants-Maatschap 20 15.9 
Nietzman, Ten Hage & Kuijper 8 7.7 
Paardekooper & Hoffman 6 8.4 
Pelser, Hamelberg, van Til & Co 5 7.7 
Price Waterhouse/ 
Cooper Brothers 1 11 5.8 
De Tombe, Demenint & Co 4 6.1 
Venker en Steenbergh 0 5.8 
Wolf f & Co 3 6.6 
Wolfrat , Entrop en van Namen 8 5.1 
All other (67) firms 133 123.8 
No auditor 68 76 .4 
Total 480 480 .0 
Chi-square = 33 .63801 
p > .10 
1
 Price Waterhouse/Cooper Brothers appear only once in the sample, as the joint auditors 
of Unilever. 
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5.6 Multivariate approach 
Having discussed in some detail the relationship between overall disclosure and 
selected company characteristics, the next and final step is to investigate what 
remains of these individual effects when they are viewed in combination. The 
main tool for this investigation wil l be multiple regression of the various explana­
tory variables on average disclosure (measured by A N D ) for various subperiods. 
Table 5.10, which shows the correlation coefficients for some explanatory 
variables for the entire 1945-1983 period, indicates that there is reason for 
concern regarding the explanatory power of some variables when viewed in 
combination. High correlations clearly exist between size on the one hand and 
number of inter-board linkages and, to a lesser extent, bond issues, on the other. 
Table 5.11 presents the results of a regression analysis of average total disclosure 
(AND) on four predictor variables: size, share issues, bond issues and whether or 
not the company is a trading company. Intercompany linkages have been omitted 
because of the high correlation with size, but also because data on these variables 
are not available for all companies or periods. The regression models for the 
various periods have been determined by stepwise forward regression. 
Table 5.10 
correlation coefficients of various explanatory variables 
ANS4583 TRADE BONDS EXISS4583 LINKS57 
ANS4583 
TRADE 
BONDS 
EXISS4583 
LINKS57 
LINKS73 
1.0000 
- .1524 
.321 r 
.1462 
. 7 4 4 1 * 
. 6 6 0 1 * 
1.0000 
- .1101 
- .1649 
- .1327 
- .1853 
1.0000 
.1903 
.1955 
.3493* 
1.0000 
.0151 1.0000 
.0410 .6012* 
p* < . 0 1 ; ** p < .001 
Comparisons are pairwise w i th minimum number of cases in each comparison: 25 
Variables as defined in previous sections. 
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Table 5.11 
Multiple regression models of AND for various subperiods 
n adj. R 2 coefficient estimates (p-values) 
A N S * TRADE EXISS* BONDS Constant 
panel A: all companies 
A N D 4 5 8 3 140 .3432 .4038 - .4215 .1343 - .0732 
(.00) (.01) (.00) (.24) 
A N D 4 5 5 4 100 .2475 .3737 - .2600 - .0248 
(.00) (.00) (.74) 
A N D 5 5 6 4 116 .2250 .3406 - .4202 .2372 - .0884 
(.00) (.01) (.01) (.29) 
A N D 6 5 7 4 112 .3981 .6058 - - - .0089 
(.00) (.91) 
A N D 7 5 8 3 66 .4060 .6388 - - - - .1291 
(.00) (.18) 
panel B: all companies excluding multinationals 
A N D 4 5 8 3 135 .2533 .3443 
(.00) 
- .4179 
(.01) 
.1369 
(.00) 
.0543 
(.39) 
A N D 4 5 5 4 96 .1565 .2829 
(.00) 
.2608 
(.00) 
- .3701 
(.04) 
.0332 
(.71) 
A N D 5 5 6 4 112 .0959 - . 4304 
(.03) 
.2461 
(.01) 
.0292 
(.73) 
A N D 6 5 7 4 107 .3244 .6341 
(.00) 
- .0103 
(.89) 
A N D 7 5 8 3 62 .3864 .7727 
(.00) 
- .0793 
(.43) 
stepwise forward regression w i th entry criterion of p < .05 
variables as defined in previous sections; A N S * and EXISS* refer to the values for the 
appropriate period. 
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Panel A of table 5.11 shows the results for all companies. The fit of the models 
as indicated by R 2 is reasonably good when compared with typical cross-sectional 
disclosure studies30. It is evident that size as measured by ANS is the single 
most important variable in explaining differences in overall disclosure, although 
its importance varies across the various sub-periods. In the sub-periods up to 
1965, T R A D E and EXISS (excess issues relative to sample average) are admitted 
to the regression equation next to size, but after 1965 size alone plays a signifi­
cant role. Moreover, after 1965, on the basis of size alone, R 2 attains the highest 
levels. The shifting relative importance of size compared to industry and share 
issues could reflect the difficulties in measuring size prior to the 1970 Act on 
Annual Financial Statements (WJO). The size measure, based on assets, may be 
distorted by the wider use of conservative valuation practices before 1965-1970. 
This explanation appears to be supported by the improving model fit after 1965. 
On the other hand, one might argue that the steep fall in the number of share 
issues after 1970 makes the corresponding variable less useful for the period after 
1970. That the role of T R A D E is similarly limited in time can perhaps be 
explained by the relationship between disclosure and exit mode indicated in 
section 5.5.4: almost one-half of the trading companies in the sample were 
delisted before 1970, most by liquidation or take-over. Especially this group 
should be characterized by less than average disclosure. 
Since it is conceivable that the size effect as illustrated above depends on the 
influence of the very large multinational companies, panel B of table 5.11 shows 
the result of the same regression analysis, but with A K U / A K Z O , PHILIPS, 
K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M and U N I L E V E R omitted. As might be expected, the 
model fit declines, as does the role of the size variable. The effect is especially 
clear in the 1955-1965 period, where the model fit is very low, and where size 
disappears altogether as a significant explanatory variable. For the sub-periods 
after 1965, however, the results with and without the multinational companies are 
by and large identical. 
For the 1955-1964 period, with relatively low fits, an alternative model can be 
tried on the basis of the data on intercompany linkages. The variable to be used 
is predicted (1957) disclosure on the basis of the average disclosure of linked 
companies (see section 5.5.6). This variable is not significantly correlated with 
size (as opposed to number of linkages, which clearly is correlated) and hence 
may provide additional explanatory power. Table 5.12 shows the results of the 
regression analysis with and without multinational companies. Introducing the 
3 0
 For a multiple regression on a single-period disclosure index, Chow and Wong-
Boren (1987) and Wagenhofer (1990c) find adjusted R 2 values of .15 and .279, respective­
ly. 
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linkage variable does improve the fit of the model to some extent, both with and 
without the multinational companies. 
Table 5.12 
Multiple regression including linkage variable 
dependent variable: A N D 5 5 6 4 
wi th multinationals wi thout multinationals 
n 68 64 
adj. R 2 .3130 .1679 
coefficient estimates (p-values) 
A N S 5 5 6 4 .3892 (.00) 
TRADE - .6177 (.02) - .6721 (.01) 
EXISS5564 
BONDS 
PRED57 2 .3538 (.02) 2 .1323 (.03) 
Constant - . 7184 (.06) - .6056 (.09) 
Notes to table 5.11 apply. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
On the basis of this chapter, it is possible to add some detail to the picture of the 
development of disclosure throughout the postwar period. The outline of this 
picture is well established in the literature, and is clearly confirmed by this study. 
Both the Dutch and the international literature stress the importance of company 
size as a covariate of disclosure. According to the present study, size, almost 
regardless of definition, is the single most important covariate of disclosure. 
The more specific expectation that the four large multinational companies have 
been prominent among the companies with more extensive disclosures has been 
confirmed as well. 
Apart from confirming this outline, the present study provides some details with 
which the general picture can be completed. 
Size, though important, is not a guarantee of good disclosure, nor do large 
companies have a monopoly on introducing and improving disclosures. On the 
one hand, several very large companies, notably in the shipping sector, had 
average or even poor disclosure records. On the other hand, some middle-sized 
and small companies distinguished themselves with good to excellent disclosures. 
To some extent, these departures from the size-rule can be linked to changes in 
size. Size growth appears as a useful variable to explain why companies of 
similar size nevertheless display quite different disclosure histories. As a rule, 
declining company size is associated with a decline in relative disclosure position. 
This relationship between (relative) decline in size and disclosure is evident as 
well for companies delisted as a result of commercial misfortune. Companies 
ending their listing through failure or receivership disclose markedly less than 
average. 
Departures from the rule that large companies disclose better appear to have been 
most widespread in the earlier part of the period. From the 1970's onwards, 
company size plays an increasingly important role in any description of disclosure 
development, almost to the point of driving other covariates into insignificance. 
This may partly be due to the difficulty of measuring size in the early part of the 
period, but, even allowing for this factor, there appear to be more size/disclosure 
order reversals in the 1940's and 1950's. This may perhaps be expanded into a 
more general statement that disclosure practices in the early part of the period 
were more of a random nature than in later years. This is highlighted by the 
occurrence of incidental disclosures', which occur quite frequently in the 1940's 
and 1950's, but not nearly as much in the later part of the period. 
Another covariate that is helpful next to size is capital market activity. In the 
period until 1965, there is a tendency for increases in disclosure to occur in 
conjunction with share issues. After 1970, owing to the absence of share issues 
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in significant numbers, this variable looses significance in distinguishing com­
panies according to disclosure. It cannot be said that the overall level of disclos­
ure has been raised by the practices of newly listed companies: on the whole, 
these companies model their disclosure on the average of the year in which they 
are first listed. 
A n industry effect has not been established by this study, apart from the general 
observations that trading companies tend to lag behind manufacturing companies. 
This, however, might as well be the result of a company-specific effect (declining 
economic position leading to less than average disclosure), that is dispro-
portionally represented among trading companies. The absence of a specific 
industry effect may result from the limitations of the available data (too many 
industries represented by too few companies). It is, however, plausible that 
group effects on disclosure did not operate strictly along industry lines. Links 
between companies of different industries were illustrated in the discussion of the 
relation between disclosure and multiple board memberships. As with other 
covariâtes, this variable is eclipsed by the effect of size from the 1970's onwards. 
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Chapter 6 
Studies of individual disclosure items 
6.1 Introduction 
Whereas the previous chapter has been concerned primarily with an investigation 
of the overall level of disclosure, and of differences in disclosure between 
companies, this chapter deals with the specific characteristics of the disclosure of 
individual items. The objective is to give an impression of the extent to which 
the adoption and diffusion processes of different items are comparable, or, to 
what extent they each display their own characteristics. The inductive approach 
of this chapter, which consists in effect of nine separate case studies, has the 
following structure. 
First, the nine disclosure areas selected in chapter 4 are discussed in nine 
separate sections which form the main part of this chapter. These sections are 
arranged in a broadly chronological order. Although most of the disclosure 
elements studied here have been disclosed to some extent throughout the postwar 
period, most of them can be classified as belonging typically to subperiods as 'the 
1950V or the 'post-1970 period'. 
Second, as far as feasible all items will be discussed with reference to a number 
of constant themes: 
- The chronology of the appearance of the item in theory, professional literature 
and regulation; 
- A broad outline of the reception of the item abroad, supported with quantitat­
ive data whenever available. The number of foreign countries discussed in 
this way varies from item to item owing to differences in data availability. In 
most cases, references are made to the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Empirical data for these countries are usually available from Accounting 
Trends & Techniques and Survey of Published Accounts. Unless otherwise 
indicated, US and U K data are from these sources. Other countries (mainly 
Germany, and, more rarely, France) are discussed whenever information was 
available. 
- The existence of possible 'change agents' or other forces influencing disclos­
ure. Frequent references wil l be made to materials from chapter 3, relating 
to the institutional background of financial reporting in the Netherlands. 
Common points of reference include the Act on Annual Financial Statements 
171 
(WJO) of 1970, the two Employers' reports on recommended annual report­
ing practices of 1955 and 1962, the Tripartite Study Group, the Enterprise 
Chamber, and the auditing profession. 
Third, in the final section, following the nine separate case-studies, these 
materials are integrated in a discussion of the similarities and differences between 
the items. Starting point of this discussion is Rogers' innovation-diffusion 
framework, specifically his listing of innovation characteristics that influence the 
rate of diffusion. The presentation within the main body of the chapter is at least 
partly guided by this end. 
6.2 Sales 
6.2.1 General 
The movement towards disclosure of sales, or turnover, probably illustrates as 
well as any other change in disclosure the transition from earlier, more secretive, 
stages in the development of financial reporting to the present, relatively open 
practices. Sales are an elementary fact of business life, so that already in the 
early stages of thought on financial reporting it was obvious to all concerned that 
company managements possessed information regarding sales. On the other 
hand, disclosure of sales was relatively rare before the Second World War, 
because fear of competitors was widely perceived as a valid argument for not 
making this information public. 
Initially, legal provisions in most countries tended to accord considerable weight 
to the argument of competitive damage. Required sales disclosures were 
introduced only in the later stages of financial reporting regulation. 
The country that took the lead in this development was the United States. 
Although total sales were 'long regarded as a profoundly important management 
secret' by US corporations (Ross, 1966:4), sales were already disclosed by 
around 60% of companies listed in New York before 1934 (Benston, 1969). By 
that time, the SEC started to require sales disclosure in the filed reports. The 
result was that sales were disclosed in published annual reports by 93% (98%) of 
US companies in 1950 (1960). 
In Europe, events proceeded more slowly, and the general nondisclosure of sales 
in Europe could be used to contrast the high esteem in which American manage­
ments held their investors with the paternalistic attitude towards stockholders 
common in Europe (Clapp, 1967:32-34). 
Germany was the first country to adopt a position more similar to the US. Sales 
disclosure was made mandatory in 1960, but in the face of considerable opposi-
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tion (Adler et al., 1960). Some companies attempted to escape the consequences 
of disclosure by including distorting items in the disclosed sales figure. This led 
to certain remedial measures enacted in 1965 (Niehus, 1966). 
Slightly earlier, it was observed that in the U K 'Sales (...) can legally be veiled 
from the owners' gaze; and there is little tendency for the voluntary concession 
of what is not demanded by law' (Baxter, 1956: 40). Ten years later, the 
disclosure of aggregate turnover was 'now gradually becoming more common', 
although the London Stock Exchange 'jibbed at including the disclosure of 
turnover among its new listing requirements' (Murray, 1965: 64). It took the 
Companies Act 1967 to achieve virtually full disclosure by the end of the 1960's. 
The Dutch prewar literature tended to attach considerable weight to the competi­
tive argument, and to excuse the nondisclosure of sales (e.g. Van Slooten, 1900: 
258; Van Gruisen, 1937). In the postwar literature, the strength of the competi­
tive argument against sales disclosure began to be played down. Spinosa Cattela 
(1948a) discussed the example of US reporting and concluded that the amount of 
detail in the Dutch income statement would have to be increased. He did 
foresee, though, that following the US example with regard to sales disclosure 
would ' in a small country like ours meet with much resistance'. Despite this and 
other advocacy of voluntary sales disclosure (e.g. Knol, 1948), there was rarely 
an outright demand for mandatory disclosure by all companies. 
The development of opinion is clearly illustrated by the differences between the 
two employers' reports of 1955 and 1962. The 1955 report merely mentioned 
that substitute disclosures had to be found when the disclosure of sales was 
judged to be detrimental to the company. The 1962 report stated: 'The objection, 
still current, that disclosure of sales figures would be detrimental in connection 
with competitors, can be considered valid in a limited number of cases only.' 
A n argument in favour of sales disclosure that gained in strength during this 
period was the fact that foreign competitors were increasingly compelled to 
disclose sales, apparently without suffering from detrimental effects (e.g. 
Sanders, 1963). Sales disclosure had become mandatory in Germany in 1960, 
and was proposed in the U K in the 1962 Jenkins report. In both countries, 
mandatory disclosure in the US was used as an argument in favour of domestic 
sales disclosure1. In this way, of course, the case for mandatory sales disclosure 
was strengthened by each nation adopting it. 
In the end, sales disclosure was not strictly required by the 1970 Act on Annual 
1
 See Farr (1955), le Coutre (1957) and Niehus (1958), for materials on Germany. In 
Britain, 'American witnesses who gave evidence before Jenkins were unanimous that 
disclosure of turnover (...) had caused no material harm' ('Turnover: What can be 
shown?', Accountancy (UK), vol. 74 no. 844, December 1963, p. 1121-1122). 
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Financial Statements. Companies were given the option of providing alternative 
disclosures, notably index figures showing changes in sales over time. The 
supporting documents to the law and the discussions in parliament made it clear, 
however, that sales disclosure would be appropriate except for small, 
undiversified enterprises. For most of the companies included in the present 
sample, therefore, there would have been a strong presumption that in their case 
sales disclosure became mandatory after 1970. 
Since opposition to mandatory sales disclosure occurred in many countries, it 
may be asked whether this opposition was in fact based on the existence of 
substantial proprietary costs of disclosure. Empirical investigation of this 
question has been limited to the effects of the 1934 (US) Securities and Exchange 
Act, with mixed results. 
Benston (1969) doubted the necessity of the disclosure requirements of the 
Securities Acts. In Benston (1973) it was found that there was no measurable 
impact on securities prices of companies affected by the 1934 Act, that is, the 40 
percent of companies that did not previously disclose their sales. Combined with 
the considerable voluntary disclosure before the Act, Benston concluded that the 
Act was not, in this regard, of great significance2. 
6.2.2 Comments on observed disclosure practices 
Data on sales disclosure were collected for the companies listed in Appendix B. 
As described in Appendix A , four different 'disclosure positions' were recog­
nized with regard to sales. Next to disclosure of the absolute amount of sales, 
either within or outside the income statement, two intermediate disclosures were 
distinguished: disclosure of a physical output measure and disclosure of an index 
number of sales. 
Early disclosures 
Figure 6.1 summarizes the development of sales disclosure over time. As can 
be seen, there were only slow increases in disclosure of the absolute amount of 
sales until the early 1960's, followed by a strong increase in the adoption rate 
during the 1965-1970 period. During the 1940's and 1950's there gradually 
came in to being a group of companies that systematically disclosed sales, while 
another, larger group, disclosed sales irregularly or experimented with surrogates 
2
 Benston's work has been the object of some methodological criticism, summarized 
in Chow (1984). Chow also attempted a more detailed study of consequences of the 1934 
Act and concluded that there was, in fact, evidence of negative wealth effects for share­
holders of previously nondisclosing companies. 
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Figure 6.1 Sales disclosure 
(fraction of companies disclosing) 
such as index numbers. If one leaves out, for the moment, the considerable 
number of companies that disclosed sales only incidentally, one is left with a 
quite small group of companies that disclosed or (started to disclose) their sales 
consistently during the 1945-1958 period. These companies form a rather 
disparate group, and the reasons for their early disclosure are not always obvi­
ous. 
The sales disclosure by U N I L E V E R since 1945 is perhaps not surprising. The 
presence among sales disclosers of A R M and K R O M H O U T , identified as progress­
ive disclosers in the previous chapter, also seems natural. But why S T O O M V A A R T 
Z E E L A N D was among the very first to publish an income statement headed by 
gross sales, or why W A L V I S V A A R T disclosed sales since 1945, is not clear. Both 
companies were to some extent government sponsored and hence shielded from 
domestic and foreign competition, which may have influenced their disclosure 
decisions. 
In the early 1950's, A K U , K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M and PHILIPS started to 
disclose their sales, for reasons possibly connected with the New York listings 
they acquired at that time (see also section 5.5.3). Some companies ( T H O M A S -
S E N D R I J V E R , B L I K M A N SARTORIUS) made it explicit in their financial statements 
that they started to disclose on the recommendations of the Rijkens report (1955). 
A L B A T R O S remarked in its 1954 report, its first to contain a sales disclosure, that 
'the demands of modern financial reporting entail a more detailed presentation of 
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our balance sheet and income statement'. This statement may well have come 
from the company president, J .D. Waller, who was a member of the Rijkens 
committee. 
Irregular disclosures and reversions to nondisclosure 
A considerable number of companies disclosed their sales irregularly during the 
1940's and 1960's. Some disclosed only once, for instance at the occasion of an 
anniversary, while others switched back and forth between disclosure and 
nondisclosure for no apparent reason (e.g. ASW). Reversions to nondisclosure 
were mainly confined to companies that disclosed only an isolated sales figure, 
for instance in the directors' report. It was very rare, apart from situations of 
financial distress, for companies that had once integrated the sales figure in the 
income statement to stop disclosing sales. The only instances of this phenomenon 
were S T O O M V A A R T Z E E L A N D and NBT, both discontinuing the practice of 
providing income statements headed by sales in the early 1950's almost as if 
suddenly becoming aware that their reports were, in this regard, out of line with 
the other companies. Subsequent to 1960, reversions to nondisclosure occur only 
infrequently. 
Influence of the 1970 Act 
There can be little doubt that the 1970 Act had considerable influence on the 
disclosure of sales. In this respect, the Netherlands clearly contrasted with the 
United States were, prior to 1934, there had already been extensive voluntary 
disclosure by listed companies. 
Although the 1970 Act did not, strictly speaking, require the disclosure of sales, 
it was made clear along the way towards enactment that claiming potential 
competitive damage was going out of favour. The reduction in the importance 
attached to the competitive argument, indicated above, was accompanied by a rise 
in sales disclosure throughout the 1960's, from about 20% in 1960 to 42% in 
1968. The major change came in 1969-1971, however, when disclosure went up 
to 72%. After that, the percentage gradually increased to 90% in 1983. 
Evidently, many companies waited with their disclosure until it was certain that a 
law strongly inclined towards sales disclosure would be passed. In 1976, when 
most listed companies disclosed their sales, the Tripartite Study Group issued a 
Considered View that nondisclosure of sales was warranted only when manage­
ment expected, on 'objective grounds' that 'substantial disadvantage to the 
enterprise' would ensue from this disclosure (IVb.2.11-12, December 1976). 
Use of different disclosure formats 
Given the perceived sensitivity of sales disclosure, many companies preferred to 
go through an interim stage before actually disclosing sales. About two-thirds of 
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the companies that finally disclosed their absolute sales did so after an average of 
six years during which they disclosed either index figures of sales or physical 
measures of output. Evidently, physical measures of output are useful for 
companies with relatively homogenous bulk production only ( H E I N E K E N , D O M A -
N I A L E M Í J N ) or in the case of customized production of capital goods (NDSM). 
Hence, providing index figures was by far the most popular interim measure. 
Index figures were an innovation themselves. Before 1950, hardly any company 
used index figures to report sales, but they rapidly acquired popularity during the 
1950's. During the 1960's, about 25% of companies showed index figures of 
sales in its annual report, and it is therefore not surprising that their use was 
provided for in the 1970 Act. However, by 1970 index figures definitely were 
being superseded by disclosure of absolute sales. From 1970 to 1972, use of 
index figures dropped to about 10% of companies, a level at which it remained 
until 1980. After 1970, it was rare not to disclose at least an index of sales. 
The 1970 Act did not prescribe that the income statement had to open with sales, 
or had to include a reconciliation of sales with profit. Traditionally, the income 
statement (or rather, profit- and loss account) opened with gross operating 
income from which items like depreciation, interest and taxes were deducted to 
arrive at net income. This format was still allowed under the new Act. 
More modern, or 'integrated' formats in which the income statement opened with 
sales were unknown in practice before the war, even though they had been 
recommended in 1938 with reference to American standards (Koppenberg, 
1938)3. Integrated income statements began to be used sporadically in the early 
1950's, mainly by the multinational companies (KONINKLIJKE P E T R O L E U M , 
PHILIPS, A K U ) with a listing in New York 4 . U N I L E V E R also adopted the 
integrated income statement at the time of its New York listing, in 1961). The 
use of such statements began to expand in the late 1960's, even though they were 
not mentioned in the law being prepared at that time (see figure 6.1). 
After 1970, however, the spread of the integrated income statement slowed, and 
a substantial fraction of companies continued with the traditional format. In this 
respect, the Tripartite Study Group provided no guidance. In the relevant 
sections of its considered views (I b.3.11, IV b.2) it adhered closely to the text of 
the law. It was not until the late 1970's and early 1980's that a number of large 
3
 Koppenberg's article referred to the widely circulated 1929 publication of the 
American Institute of Accountants, Verification of Financial Statements. This set of 
recommended auditing and accounting practices was endorsed by the Federal Reserve 
Board and 'attracted attention on both sides of the Atlantic' (Zeff, 1972:118). 
4
 The transition in the annual reports of the multinational companies from T-shaped 
profit- and loss accounts to income statements opening with sales was ascribed by Brands 
(1953) to the requirements of the SEC. 
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companies, including A L B E R T H E Y N , B Y E N K O R F and B O S K A L I S changed to an 
integrated income statement. 
6.2.3 Summary 
The disclosure of sales remained a sensitive issue during a considerable part of 
the period. Given the importance attached to sales disclosure in terms of its 
perceived benefits and costs, it is likely that most companies made conscious 
policy decisions regarding this disclosure. This is borne out by the way most 
companies chose to use interim disclosure formats in a way to balance carefully 
the demand for more disclosure against the perceived drawbacks of disclosure. 
Nevertheless, by 1970 the fear that sales disclosure would lead to heavy propri­
etary costs appears to have diminished. Although the law allowed companies to 
continue the use of interim formats such as index figures, the large majority of 
companies chose to disclose absolute sales figures. Sales disclosure can therefore 
be seen as an instance of a disclosure item that was part of the 'disclosure array' 
for a long time before a shift in perceptions of disclosure costs (brought about in 
particular by observation of foreign practice) led to increases in disclosure. 
6.3 Comparative figures 
6.3.1 General comments 
Before the war, the practice of disclosing a column of previous year's figures in 
the balance sheet and profit and loss account was rare. Even though companies 
would provide little or no additional information by doing so, few provided this 
service to the readers of the financial statements. U N I L E V E R (since 1934) , 
Heemaf N V (since 1937) and PHILIPS (since 1937/8) appear to be among the few 
companies who, before the War, published comparative figures5. 
During the immediate postwar years, the practice was continued on a limited 
scale. U N I L E V E R , one of the prewar disclosers, immediately showed comparative 
figures in its 1945 financial statements. The Anglo-Dutch company would have 
been aware of the fact that in the United Kingdom the provision of comparative 
figures had been recommended by the ICAEW in 1944, a recommendation 
included as a requirement in the Companies Act 1948 6 . PHILIPS resumed the 
inclusion of comparative figures in 1946, in its first regular postwar annual 
5
 See also Munnik (1931: 30) and Koppenberg (1938). 
6
 Recommendations of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, 
No. 8, 'Form of balance sheet and profit and loss account', 1944; Companies Act, 1948, 
Schedule 8, 11(11) and 12(5). 
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Figure 6.2 Comparative figures 
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report. Three years later, showing comparative figures was apparently still rare 
enough for the Haagsche Post to call attention to PHILIPS ' 'commendable' 
comparative figures7. Other large companies like K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M 
(1950) and A K U (1948) were preceded by a some smaller companies such as 
D O R P (1946) and K R O M H O U T (1947) . 
The change in the percentage of companies disclosing comparative figures is 
shown in figure 6 . 2 . What is immediately clear is the sharp increase in disclos­
ures following 1950 . The change was so rapid that for a few years, disclosure 
levels were higher in the Netherlands than in the U S A . In the latter country, 
comparative figures were gaining ground more gradually (see figure 6 .2) 8 . 
The most plausible explanation for the sudden expansion of disclosure of com-
7
 'Philips verslag geeft Houvast', Haagsche Post, 8 July 1950, p. 14. 
8
 In 1940, Accounting Research Bulletin No. 6 (April 1940), asserted that 'The 
increasing use of comparative statements in the annual reports of companies is a step in 
the right direction' but, even though the SEC endorsed this and other CAP pronounce­
ments, this did not amount to a formal requirement to include comparative figures in 
annual reports to stockholders. ARB No. 43 (1953) restated ARB No. 6 and asserted that 
it is 'ordinarily desirable' to publish comparative statements. According to Farr (1955) 
the disclosure of comparative figures was by no means common among German com­
panies in the mid-1950's. 
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parative figures is the fact that the Stock Exchange Association made one of its 
rare postwar attempts to influence financial reporting9. In a circular to members 
of the Stock Exchange dated October 1951, it was stated that: 
It would be applauded by the Stock Exchange Association when the practice, 
already applied by a few companies, of including for the purpose of compari­
son the figures of the preceding year next to the figures of the current 
financial year, would henceforth be followed generally.10 
6.3.2 A modelling approach 
The impact of the Stock Exchange Association's circular can be illustrated by 
developing a simple model for the disclosure process depicted in figure 6.2. This 
figure shows, in addition to the actual disclosure data, the result of a simulation 
exercise which attempts to recreate the observed data by means of a model, 
derived from an innovation-diffusion context. It wil l be recalled from the 
discussion in chapter 4 that innovation-diffusion processes are generally charac­
terized by 'S'-shaped diffusion curves. One of the more popular mathematical 
representations of this 'S'-shaped curve is the Bass (1969) model which interprets 
such curve shapes as the result of two forces influencing the diffusion of an 
innovation: 
- A n 'external influence' effect, such as the effect of mass media. This type of 
effect exerts an influence on all nonadopters that is constant over time. 
- A n 'internal influence' effect, which can be understood as the result of 
imitation or word-of-mouth communication. As the number of adopters 
increases over time, the strength of this influence increases as well. 
The process depicted in figure 6.2 can be interpreted in these terms. Specifi­
cally, one might say that prior to 1951, the 'external influence' coefficient can be 
set equal to zero. That is, from 1945 to 1950, the growing disclosure of 
comparative figures can be assumed to rely entirely on the 'internal influence' 
diffusion effect produced by mutual observation and imitation. Starting with 
1951, an external factor indicating the presumed effect of the Stock Exchange 
9
 See Van Berckel (1965), who credits the Stock Exchange Association for the fact 
that, by 1965, presenting comparative figures had become 'common practice'. See Zeff et 
al. (1992:chapter 3, passim) for the role of the Association in postwar financial reporting. 
1 0
 Vereeniging voor den Effectenhandel (Bedrijfsgroep Effectenhandel), Mededelingen 
van het Bestuur aan de Leden no. 285, 15 October 1951, 'Publicatie van gegevens door 
naamloze vennootschappen'. 
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circular comes into effect as well. It appears from figure 6.2 that a model along 
these lines is capable of matching the observed data quite closely1 1. It is there­
fore possible to conclude that the process by which comparative figures were 
introduced in Dutch financial statements took place as if before 1951, new 
disclosures occurred only because of an interaction and imitation effect, while 
from 1951 onwards new disclosures were mainly the result of a strong 'external 
influence' type of diffusion12. 
6.3.3 Other potential influences on disclosure 
The rapid introduction of comparative figures in published annual reports 
following 1951 suggest that companies were not particularly concerned about this 
disclosure. This attitude, if it existed, contrasts with the continued and emphatic 
recommendations of comparative figures. While these recommendations may 
have been relevant to unlisted companies (which are not covered in this study), 
they can hardly have played a role in encouraging disclosure by listed companies. 
In 1956, when more than 90% of the sampled companies were already disclosing 
comparative figures, the norms for the Henri Sijthoff award included the presen­
tation of comparative figures as one of the three primary criteria to be applied, 
while citing the Stock Exchange circular to stress the importance of this item 1 3. 
Whereas this apparent oversight could be excused because of the rapid spread of 
comparative figures in the previous years, it is more difficult to understand why 
comparative figures had to be a matter for discussion when in 1968 the draft Act 
on Annual Accounts was introduced (see Zeff et al., 1992: 177-78). These 
instances of relative unawareness of current actual practice are important to note. 
They illustrate the difficulties of observing and assessing the importance of new 
developments in disclosure at a time when systematic surveys of reporting 
practice were not available. 
The Dutch auditors' organization can be ruled out as an alternative influence on 
1 1
 Specifically, the model used is N(t) = N(t-1) + a[l-N(t-l)] + bN(t)[l-N(t-l)], with 
N(t): the percentage of disclosing companies in year t; 
a: the external influence coefficient (0 for 1945-1950, .25 for 1951-1962); 
b: the internal influence coefficient (.22 throughout). 
Model coefficients are estimated according to the procedure described in Mahajan and 
Peterson (1985), R 2 = .9936. 
1 2
 More or less equivalently, one might say that after 1951, new disclosures followed 
the pattern of a Markov-process in which each year about a quarter of nondisclosing 
companies started to disclose. 
13
 Normen voor de beoordeling van Jaarverslagen opgesteld voor de Henri Sijthoff 
Prijs (Amsterdam: Het Financieele Dagblad, 1956), p. 3. 
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disclosure, since the NIvA apparently played a rather reactive role in these 
developments. In 1952, the board asked the Advisory Committee on Professional 
Matters (CAB) to consider the 'phenomenon that, over the last few years more 
and more companies start to include for comparative purposes the figures for the 
preceding financial year, next to the figures relating to the current financial 
year.' 1 4 The NIvA did not take the lead in stimulating its members to encour­
age their clients to include comparative figures. Rather, at the time when the 
subject made its appearance in the NIvA literature, practice had already to a large 
extent accepted comparative figures. The discussions within the NIvA were 
confined to the auditor's duty to verify the comparative figures, and their 
coverage by the auditor's opinion (see also De Jong, 1956). 
6.3.4 Summary 
Compared to other disclosure items discussed in this chapter, the disclosure of 
comparative figures displays two interesting characteristics. 
First, this particular disclosure spread among companies with a rapidity that was 
not observed for any other item included in this study. It is true that a rapid 
diffusion of comparative figures is not in itself surprising, in the light of the 
presumably low or negligible proprietary costs associated with their disclosure. 
Yet, the actual observation of this rapid diffusion is useful since it occurred quite 
early in the postwar period, which suggests that even at that time financial 
reporting could be quite responsive to stimuli aimed at increased disclosure. 
Second, the comparative figures disclosure stands out because it can quite 
definitely be associated with a single important influence, the Stock Exchange 
memorandum of 1951. 
6.4 Taxation 
6.4.1 Introduction 
The notion of deferred taxation was, at least as far as limited liability companies 
were concerned, a distinctly postwar development. Before the Second World 
War, Dutch companies were not subject to a tax on income or profit. Income 
was subject to taxation only to the extent that it was distributed as dividends. In 
the late 1930's, preparations for the introduction of an income tax were made. 
This tax became effective in the early 1940's15. Essentially, an income tax of 
this kind was retained until the present, although a number of important modifica-
14
 De Accountant, vol. 59 no. 3, November 1952, p. 219. 
1 5
 Besluit Winstbelasting 1940, Besluit op de Vennootschapsbelasting 1942. 
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tions occurred in 1947, 1950 and 1964. 
A n important aspect of the switch from a tax on dividends to an income tax was 
that, without further measures, retained earnings from before the new tax would 
escape taxation altogether. This was prevented by the transformation of part of 
retained earnings from previous periods into a tax-free reserve on which the tax 
authorities retained a deferred claim 1 6. Even if, in future, there would be no 
differences between taxable and reported income, this tax-free reserve confronted 
companies with the question of wether or not to recognize the deferred claim in 
their balance sheets. In 1947, additional scope for deferred taxation issues was 
created with the introduction of several other tax-free reserves. In 1950, these 
were amalgamated into one type of temporarily tax-free reserve17. The cumu­
lative effect of the various measures was that, by the early 1950's, the single 
remaining tax-free reserve 'had reached a considerable level in many companies' 
(Nierhoff, 1952:281). Tax-free reserves formed an important component of 
deferred tax claims. It was, however, a transitory source of tax deferrals since 
the regime of these reserves was not supposed to last indefinitely. 
At the same time, next to the tax-free reserves typical for this period, there were 
more general and more lasting sources of differences between taxable and 
reported income. One of the most important was the introduction, in 1950, of 
accelerated depreciation for tax purposes. It was gradually being recognized that 
there existed a broader problem of latent tax claims than that arising from the 
tax-free reserves18. 
Hence, in successive stages between 1940 and 1950, Dutch corporations were 
confronted with, and became more and more aware of, an increasingly complex 
issue of deferred taxation, an issue which they had not faced before. The 
newness of the phenomenon can be illustrated by a remark from Lafeber (1952: 
351) that, to his knowledge, there was as yet no generally accepted name for the 
balance sheet item containing deferred taxes. 
The same changes in the tax law that gave rise to the issue of deferred taxation 
also gave rise to an increased importance of tax costs as a disclosure. Whereas 
tax payments in the past had been tied to dividends, they were now tied to the 
assessment of profits by the tax authorities. In an age of secret reserves and 
blatant earnings management, readers of financial statements showed an under-
1 6
 The so-called Herleide overgangsreserve (H.O.R.) 
1 7
 The so-called Nieuwe Onbelaste Reserve (N.O.R.) 
1 8
 Roozen (1952:339) characterized it as a 'piepjong vraagstuk' (a 'fledgling issue'), 
and asserted that before, under the regime of a dividend tax, deferred taxation could not 
be considered to occur. Moreover, he extended the question of deferred taxation from the 
tax-free reserves to any difference that may occur between reported income (equity) and 
income for tax purposes. 
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standable interest in disclosure of tax costs19. Evidently, this made some 
companies reluctant to provide extensive disclosures of both current and deferred 
tax charges and liabilities. Some apparently even turned the argument around by 
claiming that deferred tax liabilities did not need to be disclosed because they 
could be balanced by secret reserves hidden elsewhere in the balance sheet (an 
argument rejected by Roozen, 1952:340). 
By 1955, therefore, tax disclosure and disclosure of deferred liabilities were a 
recognized financial reporting issue for which no generally accepted solution was 
available (see also Soesbeek, 1955:256 and De Jong, 1964:42n). 
It appears from the literature that the Rijkens report issued in that year did much 
to provide a standard for at least the disclosure aspect of the deferred tax issue. 
Burggraaff (1968) suggests that this report and its 1962 successor played an 
important role in elevating requests from the financial press for fuller disclosure 
of tax items to the level of a generally accepted point of view. 
The Rijkens report listed the topic of taxation among the three key reporting 
issues singled out for extensive treatment at the start of the report (the other two 
being secret reserves and current cost accounting, implying that accounting for 
taxes was on a level with these two important issues). It was recommended to 
disclose tax costs charged to this year's profits, even though it was conceded that 
for some companies nondisclosure might be justified because of potential damage. 
Furthermore, tax costs were to be calculated over reported profits and should not 
necessarily equal taxes payable. Deferred tax obligations should be recognized, 
but not necessarily separately disclosed. If no deferred taxes were taken into 
account, this should be mentioned in the annual report. The 1962 Hamburger 
Committee report, although it largely reiterated the demands of its 1955 prede­
cessor, was more specific regarding disclosures of tax liabilities. Whereas the 
Rijkens report had recommended including taxes payable in the 'Other payables' 
item, the Hamburger report called for separate disclosure. That deferred taxes 
were to be separately disclosed might be inferred, but it was not made explicit. 
Although the right way to calculate tax deferrals remained a controversial issue 
until well into the 1980's, by the mid-1960's it was more or less agreed that the 
financial statements ought to provide information on both the tax charges in the 
1 9
 As an example, the financial journalist Justus Meyer used disclosed tax data to 
arrive at a more realistic estimate of the 1949 income of Heemaf NV, a company that was 
evidently keen to report a very conservative measure of income ('Het Jaarverslag der 
Heemaf, Haagsche Post, 18 March 1950, p. 16). 
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income statement, and on tax liabilities included in the balance sheet20. This 
agreement in theory did not immediately translate into a completely homogeneous 
disclosure practice. Tempelaar (1966:272) notes that one of the three most 
common deficiencies in a sample of financial statements was the absence of 
information on taxes. But these deficiencies were soon to be eliminated by the 
enactment of the 1970 Act (WJO). The 1965 Verdam committee report proposed 
separate disclosure of current and deferred tax liabilities and tax charges in the 
income statement. The committee refrained, however, from pronouncing on the 
calculation of deferrals. Its recommendations were incorporated in the law. 
2 0
 In 1962 a report on tax deferrals was published by a NIvA-subeommittee, installed 
in 1952 when the deferred tax issue was still young. Although the report prompted 
extensive discussion within the NIvA and in the literature, these discussions hardly 
touched on the disclosure aspect of (deferred) taxation. To the extent that disclosure was 
discussed, a reference was generally included to the Employers Organizations' reports. 
See Commissie van Advies inzake Beroepsaangelegenheden, 'De vraagstukken, welke 
samenhangen met de invloed van de latente belastingverhoudingen op de jaarrekening van 
de naamloze vennootschap', De Accountant, vol. 69 no. 1, September 1962, p. 40-51, and 
De Accountant, vol. 69 no. 8, April 1963, p. 524-543; also: 'Belastingen naar de winst in 
de jaarrekening', De Accountant, vol. 74 no. 2, June 1967, p. 35-46. The literature 
referred to includes de Jong (1964), Brok (1964), Burggraaff (1968) and Smulders (1968). 
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6.4.2 Comments on observed disclosure practices 
Figure 6.3 shows the increase in disclosure of tax data by the sample companies. 
In contrast to other disclosure items discussed in this chapter, no comparative 
data for other countries are shown owing to a lack of published comparable time 
series. 
The various disclosure positions distinguished in figure 6.3 include: 
- The disclosure of the tax cost item charged to the profit- and loss account. 
- Disclosures regarding the balance sheet tax liability. 
With regard to the balance sheet item, various classes of disclosure are distin­
guished: the disclosure of an unspecified tax item, the disclosure of a single item 
with the indication that it consists both of current and deferred taxes, the disclos­
ure of either current or deferred taxes and the disclosure of the two items 
separately (see also Appendix A) . 
Relationship between disclosures of tax cost and tax liabilities. 
Given that tax costs and tax liabilities are closely related in terms of the journal 
entries required to enter them into a set of accounting records, it might be 
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assumed that there would also be a fairly close relationship between the disclos­
ures of the two items. A first indication of the strength of this relationship was 
provided in table 5.1, where it was found that the years of Observed First 
Disclosure of the two items were fairly strongly correlated21. Nevertheless, as 
figure 6.3 indicates, disclosure levels for tax costs were somewhat higher than 
those for tax liabilities through most of the pre-1970 period. This leads to the 
assumption that new disclosures of the two items often did not occur simulta­
neously, and that disclosure of tax costs usually preceded disclosure of tax 
liabilities. This is supported by the following observations: 
- In the entire sample, there were 105 observed switches from nondisclosure to 
disclosure of tax costs and 95 switches in the same direction regarding tax 
liabilities. In 32 cases, the switches occurred simultaneously. 
- A n even lower fraction was observed for the reversions to nondisclosure: 
there were 9 simultaneous switches out of 53 tax costs reversions and 40 tax 
liability reversions22. 
- Roughly a third, therefore, of all disclosure switches occurred simultaneously 
for both items. The others occurred in a wide variety of circumstances, with 
the average time elapsing between the first disclosure of tax costs and the first 
disclosure of tax liabilities being slightly more than ten years. Occasionally, 
some 20 years elapsed between the first disclosure of tax costs and the first 
disclosure of tax liabilities 2 3. 
Main factors underlying changes in disclosure 
It is likely that the factors governing tax disclosures were somewhat different 
from the factors underlying other disclosures. This is suggested not only by the 
somewhat irregular shape of the disclosure curve for tax cost disclosures, but 
also by the absence of a relationship between tax cost disclosure and size 2 4. 
2 1
 r = .4914 ( p< .001, n = 69). It will be recalled that a binary disclosure 
definition (see appendix A) was used to make this calculation. 
2 2
 There were even some simultaneous switches in opposite directions: in two cases 
tax liabilities were disclosed in the year that disclosure of tax costs was discontinued, and 
two cases with switches in the opposite directions. 
2 3
 As in the cases of STOOMVAART NEDERLAND, DORP and GROFSMEDERIJ. 
2 4
 A cross-sectional analysis for 1960 shows that the tax cost disclosure percentages 
for companies of above (below) median size was 64% (66%), which is an insignificant 
difference. As an indication of the size effect with other disclosures it can be said that for 
sales disclosure the disclosure percentage for above (below) median size were 27% (11%), 
a difference significant at p < .05. For consolidated statements these figures were 50% 
(25%), significant at p < .015. Probabilities shown are based on the Fisher exact 
probability test. 
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It is not easy to indicate the main influences on the disclosure process. On the 
one hand, the disclosures of tax costs and tax liabilities are sufficiently different 
to prevent easy generalisation. On the other hand, the number of potential 
explanations for the observed changes is quite large. 
Figure 6.3 shows a clear break in the series for tax liability disclosure in 1971. 
It is quite evident that for this disclosure item the 1970 Act had a major impact 
on the process of disclosure extension that had been going on since the early 
1950's. For tax cost disclosures, there was less scope for the Act to make an 
impact since by 1965 about 80% of companies were already disclosing this item. 
Figure 6.3 suggests a more or less cyclical pattern in the extension of tax cost 
disclosure between 1945 and the middle 1960's, with periods of increases in 
disclosure alternating with periods of constant or even slightly decreasing 
disclosure. A similar pattern suggests itself for tax liabilities, before 1960. 
Figure 6.4 allows a closer look at these developments by showing observed 
changes from nondisclosure to disclosure by year. In this way, the effects of 
discontinued disclosure, new listings and delistings can be suppressed. 
Figure 6.4 shows that there were definite 'spikes' of new disclosures of tax 
liabilities in the years 1964 and 1971. There appears to be some indication of a 
slight fall in the rate of new disclosures in 1951-1952 and 1960-1962. For tax 
costs, the peak years with regard to new disclosures appear to be 1947 and 1955. 
It seems reasonable to relate the tax cost disclosures of 1955 (and subsequent 
years) to the Rijkens report, especially in the light of the importance attached to 
that report by contemporaries in promoting thought on accounting for taxation. 
It is tempting to relate the disclosures of 1947 and 1964 to the tax law changes of 
those years on the ground that these changes in the law focused attention on taxes 
and hence increased the probability of new disclosures. The apparent tendency to 
disclose tax costs prior to tax liabilities would explain why in 1947 the effect on 
disclosure was primarily in terms of tax costs whereas in 1964 the main change 
was in tax liability disclosure. 
Reversions to non-disclosure 
Both tax items show a rather high reversion rate. That is, the number of 
observed switches to nondisclosure is high compared to the number of observed 
switches to disclosure (see table 6.1, which shows that for both items the number 
of reversions is about half the number of new disclosures). This can, at least in 
part, be explained by the fact that loss-making companies may have no tax 
obligation and/or tax charges to report for a number of years. At least for some 
companies, such as A D A M , A S S E L B E R G , ASW, G I E S S E N , this explanation appears 
to account for some of the fluctuation in disclosure: reported losses coincide with 
the disappearance of a tax item from the financial statements. In this regard, it 
should be noted that a company explaining in the notes to the financial statements 
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that there are no tax liabilities or tax charges to be reported because of losses is 
considered to be disclosing its tax data. 
Table 6.1 
Discontinued disclosure by item 
Discontinuance ratio 
(reversions to nondisclosure / observed new disclosures) 
Geographical segments 5 6 . 4 % 
Tax costs 5 0 . 5 % 
Tax liabilities 4 2 . 1 % 
Number of employees 4 0 . 6 % 
Current cost / balance sheet 2 9 . 8 % 
Industry segments 2 8 . 6 % 
Current cost / income statement 2 7 . 8 % 
Sales 2 1 . 9 % 
Wage costs 13 .3% 
Earnings per share 7 .4% 
Consolidated statements 6 .7% 
Funds statement 1.7% 
Comparative figures 1 . 1 % 
Reversions are especially prominent during the years 1950-1952. During those 
three years, 16 companies discontinued the disclosure of tax costs (30% of all 
observed reversions for the entire 1945-1983 period). It seems that after the 
initial round of new disclosures following 1947, a number of companies realized 
that the potential costs of disclosure (in terms of additional information on profit) 
might be too high, and therefore reverted to nondisclosure. 
A number of these discontinued disclosures were achieved by combining taxes 
into an aggregate balance sheet and/or income statement item. This was a 
reporting device that gained considerable popularity during the earlier postwar 
period. The item would bear names like 'reserve for special purposes', 'reserve 
for miscellaneous purposes' or 'reserve for sundry interests'. In the notes to the 
financial statements a remark would be made to the effect that an unspecified 
provision for taxation was included in this reserve, which might either be fed by 
charges to the income statement or by allocations from retained earnings. The 
device remained quite popular until the disclosure requirements of the 1970 Act 
made it no longer acceptable. 
An individual company 
In some cases, insight may be gained into the difficulties that companies were 
faced with in providing tax disclosures, assuming they were willing to do so. 
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The 'Hoogovens' steel mills did not disclose any quantitative data on taxes until 
1957. However, because of verbal statements in the preceding years' annual 
reports, it is possible to obtain some insight into the circumstances surrounding 
the decision to start disclosing in 1957. 
Starting with the 1954/55 annual report, the section of the directors' report 
discussing the balance sheet and income statement was significantly expanded. 
The more extensive discussions contained henceforth a paragraph on taxes. In 
the 1954/55 report, it was observed that 'regarding our tax situation, we are not 
yet capable of providing precise figures owing to our ongoing consultations with 
the tax authorities. (...) As soon as the tax assessments are established, we wil l 
disclose the tax liability separately in our annual report.' 
The most likely explanation for this declared willingness to disclose tax data is 
the 1955 Rijkens report which appeared about six months before the Hoogovens 
annual report and which paid extensive attention to disclosure of taxes. It may 
be recalled (see section 5.5.6) that Hoogovens president A . H . Ingen Housz was a 
member of the Rijkens committee. 
It took a while before the declared intention could be realized. Readers of the 
1955 and 1956 annual reports were kept informed about the proceeding negoti­
ations with the tax authorities (which centred on the acceptance by the tax 
authorities of the base stock method), but in both years it was stated that the 
company preferred not to give actual figures before the exact liability was 
known. Finally, in the 1957 annual report, it was stated that 'the moment has 
arrived to disclose our tax liabilities in the financial statements'. The company 
certainly did so, with a complete disclosure of current and deferred liabilities and 
a breakdown of tax costs in taxes payable and movements in deferred liabilities. 
6.4.3 Summary 
Tax disclosures were governed to a large extent by their own specific causes. 
This appears from the relatively small degree of association with other disclos­
ures and the absence of the otherwise ubiquitous size effect. The factors 
operating on tax disclosure were primarily legal, connected with the progress of 
tax reform in the Netherlands. Changes in the tax structure gave rise to the issue 
of deferred taxation. The tax law revisions of 1947 and 1964 were accompanied 
by distinct improvements in disclosure. The 1970 Act also played a certain role 
in bringing about disclosure by the remaining nondisclosing companies. 
As to non-legal influences, the data provide some support for the assertions in the 
contemporary literature that the employers' reports of 1955 and 1962 were an 
important factor in bringing about improvements in disclosure. 
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6.5 Employment-related disclosures 
Regarding disclosure of employee-related data, two disclosure items were 
investigated: the disclosure of labour-related costs (primarily wages) and disclos­
ure of the number of employees. Considerable differences in disclosure with 
regard to these two items can be observed, even though they show aspects of the 
same facet of the enterprise. By and large, companies appeared more willing to 
disclose the number of employees than their aggregate remuneration. 
This difference becomes apparent from figure 6.5, which shows the disclosure of 
both items over time. Whereas the number of companies disclosing employee 
numbers rises rather gradually, the number of companies disclosing wage costs 
remains low until the late 1960's, when a sudden increase occurs. The remain­
der of this section provides comments and backgrounds on these developments. 
6.5.1 Employee numbers 
Throughout the period, disclosure of employee numbers was not mandated by 
law. A disclosure requirement was introduced with the adaptation of Dutch law 
to the Fourth Directive in 1983. Nevertheless, from the middle 1950's onwards 
the number of companies disclosing employee numbers rose steadily to reach 
90% or more in the mid-1970's. During the 1940's and 1950's, disclosure of 
employee numbers was to a large extent a matter of experimentation and inciden­
tal disclosure. As with sales disclosure, the number of new disclosures during 
the 1945-1954 period is almost balanced by the number of discontinued disclos­
ures. Another illustration of the irregularity of disclosure is that during this ten-
year period, a total of 27 companies started to disclose employee numbers. 
However, only 9 of these companies disclosed employee numbers for more than 
three consecutive years. A n echo of this situation is provided by a complaint in 
the financial press that 'only few financial statements report on the number of 
employees.'25 
From 1955 onwards, new disclosures began to outweigh discontinued disclosures, 
although the latter remained substantial. A n indication of a changing attitude is 
that the Norms for the Henri Sijthoff award (1956) suggested the disclosure of 
the number of employees in the directors' report. 
Apparently, the 'jubilee factor' played a larger role with this item than with any 
other. It accounts to a considerable extent for the pattern of intermittent disclos-
'Financiële publiciteit' in Het Financieele Dagblad, 6 January 1955, p. 1. 
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Figure 6.5 Disclosure of employee data 
(percentage of companies disclosing) 
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
~— Wage costs + No. of employees * US: Wage costs 
ure during the period up to 195526. As noted by the financial journalist W . C . 
Posthumus Meyjes (1960), labour-intensity was frequently a subject shrouded in 
secrecy, except at anniversaries when the president might take pride in pointing 
out 'that he started out on his own and that now a thousand men earn a living in 
the company'. Examples of irregular disclosures include SMITS, which 
announced the recruitment of the 100th employee in its 1964 annual report; 
R E E U W I J K (1964), which disclosed employee numbers at the occasion of its 50th 
anniversary; N I E A F , which in the 1949 annual report mentioned the current 
number of employees in the obituary of the company's founder; and S I M P L E X 
which on one occasion printed a group portrait of what it claimed was its entire 
staff. Anniversaries could also be the occasion for more structural changes in 
disclosure, as for B Y E N K O R F which started disclosing employee numbers with its 
1969/1970 annual report coinciding with the company's 100th anniversary. 
The fact that many companies were willing to make incidental disclosures, and 
the fact that disclosure gradually increased on a net basis without a hint of legal 
compulsion suggest that any secrecy surrounding employment figures was based 
2 6
 Another, temporary factor was the Second World War: a number of companies 
made incidental disclosures of both casualties and total employee numbers in their 
retrospective narratives included in their first postwar annual reports. 
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more on habit than on conviction. Companies were apparently not unwilling to 
provide the information when requested by shareholders or when they formed the 
impression that disclosure was becoming majority practice27. What may have 
played a role is that it was rather hard to keep this particular type of information 
secret. As noted again by Posthumus Meyjes (loc. cit.), it was not too difficult 
to arrive at a reasonably correct estimate of the number of employees by 'chat­
ting at the gate'. 
Data on disclosures in other countries are rare. Chambers (1955:197) observed 
that employee numbers were 'commonly' disclosed in the United States, but that 
'only a small proportion' of companies in England and Australia disclosed these 
data. If correct, this observation again underlines the superiority of US disclos­
ures, and the fact that Dutch disclosures were not widely out of line with those in 
other parts of the English-speaking world. 
6.5.2 Wage costs 
From the postwar literature, it appears that disclosure of labour costs was seen as 
a fairly sensitive item. This becomes especially clear from the treatment of this 
topic in the various publications leading up to the 1970 Act on Annual Financial 
Statements. 
As in other matters, the 1955 Rijkens report was perhaps the most outspoken 
advocate of disclosure: 'The disclosure of salaries, wages and social security 
contributions (...) can be deemed to be efficacious' (is doelmatig te achten) (p. 
17)2 8. The 1962 Hamburger report adopted a more cautious tone: 'As appears 
from current practice, it is sometimes considered desirable to state separately 
[from total costs] the total of wages, salaries and social security costs in order to 
indicate the significance of the enterprise to the labour market. This can also be 
achieved by disclosing the number of employees in the annual report.' (p. 46) 
This growing caution may well reflect the political nature of the debate on 
company law reform in which financial reporting began to be involved. Con-
2 7
 In this light, it is intriguing that Munnik (1931:29) remarks that 'almost all' bank 
financial statements in a large survey of financial statements from the late 1920's 'gave 
particulars about the number of staff and changes therein'. However, according to 
Munnik, the banking sector distinguished itself by its good reporting practices. 
2 8
 In the same report it was stated: '[In the directors' report] the most important 
developments regarding staffing and employee policy, wages and conditions of employ­
ment and the labour market can be reviewed.' (p. 19) and: 'Statistical summaries are 
appropriate for (...) number of employees, wages and salaries paid, social costs, addi­
tional provisions such as contributions to pension funds.' (p. 21). 
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cerns of this nature appear to have influenced at least some participants in the 
discussions surrounding the 1970 Act. 
The requirement to disclose wages and social security contributions was not 
included in the preparatory Verdam proposals for a law on company reporting. 
However, such a requirement was included in the 1968 draft law on the basis of 
an advice by the Social-Economic Council (SER) 2 9 . The auditors' organizations 
noted in their joint advice on the Verdam report30 that the SER's suggestion for 
a separate disclosure of wage costs 'can not be founded on considerations of 
bedrijfseconomie'. They therefore guarded what amounted to a careful neutrality 
on the subject by stating that '[i]f separate disclosure of the item 'wages and 
social security contributions' is considered desirable for reasons other than [the 
requirement that the financial statements give insight as contained in] articles 2 
and 3 of the law' care should be taken to arrive at a proper definitional treatment 
of the various items involved. A similar view was expressed by Groeneveld 
(1968:139) who remarked that the inclusion of a wage cost disclosure in the draft 
law was based on motives 'other than strictly financial information provision' 3 1. 
Figure 6.5 illustrates that wage cost disclosures were regarded as a somewhat 
sensitive issue during the 1960's. Throughout the 1950's and until 1967, the 
percentage of companies disclosing wage costs remained well below 20%. At the 
same time, it is clear that the unambiguous disclosure requirement inserted into 
the draft law in 1968 was effective. Between 1968 and 1971 (when the law 
became effective), the rate of disclosure sharply increased to just short of 100%. 
Some companies explicitly stated that their disclosures were motivated by the new 
law. U N I L E V E R (1968), D E S S E A U X (1969/70) and BERGOSS (1970) are among 
the companies disclosing wage costs before it became strictly necessary and 
motivated this change as an anticipation of the new legal requirements. 
Developments in the United States provide an interesting comparison with the 
Dutch data. In the US, employment cost disclosures were not, during this 
period, mandatory under G A A P . Around 1950, there was a considerable extent 
of voluntary disclosure. However, as indicated by figure 6.5, disclosure of 
2 9
 The SER is one of the most important advisory bodies to the Dutch government. It 
is routinely consulted on important economic legislation. 
3 0
 Nederlands Instituut van Accountants, 'Nota van de besturen van het Nederlands 
Instituut van Accountants en van de Vereniging van Academisch Gevormde Accountants 
inzake het voorontwerp van de commissie Verdam van Wet op de jaarrekening van 
ondernemingen', De Accountant, vol. 72 no. 11, July/August 1966, p. 583-595. 
3 1
 In Germany, disclosure of wage costs and, separately, social security contributions, 
was required from 1931 (or 1937) onwards. These disclosures were considered to be 
based on 'general economic and socio-political considerations' (Van Viegen, 1956: 277). 
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employment costs in the USA declined continuously from 1950 onwards32. In 
both the Netherlands and the USA, therefore, there was no evidence of a lasting 
willingness to disclose wage costs voluntarily. In the Netherlands, however, full 
disclosure was achieved by the imposition of regulation whereas in the United 
States the absence of regulation meant a gradual decline in disclosure. 
Post 1970-occurences further support that wage cost disclosures were largely 
influenced by the 1970 Act. Around 1970, there was apparently some uncer­
tainty on what constituted the legal minimum of disclosure. Once this became 
clear, there is a distinct tendency to fall back on the legal disclosure minimum. 
Labour costs can be broken down into components as wages and salaries, pension 
contributions and social security payments. Whether the law required a break­
down was not immediately obvious from either the law itself or the accom­
panying Explanatory Memorandum. Some commentators (Vecht, 1968:313) 
appeared to favour a separate disclosure. But post-enactment commentators 
(IJsselmuiden, 1972:196, Sanders, Burgert and Groeneveld, 1975:287) assumed 
that the disclosure could be made as one single item. 
What the data show is that, over the entire 1945-1983 period, there are only 14 
companies who, for varying lengths of time, broke down their labour costs into 
various components (such as pension costs). This low percentage in itself 
suggests an unwillingness on the part of companies to provide the disclosure, a 
suggestion that is reinforced by the observation that only five of these 14 
companies continued the more detailed disclosure to the end of the observation 
period. The other nine sooner of later fell back to a lower level of disclosure. 
Before 1970, this lower level was in all cases (four instances) no disclosure of 
labour costs at all. After 1970, the five companies who reduced their disclosure 
all fell back on the legal minimum of disclosing a total 'labour cost' item. 
Given that legal requirements played an important role in introducing wage cost 
disclosures, it is interesting to investigate in some detail the disclosures of this 
item before 1965, when no legal requirements were either in force or in prepara­
tion. 
From 1945 to 1968, two important characteristics of the Dutch economy were a 
tight labour market and a so-called 'guided wage policy' 3 3 . The latter aimed, 
3 2
 It was remarked at the end of the 1960's that 'An increasing number of companies 
(...) are omitting any presentation of the amount of employment costs from their annual 
reports' (Accounting Trends and Techniques, 1969:167). 
3 3
 See Windmuller, de Galan and Van Zweeden (1983, chapter V and p. 215 for 
details on wage movements). 
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Figure 6.6 Wage cost changes 
and wage cost disclosure 1949-1967 
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through a fairly elaborate mechanism of central negotiation and government 
controls, to restrain wage increases with a view to protecting the competitiveness 
of Dutch industry. The former ensured that wages were frequently under upward 
pressure and that the policy was difficult to implement. As a result, wages rose 
with leaps and bounds and years of relative stability alternated with years of 
double-digit wage increases. Figure 6.6 relates for each year in the period 1949-
1967 the increase in wages with the change in the number of companies disclos­
ing wage costs in that year's annual report. Data on wage increases are those for 
the year-on-year percentage increases in nominal manufacturing wages34. It 
appears that the fitful developments in wages left their mark in companies' annual 
reports: in years with a higher than average growth in wages, the number of 
companies disclosing wage costs tends to increase, whereas this number remains 
constant or falls (on a net basis) in years with lower than average wage 
increases35. 
3 4
 Nominal weekly wages in manufacturing as reported in International Labour 
Organization (ILO), Year book of labour statistics 1950-1975. 
35
 r = .605, which is significant at the .01 level. 
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This phenomenon might be explained by assuming that any item that is brought to 
the attention of a company's management because it is affected by a serious 
disturbance has an increased likelihood of disclosure. It is also possible that 
more purposeful disclosures occurred and that some company managements might 
want to draw attention to the negative consequences of rapid wage increases by 
means of disclosure of the total wage bi l l . The data at hand do not support a 
choice between these two explanations. 
6.5.3 Summary 
The data suggest that wage cost disclosure was more controversial than disclosure 
of the number of employees. In fact, it appears that without regulatory support, 
wage cost disclosure would not have become very widespread. US data tend to 
support this conclusion. Those companies that did disclose wage costs before 
1965 appear to have done so at least in part in response to labour market 
developments. The 1970 Act, which did have its intended effect on wage cost 
disclosure, also appears to have had a side effect on the disclosure of the number 
of employees: even though there was no reference to disclosure of employee 
numbers, there was an increase of disclosure in the years around 1970. 
6.6 Consolidated financial statements 
6.6.1 Introduction 
Consolidated financial reporting is, like the funds statement, a distinctly recogni­
zable reporting innovation. A number of previous studies is therefore available, 
both with regard to the Netherlands and other countries, on the development over 
time of this type of reporting36. 
By the mid-1920's, the consolidated balance sheet could be regarded as 'some­
thing new, distinctly American in origin' (Hatfield, 1927:279). Knowledge of 
the device spread fairly rapidly beyond the United States, however. As indicated 
by Kitchen (1972), consolidated reporting was well-known in Great Britain before 
the Second World War, even though this was not reflected by a commensurate 
3 6
 The most important historical studies on the spreading of consolidated reporting 
include: Bores (1934, general), Kitchen (1972, UK), McKinnon (1984, Japan), Whittred 
(1986, Australia), Bircher (1988, UK) Edwards (1991, UK), Blommaert (1995, Nether­
lands). Studies attempting to analyze consolidated reporting on the basis of specific 
theoretical models include Whittred (1987) and Blommaert (1995), who use a derived 
demand approach, and Parker (1977), who uses an innovation-diffusion perspective. 
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extent of published consolidated statements. The 1948 Companies Act required 
the publication of consolidated financial statements. 
In Germany, consolidation was a well-known topic in the literature before the 
Second World War. Whether or not companies should be required to publish 
consolidated financial statements was an important issue in the debate on com­
pany law reform in the 1930's (Fuchs and Gerloff, 1954:15). The result was 
limited to a clause introduced in 1931 which gave the government the right to 
regulate the publication of group accounts by decree. This clause was not acted 
upon, nor were companies keen to start publishing consolidated accounts volun­
tarily. The first voluntary publications occurred in the early 1950's37. At the 
same time, moreover, consolidation received an unexpected encouragement. As 
one of the many consequences of the War, consolidated accounts were imposed 
on German financial reporting practices. The Allied occupation authorities 
charged with reorganizing German industry and dismantling the large conglomer­
ates inserted a clause in the model articles of incorporation for successor com­
panies in the coal and steel industries, that required these companies to publish 
consolidated financial statements. In this way, an element of US reporting 
practice was transplanted directly to Germany (Wietzke, 1962:12). This require­
ment was in force for a short period only, but it did have a lasting effect. A 
small number of the affected companies continued to publish consolidated state­
ments on a voluntary basis38. A requirement to publish consolidated financial 
statements was imposed for the first time on all companies (AG's) by the 1965 
Company Law. 
In the Netherlands, it could be claimed in 1926 that there existed hardly any 
discussion of consolidation in the literature, and that many Dutch auditors did not 
appreciate the importance of the consolidated balance sheet (Ten Haven, 1926). 
The standard auditing textbook Leerboek der Accountancy (Nijst, 1929) devoted a 
chapter to publications by holding companies in which various alternatives, 
including consolidated statements, were discussed. This text emphasized the need 
to protect the publishing companies, and competitive damage was advanced as a 
plausible reason for not publishing consolidated statements. In keeping with this 
cautious attitude, Blommaert (1995) found only 11 listed Dutch companies that 
published consolidated financial statements before the Second World War 3 9 . 
From ten Haven's (1926) assertions, but also from the basis of retrospective 
assessments by Groeneveld (1962) and Goudeket (1961), it appears that consoli-
3 7
 Fuchs and Gerloff (1954:138); cf. Weiß (1949). 
3 8
 Adler, Düring, Schmaltz (1972:111,3); cf. Fettel (1958). 
3 9
 See also Polak (1933:30-31) for a summary review of contemporary Dutch 
practices. 
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dation was at first accepted as a tool for internal use rather than as an element of 
external financial reporting. Loos (1940) repeated ten Haven's call for Dutch 
auditors to promote an accounting tool that had proven its usefulness in the US, 
but which appeared only 'sporadically' in the Netherlands. 
It was only during the decade following the War that consolidated financial 
statements began to be regarded as an important element of up-to-date external 
financial reporting. According to Hofman (1950:387), there were two reasons 
why consolidated external reporting, which after all had been known in the US 
for about half a century, became the subject of attention in the Netherlands in the 
late 1940's. 
First, a large number of Dutch companies had extensive interests in the Dutch 
East Indies which, in 1950, became independent as Indonesia. Before the war, 
assets and liabilities held in the East Indies could be integrated in the financial 
statements without difficulty owing to the free convertibility of colonial currency. 
With independence, however, currency convertibility was no longer guaranteed. 
Assets and liabilities in Indonesia had to be treated as if they belonged to foreign 
subsidiaries over which the parent company no longer had full control. There­
fore, many companies and their auditors were for the first time confronted with 
issues of consolidation of foreign subsidiaries. 
Second, the Companies Act 1948 required publication of consolidated financial 
statements by English holding companies. This did attract some attention in the 
Dutch literature, and it was pointed out that Dutch accounting and Dutch auditors 
ought not, in this respect, to fall behind other nations (Spinosa Cattela, 1947; cf. 
Spinosa Cattela 1948b:chapter 15). 
Moreover, the British requirements had direct implications for the two Anglo-
Dutch multinationals, U N I L E V E R and K O N I N K L U K E P E T R O L E U M . The first 
consolidation of U N I L E V E R in 194540 and the announcement by K O N I N K L U K E 
P E T R O L E U M in 1950 that it would soon follow suit were considered as landmark 
events by Hofman (op.cit.). 
When opinions could be aired without imposing strict obligations, consolidated 
reporting for external purposes began to be recommended, as in the 1955 Rijkens 
report and the 1956 Henri Sijthoff norms. The Stock Exchange Association, 
however, did not go as far as to require consolidated financial statements 
(something which the London Stock Exchange had done in 1939). In 1951, the 
Association declared that it had considered this option, but that the consequences 
4 0
 Blommaert (1995) cites the year 1928 as the start of UNILEVER'S consolidation. 
This was, however, a one-off event on the occasion of the merger between the Dutch and 
the British company. During the 1930's, the company did not publish consolidated 
statements. 
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of this step could not be assessed to their full extent. It contented itself 'for the 
time being' with urging listed companies to provide a list of subsidiaries, ' i f 
possible accompanied by extensive information'41. 
As explained more fully in Blommaert (1995), the 1970 Act did not contain a 
strict legal requirement to provide consolidated financial statements. Consoli­
dation was presented as an option next to combined or separate subsidiary 
financial statements. Of course, for all companies with more than a very small 
number of subsidiaries, presenting consolidated financial statements would be the 
only practical way to comply with the legal requirements. 
6.6.2 Comments on observed disclosure practices 
Figure 6.7 summarizes the introduction of consolidated financial reporting in the 
Netherlands. In presenting the percentage of companies that include consolidated 
financial statements, it is possible either to take a percentage of all companies, or 
to take into account that for companies without subsidiaries publication of 
consolidated financial statements is not relevant. In figure 6.7, the data on 
'gross' and 'net' disclosure percentages refer to this distinction. As indicated in 
Appendix A , this distinction is often of a judgmental nature. Indications of the 
spread of consolidation in other countries are included for comparison. Complete 
series were generally not available for these countries42. 
Blommaert (1995) contains a major study of the development of consolidated 
financial reporting by Dutch listed companies during the 20th century. Rather 
than presenting an extensive analysis of the sample data, this section wil l concen­
trate on comparing and supplementing some of Blommaert's results with data 
from the present study. 
Blommaert's data on first consolidations correspond well with those used in this 
study43. The Blommaert study did not contain data that allowed a precise 
4 1
 Vereniging voor den Effectenhandel, 'Publicatie van gegevens door naamloze 
vennootschappen', Mededelingen van het bestuur aan de leden, No. 285, 15 October 
1951. 
4 2
 The UK figure is based on Survey of Published Accounts. Unfortunately, no UK 
data before 1967 are available, except those in Bircher (1988) for the largest 40 British 
companies. The Companies Act (1967) ended the period during which consolidated 
statements might be provided on a voluntary basis. The US data are derived from 
Accounting Trends & Techniques. Data before 1959 were not available. The Australian 
data are from Whittred (1986), the Canadian data from Murphy (1988). 
4 3
 For some companies, the years of first consolidation recorded in the two studies 
differed. Repeated scrutiny of the financial statements showed that such deviations were 
mainly due to different choices of whether consolidation of a subset of subsidiaries only 
results in a proper consolidated financial statement. Hence, this study uses first consolida­
tion data that depart, in a small number of cases, from those in the Blommaert study. 
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Figure 6.7 Consolidated reporting 
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estimation of the overall rate of adoption of consolidated financial statements. 
Compared with other disclosures documented in this chapter, the diffusion of 
consolidated financial statements is characterized by a fairly smooth and almost 
constant increase in disclosure for the twenty years between 1950 and 1969. 
Blommaert noted that in the period around 1960 and in the years leading up to 
the 1970 Act there were important changes in the rate of new consolidations. 
This pattern is confirmed by the present study as well, although the number of 
new consolidations around 1960 in this study does not depart much from the 
trend. The smooth pattern is related to the rarity of reversions to nondisclosure. 
Only one instance of reversion was observed. There is no indication of the sort 
of experimentation that was observed with some other items. 
Although the foreign data shown in figure 6.7 are somewhat fragmentary, the 
suggestion is clearly that the Netherlands did to some extent lag behind the 
English-speaking countries in the adoption of consolidated financial statements. It 
should be remembered that the results may not always be strictly comparable. 
Differences may arise especially in determining the applicability' of disclosure. 
Furthermore, the difference with Canada, where consolidation did not become 
mandatory until a relatively late date, is not very great. Nor can it be assumed 
that German companies displayed a greater willingness for voluntary consoli­
dations (see above). As to France, consolidation was still in its infancy during 
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the early 1960's44. 
Consolidation and the incidence of subsidiaries 
One basic explanation for the spread of the consolidated financial statement 
would be the growing use of subsidiary companies. Mergers and takeovers 
occurred throughout the postwar period, but especially during the 1960's. In the 
early 1960's, mergers became sufficiently widespread to bring about a growing 
awareness of the 'merger phenomenon' (see Van Sloten, 1963, for various 
references). By the end of the decade, the volume of mergers and acquisition 
had swollen to a veritable merger wave (see also figure 4.1). 
Figure 6.8 compares the increasing number of consolidating companies with the 
number of companies showing investments in one or more other companies in 
their parent company balance sheet. The financial statements of many companies 
did not provide the information necessary to distinguish between controlling and 
minority shareholdings45. The percentage of companies with subsidiaries 
(shown in figure 6.8) is therefore an overstatement of the number of companies 
for which consolidation was appropriate. 
Until the late 1950's, the percentage of companies without subsidiaries, and for 
which consolidation was therefore certainly inappropriate, remained stable around 
30%. By 1960, this percentage starts to fall, corresponding indeed with the 
increase in consolidation noticed by Blommaert. About 25 sample companies 
acquired investments during the period studied. In 40% of these cases, this 
coincided with a first consolidation. For the other 60%, first consolidation 
happened on average 7 to 8 years after the acquisition of the first investment. 
Changes in investments in other companies were apparently an important, but not 
a decisive factor in the spread of consolidated reporting, as a large proportion of 
companies started to consolidate rather later than they might have done. 
Interim formats 
A possible interim format between no and full consolidation is the inclusion of 
separate financial statements of major subsidiaries in the parent annual report. 
4 4
 'in neither France nor Germany is a holding company obliged to publish accounts 
for the group. (...) [s]ome French companies are already beginning to do so on a 
voluntary basis' (Most, 1964:10). 
4 5
 Article 42 of the Commercial Code did require the separate disclosure of invest­
ments (deelnemingen) in other companies. According to Van der Heijden (1929:355), 
'investments' were not defined in terms of control but in terms of the relationship between 
the operations of the investing and investee companies. This provision makes it unlikely 
that investments were hidden in other balance sheet items, but it does not guarantee that 
all investments shown were controlled by the investing company. 
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Figure 6.8 Consolidated reporting 
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This approach to disclosure was not widely used. Figure 6.8 shows that there 
were two periods when m appreciable percentage of companies published 
separate financial statements: from the late 1940's to the late 1950's, and in the 
early 1970's. 
During the late 1940's, reporting of separate financial statements was limited 
almost exclusively to trading and mining companies with a clear distinction 
between overseas operations and the metropolitan parent company. H V 
R O T T E R D A M , F R A N S C H S O U D A N , T W E N T S C H E H A N D E L , H V A , REISS, L I N D E T E -
V E S , A L G E M E N E E X P L O R A T I E , D O R P , M A I N Z fall into this group. These 
companies typically published separate financial statements for the domestic and 
overseas operations, the latter usually in local currency. Companies with 
investments in the Dutch East Indies/Indonesia were regarded as problematic 
because of uncertainties regarding currency convertibility. A number of auditors 
preferred non-consolidation and separate reporting in local currency in this case 
(Hofman, 1950:422-23). This problem (and hence the need for separate financial 
statements) was ended by the nationalization of Dutch investments in Indonesia in 
1957. Around 1970, a number of companies disclosed separate financial state­
ments apparently in response to the demands of the 1970 Act. O O S T Z E E , 
G R O F S M E D E R U and R E E U W I J K published separate statements for a few years 
before changing to consolidation. 
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Consolidation and other disclosures 
Blommaert has tested a number of specific hypotheses explaining voluntary 
consolidations during the 1925-1968 period. These hypotheses correspond 
largely to those tested by Whittred (1987), and are explicitly based on the 
premise that the demand for consolidated financial statements is a derivative from 
the contractual arrangements between the company, its creditors and its sharehol­
ders. As phrased by Whittred (1987:259), 'the central argument [in this type of 
study] is that in those instances in which consolidated financial reporting was 
adopted it reduced agency costs'. For the hypotheses derived from this basic 
premise, both studies did indeed find some support. It was found that observed 
consolidations were associated with the relative size of the balance sheet and 
income statement items 'investments' and 'income from investments', with the 
number of cross-guarantees (approximated by solvency and liquidity ratios), and 
with possibilities for opportunistic behaviour (approximated by differences 
between pre- and postconsolidation equity and income). 
The present study presents an opportunity to compare data on the adoption of 
consolidated reporting with other developments in disclosure. Referring to table 
5.1, it can be concluded that the correlations between first consolidations and 
other disclosure items do not differ significantly from correlations between all 
other items. In other words, first consolidations are not more or less strongly 
associated with other disclosures than are the other disclosures among themsel­
ves4 6. This suggests that consolidation is at least partly governed by explanatory 
factors common to more disclosure items, and not merely by item-specific 
factors. Further research appears to be in order to establish whether the covaria-
tes investigated by Whittred and Blommaert are in fact specific to consolidation, 
or whether they are covariates of disclosure in general. 
6.6.3 Summary 
The introduction of consolidated reporting was achieved roughly between 1950 
and 1970 in a process of constant disclosure expansion. Although the 1970 Act 
did have a role to play in persuading the last nondisclosers, the diffusion of 
consolidated reporting was far advanced by the later 1960's. The background of 
this phenomenon was a process of increasing merger and acquisition activity 
starting in the middle 1950's and peaking in 1969. 
4 6
 For all items, the average correlation coefficient (weighted by the number of 
pair wise comparisons) is 0.30. For individual items, the weighted average correlation 
with the 12 other items ranges from 0.17 to 0.37, with the average correlation coefficient 
of consolidation being 0.26. That the correlation of consolidation is lower than average 
can be attributed to the low correlation between current cost accounting and consolidation. 
When this item is ignored, the average correlation is 0.34, while the correlation of 
consolidation is 0.33. 
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6.7 The Funds Statement 
6.7.1 Introduction 
In the US, the underlying notion of the funds statement, which is to explain 
changes in balance sheet items like cash or working capital by means of changes 
in other balance sheet items, can be traced back to the 19th century. Embryonic 
funds statements are reported to have been in use by various companies through­
out the second half of the 19th century, while the funds statement made its entry 
into the textbooks in the first decades of the 20th century. But although the funds 
statement was known as a tool for financial analysis, this did not mean that it was 
also immediately accepted as an element of public financial reporting. Only four 
out of 60 surveyed US companies published a funds statement before 1925 
(Rosen and DeCoster, 1969). A survey by Kempner (1957) revealed that in the 
middle 1950's about one-half of US audit firms regularly included a funds 
statement in their long-form audit report to clients. The accounting staff of many 
large clients already prepared funds statements for internal use themselves. 
Again, the inclusion of funds statements in reports to stockholders lagged behind: 
for the same period, Käfer and Zimmerman (1967) cite a number of studies 
reporting that funds statements were included in (depending on the sample of 
reports surveyed) not more than 35% of published financial statements. 
In terms of official guidance on external reporting, it was not until 1961 that an 
A I C P A research study (Accounting Research Study No. 2) on the subject appea­
red. This was followed in 1963 by A P B Opinion No. 3, which contained the 
opinion that companies should in general include a funds statement in their 
published financial statements. 
The adoption of funds statements by US companies as reported in Accounting 
Trends & Techniques is charted in figure 6.9. This shows that the real break­
through of the funds statement occurred in the US as late as the middle 1960's. 
In the 1962 volume of Accounting Trends & Techniques, this phenomenon 
received the following comment: 
As may be noted (...), the trend here is strongly in favor of the statements of 
sources and applications of funds (...). The "funds statement" is no innova­
tion in the field of accounting, but it is becoming more prominent, and is now 
to a greater extent taking its place among the statements covered by the 
auditor's report, (p. 17) 
According to Rosen and DeCoster (1969:133), the main credit for this develop­
ment must not be given to the A P B , whose recommendations in Opinion No. 3 
were 'vague', but rather to the New York Stock Exchange and the Federation of 
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Figure 6.9 Adoption of funds statements 
(percentage of companies disclosing) 
1965 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
~*~ Present sample USA data UK data 
Financial Analysts 'who strongly advocated its use'. APB Opinion 19, which 
required the publication of a funds statement from 1971 onwards, merely 
confirmed previous developments. According to data published in Murphy 
(1988:277), the adoption of the funds statement in Canada went virtually parallel 
with that in the United States. 
Previous studies of the introduction of the funds statement in the Netherlands, 
notably by Dijksma (1984, 1987) point out that the history of the funds statement 
in the Netherlands, compared to that elsewhere, is relatively short. When data 
from the sample of companies included in the present study and US data are 
compared, as in figure 6.9, it appears that as far as adoption on a substantial 
scale is concerned, the Netherlands was about ten to fifteen years behind the US. 
The main difference between the two countries lies in the early adoption history, 
which in the US goes back well before the War, whereas the first published funds 
statements in the Netherlands date from the late 1950's. 
Compared to the U K , the Netherlands certainly was not far behind. In 1961, the 
funds statement could be presented as a new device from the United States, that 
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was hardly if at all used in British annual reports47. According to qualitative 
remarks in Murray (1965: 69-70), Käfer and Zimmerman (1967:109) and 
Hendriksen (1969:24), it seems unlikely that more than a handful of British 
companies included funds statements in their financial statements during the first 
half of the 1960's. Figure 6.9 shows that around 1970, practices in the Nether­
lands and the United Kingdom were approximately similar. After 1970, the 
funds statement spread more rapidly in the U K than in the Netherlands, at first 
on a voluntary basis, and from 1975 onwards under the influence of SSAP 10. 
In Germany, the funds statement had traditionally occupied an important place in 
the literature on company finance and planning. As documented in Käfer and 
Zimmerman (1967), the notion of the Bewegungsbilanz went back to prewar 
finance textbooks. It is also true that the relevance of developments in the US 
for German reporting were perceived rather quickly by at least some German 
authors. Holzer and Schönfeld (1962:564) raised the question 'whether [the 
introduction of the proposals of Accounting Research Study No. 2] would not 
influence the published annual reports of European companies'. A n expanding 
use of funds statements in annual reports was in fact observed during the middle 
1960's, indicating that German practice was (by a rough calculation), perhaps 
three years ahead of the Netherlands48. 
The available data on France do not allow a strict comparison but suggest that 
French companies were about equally swift, or lagged somewhat behind, the 
Netherlands in actual disclosure practice49. 
4 7
 See 'Points from published accounts: the source and application of funds', in: 
Accountancy (UK), vol. 72 no. 813, May 1961, p. 298. The article was illustrated by a 
funds statement from a Newfoundland company since, apparently, no British examples 
were at hand. 
4 8
 Flohr (1964) reported that at that time '20 to 25 mainly large companies' in 
Germany published a funds statement. According to Käfer and Zimmerman (1967:115n) 
'Only a few years ago one would only occasionally find such statements in German annual 
reports (...) This is different today: An examination of the annual reports of eighteen of 
the largest German corporations showed that in 1962 (...) eleven, and in 1963 (...) 
thirteen included fully developed capital flow statements (about two-thirds in the form of a 
funds statement'. According to the data in table 6.2, it appears reasonable to estimate the 
total number of funds statements published in the Netherlands in 1967 at about 15. 
Allowing for at least twice as many listed companies in Germany would make this 
comparable with the 1963/1964 data for Germany. 
4 9
 Boussard and Colasse (1992) state that 'in the late 1950s and early 1960s (...) a few 
French banks and some French companies started to use funds statements'. In 1968, an 
'influential' model statement was published by the institute of auditors (OECCA). By 
1981, '60 % of registered companies' disclosed a funds statement. 
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6.7.2 Origin and diffusion of Dutch fund statement disclosures 
The funds statement did not make its appearance in the Dutch literature until the 
late 1950's5 0, when the funds statement also began to be used in annual reports. 
The 1955 Rijkens report did not call for a funds statement. It was recommended 
that 'especially the liquidity position be elucidated' in the directors' report (p. 
19). A slightly more extensive note could be found in the 1962 successor report: 
T o enhance the insight in the manner in which the company is being financed, it 
is suggested for consideration to pay attention [in the directors' report] to the 
sources and application of funds during the current and some previous financial 
years' (p. 49). The difference in wording between the two reports neatly 
coincides with the appearance of the first funds statements in Dutch annual 
reports as documented in table 6.2. Since the first adoptions all occurred well 
within the period with which this study is primarily concerned, and because these 
were adoptions by large, relatively well-documented companies, it is possible to 
reconstruct the circumstances of these first disclosures in more detail than for 
other items discussed in this chapter. The first adoptions wil l be discussed on a 
company by company basis. 
Unilever 
U N I L E V E R ' S 1956 funds statement appears to be first of its kind in the Nether­
lands. Although it is possible that proto funds-statements did appear sporadically 
in the early part of the century, as they did in the US, it is probably correct to 
identify part of U N I L E V E R ' S 1956 annual report as the first postwar example of a 
formal analysis of changes in liquidity (Dijksma, 1987:27). This 1956 statement, 
presented in the body of the text of the directors' report rather than as a separate 
table, explained changes in liquid assets as the combined result of retained 
earnings with depreciation added back, net investment in fixed assets and working 
capital, and 'other' transactions. 
But even though a good case can be made to regard it as the first funds state­
ment, this particular passage did have clear antecedents in the annual reports of 
previous years. It is likely that those involved in the gradual evolution of 
U N I L E V E R ' S annual reports would have considered the epithet 'first funds 
statement in the Netherlands', which suggests a distinctly recognizable innovati­
on, as inappropriate. 
Since 1951, the U N I L E V E R annual report included a section of graphical repre­
sentations to illustrate developments over time. One of these, shown from 1951 
to 1953 and again in 1955, displayed in two parallel stacked bars on the one hand 
5 0
 However, Dijksma (1987) has documented various instances of funds statement 
technology being used in financial analysis and education in the Netherlands before the 
Second World War. 
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the investment in fixed assets and working capital, and on the other hand the 
sources of finance consisting of retained income, current cost depreciation and 
Table 6.2 
First disclosures of funds statements 1956-197(fl 
Year of 
first disclosure Company 
1 9 5 6 UNILEVER 
1 9 5 8 KONINKLIJKE PETROLEUM 
1 9 6 0 Hoogovens 5 2 
1 9 6 1 VLISSINGENS KATOEN 
1 9 6 2 OGEM 
1 9 6 3 K L M 
1 9 6 4 A K U 
1 9 6 6 TEXTIEL UNIE 
1 9 6 7 INDOHEEM 
MÜLLER 
KEY 
1 9 6 8 N K F 
1 9 6 9 BYENKORF 
A C F 
issues of securities. Readers were invited to observe the large extent to which 
the company relied on retained earnings to finance its expansion, and to observe 
(in an accompanying diagram), the large share of earnings absorbed by taxation. 
In this way, the company used its annual report to reiterate a message that was a 
main theme in its public policy statements throughout the early 1950's, that 
financing through retained earnings was essential, and that high taxes were a 
potential threat to economic development53. 
5 1
 On the basis of Scholten (1962:221-2), it appears plausible that this listing is 
complete for the years until 1961, that is, for the first four disclosing companies. 
Zwagerman (1970) reports that 11 listed companies disclosed a funds statement in 1967, 
which would indicate that the listing in table 6.2 is a comprehensive presentation of funds 
statement disclosure by listed companies until 1967. This is not particularly likely, given 
that the table is basically the result of a sample of 30% of listed companies. 
5 2
 In fact, Hoogovens 1960 disclosure was part of a long incidental discussion of the 
financial position in the directors' report. It was not until 1964 that the company started 
to publish funds statements on a regular basis. 
5 3
 See for UNILEVER'S emphasis on internally financed growth: Wilson/Baudet 
(1968:135-6). See also the 1948 and 1949 addresses by UNILEVER chairman P. Rijkens to 
the general meeting of shareholders and the 1956 lecture 'Het bedrijfsleven en de 
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In 1956, the notion of sources and application of funds that was implicitly in 
these graphical representations was combined with other elements of the directors 
report. This had, in a separate section on 'Finance', already for a number of 
years included as part of the narrative items like the change in liquid assets and 
the amounts raised by issues of securities. In 1956, all these elements were 
combined, still in the text of the narrative, into a tabular format which linked 
them all together in an arithmetically closed addition. This, then, was the first 
funds statement. 
The direct motivation for this change was probably the extraordinary level of 
liquidity attained by the company in 1956 as a result of the Suez crisis, a factor 
mentioned in this context in the directors' report. The company may have felt 
the need to explain the large increase in net liquid assets by a more elaborate 
statement. This may also explain why the 'funds statement' did not reappear in 
the 1957 annual report, when net liquid assets had fallen again to more normal 
levels. However, in 1958, the process repeated itself. The company was again 
compelled to explain a huge increase in liquidity as a result of various incidental 
circumstances (sales of subsidiaries, currency movements) and it resorted again to 
the inclusion of a 'funds statement' in the directors report. By this time, it may 
have been decided that this type of information was useful on a permanent basis 
as well, and it remained an element of the financial statements that eventually 
evolved in the modern cash flow statement. 
The conclusion should therefore be that U N I L E V E R , rather than introducing the 
funds statement as a conspicuous innovation in 1956, merely arrived through 
gradual evolution at a convenient format to convey messages particular to its 
situation in the 1950's. It was only subsequently that these statements came to be 
seen as a useful permanent fixture of the annual report. 
Koninklijke Petroleum 
The first funds statement published by K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M in 1958 did 
have a somewhat similar origin. It too appeared originally as a statement to 
bring a particular message across, rather than as a general-purpose increase in 
disclosure. In the 1958 annual report, the company included a separate table 
labelled 'Sources and applications of funds' which was, in effect, an approxi­
mated cash-flow statement. It was included in a section of the directors' report 
headed 'Influence of taxation on growth' and the accompanying text pointed out 
that a very large part of the huge revenues of the group were paid out to various 
governments in the form of taxation, and that of the remaining income a large 
fraction had to be retained to finance the heavy capital requirements. The 
company apparently realized, as did U N I L E V E R in the same year, that this type of 
belastingen' (All published as brochures by the company). 
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table might also be useful as a regular disclosure. This transition to a general 
purpose funds statement is neatly illustrated in the 1959 annual report. This 
included again a similar table, this time in a separate section of the directors' 
report headed 'Sources and application of funds'. In the accompanying text it 
was stated that '[t]his table has been prepared to place the very large amounts 
received by the Group companies from sales to customers all over the world in a 
proper perspective, that is, in relation to the equally large expenditures that must 
be made out of these revenues. This year, there are no specific comments to 
make on these figures, although we might point out that the total amount paid in 
some form of taxation or another to the government, has increased again' ( 1 9 5 9 
report, p. 17). 
For KONINKLLTKE P E T R O L E U M , its listing on the New York Stock Exchange may 
explain why the company clearly presented its funds statement as a separate 
statement with the title 'source and application of funds'. In contrast, U N I L E V E R 
did not acquire a New York listing until 1961 and was far less oriented on the 
US than K O N I N K L U K E P E T R O L E U M (In 1958 , Unilever's Western hemisphere 
sales were 1 3 % of total revenues). 
Hoogovens 
Around 1960 , Hoogovens arrived at an important juncture in its development. It 
approached the capacity limits of its core rolling mill installed in 1952 , which 
meant that it had become a full-grown but still rather narrowly specialized 
producer of steel sheets. Further growth would entail a new round of core 
capacity expansion involving large investments. Moreover, it was decided that 
further growth should no longer merely consist of increasing output of the basic 
sheet steel, but that there should be a strategic shift towards a wider product 
range including profile steel and non-steel metals such as aluminum (see also 
Dankers and Verheul, 1993:chapter 2 ) . In the 1959 and 1960 annual reports, 
these strategic shifts were discussed. In the 1960 annual report, this discussion 
focused on the way the large financing requirements of the coming expansion 
would be met. To elucidate this discussion, a 7-year summary of sources and 
application of funds was included as part of the narrative. As with the first 
U N I L E V E R and K O N I N K L U K E P E T R O L E U M funds statements, this first Hoogovens 
funds statement was an incidental disclosure, included to illustrate a rather 
specific point. In the 1961 annual report, no analysis of sources and application 
of funds was included. Instead, the directors' report focused on another specific 
problem of expansion and included, for this year only, detailed analyses of 
movements in its workforce. In the 1962 annual report, there was a short note 
on the realization of the expansion plans unveiled in the 1960 annual report. 
This included, as part of the narrative and without separate title, a short analysis 
that could formally be classified as a funds statement: it balanced the figures for 
212 
investment in fixed assets and working capital with retained earnings, deprecia­
tion, increases in liabilities and decreases in liquid assets. This was not repeated 
in the 1963 annual report. It was only in 1964 that the company started to 
include, on a regular basis, separate tables in the directors' report entitled 'move­
ments in liquidity', and which were, in effect, proper funds statements. 
The next generation 
In the early 1960's there is a shift in funds statement disclosure. The funds 
statement was by now not necessarily a statement to be used to explain extraor­
dinary situations, but had become, as indicated by the practice of K O N I N K L I J K E 
P E T R O L E U M , a standard element that might usefully be included in all financial 
statements on a regular basis. It had become a distinctly recognizable and 
'adoptable' innovation. 
The gradual emergence of the funds statement as a distinct phenomenon is 
reflected in the Dutch literature. Because of its relatively late appearance, a 
more complete reconstruction of the 'discovery' of the funds statement in the 
literature can be given here than is possible for other items. The emergence of 
the funds statement is closely linked to prof. B . Pruijt of the Rotterdam School of 
Economics. Pruijt was involved in a number of instances where the funds 
statement emerged in the period 1958-1962, and he can therefore, to a certain 
extent, be credited with the status of 'change agent' with regard to this particular 
innovation. 
Pruijt appears to have discovered the funds statement for himself in the late 
1950's. In a 1956 article, Pruyt discussed the impossibility of complying with 
the Rijkens' report recommendation of giving insight into liquidity by means of a 
balance sheet, however well ordered. The alternative of a funds statement was 
not mentioned. In a 1961 article54, Pruyt presented the funds statement as a 
new and promising phenomenon, one that had not spontaneously evolved in 
Dutch practice. As sources, he referred to publications on national income 
accounting by general economists, and to US textbooks on financial statement 
analysis. 
During this period, Pruijt also supervised the PhD-thesis of T h . M . Scholten 
(published as Scholten, 1962) which contained an extensive discussion of the first 
funds statements in Dutch annual reports. Finally, Pruijt was an active member 
of the Hamburger committee which prepared the 1962 Employers' recommenda­
tions on financial reporting. These various activities presumably reinforced each 
other, and together underline the extent to which Pruijt may be considered as one 
of the people who was most aware of the funds statement in the Netherlands. 
5 4
 Recognized by Dijksma (1987) as the first Dutch publication on the use of the funds 
statement in external financial reporting. 
213 
It can therefore hardly be coincidental that the next company to publish a funds 
statement, in 1961 , was VLISSINGENS K A T O E N , a middle-sized company with 
which Pruijt served as a member of the Supervisory Board. In the 1961 financial 
statements, a separate table of sources and applications of funds was introduced, 
together with a summary in graphical form. These data were explicitly presented 
as general purpose information to be provided on a regular basis next to the 
customary balance sheet and income statement. That it was Pruijt's influence 
that played a role in this adoption, is supported by the conclusion of Scholten that 
V L I S S I N G E N S K A T O E N ' S funds statement was similar to the one indicated by Pruijt 
in his 1961 article (Scholten, 1962 :227) 5 5 . 
In the following years, there were more instances of companies adopting 'gen­
eral-purpose' funds statements. O G E M was the first to follow in 1962 . For this 
company, there is no readily available explanation in terms of 'change agents'. 
Starting with its 1962 annual report, the company thoroughly refurbished the 
layout and contents of its hitherto fairly traditional financial statements. On this 
occasion, it may have looked around for 'state of the art' reporting practices and 
have found them, for instance, in the recommendations of the Hamburger report 
published a year earlier. A funds statement was included without comment as a 
separate table at the back of the report, among other statistical summaries. 
Next in line were K L M (1963) and A K U (1964) . In the case of K L M , a vestige 
of the previous 'special purpose' funds statement can be discerned. The company 
started to disclose funds statements during a period of considerable financial 
difficulties. In 1962 , the government had to step in with additional funding and a 
standby credit facility to prevent liquidity shortages. The initial funds statements 
were included to illustrate that, despite grave problems, the companies' liquidity 
position was still sufficient and that there was no need to call upon the govern­
ment credit facility. The funds statement was retained as a permanent feature of 
the report in later years. 
It is also quite possible that the sudden upsurge in the use of funds statements in 
the U S A played a role in the disclosures by K L M and A K U , since both com­
panies were listed in New York. As illustrated in figure 6 . 9 , the adoptions of 
these two companies coincided with the final breakthrough of the funds statement 
in the U S A . 
PHILIPS , the only other company listed in New York at the time, did not adopt a 
5 5
 It is, however, likely that Pruijt's interest in funds statements was temporary. He 
never published any other article on the subject, and he did not avail himself of the first 
opportunity of publishing a funds statement himself. In the middle 1960's, he was made 
president of Steenkolen Handelsvereeniging NV. This large private company started to 
publish its financial statements in 1968 on a voluntary basis. Although these statements 
were remarkable enough for their generous disclosure (see Brands, 1969), they did not 
contain a funds statement until 1972. 
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funds statement until 1972. A reason for this may have been a conviction within 
the company that a traditional funds statement linked to a current cost balance 
sheet and income statement would not provide much insight because of the large 
influence of 'elements of bookkeeping' on such a statement. This view was put 
forward by P .C . Breek, a board member of Philips, in 1974 (Breek, 1974). 
Later adoptions 
By the mid-1960's, a number of factors could influence the decision of individual 
companies to adopt funds statements. Apart from developments in the USA, 
which were made known to the Dutch in review articles like Diephuis (1966), 
there were the recommendations in the domestic literature. There was also a 
small number of well-known companies publishing funds statements on a regular 
basis. But although this could provide sufficient justification for any company 
considering publishing a funds statement, it apparently provided little active 
encouragement. The percentage of companies publishing a funds statement did 
not reach 20% until well into the 1970's. Around 1972/3, however, diffusion of 
the funds statement began to take off. By 1979, about 90% of the listed com­
panies published a funds statement. 
Developments from 1972 to 1979 should perhaps be characterized as an 'internal 
influence' diffusion process, because there are few discernible outside influences 
that might be used to explain the increase in funds statement usage after 1972: 
- The 1970 Act on Annual Financial Statements did not mention the funds 
statement. In itself, this was not too surprising since the law aimed primarily 
at codification of existing practice and was limited in scope to the traditional 
financial statements: balance sheet and income statement. It would, how­
ever, not have been surprising to find references to the funds statement in the 
extensive literature produced in the course of the enactment process56. 
- The Tripartite Study group set up to produce guidance on financial reporting 
following the 1970 Act did not publish a statement on the funds statement 
until 1979, when adoption was virtually complete. Even then, its guidance 
was very general and widely criticized (e.g. Rietkerk, 1981). 
- In its first (1977) pronouncement, the Enterprise Chamber (OK) ruled that 
funds statements, when published on a voluntary basis together with the 
financial statements, were part of the financial statements as defined by the 
law. This pronouncement may have increased attention for the funds state-
5 6
 In this literature, an important theme was the extent to which the balance sheet 
could meet the proposed legal requirement that it give 'insight into the liquidity of the 
enterprise'. Even though it was widely assumed that the balance sheet could not do this, 
there was no discussion of a possible role for the funds statement in this regard. 
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ment, but it did not contain any formal encouragements to publish them. 
- A similar increase in attention without formal encouragement was provided by 
the publication of IASC's ED 7 in 1976. 
One possible source of external influence may be identified, however. The 
norms of the Henri Sijthoff award for the best annual report were changed in 
1968 and 1974. At the time of the 1968 change, the funds statement was not 
mentioned. In 1974, though, the funds statement was included among the basic 
requirements defining eligibility for the award. Apart from any influence of the 
Sijthoff award, it seems not unlikely that the funds statement started to be 
adopted in the course of the 1970's because it was perceived to be a low-cost 
innovation that was increasingly common. Large-scale enthusiasm for the funds 
statement was still rare by the late 1970's. A 1979 survey (reported in Klaassen 
and Schreuder, 1981) showed that the funds statement ranked rather low in 
importance according to financial statement readers. Vecht (1977) did not think 
that the typical funds statement published in the mid-1970's provided any useful 
information in addition to the balance sheets on which it was typically based. 
6.7.3 Summary 
The first funds statements evolved during the late 1950's. As was demonstrated 
for U N I L E V E R , the precursors of the funds statement were verbal discussions of 
particular financing problems in the directors' report. The supporting figures in 
these discussions gradually took on the format of funds statements. When they 
had reached this stage of a distinctive format and label, other companies started 
to include funds statement as a regular element of their annual report. From the 
middle 1960's onwards, funds statement adoption proceeded smoothly, resulting 
in a 'regular' diffusion pattern, apparently largely unaffected by any outside 
influences. 
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6.8 Disclosure of current cost data 
6.8.1 Introduction 
Current cost accounting57 has been advocated in theory in the Netherlands since 
the 1920's and was quite well-known as an alternative for historical cost accoun­
ting by the end of the 1930's (see Camfferman, 1994b). Prewar usage of current 
cost accounting in published annual reports was rare, however, and largely 
confined to partial applications. In the early 1950's more pronounced forms of 
current cost accounting began to be adopted by a number of companies. The 
most conspicuous of these was PHILIPS, which used a full-fledged system of 
current cost accounting starting with its 1951 financial statements (see Groene-
veld, 1953; Brink, 1992). On the basis of this example, current cost accounting 
was recommended in the 1955 and 1962 employers' reports. At least among 
auditors, current cost accounting was considered by many to be the clearest 
indicator of the high quality of accounting thought and practice in the Nether­
lands. 
It was not until the middle 1960's, however, that empirical data became available 
on the actual extent of current cost accounting practice in the Netherlands. In 
surveys reported in Tempelaar (1966) and Foppe (1965), 10 to 20% of listed 
companies (depending on the definitions used) applied some form of current cost 
accounting. During the 1970's, more systematic data were gathered, but the 
conclusion was that there was only slow progress in the movement towards more 
widespread adoption of current cost accounting58. 
Despite the slow development of practice, theoretical attention for current cost 
accounting increased during the 1970's (see Groeneveld, 1979; for a review). 
One of the more important stimulants for further reflection was the topicality of 
inflation accounting in the English-speaking world during that period. Current 
cost accounting also played an important role in the deliberations of the Tripartite 
Study Group and in the preparations for the adaptation of Dutch law to the 
Fourth Directive (Zeff et aL, 1992, chapters 5 and 6). 
5 7
 The distinctly Limpergian construct of vervangingswaarde is best translated as 
'current value accounting'. In this section, 'current cost accounting' is used as a more 
general term to denote all attempts to incorporate specific price changes in the financial 
statements. 
5 8
 See the NIvRA biennial survey, Onderzoek Jaarverslagen, and Vijftig jaarverslagen 
— Gewogen en te licht bevonden, Economisch Instituut der Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht 
(Leiden: Stenfert Kroese, 1975). 
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Figure 6.10a Current cost data 
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6.8.2 Comments on observed disclosure practices 
Figure 6.10 shows the development of current cost applications over time, broken 
down into categories indicating various degrees of disclosure. In the literature, 
many elaborate classifications of current cost applications have been suggested to 
describe the various degrees of comprehensiveness with which current cost 
accounting may be applied (see, for instance, Slot and Vijn, 1979, ch. 16). In 
this section, the discussion wil l be limited to three types or gradations of current 
cost accounting: 
- Partial supplementary data: indications in the notes to the financial statements 
of current costs of selected assets or the effect of current cost accounting on 
selected income statement items. In this section only supplementary balance 
sheet data wil l be discussed. 
- Partial financial statement applications: the main, or supplementary financial 
statements, are in part based on current cost accounting. 
- Full financial statement applications: current cost accounting is used for all 
applicable items in the (main or supplementary) balance sheet and income 
statement. 
Figure 6.10 shows that there was only limited use of current cost data in the 
financial statements themselves until the 1970's. Before that time, companies 
mainly limited themselves to partial supplementary data. Full financial statement 
applications of current cost accounting remained rather rare. At the peak, in 
1983, 8 out of 46 companies showed full current cost financial statements. 
Together with partial financial statement applications, almost half the companies 
eventually included some current cost data in their financial statements. By the 
1970's, of course, in many countries accounting for inflation had become the 
subject of intensive discussion, and by that time current cost accounting could no 
longer be assumed to be a purely Dutch phenomenon. 
Interim formats 
Most companies that applied some form of current cost accounting did not do so 
straight away. Rather, the preferred course during the 1950's and 1960's was to 
meet calls for current cost accounting by disclosing in the notes an indication of 
the current cost of major fixed assets. For this particular purpose, the notion of 
'insured value' ('verzekerde waarde') enjoyed a spell of considerable popularity, 
which can be explained by the fact that it was directly available without addi­
tional costs. The two employers' reports did recommend supplemental disclosure 
of the current costs of assets, but they did not mention that insured value might 
be used as an approximation of current cost. In fact, this approximation was 
frowned upon by the more rigorous theorists (see Vecht, 1981: 93; Slot and Vijn, 
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Figure 6.11 Current cost data 
types of supplementary data 
(fraction of companies disclosing) 
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1979:81). It was suggested mainly by those outside the audit profession, such as 
the Wiardi-Beekman report of 1959 (p. 122), the financial journalist Posthumus 
Meyjes (1960:262) and the Society for Investor Protection59. In 1973, the 
Tripartite Study Group expressed its view (in an exposure draft) that 'the 
disclosure of insured value, which occurs frequently in practice, is (...) of limited 
value and can, in certain circumstances, be misleading , (Hal). 
The importance of 'insured value' as a preparatory stage for current cost account­
ing is shown by the fact that, of the 31 companies that switched to some form of 
current cost accounting in both balance sheet and income statement, 19 did so 
after a number of years during which they just disclosed 'insured value'. Those 
that adopted current cost without this interim stage were either very large 
companies (such as N S U , U N I L E V E R , K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M ) for which there 
was probably not a large cost advantage in gathering data on this particular 
approximation of current costs, or pioneers (PHILIPS, A K U , N Y V E R D A L ) that 
adopted current cost when 'insured value' was not yet a common disclosure. 
The development over time of supplementary balance sheet data is shown in 
figure 6.11. In this figure, no data are included for companies that use current 
cost data in the balance sheet itself. The figure refers, therefore, only to 
5 9
 Vereniging Effectenbescherming, letter 14 July 1965 to SER relative to Verdam 
committee report. 
220 
companies for which this is the only current cost information provided with 
regard to the balance sheet. As can been seen, the provision of this sort of 
information reached its peak in 1971. After that, most of the decline can be 
attributed to companies moving on to more advanced stages of current cost 
disclosure. It does not seem unreasonable to attribute at least part of the transi­
tion to other approximations of current cost observed from 1975 onwards to the 
Tripartite Study Group's discouragement of insured value. Whereas in other 
instances discussed in this chapter there appeared to be no ground to assume a 
large role for the TO in furthering disclosure among listed companies, in this 
case where it tried to discourage a disclosure, it appears to have been quite 
successful. 
Current cost data within the financial statements 
The extent of current cost usage in the financial statements themselves (that is, 
partial or full applications in main or supplementary balance sheet and income 
statement) is shown in figure 6.12. From this figure, it is evident to what extent 
current cost accounting was in fact a 1970's phenomenon: it was not until 1965 
that the adoption rate reached 10%. By 1983, though, almost half (21 compa­
nies) of the surveyed companies used current cost data for at least part of the 
items in both the balance sheet and income statement (or supplementary state­
ments). The fact that, by the early 1980's, current cost accounting was for most 
companies a rather recent phenomenon can also be stated in another way. By 
1983, two-thirds of the companies with at least partial financial statement 
applications of current cost had started to do so in or after 1971. Only three 
companies (PHILIPS, H E I N E K E N and N I J V E R D A L ) could trace their current cost 
accounting back to the 1950's while four others had started during the 1960's60. 
Comparison with UK disclosure 
During the 1970's, various forms of accounting for inflation were introduced in 
U K accounting standards. Between 1971 and 1980, an almost annual series of 
study reports, exposure drafts and final accounting standards were published 
which turned accounting for inflation into a major accounting issue61. The 
resulting changes in accounting practice are shown in figure 6.12 as well. 
Comparisons between the Dutch and the U K series should be made with some 
6 0
 A K U had started in 1953, but A K Z O discontinued the practice between 1969 and 
1974. 
6 1
 An ASC discussion paper was published in 1971. This formed the basis for ED 
(1973) and SSAP 7 (1974). In September 1975, the Sandilands report was published. 
This led, in turn, to ED 18 (1976), the so-called Hyde Guidelines (1977), ED 24 (1979) 
and, finally, SSAP 16 (1980). 
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Figure 6.12 Inflation Accounting 
in the Netherlands and the UK 
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caution since the data may not, owing to the definitions used, be strictly compa­
rable. Moreover, the U K data contain a (small) component of Purchasing-Power 
disclosures which are not included in the Dutch data. 
Nevertheless, it can be concluded that, as a minority practice, current cost 
accounting developed in the Netherlands well before it developed in the U K . 
However, regulatory pressure in the U K led to a sharp increase in disclosure in 
that country between 1974 and 1979. By the later 1970's, the U K led the way in 
accounting for inflation, at least in terms of the crude measure of the number of 
companies that did at least disclose some information on this topic. 
Current cost disclosures and inflation 
Figure 6.12 shows an acceleration in reporting current cost figures following 
1964, and a decrease in the percentage of disclosing companies around 1970. 
Closer observation of the data shows that the fall in the number of disclosing 
companies around 1970 is due to (a) the fact that a disproportionate number of 
companies being delisted in the late 1960's merger wave were current cost users 
and (b) to an almost complete temporary standstill in new current cost disclosures 
around 1970. 
In general terms, it is not too difficult to relate the increase in current cost 
disclosures to the rate of inflation. As indicated in figure 6.13, current cost 
disclosures began to take off when the rather stable price level of the 1950's and 
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Figure 6.13 New current cost disclosures 
and rate of inflation 1953-1983 
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1960's gave way to sustained inflation. The very large price increases after 1974 
coincide neatly with rather marked increases in current cost adoptions. Drawing 
detailed conclusions about the relation of current cost adoptions with inflation is 
plagued by the difficulty of defining inflation. The data used in figure 6.13 are 
based on the producers' price index. Using a headline inflation rate can result in 
rather marked differences within individual years, although the overall trend 
remained unchanged. 
In addition to attributing the drop in current cost disclosures around 1970 to a 
temporary falling or levelling inflation rate, it is also possible to point towards 
inherent difficulties with current cost accounting that began to be evident around 
that time. Awareness of the theoretical deficiencies of the traditional current cost 
approach began to spread in the later 1960's (see Camfferman and Zeff, 1994). 
A n indication of a changing attitude to current cost accounting is found in Blom 
(1967) who provides a critical review of the difficulties and dangers of applying 
current cost accounting in practice. Blom concludes: 
I think — and I have found support in conversations with many directors and 
supervisory directors and with some auditors — that the objections against 
current cost financial statements are being felt ever more strongly. I therefore 
expect that we will go back to the traditional and internationally customary 
'historical financial' balance sheets and income statements (p. 68). 
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Blom also points out that a number of companies that had adopted current cost 
accounting in the past because their competitors had done it or because their 
shareholders had asked for it, now regretted that decision. These companies 
often did not go back openly to historical costs. But because they omitted further 
revaluations of their assets, their financial statements would in a number of years 
revert automatically to a historical cost basis. 
Blom's assertions are to some extent borne out by the facts of this survey, 
notably the drop in the number of new current cost adoptions in the late 1960's 
points in this direction. To what extent companies did relinquish current cost 
accounting without formal reinstatement of assets at historical cost was not 
systematically surveyed. Blom's prediction as to the continuing decline of 
current cost accounting was overtaken by the onset, in the 1970's, of an inflation 
more severe than before, and by a spell of international attention to current cost 
accounting that temporarily mitigated any possible concerns regarding interna­
tional conformity of Dutch reporting practice. 
Comments in annual reports 
Company financial statements do shed some lights on the perceptions of current 
cost disclosures 1)y companies. Compared to other changes in disclosure, which 
usually were not commented upon, the incorporation of some form of current 
cost data in the financial statements was more often the subject of comments. In 
some cases (DRU, 1963; K O R E N S C H O O F , 1960), requests by shareholders were 
cited as reasons for additional disclosures. B Y E N K O R F (1979/80) mentioned a 
more general growth in demand for insight in current costs. H E I N E K E N (1957) 
strove for 'more clarity' in financial statement presentation, while SMITS (1964) 
used current cost data to 'give our balance sheet a more modern form'. In an 
unconcerned disregard for the preceding fifty years of theory development, 
R E E S I N K (1979) started to value inventory at current cost ' in conformity with new 
insights'. I N T E R N A T I O - M U L L E R included supplementary data in 1983 'also with a 
view to the Fourth Directive'. 
Reasons for not or no longer supplying current cost data were also occasionally 
given. From 1977 to 1983, V A N O M M E R E N apologized for not giving informati­
on on a current cost basis owing to 'the ongoing discussion in academic and 
business circles' and because 'sharp price fluctuations' made the application of 
current cost accounting difficult for this particular company. 
Finally, V I H A M U B U T T I N G E R stopped after three years in 1973 because supplying 
current cost data was 'not really practicable'. 
A case of extensive footnote explanation of additional disclosures can be found in 
the financial statements of K O N I N K L U K E P E T R O L E U M (see also Grob, 1995). Fort 
this company, the reasons for addition or deletion of supplementary schedules can 
be found almost exclusively in the developments in standard-setting in the 
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English-speaking world. Its first inclusion of supplementary data on the basis of 
general price level accounting coincided with SSAP 7 (1974); current cost data 
were added when required by SSAP 16 (1979) and scrapped together with that 
statement. In other comments during the later 1970's, the company extensively 
explained its lack of confidence in the various accounting standards with which it 
had to comply 6 2. For this particular company, at any rate, inclusion of current 
cost data was hardly a matter of voluntary disclosure at all. 
The same appears to be true of U N I L E V E R , which professed to have used current 
cost data since the early 1950's for internal purposes (De Jong, 1980:18), but 
which only started the disclosure of supplemental financial statement data as late 
as 1976. On this occasion, as in 1980, when the supplementary data were much 
expanded, the company averred to have followed British standards (the Hyde 
Guidelines and SSAP 16, respectively). The Dutch pronouncements of 1979 
were mentioned to indicate that the company considered compliance with the 
British standards as equivalent with compliance with their Dutch counterparts. 
Current cost disclosures and audit firms 
Current cost accounting found its origins and its most enthusiastic promotors 
within the Dutch auditing profession. But within that profession, there were 
serious doubts and dissenting views as well. This can be illustrated by the 
following quotes from a published series of interviews with leading Dutch 
auditors from the postwar period (Schoonderbeek and De Hen, 1995): 
When I stopped practicing, I no longer had any client who did not prepare its 
financial statements on the basis of current values, (p. 3) 
Everybody tried in practice to be a propagandist for the application of current 
value by clients. Sometimes this succeeded in an internal trial. On the rarest 
of occasions it succeeded in the published annual report, (p. 50) 
I think that, insofar as in the Netherlands current value accounting is used, 
this has for the great majority of cases been encouraged by [practicing] 
auditors (...). I used to recommend current value accounting, whenever this 
was useful. This advice was generally followed, albeit not always in the 
published annual report, (p. 60-61) 
With all large clients we pleaded the cause of current value accounting, and 
with success, (p. 66) 
6 2
 See also 'Shell vecht [ASC] ED 24 (current cost) aan\ De Accountant, vol. 86 no. 
5, January 1980, p. 266. 
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I never recommended [current value accounting] to anyone. I discussed it 
sometimes with clients, but I never was a current value apostle, (p. 90) 
Given these and other assertions63, it appears useful to investigate the relation­
ship between audit firms and current cost disclosures. One can examine this 
relationship by comparing 
- the market shares of audit firms estimated on the basis of sample market 
shares, with 
- the number of current cost disclosers among the clients of a particular firm 
relative to the total number disclosing companies in a particular year. 
The significance of these comparisons is difficult to judge, though, because of (1) 
the relatively small number of disclosures through most of the period, (2) because 
of the small market shares of all except the largest firms, and (3) because of the 
continuous changes in the populations of audit firms and companies. 
A rough indication of significance may be obtained by considering for each audit 
firm the number of current cost disclosers64 among its clients in a particular 
year as the outcome of a binomial distribution65. On that basis, 10 out of 91 
firms are identified as having, for one or more years, relatively many current 
cost disclosers among their clients. None of these cases appeared after 1973, 
suggesting that if a relationship of sorts existed, it did so only before that date. 
Six of these cases can be discounted as chance incidents during transition periods 
since they refer to short periods in the middle 1960's and early 1970's, when, as 
indicated above, there were considerable changes in the total number of disclos­
ures. In all, the numbers appear to be insignificant in the sense that (with one 
possible exception, see below) there were no audit firms in the sample that dis­
played a clear and lasting tendency to have relatively many current cost disclosers 
among its clients. 
These results are underlined by a more precise test of a less general hypothesis: 
whether current cost disclosures are associated with large audit firms. For the 
6 3
 See, for instance, Klaassen (1975: 76), who reports on interviews with company 
managements on their motives for adopting current cost accounting. Six out of 29 
companies mentioned that 'the attitude of the auditor had been of major importance' in the 
decision to adopt current cost accounting. 
6 4
 In this case, and in the remainder of this section, current cost disclosure is narrowly 
defined as partial or full adoption in balance sheet and income statement. 
6 5
 With the probability of success (p) equal to the total disclosure rate across all 
companies for that year, and n equal to the number of clients of the specific firm. A 
second simplification is to approximate the binomial with the normal distribution, which 
strictly speaking is unwarranted. The combined effect of these approximations is to 
overestimate the significance of relations between audit firms and current cost disclosures. 
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selected years 1963 and 1980, the relationship between audit firm size (measured 
by sample market share) and current cost disclosures was investigated. It was 
found that for both years, although current cost disclosures by clients of large 
firms were in excess of what might be expected on the basis of the firms' sample 
market share, these differences were not significant66. 
The fact that current cost disclosures among clients were more or less propor­
tional to market share meant that during the 1950's, when the number of audit 
firms was large, quite a number of audit firms had current-cost using clients. 
The six companies using some form of current cost accounting in balance sheet 
and income statement during the 1950's retained five different audit firms. 
Among these, Klynveld, Kraayenhof & Co. was prominent with two celebrated 
current cost users (PHILIPS and A K U ) among its clients. But smaller firms also 
had their share of clients using current cost accounting. A very small audit firm 
like the one-man firm of M . Janssen67 assisted in the adoption of a rather 
elaborate form of current cost accounting by D R U which coincided with the far 
better known adoption by PHILIPS in 1951. 
The point that current cost disclosures tended to occur in harmony with audit 
firm market share is illustrated in figure 6.14. The two panels compare the data 
for Klynveld, Kraayenhof & Co and Moret & Limperg, both combined with their 
respective predecessor firms. For the group of firms forming Moret & Limperg, 
the actual number of current cost disclosures follows quite closely the pattern 
suggested by the firm's market share. For the Klynveld firms, there is some 
indication that during the 1950's and early 1960's there was an excess of current 
cost using clients, but this had disappeared by 1970. In the years 1974-1976, 
Klynveld clients joined in the second wave of current cost adoptions. The firm, 
Audit firm size and current cost disclosures 1963 (1980) 
large firms small firms 
clients using 
current costs 
6 (20) 3(1) 
clients not 
using current costs 
45 (24) 41 (8) 
Chi 2 values (with continuity correction) are insignificant at the 10% level. 
'large' audit firms are defined as firms with greater than average market share. 
'clients using current costs' have fully or partially adopted current cost accounting in both 
balance sheet and income statement. 
6 7
 This firm would, through various mergers, later become a part of Dijker & Doorn-
bos, and hence of Coopers & Lybrand. 
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Figure 6.14 CCA adopters by audit firm 
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or rather, its clients, were a few years ahead of the remainder of the sample in 
choosing current cost accounting practices. 
In all, it can be concluded that it is unlikely that there were large differences 
among Dutch audit firms regarding persistency or success in persuading their 
clients to provide current cost accounting information. Although it can therefore 
be tentatively concluded that all firms were equally active in this regard, no 
conclusions can be drawn regarding the level of their activity. On this issue, one 
still has to rely on assertions in the literature, as quoted in this section, that a 
large number of auditor regularly advocated current cost accounting. 
6.8.3 Summary 
In the development of current cost disclosures, two stages can be distinguished. 
The first stage lasted until the late 1960's. During this period, the absence of 
significant attention for current cost accounting abroad meant that developments 
were governed by domestic circumstances only. Fairly widespread attitudes in 
favour of current cost led some pioneering companies to adopt rather elaborate 
systems of providing current cost information during the 1950's and 1960's. A 
more typical reaction was for companies to disclose some readily available 
supplementary data, most often the insured value of fixed assets. 
During the 1970's, a second stage began. In this stage, high inflation and 
international attention for inflation accounting were accompanied in the Nether­
lands by a quickening of the pace of new current cost disclosures. In both 
stages, there is no evidence that particular Dutch audit firms can be associated 
with current cost adoptions by client companies. 
6.9 Earnings per share 
Compared with the United States, the ratio of earnings per share gained popular­
ity but slowly in the Netherlands. According to a casual survey by Barr (1972), 
earnings per share started to be disclosed in US annual reports during the 1920's, 
with the practice gradually increasing in the 1930's. In the late 1940's and early 
1950's, earnings per share had already been well-established in the United States 
as a tool of financial analysis for a considerable time (Myer, 1952:51,244). 
There are few indications that earnings per share was used at all in the Nether­
lands before or shortly after the war. 
Earnings per share became a familiar notion in the Netherlands following the 
listing of the shares of K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M in New York in 1954. This 
listing focused attention in the Netherlands on the importance attached in the 
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United States to price-earnings ratio's and hence to earnings per share: 
The Dutch investor, not aware of the notion of the price:earnings-ratio (...) 
has had the opportunity in recent months to become acquainted with this 
concept. This phrase can frequently be encountered in the financial press 
these days, especially in observations on the shares of Royal Dutch Petro­
leum. These shares have become very popular with the American public 
since they were listed on the New York Stock Exchange. This popularity is 
based primarily, so it is said, on the very low P:E-ratio of the shares of Royal 
Dutch Petroleum relative to American oil shares. (Gans, 1954:918) 
In 1955, J . M . Vecht commented on the relative unfamiliarity of Dutch investors 
with the notion of earnings per share and he provided a possible explanation for 
this phenomenon when he discussed the influx of American investment into the 
Amsterdam Stock Exchange during 1954: 
One had to recognize the fact, peculiar [to those accustomed to] the Dutch 
circumstances, that the American investor calculates with the so-called 'price-
earnings ratio', that is, with the ratio of the share price to earned (and 
therefore not distributed) income. This ratio, which represents the 'earning 
capacity' of the company, is decisive for the American investor even though 
he wi l l , of course, take other factors into account. (...) The Dutch investor 
calculates mainly with returns, that is, with the relationship between share 
price and distributed income, probably because the impossibility of calculating 
earnings per share on the basis of financial reporting as practised by the 
majority of companies. (Vecht, 1955:67). 
As is indicated below by the discussion of developments in the U K , another 
reason for the fact that earnings per share were relatively unknown in the 
Netherlands may have been the existence of a tax on dividends rather than profits 
before the war. Since the amount of taxes depended on the dividend policy, 
studying trends in after-tax earnings on a per share basis, or comparing price 
earnings ratio's, was not very useful. 
Finally, it has been observed that 'ratio's were alien to Limperg's way of looking 
at things' (Gans, 1979: 120). In the same place, it is observed that Limperg 
shared the contemporary focus on dividend yield rather than on share price. 
Given Limperg's influence on auditor education, this may provide a further 
reason for a relative disinterest in the earnings per share figure in the Nether­
lands. 
During the late 1950's, the first disclosures by sample companies were observed. 
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Figure 6.15 Earnings per share 
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The first to disclose was indeed K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M , the company alleged­
ly responsible for the sudden increase in attention to earnings per share in the 
Netherlands. It was followed in 1960 by O G E M (also among the first to disclose 
a funds statement, around the same time, see paragraph 6.7). Other large 
companies as PHILIPS (1961), U N I L E V E R (1962) and A K U (1965) followed suit. 
Earnings per share disclosure developed along an almost classical S-curve (figure 
6.15). 
During the 1960's, earnings per share apparently gained a growing foothold in 
the investment community. In 1962, earnings per share were included in a serial 
publication on key data of listed securities68. But its popularity continued to be 
hindered, on the one hand, by established stock exchange practices and, on the 
other hand, by the alleged deficiencies of financial reporting. In the middle 
1960's, at least a substantial minority of investors continued to think primarily of 
share prices and dividends in terms of percentages of face value. There was, in 
68
 Kerngetallen van ter beurze van Amsterdam genoteerde Nederlandse effecten 
(Amsterdam: Amsterdamsche Bank, March 1962- ). Entries included earnings per share, 
cash flow per share and price-earnings ratios. Whether or not the bank did include 
comparable figures in predecessor publications could not be established. The assistance of 
W. Sprey (ABN-Amro bank) in preparing this footnote is gratefully acknowledged. 
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fact, a degree of controversy over the method to be used in share price quotations 
at the Stock Exchange. Proponents of listing in terms of guilders (rather than 
percentages of face value) conceded that it would be helpful to relate the absolute 
share price to some other amount, such as earnings per share: 'But this is quite 
difficult because earnings are calculated in various ways. The chaotic situation in 
financial reporting by companies in this country precludes uniformity of calcula­
tion.' (Verwayen, 1963:224; see also Haccou, 1963). 
It is difficult to trace how the importance attached to earnings per share increased 
during these years because of a lack of published material on the subject of 
financial statement analysis. Existing indications suggest that this increase was 
rather slow. In 1973, earnings per share was still presented as a novelty of 
which the use was spreading gradually as a result of the US example (De Reus, 
1973). It was claimed that a 1974 textbook on financial statement analysis was 
about the first such book in the Netherlands (Slot and Vecht, 1974:v). By that 
time, however, earnings per share had taken its place among the standard 
financial statement ratio's, although it was not until 1977 that the association of 
investment analysts recommended a standard procedure for calculating earnings 
per share (Boissevain and Van Doom, 1977). 
The disclosure of earnings per share data in annual reports spread rather slowly. 
The otherwise extensive recommendations of the 1955 Rijkens report did not 
include a reference to earnings per share although it did suggest inclusion of a 
few related ratio's (such as income and dividends as a percentage of share 
capital). The 1962 Hamburger report went no further than a general recommen­
dations to include 'ratios' in the report of directors. One might expect that the 
financial community would be rather more early in demanding earnings per share 
figures, but the 1956 statement of norms for the Henri Sijthoff award (sponsored 
by the leading financial newspaper) did not mention any ratio's, let alone 
earnings per share. It is therefore not surprising to find that, until 1965/1967, 
the number of companies publishing earnings per share data remained low. 
Around 1970, though, one can observe a sudden surge in publications. The 
reason for this change is not evident. A relationship with the WJO suggests itself 
because for companies of all size groups, there are strong increases in disclosure 
in 1970 and/or 1971. There is, however, no hint in the law itself or in its 
preparatory documents about the publication of financial ratio's. Yet, it is 
conceivable that the drafting of the law induced a number of companies to review 
their financial reporting policies as a whole, and not just those aspects covered by 
the law. Comments in company financial statements on the inclusion of earnings 
per share are extremely rare. In one instance (NIERSTRASZ, 1971) it was 
remarked that '[i]t has come to our attention that shareholders value the inclusion 
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in the financial statements of some ratio's on Nierstrasz stock'. This suggests 
that at least for some companies that started to publish earnings per share around 
1970, the primary motive was simply that the disclosure was ' in the air'. 
In the United Kingdom, earnings per share was also a relatively late arrival. 
Whereas in the Netherlands, initial attention to earnings per share had developed 
because of the listing of K O N I N K L U K E P E T R O L E U M in New York, in the United 
Kingdom the catalyst was the Corporation Tax introduced by the Finance Act of 
1965: 
The concept of earnings per share is still relatively new in this country. Until 
1965 investors and investment analysts tended to work in terms of dividend 
yield and cover. The Finance Act 1965 (...) meant that there were two 
distinct breaks in the basis of computation of yields and covers between 1965 
and 1967. There was thus a quite natural tendency to look at what other 
countries were doing, and most investment journals and investment analysts 
began to talk in terms of P/E ratios. (...) [T]his interest in P /E ratios brought 
a corresponding interest in earnings per share. There had been little or no 
discussion of earnings per share in this country for the simple reason that (if 
earnings are taken to be the amount available for ordinary shareholders after 
tax) the different rates of tax paid on distributed and non-distributed profits 
meant that earnings (and hence the earnings per share) varied with the level of 
dividend. 6 9 
In addition to the effect of the Corporation Tax, Holmer (1971) mentions the 
prevalence of no-par shares in the US (which were non-existent in the UK) as a 
factor. Whereas in the US, the existence of no-par shares led to the general 
practice of stating dividends on a per share basis, with earnings per share as a 
natural extension, in the U K dividends were generally discussed as percentages of 
par value. 
In the U K , the topic of earnings per share was rapidly covered by the newly 
developing accounting standards. In March 1971, an exposure draft was issued 
which was converted into SSAP 3 in February 1972. The resulting disclosures, 
compared with those in the Netherlands, are shown in figure 6.15. Unfortunate­
ly, the U K data source does not go further back than 1969/197070, so that the 
development of disclosure on a voluntary basis can only be compared for about 
6 9
 'ED4 and the new Corporation Tax', Accountancy (UK), vol, 82 no. 935, July 
1971, p. 364. 
70
 Survey of Published Accounts, published since 1968/1969. Earnings per share have 
been included since the 1969/1970 issue. 
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two years. Nevertheless, it is clear that around 1970, the extent of disclosure 
reached in the Netherlands and in the U K , in both countries without any form of 
regulation, was more or less equal. Both countries71 were equally behind the 
United States, where disclosure of earnings per share had become universal in the 
late 1950's. After 1971, disclosure in the U K rapidly outpaced that in the 
Netherlands, owing to the influence of SSAP 3 7 2 . 
In the Netherlands, accounting standards did not play a comparable role. If the 
Considered Views of the Tripartite study group did play a role at all in furthering 
disclosure among listed companies, they could have done so only for the smaller 
companies. Guidance on earnings per share was published for the first time in 
december 197673, at a time when almost three-quarters of the listed companies 
did already disclose this item. The study group did not recommend the publicati­
on of earnings per share data, but merely observed with some understatement 
(see figure 6.15) that '[i]t does happen that an earnings per share figure can be 
found in the financial statements of companies. The financial press tends to pay 
much attention to this figure and its development.' The actual recommendation 
went no further than the statement that if a company displayed an earnings per 
share figure without any notes, readers should be able to rely on the figure being 
calculated according to the procedure outlined in the remainder of the recommen­
dation. Although the wording of this statement was not very strong, it may have 
provided the required impetus to raise the disclosure level to (nearly) 100% in 
1983. New disclosures had levelled of since 1972/3, but picked up again in 
1977/8. 
Summary 
Disclosure of earnings per share was closely linked with changes in the environ­
ment in which Dutch companies operated. Before the War, meaningful earnings 
per share calculations were hindered by the tax system. Even when the tax 
system was changed, earnings per share calculations (and the associated measure 
7 1
 A comparison with Germany might also be helpful, but empirical data appear to be 
lacking. In Germany, earnings per share had apparently been known for some time, but 
in terms of financial statement disclosure, earnings per share were apparently not very 
widespread by 1969 (see 'Gutachten des amerikanischen Instituts zur Berechnung des 
Gewinns pro Aktie', Die Wirtschaftsprüfung, vol. 22 no. 24, 15 December 1969, p. 709-
10). 
7 2
 A survey by Gray (1978a) shows that (large) UK companies disclosed earnings per 
share at that time to a significantly greater extent than companies in other Western 
European countries. The difference is attributed to the influence of UK accounting 
standards. 
73
 Beschouwingen naar aanleiding van de wet op de jaarrekening van ondernemingen, 
issue nr. 5, December 1976. 
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of the price-earnings ratio) gained ground only slowly in stock exchange prac­
tices. The latter development was clearly influenced by a growing awareness of 
US practices. When earnings per share did begin to play a role in financial 
analysis, companies reacted swiftly to provide these figures as a new annual 
report disclosure. 
6.10 Segment reporting 
6.10.1 Theoretical views on segment disclosure 
In the United States, '[f]ew issues (...) have been as enduring or as controversial 
as that of segment reporting.'7 4 This is, to a greater or lesser extent, true for 
other countries as well. These controversies have resulted in a voluminous 
literature on segmental reporting, dealing with the theoretical, practical and 
regulatory aspects of segment reporting. This section briefly discusses some of 
the theoretical aspects of the disclosure of segment data75. Section 6.10.2 
discusses the development of segment reporting as a reporting 'issue' in the 
Netherlands and abroad. Section 6.10.3 comments on the survey data of the 
present study. 
At a purely theoretical level, the relevance of segment reporting can be discussed 
in terms of the informational value of increasingly detailed information. Ronen 
and Livnat (1981) point out that segmental reporting may increase the possibil­
ities of creating state-dependent securities. Segmental information may allow 
writing more refined contracts and this change in market structure wil l be either 
neutral or positive in value to society as a whole. In very general terms, they 
prove in the context of an analytical model that if management's objective is to 
maximize wealth or utility of investors, disclosing segment information is 
superior to not disclosing. Of course, this conclusion does not provide any basis 
for a prediction regarding the actual extent of voluntary disclosure of segment 
data. 
A possible ground for voluntary segment reporting by individual companies may 
be found in its effect on a company's cost of capital. Generally speaking, 
segment reporting may reduce information asymmetry. This point is explored by 
Greenstein and Sami (1994), who show that companies disclosing segment data 
for the first time following the new SEC requirement of 1970 (see below), 
7 4
 Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, quoted in Horwitz and Kolodny (1980). 
7 5
 No attempt is made to produce an extensive review. For further references see, for 
instance, Swaminathan (1991). 
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experienced a relatively greater reduction in their bid-ask spreads. This is seen 
as evidence of the lower transaction costs resulting from reduced information 
asymmetry. A relationship between segmental information and share prices has 
been established in a number of studies (e.g. Ronen and Livnat, 1981; Prodhan 
and Harris, 1989). Horwitz and Kolodny (1980:418) summarize a number of 
studies exploring the relationship between segment reporting and forecast ability, 
and conclude that 'segment sales data can be utilized to improve earnings 
forecasts and to make better investment decisions, but that the availability of 
segment profit numbers provides no marginal benefit.' These studies do not 
explain why some firms choose not to disclose segment information, given that 
these disclosures appear to have a positive effect on share prices and share price 
volatility (Gray and Radebaugh, 1984). Part of this explanation may be provided 
by referring to the notion of the proprietary costs of disclosure. Reluctance to 
disclose segment information may be the result of a perception of large costs 
(notably competitive damage) resulting from such disclosures. Gray and Roberts 
(1989) surveyed a number of British multinationals, in order to establish a 
ranking of the perceived net costs of disclosure of a broad range of disclosure 
items. The results indicated that profits segmented by line of business on the 
basis of a narrow segment definition ranked as the most 'costly' disclosure out of 
the various items in the study. It was also found that using coarser segment 
definitions would result in significantly lower perceived net costs for all types of 
segment disclosures. 
On a theoretical level, therefore, a model can be constructed explaining why 
there may be equilibria of partial disclosure regarding segment information. To 
translate such models into accurate predications of practice is complicated by the 
many forms that 'segment reporting' can take. Horwitz and Kolodny (1980:419) 
have indicated that many of the conclusions regarding the effects of segment 
disclosure on share price or incurred costs are dependent on the amount of detail 
and on the way of calculating segment figures. That is, segment data may be so 
contaminated by inappropriate choice of segments and cost and revenue alloca­
tions that the resulting figures do not amount to meaningful disclosures. Defects 
like these may impede straightforward predictions regarding the voluntary 
provision of segment information. 
In sum, segment reporting has been shown to be significantly related to a 
complex set of factors including rather distinct company perceptions of costs and 
benefits of disclosure, beliefs and decisions of share market participants and 
hence share price behaviour. In other words, it has been demonstrated that some 
forms of segment reporting are associated, in the minds of company manage­
ments and in terms of share price behaviour, with the economics of the disclosing 
company. Although in theory this true for many other disclosures, segment 
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reporting is one of the few items where extensive research has provided proof of 
the existence of these links. Both the amount of research directed at this 
disclosure item and the research findings support the assumption that economic 
consequences are more pronounced with segment reporting than with many other 
disclosures. 
6.10.2 Segment reporting as a financial reporting issue 
As early as 1951, before segment reporting was an issue in any country, the US 
SEC required registrants to disclose 'the relative importance' of major products 
and product groups. Rapid growth in mergers and especially in diversified 
acquisitions during the 1950's and 1960's gave rise to demands for substantially 
more detailed information by line of business (Barr, 1967). However, this 
demand was not immediately met by changes in practice. Horngren (1958:85) 
characterized the segmentation of sales into major components as a 'tendency 
(...) already evident in a few scattered annual reports'. 
In 1965, the US Senate's Subcommittee on Anti-Trust and Monopoly prodded the 
SEC into reconsidering the sufficiency of its 1951 requirement76. When the 
SEC publicly declared its interest in the issue, this gave rise to a flurry of activity 
by the A P B , the Financial Executives Institute and various other interested 
parties. The APB issued Statement No. 2, Disclosure of Supplemental Informa­
tion by Diversified Companies in 1967. In this document, the Board revealed its 
preference for voluntary extensions of disclosure rather than for mandatory 
guidelines. The SEC, however, chose not to rely on voluntary disclosures. 
Relying on the recently published Wheat Report, it successively required compre­
hensive (i.e. both revenues and profits by) line of business reporting in registra­
tion statements (1969), Form 10-K filings (1970) and corporate annual reports to 
stockholders (1974). Whether or not the SEC was correct in opting rather 
quickly for mandatory disclosure rather than awaiting the results of a system of 
voluntary disclosures as advocated by the A P B remained the subject of extensive 
debate throughout the 1970's (see Horwitz and Kolodny, 1980). This remained 
true even when the FASB in effect endorsed the comprehensive disclosure of 
both revenues and profits for both industry and geographical segments in SFAS 
14 (1976). In all, attention for segment reporting in the United States developed 
rapidly in second half of the 1960's. By the middle 1970's, the current regula­
tory framework was by and large in place. 
In the United Kingdom, a requirement to provide segmented data on revenue and 
7 6
 Information on the chronology of events in the US has been derived from Barr 
(1969), Skousen (1970), Zeff (1972) and Horwitz and Kolodny (1980). 
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income for lines of business was included in the Companies Act 1967 (S. 17) and 
effective from the middle of 1968 onwards. At the time, this was regarded as 
going 'much beyond the current disclosure requirements in the United States' 
(Hendriksen, 1969:27). A n escape clause was provided, however, since judg­
ment regarding segment materiality was left to management, and because 
management might abstain from publication altogether on the grounds of possible 
competitive damage. These regulations remained largely unaltered until SSAP 25 
(1990). 
In the Netherlands, disclosure of segment data developed into a reporting issue 
somewhat later than in the US. In the Netherlands, segmental reporting received 
much attention from the middle 1970's to the early 1980's, whereas, as indicated 
above, segment reporting figured prominently in the US literature of the later 
1960's. Statements on segmental reporting in the Dutch literature before 1970 
are rare. The 1955 Rijkens report did suggest in general terms that the informa­
tion in the directors' report be 'focused on' (toegespitst op) main lines of 
business, but this recommendation did not reoccur in the 1962 successor report. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that the 1970 Act on Annual 
Financial Statements did not contain a requirement to segment either sales or 
income. The law did contain a requirement that the figures of the income 
statement 'are analyzed and explained in the notes according to standards 
acceptable in the [relevant] industry'. This requirement might, at first sight, be 
constructed as a segmentation requirement. But according to Sanders, Burgert 
and Groeneveld (1975:283), this interpretation was not correct. In their opinion, 
the law protected the diversified companies by not requiring a breakdown of 
sales, and the smaller companies by allowing the publication of index figures for 
sales. The 1970 Act therefore left segmental reporting entirely in the realm of 
voluntary disclosures. 
Some attention to segmental reporting appears to have developed in the late 
1960's, in the wake of developments in the United States77. At the end of the 
1960's, a wave of mergers and acquisitions significantly altered the corporate 
landscape in the Netherlands (see figure 4.1), but there is no indication that this 
particular development resulted immediately in a call for more segmental 
information. Yet, by 1972, awareness of the issue had spread sufficiently to 
7 7
 Around that time, it was observed by a leading Dutch auditor that an income 
statement showing income by line of business is , at least in terms of published financial 
statements, in our country the rarest of exceptions. Neither are such statements usual in 
the United States, although voices can recently be heard in that country calling for a 
presentation of results by line of activity.' (Burggraaff, 1968:169) 
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bring the topic before a NIvRA study meeting where the desirability and feasibil­
ity of segment reporting was discussed by accountants employed in industry 
(reported in Wilschut, 1973). According to the introductory material supplied for 
the discussion, the question was phrased primarily with reference to recent 
developments in the United States and the United Kingdom. Similarly, Frederiks 
(1973) discussed segment reporting on the basis of developments in the English-
speaking world. During 1972/3, the issue was placed on the agenda on the 
NIvRA's committee on financial reporting, the C A J , which served as a prepara­
tory committee for the Tripartite Study Group 7 8. 
Around the middle 1970's, segment reporting had definitely become a current 
issue. References to segment reporting began to emerge with increasing fre­
quency in wider circles: 
In February 1974, a revised version of the draft Fourth Directive was 
published. Citing the British example, the new draft included a require­
ment to segment both sales and operating income according to areas of 
activity and geographical areas (article 41 paragraph 6). The NIvRA 
reacted negatively to this change and proposed to eliminate the geographi­
cal segmentation and to allow a broader definition of activity segments79. 
In October 1974, new norms for the Henri Sijthoff prize were announced. 
These included, for the first time, the 'recommendation' to segment 
income and sales according to line of business. 
IASC's ED 3 on consolidated financial statements, issued in December 
1974, did contain a requirement to specify main balance sheet headings 
geographically. In its comments, the NIvRA committee in question 
suggested in effect an expansion of the requirement by stating that a 
geographical breakdown of invested capital and/or turnover' might be 
more appropriate80 (NIvRA, 1975(b): 702). That a geographical break­
down was rejected in the comments on the Fourth Directive was presum­
ably due to the fact that different committees were involved in drafting 
7 8
 Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants, Jaarverslag 1972/73, p. 87. 
7 9
 Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants, Commissie Ondernemingsrecht, 
'(Gewijzigd) voorstel voor vierde EEG-Richtlijn', De Accountant, vol. 81 no 5, January 
1975, p. 313-323, in particular p. 319. 
8 0
 Nederlands Instituut van Registeraccountants, College voor Beroepsvraag­
stukken,'De geconsolideerde jaarrekening en de methode van de vermogenswaarde voor 
deelnemingen', De Accountant, vol. 81 no. 11, August 1975, p. 700-702. 
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the two responses. 
In an address to NIvRA members in April 1975, Labour Union represen­
tative W. Kok identified segmented reporting as an inevitable appurten­
ance of the increasing democratisation of the enterprise (Kok, 1975). 
This speech evidently drew on previous work within the labour unions 
(see Nabbe (1974)) and was elaborated in a July 1976 brochure on the 
information demands of employees issued by one of the main Federations 
of Labour Unions 8 1. 
In a series of meetings of auditors employed in industry, late in 1974, the 
topic was studied on the basis of the FASB's drafts for SFAS 14 (Kas, 
1975). 
Finally, in Apri l 1975, segment reporting was introduced into the Act on 
Annual Accounts (WJO) of 1970. A member of the lower house of 
parliament used the occasion of an otherwise largely technical reorganiz­
ation of legal matter to introduce successfully an amendment calling in 
general terms for segment information according to lines of business82. 
The new requirement did much to keep attention to the issue of segment report­
ing alive, but provided certainly no definitive settlement. The requirement was 
formulated rather generally, and required interpretation to establish its exact 
extent. Already in October 1975, a NIvRA commentator observed after exten­
sive quotes from the parliamentary record that 'for the time being, no concrete 
figures on the breakdown of operating income according to different classes of 
goods and services can be expected'83. Similar views regarding the limited 
impact of the new requirement were aired by Boukema (1976) and Beekman 
(1977). 
A more decisive indication of the extent of the required disclosure was provided 
by the Enterprise Chamber. In a verdict pronounced in 1980, it was ruled that 
'the parliamentary history [of the segmentation requirement introduced in 1975] 
does not give a clear answer to the question in what way the required insight 
must be provided. There are differences of opinion in the literature. In practice, 
81
 Open boek: Een nota over de behoefte van werknemers aan informatie over hun 
onderneming (Amsterdam: Federatie Nederlandse Vakbeweging, 1976), p. 6, 10. 
8 2
 For details, see Zeff et al (1992:232-234) 
8 3
 'Voorstellen tot wijziging WJO aangenomen', De Accountant, vol. 82 no. 2, 
October 1975, p. 60-62. 
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no fixed pattern of behaviour has developed of how to implement the require­
ment.'8 4 
This ruling confirmed the interpretation that a verbal indication of the contribu­
tion of the various lines of business to operating income was sufficient to comply 
with the disclosure requirement (Beckman, 1981:520)85. While numerical 
segmental disclosures therefore remained in effect non-mandatory, further 
developments ensured that the issue continued to receive attention. 
In February 1977, the Tripartite Study Group (TO) issued a statement on 
segmental reporting86. Although the study group had by then been rather 
severely criticized for not taking firm positions, it did take a rather forward 
stance on segment reporting (Zeff et al., 1992:240). Segmenting sales according 
to major product groups was simply prescribed, a numerical breakdown of 
operating income according to product groups was 'emphatically' recommended, 
while geographical segmentation of sales, gross margin and number of 
employees was recommended without adverbial qualification. 
In the latter half of the 1970's, a number of international developments also 
directed attention towards segment reporting. The OECD Code of Conduct for 
Multinational Companies (1976, 1979), the U N International Standard of Accoun­
ting and Reporting for Transnational Corporations (1977) and IASC's E 15 
(March 1980) all dealt to a greater or lesser extent with segment reporting. 
A similar impetus came from the European Community. As indicated above, 
drafts of the Fourth Directive on Company Law required comprehensive 
segmental information from February 1974 onwards. It was this change that 
gave support to the introduction of the requirement to segment operating income 
into Dutch law in 1975. However, the adopted version of the Directive published 
in July 1978 restricted the segmentation requirement to sales, which had to be 
segmented according to both lines of business and geographical areas. As a 
result, the Act to adapt Dutch law to the Fourth Directive dropped the reference 
to segmentation of operating income included in 1975. This was considered 
8 4
 OK 3 April 1980 (HAL). In earlier cases, the court had ruled in a similar way that 
segmental information was not required (OK 20 January 1977 (DE) and OK 26 January 
1978 (Eggerdink)). These pronouncements, however, dealt with financial statements over 
1974 and 1975 when the new segmental disclosure requirement did not yet apply. 
8 5
 The assertion of Horwitz and Kolodny (1980: 420) that '[a]t the present time, no 
foreign law or stock exchange rule mandates public disclosure of profits attributable to 
industry or geographic segments', was therefore strictly speaking correct as far as the 
Netherlands was concerned. It seems unlikely, though, that the authors were aware of the 
careful interpretation required to arrive at this conclusion. 
8 6
 Draft Beschouwing IV b.2. Detaillering van omzet en bedrijfsresultaat. Included in 
Issue nr 5, dated December 1976 but published February 1977. 
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disappointing by a number of Dutch observers (e.g. Helderman, 1981:280; see 
also Zeff et al, 1992:306-307). This 'step backwards' (IJsselmuiden, 1981:92) 
was reflected in the position of the successor to the Tripartite Study Group, the 
Council on Annual Reporting, which in 1984 subtly toned down its recommenda­
tion to disclose segmented operating income in the wake of the change in the law 
(Zeff etal., 1992: 327-328). 
Summing up, segmental reporting was introduced as an issue in Dutch financial 
reporting around 1970 through awareness of developments in the United States. 
Soon, however, the issue acquired a local momentum because of the link with the 
contemporary tendency towards increased corporate accountability and vermaat­
schappelijking, and because of the uncertainty introduced through the changes in 
position in the successive drafts of the Fourth Directive. Towards 1983, howe­
ver, the situation was clarified both by court pronouncements and by the draft 
Act to adapt Dutch law to the Fourth Directive. Segmentation of sales was to 
become unavoidable. Segmentation of operating income, though still favoured in 
sections of the literature and in the largely advisory statements of the IASC and 
the Dutch Council on Annual Reporting (RJ), was not to become mandatory. 
6.10.3 Empirical results 
The development of disclosure for line of business and geographical segmentation 
is charted in figure 6.16. Comparable US and U K data on line of business 
segmentation are added. Comparative data on geographical segmentation are not 
shown since US and U K data were either available on an irregular basis or were 
classified in a way to impede comparability with the Dutch data. In interpreting 
the figure, it should be remembered that it shows the percentage of companies 
making any sort of numerical segmental disclosure, that is, either of income or of 
sales, or of both. Needless to say, these companies form a rather heterogeneous 
group. For instance, companies merely breaking down sales into export and 
domestic sales are treated as equal with companies providing both sales and profit 
by as many as five or more geographical areas. As far as numerical disclosures 
are concerned, figure 6.16 therefore presents the most favourable interpretation 
of the extent of segmental disclosure. In order to increase comparability with the 
U K and US data, no correction was made for applicability. A check on the 
representativeness of the present sample by means of the results of previous 
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Figure 6.16 Segmental disclosures 
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cross-sectional studies provides satisfactory results87. 
Disclosure levels 
For both types of segmentation, the percentages of disclosing companies remai-
ned low throughout the 1960's. It was not until 1969 that disclosures of both 
types were made by one-fifth of the sampled companies. Around 1970, the 
percentage of companies disclosing line of business information starts to grow at 
an accelerated pace, while geographical disclosures continue to increase at a more 
steady rate of one to two percentage points per annum. 
Regarding line of business disclosures, it can be observed that, from about 1967 
to 1975, developments in the Netherlands followed behind the United Kingdom 
and the United States by about five years. Given that disclosure in both the US 
8 7
 The sample data for 1976 and 1977 are comparable to those reported in Beckman 
and Van Rijn (1979), the data for 1983 compare moderately well with those in Van der 
Gaag (1986). In general, disclosure rates in the present sample are slightly but not 
significantly higher than those in the Beckman and Van Rijn sample. Apart from chance 
effects, these difference might also be explained by the fact that the Beckman and Van 
Rijn sample included some non-listed companies. The Van der Gaag study included all 
non-financial listed companies. The 1983 percentage of geographical disclosures is 
identical to the present sample. Van der Gaag reports a 62% disclosure of line of 
business data, while rate in the present sample is 74%. 
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and the U K was influenced if not downright directed by regulation, whereas in 
the Netherlands it was not, and given that segment disclosures are generally 
considered as rather sensitive, the fact that disclosure practices in the Netherlands 
lagged only a few years behind those in the U K and in the US is quite remarka­
ble 8 8. 
Nevertheless, regulation did start to make a difference after 1975. From that 
year onwards, segment reporting was made mandatory for US published annual 
reports (rather for 10-K filings), while strict materiality criteria applied. The 
result was that segment reporting became universal for US companies. In the 
U K and the Netherlands, no materiality criteria were in force, with the result that 
more companies might plausibly claim to be in a single class of business only. 
As indicated in figure 6.16, disclosure percentages in the U K and the Netherlands 
converged after 1975, suggesting that materiality judgments were made with 
approximately the same effect. Strictly speaking, though, the Dutch law did not 
require explicitly that numerical segmental information be provided. The 
disclosure percentage found for Dutch companies represents therefore a larger 
component of voluntary behaviour than that of their British counterparts. 
Segmentation and consolidation 
Segmentation, especially segmentation along industry lines, is a way to partially 
undo the effects of consolidation. In this light, it is not surprising to find that in 
the sample, segmentation by line of business generally follows the adoption of 
consolidated reporting. In only four out of 140 companies some form of 
segmental information according to line of business was provided prior to the 
inclusion of consolidated financial statements89. In all other cases, segmentation 
coincided with or followed consolidation, or did not occur at all. 
As shown in table 5.1, there is a certain correlation between consolidation and 
segment reporting. That is, companies that consolidate early are likely to be 
early disclosers of segment reporting as well, although the average interval 
elapsing between first consolidation and disclosure of segment information by line 
8 8
 On the basis of these data, Gray's (1978b) conclusion that the higher incidence of 
segment reporting among UK as opposed to continental multinationals in 1972/3 was due 
to a higher degree of efficiency of the UK equity market appears questionable. It seems 
more likely that the single most important influence on UK disclosure had been the 1967 
Companies Act. In the Netherlands, a comparable legal provision introduced in 1975 
brought disclosure swiftly to UK levels, but even before that date disclosure had risen 
significantly above the UK pre-legislation level of the late 1960's. This conclusion is 
further reinforced by Gray and Radebaugh (1984) who attribute the higher level of 
disclosure in the US compared to the UK to differences in regulation. 
8 9
 In none of the four cases did the timing difference exceed four years. 
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of business was 10.4 years90 This average hides considerable variation, ranging 
from more or less simultaneous disclosure to a maximum time lag of 38 years. 
Industry versus geographical segmentation 
For the earlier part of the period, geographical segmentation was slightly more 
widespread than segmentation by line of business, although the difference is not 
likely to be much in excess of the range of sampling error. It is interesting to 
note that after 1970, disclosure of line of business information started to outgrow 
geographical segmentation, resulting in a significant gap by 1983. This appears 
to contrast with the findings of Gray and Roberts (1989) who report that com­
pany managements generally perceive geographical segmentation as less costly, 
and hence more amenable to voluntary disclosure, than line of business informa­
tion. A closer look at the relationship between geographical and line of business 
reporting seems therefore warranted. 
Figure 6.17 Segmental disclosures 
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Figure 6.17 displays the absolute numbers of companies broken down into the 
various combinations of line of business and geographical segmentation. This 
chart demonstrates in the first place that large numbers of companies in the 
sample never arrived at the stage of considering any form of segment reporting at 
9 0
 This average is calculated for the 31 companies for which observed first disclosure 
(OFD) data are available for both consolidation and industry segments. 
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all: the merger wave of the late 1960's occurred before segment reporting was 
practised by more than a small minority. Furthermore, it can be seen that, with 
the conspicuous exception of U N I L E V E R (about which more below), the combi­
nation of both line of business and geographical segmentation did not appear until 
1962. Not before the early 1970's did more than a handful of companies disclose 
both types of segmental information. By then, however, companies disclosing 
geographical information only formed a disappearing minority. From about 1976 
onwards, geographical information was an 'additional' disclosure, provided by 
companies that also provided line of business disclosures. 
Discontinued disclosure 
As shown in table 6.1 (above), the 'discontinuance ratio' for geographical 
information is the highest across the sample of disclosure items. 
One-yearly, or incidental disclosures account for a considerable share of this high 
rate of 'discontinuance'. One-off disclosures might occur for a number of 
reasons. The jubilee factor did play a role, but less obviously than in with 
employee disclosures. In another instance of incidental disclosure, (VLISSINGEN 
K A T O E N , 1947) a geographical distribution of sales was given in the report of 
directors to support an argument against the government's exchange rate and 
balance of payments policies. 
Looked at in closer detail, discontinuance of geographical segment disclosure 
appears to be constant throughout the 1945-1983 period. It might be described as 
a process of attrition in which every year on average ten percent of the com­
panies disclosing geographical information stops providing that type of disclosure. 
For individual companies, the reason for discontinued disclosure may, of course, 
simply be the discontinuance of a line of business or of activities in a geographi­
cal area. For the population as a whole, though, it is unlikely that by the early 
1980's less than half of the companies had any foreign activities or export sales 
(as would be the case if figure 6.16 described a situation of full disclosure). In 
fact, Van der Gaag (1986) reports an increase in the percentage of companies 
disclosing geographical information from 45% to 66% between 1983 and 1984. 
Since this increase may be related to impending legislation, there had apparently 
been some room for a voluntary expansion of geographical segment reporting. 
This again appears to contradict the findings of Gray and Roberts (1989) mentio­
ned earlier. It may well be, though, that this difference is caused by the fact that 
the Gray and Roberts study was limited to multinationals. In the present study, 
this subgroup shows no signs of reversion regarding geographical information. A 
tendency for geographical information to decline during the 1970's and 1980's 
was found in the Rennie and Emmanuel (1992) study, which, like the present 
one, was based on a wider sample of U K companies. 
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Figure 6.18 Income segmentation 
by companies segmenting sales 
(fraction of companies disclosing) 
0.5 | 
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Graph shows the fraction of companies 
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(operating) income 
Segmentation of operating income 
As evidenced by the literature discussed above, segmentation of income has been 
more controversial than segmentation of sales. On the one hand, companies have 
been reluctant to provide breakdowns of operating income out of fear for 
competitive disadvantages. On the other hand, it has been claimed that such 
disclosures of (operating) income as have been provided have been of limited use 
owing to the occasionally arbitrary allocations of costs and revenues involved. 
The companies in the sample have shown a marked reluctance to disclose details 
on (operating) income. Figure 6.18 shows companies disclosing details of 
income as a percentage of companies breaking down sales (There are only a few 
instances of companies that show details of income without showing a breakdown 
of sales). Before 1975, only a handful of companies provided details on income. 
After 1975, and apparently as a result of the change in the law, there is a marked 
increase in the provision of segmented income data. Interestingly enough, this 
applies to geographical segmentation as well, even though this was not mentioned 
in the law. Hence, the willingness to provide details on income does not vary 
substantially between line of business and geographical segmentation. Nor are 
companies that segment sales according to both criteria more willing to provide 
details on income than companies that segment sales according to only one 
criterion. 
247 
Influence of the law 
There was a definite increase in disclosure of line of business information during 
the period 1966-1974, that is, before segmentation was explicitly mentioned in 
the law (see figure 6.16). It possible that the 1970 Act on Annual Financial 
Statements prompted an overall revision of financial reporting practices, including 
areas not covered by the law. A similar development was noted for the funds 
statement. The text of the 1970 Act regarding the income statement was rather 
general, and could give rise to the conclusion that some sort of segmentation was 
appropriate (see above). No firm conclusions are possible here. 
The 1976 modification of the law, even though it did not impose a strict require­
ment to provide numerical segment information, did have an effect on segmenta­
tion of operating income91. As indicated by figure 6.18, this effect applied both 
to line of business and geographical segmentation even though the latter was not 
covered by the law. 
A number of companies discontinued the practice of disclosing segmented 
operating income in the latter 1970's, apparently after realizing that such was 
not, after all, strictly required by law. BERGOSS seems to offer an instance of 
such behaviour. More importantly, though, is that figure 6.18 shows that the 
number of such reversions in the later 1970's was limited. 
Finally, there is no evidence that the 1976 amendment influenced the disclosure 
of segmented sales in a significant way. This latter observation is important 
when an attempt is made to disentangle the effects of the law from the effects of 
the relevant Considered View issued by the Tripartite Study Group in 1977. As 
was indicated above, this publication prescribed the segmentation of sales in 
rather strict terms, while the segmentation of operating income was recommen­
ded. If this publication did influence disclosure, it seems likely that there should 
have been an impact on segmented sales disclosure as well as a change in 
segmented operating income. Since only the latter was observed, there is no 
reason to attribute a strong influence to the study group. 
Company characteristics and segmental disclosures 
There can be no doubt that U N I L E V E R led the way in segmental reporting in the 
Netherlands. Already by 1947, it distinguished itself by extensive geographical 
and line of business breakdowns of sales which were highly acclaimed by the 
financial press (see Zeff et al> 1992:75-77). The extent of its lead on other com­
panies can be appreciated by noting that between 1947 and 1962, it was the only 
9 1
 In the case of PHILIPS, a statement by one of its directors (Breek, 1974) shows that 
the company was not enthusiastic about segmenting operating income. Nevertheless, the 
following year the company showed operating income by line of business. In this case, 
the law appears to have exerted a direct influence. 
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company to provide both types of breakdown. Another indication of its lead was 
that a PHILIPS chairman considered it necessary, halfway down this period, to 
justify at some length why his company would not publish geographical and line 
of business breakdowns (Otten, 1954:9). U N I L E V E R was not the first to provide 
a segmentation of income92, but it was the first to provide 'comprehensive' 
segmentation (in 1968). In all these developments, it was not just ahead of its 
Dutch counterparts, but also of most American and British companies. 
Previous studies have found that large, multiple listed companies are prone to be 
early and/or more extensive disclosers of segment information (Salamon and 
Dhaliwal, 1980; Rennie and Emmanuel, 1992; Bradbury, 1992a). This is 
supported by the present sample. The multiple-listed companies H E I N E K E N , 
K N P , V A N O M M E R E N , P A K H O E D and V M F (see section 5.4.3.) are, together 
with the larger multinationals, conspicuous among those disclosing some form of 
segmental information before 1970. However, this observation can be qualified 
in a number of ways: 
First, the meaning of 'segmental disclosure' is not constant throughout the 
period. Since the late 1960's, segmental disclosures are usually thought of as 
separate schedules in the notes to the financial statements. In the late 1940's and 
early 1950's, however, companies might disclose segmental information in the 
context of the traditional profit- and loss account. Usually, such a profit and loss 
account would show the combined balance of all trading accounts (exploita­
tierekeningen) as one credit item, which would be offset with depreciation, taxes 
and sundry expenses. Some companies, however, would show the balances of 
the trading accounts separately, providing, in effect, a segmentation of gross 
income. In this way, it might be argued that the rather early segmental disclos­
ure of V A N O M M E R E N (since 1947) was in effect little more than the result of the 
strong link between the ledger accounts and the published financial statements 
which had characterized financial reporting in its early stages. 
A R M , already identified in chapter 5 as a rather exceptional discloser, did 
provide exceptional disclosures even though its financial statements were cast in a 
traditional form. Since 1945, it published not just its profit and loss account, as 
required by law, but also its trading account. In the latter statement, it showed 
on the credit side its revenues divided into four groups, and on the debit side the 
totals for various expense categories. It is implausible that this high level of 
detail was not the result of a deliberate reporting policy. 
9 2
 Within the sample, that distinction goes to V A N OMMEREN, which, in an otherwise 
rather traditional profit and loss account, showed the balances of the trading accounts of 
its various activities since 1947. 
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Table 6.3 
Segmentation by size group 
Geographical Line of Business 
Year: 1960 1980 1960 1980 
Number of companies: 14 20 6 36 
Size group: 
1 (largest) 2 9 % 6 5 % 6 7 % 4 4 % 
2 1 4 % 2 5 % - 3 9 % 
3 4 3 % 1 0 % 1 7 % 1 1 % 
4 (smallest) 1 4 % - 1 7 % 6% 
1 0 0 % 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 % 1 0 0 % 
Notes: 
'Size groups' as defined in section 5.5.2 
'Segmentat ion' refers to segmentation of sales and/or income. 
Second, a number of the larger companies began to disclose segmented informa­
tion either before they acquired foreign listings or before foreign exchanges 
began to demand segmented information. Therefore, their subsequent listing 
status may simply be another size covariate, just as their segmental disclosures. 
Third, there are a number of exceptions in the form of other companies without 
foreign listings who turned out among the early disclosers as well. This is true 
mainly for geographical segmentation, however. As far as line of business 
information is concerned, the only unexpected disclosures are those by A R M , 
mentioned above, and B A T E N B U R G , which showed the balances of the various 
trading accounts from 1955 to 1961. Otherwise, early line of business reporting 
was dominated by the large companies. 
A considerably larger number of smaller companies provided at least minimal 
geographical breakdowns during the 1950's (often exports as a percentage of total 
sales), such as D R U , K R O M H O U T , B E G E M A N N , V U L C A A N S O O R D and ENOT. In 
this respect, they preceded the large multinationals who, with the exception of 
U N I L E V E R , did not provide geographical breakdowns until the middle or late 
1960's. These multinationals made good their late start by the quality of their 
subsequent disclosures, however: they were all among the six companies in the 
sample providing 'comprehensive' disclosures at any one time ( U N I L E V E R (since 
1968), A K Z O (since 1974), K O N I N K L D K E P E T R O L E U M (since 1975), PHILIPS 
(since 1977), I N T E R N A T I O - M U L L E R (1977-1982) and P A K H O E D (since 1978)). 
The perceived applicability of geographical segment disclosures appears to have 
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diminished over time. Table 6.3 summarizes segment disclosures by size group 
for 1960 and 1980. 
Although the 1960 data refer to rather small numbers of observations, the 
conclusion still seems warranted that the middle-sized and small companies (size 
groups 3 and 4) provided a substantial share of the geographical disclosures in 
1960. By 1980, though, geographical disclosures had become the preserve of the 
large and very large companies. Given the very small number of 1960 disclos­
ures, it is difficult to draw strong conclusions with regard to line of business 
reporting. 
Fourth, a number of companies, though not providing numerical information, did 
provide rather extensive verbal information on industry and geographical seg­
ments of their business (e.g. M U L L E R , since 1945). 
6.10.4 Summary 
There are definite changes over time in the pattern of segment data disclosure. 
Obviously, companies had to disclose sales before segmentation of sales could be 
considered. Hence, disclosure levels before the late 1960's are quite low. 
During this period, the companies that did provide some form of segmentation 
were slightly more likely to provide a simple form of geographical segmentation 
rather than any kind of line of business reporting. 
Around 1970, a clear change in reporting practices occurred, which can be traced 
to developments in the United States a few years earlier. The time lag in 
disclosure practices between the Netherlands on the one hand and the United 
States and the United Kingdom on the other is not particularly large, especially 
not when the different impact of regulation is considered. 
The changes around 1970 were not only in terms of an increased extent of 
disclosure. During the 1950's and 1960's, segmental reporting was rather evenly 
distributed among companies of various size. During the 1970's, segment 
reporting (especially in its more elaborate forms) became largely the preserve of 
the larger companies. 
The 1976 amendment appears to have had an influence on disclosure of segmen­
ted operating income. Segmentation of operating income increased after 1976, in 
a roughly equal measure for segmentation of both geographical and line of 
business criteria. 
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6.11 Discussion and conclusions 
This section combines the results of the previous nine studies of individual 
disclosure items. This inductive process of drawing comparisons can be structu­
red by drawing on the concepts of innovation-diffusion studies. First, an 
innovation-diffusion approach allows a formal comparison of the various pro­
cesses of disclosure change in terms of the speed or rate of diffusion. This 
comparison is the subject of section 6.11.1. Second, innovation-diffusion studies 
have developed a number of relevant characteristics or dimensions of innovations 
which help to understand differences in the rate of diffusion. Section 6.11.2. 
contains a comparison of the disclosure items by means of these characteristics or 
dimensions. Third, apart from an adopter-characteristics and an innovation-
characteristics perspective, an 'infrastructure' perspective on innovation-diffusion 
can play an important role. In this context, the innovation 'infrastructure' 
consists largely of a number of external influences on disclosure, such as the role 
of the law. These external influences are discussed on a comparative basis on 
section 6.11.3. 
6.11.1 Overall diffusion patterns 
As has been illustrated by the various diagrams throughout this chapter, the 
process of disclosure extension of almost all items studied here was characterized 
by the type of 'S'-shaped curves usually associated with processes of innovation 
diffusion. The impression conveyed by these graphical representations can be 
formalized by fitting an appropriate, S-shaped curve to the data. This also makes 
it possible to arrive at a numerical indication of differences in rate of diffusion 
among disclosure items. 
In the diffusion literature, a number of mathematical models have been proposed 
to describe various types of S-shaped functions (see, for instance, Mahajan and 
Peterson, 1985). As indicated above (section 6.3), an elementary yet frequently 
used model is the internal-influence model proposed by Bass (1969). In this 
model, the number of new adoptions in each period is determined by the numbers 
of adopters and non-adopters in the previous period. In other words, the 
number of new adopters in a particular period is explained in terms of the effects 
of imitation induced by mutual communication and/or observation among 
potential adopters. 
Applied to the changes in disclosure, the model and its interpretation would be: 
N(t) = N(t-l) + b * N(t-l) * [l-N(t-l)] 
in which N(t) is the number of disclosing companies at time t. The coefficient b, 
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or the 'coefficient of internal influence' represents the strength of the assumed 
'imitation effect', with high values for the coefficient b indicating a rapid 
diffusion of the disclosure in question93. 
A n internal influence model may be expected to work well for annual report 
disclosure: 
The internal influence model is most appropriate when an innovation is 
complex and socially visible, not adopting it places members at a 'disad­
vantage', the social system is relatively small and homogeneous, and 
there is a need for experiential and or legitimizing information prior to 
adoption. (Mahajan and Peterson, 1985:18-19) 
Financial statement disclosure by listed companies meets these conditions, albeit 
to varying degrees for different items. At least as an approximation, this type of 
model appears to be useful to describe changes in disclosure during this period. 
The (discrete) internal-influence model described above can be approximated by a 
(continuous) exponential function. The results of fitting such a function to the 
data are presented in table 6.4 9 4. 
For most disclosure items, the model fits the data quite well. High values of 
(adjusted) R 2 are the rule in diffusion studies, though. Hamlin, Jacobson and 
Miller (1973) posit on the basis of a wide survey of diffusion studies that fitting 
S-shaped models typically results in an R 2 of .98 or higher. With the present 
data, however, it can easily be illustrated that such good fits do not necessarily 
indicate that an appropriate model has been selected. The flexibility provided by 
two parameters to be estimated is apparently sufficient to produce a good fit even 
for the labour cost item, for which an internal influence model is clearly incor­
rect. In a previous section, it was argued that the single most important influence 
on the rapid increase in disclosure of this item was the introduction of a legal 
requirement in 1970. For this item (and in the case of funds statements), a good 
fit was obtained by means of an extremely low estimate of the initial disclosure 
9 3
 It will be recalled that in section 6.3 an extended or 'mixed-influence' model was 
used in which an 'external influence' was recognized next to the 'internal influence' 
factor. 
9 4
 The curve used here explains N(t), the fraction of disclosing companies at time t, 
in the following way: 
N(t) = 1 / (1 + (1-N(0))/N(0) * eA (b * t) ) 
in which b is the coefficient of internal influence and N(0) is fraction of disclosing 
companies in the year of first observation. 
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Table 6.4 
Estimates of internal-influence model parameters 
Disclosure item coefficient of internal 
influence (b) 2 
initial disclosure 
N(0) 
adj. R 2 
Geographical segments 
Current cost 
Tax liabilities 
Tax costs 
Consolidation 
Industry segments 
Sales 
Employee number 
Earnings per share 
Funds statement 
Comparative figures 
Labour costs 
,08 
,10 
,13 
,14 
,16 
,18 
,19 
.19 
,29 
.44 
,71 
.85 
.042 
.016 
.123 
.206 
.051 
.003 
.012 
.018 
.001 
1.87E-9 
.008 
1.09E-9 
.965 
.973 
.917 
.979 
.995 
.982 
.963 
.972 
.988 
.991 
.994 
.972 
Notes: 
1. A binary disclosure definition was used as defined in Appendix A, with current cost disclosure defined as 
partial or full application in both balance sheet and income statement. 
2. Results are based on the nonlinear regression. 
percentage. Similarly, the fit for comparative figures reported in table 6.4 is 
good (and the b-coefficient suggests a high degree of imitation), while the more 
detailed analysis of section 6.3 has shown that there is reason to believe that at 
least part of the disclosure process for this item should be explained in terms of 
external influence. 
Even with these qualifications, the data in table 6.4 help to make a point that 
might also have been apparent from inspection of the various figures in this chap­
ter. Although the basic shape of the diffusion curves is similar across most 
items, the rapidity of diffusion can differ considerably. These differences are 
further considered in section 6.11.2. 
6.11.2 Innovation characteristics 
Rogers' (1983) list of innovation characteristics that influence the adoption 
process can be used to structure the interpretation of the data presented in this 
chapter. According to this approach, the rate of adoption of an innovation is 
associated with certain qualities of the innovation itself. These qualities include: 
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Advantage: the advantages of the innovation, as perceived by the 
adopters, relative to what it supersedes. 
Compatibility: the degree to which the innovation is in harmony with 
existing values, past experiences and needs of the adopters. 
Complexity: the degree to which the innovation is difficult to understand 
and use. 
Trialability: the degree to which an innovation can be tried on a limited 
basis. 
Observability: the degree to which the results of an adopted innovation 
are easily observed by other potential adopters. 
Since Tritschler (1970), the applicability of these criteria to accounting innovati­
ons has been asserted by various authors (e.g. Parker, 1977). This section 
therefore considers whether the differences in rates of adoption documented in 
the previous section can be interpreted in terms of differences among disclosure 
items in terms of these five characteristics. 
A summary of the results is shown in table 6.5. Inevitably, this table is more of 
the nature of a descriptive summary of the data, than a conclusive proof that 
these criteria are in fact applicable or yield the expected conclusions. A l l that 
table 6.5 attempts to do is to make clear that this framework can assist in arriving 
at a plausible interpretation of the observed developments in disclosure. For this 
purpose, table 6.5 ranks the disclosure items according to general indicators of 
the rapidity and extent of adoption: the final rate of voluntary disclosure and the 
number of years elapsing between initial and final disclosures. 
Ordering of disclosure items 
The ordering of disclosure items in table 6.5 according to the rapidity and extent 
of diffusion provides an indicative rather than exact ranking of the ease with 
which an item was adopted. Two measures have been used, while a simple 
average ranking determined the order in table 6.5. 
The first measure is the final percentage of voluntary disclosure. This is the 
percentage of disclosing companies observed immediately before disclosure of 
that item became mandatory95, or the percentage observed in 1983. 
The second measure of the difficulty or ease with which an item was adopted is 
the length of time between the year in which 10% of the companies disclosed that 
item and the year in which disclosure reached 90%. The limitation of the study 
to the period between 1945 and 1983 means that for a number of items no data 
9 5
 This may result in overstatement of the final degree of voluntary disclosure since 
some companies may anticipate the imposition of a disclosure requirement. The resulting 
disclosures cannot strictly be regarded as 'voluntary'. 
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are available on when disclosure reached the 10% or 90% mark. The table 
shows these items by means of > signs, but for purposes of ranking these signs 
were ignored9 6. 
Advantage 
The criterion of 'advantage' is difficult to apply in a straightforward manner to 
financial statement disclosures. Theoretically, of course, disclosures represent a 
balance of costs and benefits. In practice, however, it is difficult to rate disclos­
ure items objectively in terms of the net benefits they are seen to provide. For 
some items, especially sales and segmented data, previous empirical studies have 
demonstrated relationships between disclosure and share price developments, 
suggesting that, apart from proprietary costs, disclosures are valued by investors. 
For other items, however, like disclosure of tax data, it can only be shown by 
reference to the professional literature that there has been an explicit demand for 
their disclosure. Given this difficulty in assessing benefits, the benefits of all 
disclosures are assumed to be more or less equal for the purpose of arriving at 
the summary presentation in table 6.5. In other words, 'advantage' has been 
interpreted simply as absence of major perceived proprietary costs. This 
criterion has been operationalized by reference to the Dutch literature discussed 
in the previous sections. On this basis, sales, segmentation, labour costs and the 
two tax items have been classified as being associated with significant costs ('-') 
whereas the other items were not (' + '). Consolidation and current cost accoun­
ting, though not generally perceived as highly sensitive (at least during this 
period), might be accompanied by substantial implementation costs and are hence 
rated ' - /+ ' . 
Complexity 
Complexity refers to the difficulty of understanding and using an innovation. 
Compared with many technological innovations, innovations in annual report 
disclosure can generally not be considered as inordinately difficult to understand. 
Most items are therefore considered to be not complex (' + '). The exceptions are 
current cost accounting, consolidation and tax disclosures, all of which require 
more extensive calculations or fairly advanced technical accounting knowledge. 
Segment disclosures are scored ' - /+ ' to indicate that full-fledged segment 
reporting is quite complex, but that simple forms of sales segmentation are not. 
9 6
 It will be observed that the ordering in table 6.5 corresponds largely with the 
ranking in table 6.4. The differences can be attributed to the fact that for the calculations 
in table 6.4 no distinction was made between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. 
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Trialibility 
Trialability refers to possibility of trying an innovation on a limited scale. In the 
context of financial statement disclosure, this can be interpreted in two ways. 
One possibility is to see trialability as the possibility of disclosing an item 
incidentally, without a commitment to disclose the item again in subsequent 
years. Theoretically (see chapter 2), such incidental disclosures are feasible only 
with regard to data of which it is known or plausible that they are only inciden­
tally available to the company. Otherwise, discontinued disclosure should be 
prevented by an 'adverse selection' mechanism. From this perspective, only the 
tax disclosures are 'trialable' since it is not always known with certainty that a 
nondisclosing company is in fact faced with a tax liability. It wil l be recalled 
from table 6.1 that the tax items have, in fact, very high rates of reversion to 
nondisclosure. 
Another interpretation of trialability considers the extent to which limited forms 
of implementation are possible. For segmental reporting, consolidation, current 
cost accounting and sales disclosure, the use of interim disclosure formats may 
have facilitated the movement towards full disclosure. For instance, it appears 
plausible that the custom of using index figures of sales made the gap between no 
disclosure and full disclosure easier to bridge. The data do not always allow a 
precise distinction, however. For segment disclosure, for instance, it can be 
argued that trialibility is enhanced by the possibility of choosing a coarse segment 
definition first, which can subsequently be refined. 
In general, the observations from table 6.1 have been used to assign scores with 
regard to trialability. That is, the observation of high rates of reversion to 
nondisclosure has been interpreted as an indication of trialability97. 
Observability 
Strictly speaking, all financial reporting innovations are equally observable since 
they are all included in published annual reports. Nevertheless, a judgmental 
scoring of observability has been attempted based on the experiences gained 
during the data collection for this study. Disclosures within the directors' report 
are less easily found by a quick perusal of an annual report, whereas items like 
the funds statement and consolidated reporting occur generally on separate pages 
and are easily spotted. Earnings per share and sales, although generally not 
9 7
 The only departure from table 6.1 concerns the current cost item, which in table 6.5 
is interpreted more narrowly, in terms of 'balance sheet and income statement applicati­
ons'. 
257 
shown on the face of the financial statements, since the late 1950's often 
appeared on a page of 'key figures' and are therefore considered 'observable'. 
Compatibility 
No attempt has been made to score compatibility. At a technical level, almost all 
these disclosures are incremental, and can easily be added without disturbing the 
remainder of the annual report. Possible exceptions are the current cost and tax 
items which may entail some reorganization of other financial statement items. 
On the whole, differences in compatibility would seem to be negligible. This is 
also true at a more general level, where compatibility is often interpreted as 
'being compatible with overall value systems or outlooks'. On this level, 
compatibility may differ among companies but even in this case one would 
probably find that companies with extensive disclosures wil l find an additional 
disclosure rather more compatible than more secretive firms. 
The preceding discussion of the scorings in table 6.5 makes it clear that these 
scores are to a considerable extent open to discussion. Nevertheless, the result­
ing pattern appears to be helpful in interpreting differences in disclosure among 
items. It does at least provide a workable framework to distinguish between the 
more extreme differences in diffusion patterns among items. A plausible case 
can be made that the items in the lower (upper) end of table 6.5 are indeed 
different in important respects and hence show quite different disclosure develop­
ment patterns. A n important implication for this line of research appears to be 
that a search for more objective or accurate indicators of such factors as 'trialab-
ility' and 'complexity' may well yield good results. 
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Table 6.5 
Summary presentation of innovation characteristics and key adoption data 
% f i n a l 10 -90% Advantage Complexity Trialability Observability 
vol . disci. (years) 
(year) 
Geo segments 4 6 % (1983) > 27 
- -/ + + -
Tax liabilities 7 3 % (1970) > 26 - - + _ 
Sales 9 1 % (1983) 32 - + -
-/ + 
Current Cost 4 6 % (1983) > 20 -/ + - - _ 
Consolidation 9 3 % (1983) 30 -/ + - -
Tax costs 9 2 % (1970) > 25 - - + 
Industry segments 7 4 % (1983) > 19 -
-/ + + _ 
Labour costs 5 7 % (1970) 8 - + - _ 
Employee number 9 8 % (1983) > 20 + + + 
Earnings per share 9 6 % (1983) 16 + + - + 
Funds statement 9 6 % (1983) 11 + + - + 
Comparative figs 1 0 0 % (1960) 5 + 
Figure 6.19 Total changes in disclosure 
by year, all companies 
total disclosure changes of any type 
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6.11.3 External influences on disclosure 
Throughout this chapter, a number of external influences on disclosure have been 
discussed. This section recapitulates the findings regarding the most important of 
these various influences. 
The law 
There can be little doubt that the 1970 Act on Annual Financial Statements was 
an important influence on disclosure. This is illustrated by figure 6.19 which 
shows the total number of changes in disclosure (of any kind) observed for each 
year. The exceptional nature of the year 1971, the first financial year to which 
the new law applied, is evident. There is some indication of a rise in disclosure 
in the few years preceding the law, but the extent of this anticipatory effect pales 
in comparison with the direct effect observed when the law came into force98. 
What is interesting from a voluntary disclosure perspective, of course, is the fact 
that for many if not all items the years preceding 1970 also showed a considera-
9 8
 This tends to confirm contemporary impressions. Louwers (1972a, 1972b) observed 
that many companies would have to give considerably more information as a result of the 
1970 Act. Frijns (1979) thought in retrospect that the law called for more detailed 
reporting than customary until then. 
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ble disclosure activity. By a rough calculation, each of the sample companies 
made change in its disclosure of the items studied here very other year. When 
one also considers the disclosures not covered in this study, the picture emerges 
of a fairly steady rate of change in disclosure throughout the 1950's and 1960's. 
Across all the items studied here, this process of voluntary disclosure extension 
resulted in rather high disclosure percentages prior to the imposition of legisla­
tion. As indicated in table 6.5, all items were disclosed voluntarily by at least 
about half of the companies before disclosure became strictly mandatory. Even 
though for some items (e.g. wage costs) the anticipation of legal requirements 
causes some overstatement of the effects of voluntary behaviour, the overall 
conclusion is justified that substantial advances in disclosure were achieved before 
1965. 
The main impact of the law was therefore that it made certain disclosures 
mandatory that were already to a large extent disclosed voluntarily. The most 
conspicuous example is the provision of consolidated data. Moreover, it has 
been noted in this chapter that there were noticeable increases in disclosure even 
in areas were the law provided little or no guidance. These effects were 
observed in particular in the cases of employee number disclosure and earnings 
per share disclosure. These items were not covered by the law, but disclosure 
increased nevertheless in 1970 and 1971. 
A similar effect was observed with the 1976 amendment. Although geographical 
segmentation was not covered, there was a marked increase in geographical 
segmentation of operating income in the years following this law. 
Other domestic influences 
The 1955 and 1962 reports are generally credited with exerting a major influence 
on Dutch financial reporting in the postwar period. For some disclosure items, 
notably the disclosure of tax data, it was found that there was evidence for a 
relation between increased disclosure and the contents of these reports. But even 
when no such evidence was found, it could generally be concluded that, in 
conformity with contemporary opinion, the recommendations of the two reports 
were considerably ahead of practice. Even though their recommendations were 
often softened by escape clauses, the general impression of the two reports, when 
compared with contemporary practice, is quite progressive. Figure 6.19 does in 
fact show that there were considerable movements in disclosure in the two 
financial years ending after the publication of the two reports". The case for 
9 9
 The 1955 report was published in April, which at that time would have meant that 
most companies would not yet have published their 1954 annual report. The 1962 report 
was published in October, which meant that the 1963 annual reports were the first it might 
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attributing these movements to the two employers' reports becomes stronger 
when the data on comparative figures are not taken into accounting in calculating 
the total number of disclosure changes by year. This flattens the peak shown in 
figure 6.19 for 1950-1952, and makes it clearer that 1954-1955 and 1963-1964 
are exceptions to an otherwise fairly stable level of annual disclosure change 
between 1950 and 1966. 
This chapter provides also some material for assessing the role played by the 
Tripartite Study Group (TO) after 1970. References to the study group in 
company financial statements are very rare, but that in itself is no reason to 
assume that the Considered Views of the study group not influence financial 
reporting. After all, the number of references to the 1955 and 1962 employers' 
reports was also rather small. It is more important to notice that this chapter has 
shown that, in contrast to the two employers' reports, statements by the study 
group on disclosure issues were published in general at times when many or most 
companies already disclosed the items in question. As far as the disclosures con­
sidered in this chapter are concerned, the most favourable interpretation of the 
work of the study group is that it may have influenced the disclosures by the iate 
majority' or 'laggard' companies. The study group may have played this role in 
the case of sales disclosure, segment reporting, the funds statement and earnings 
per share disclosure. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that this chapter deals 
only with listed companies, whereas the Considered Views of the study group 
were intended to apply to non-listed companies as well. Nevertheless, the 
contrast in terms of progressiveness of recommendations between the study group 
and the two employers' committees (to which the study group was in a sense the 
successor), is striking. 
Foreign influence 
It has been shown in this chapter that for most items, disclosure levels in the 
Netherlands were consistently lower than in the United States. With respect to 
that country, there existed therefore a differential that could serve as a stimulus 
for imitation. With respect to other countries, the existence and extent of any 
disclosures differentials is less clear, owing to the fragmentary nature of the 
available data. However, the conclusion appears to be justified that during the 
late 1960's, disclosure levels in the Netherlands were roughly comparable to 
those in the United Kingdom 1 0 0. Especially with regard to items like earnings 
influence. 
1 0 0
 This does contradict the findings of Barrett (1977) who found that UK disclosure 
levels in the period 1963-1972 where throughout comparable to those in the US, whereas 
the Netherlands was found to be on a level with Japan, Sweden and Germany. Barret's 
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per share disclosure and the fund statement, differences between the two coun­
tries are slight indeed. Following 1970, a high degree of standard setting activity 
in the U K resulted, at least for some disclosures, in a gap between U K and Dutch 
disclosure levels. As a result, U K financial reporting could serve once again as 
an example for Dutch financial reporting. 
Cross-border listings played a role in transmitting the influence of these two 
potential role models. The possible role of international business in this regard 
has been discussed for the United Kingdom (as a recipient country) by Cook 
(1989), and has also frequently been suggested with regard to the Dutch multina­
tionals. This possibility has to some extent already been explored in section 
5.5.3. In that section it was concluded that, although the large multinationals 
were usually at the forefront of disclosure, there frequently were smaller, 
domestic companies with disclosures to match those of the large multinationals. 
In this chapter, three cases were reported in which a foreign listing was an 
immediate cause of reporting change in the Netherlands: 
- The listing of K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M in New York was found to have 
played a distinct role in the introduction of the earnings per share disclosure 
in the Netherlands. 
- The New York listings óf PHILIPS, K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M and A K U 
coincided with the adoption, by these companies, of modern integrated income 
statements which hitherto had been unknown in Dutch practice101. 
- The fact that U N I L E V E R and K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M were l is ted ' 1 0 2 in 
London helped to bring the reform of the Companies Act 1948 under the 
attention of the Dutch, notably with respect to the requirement to provide 
consolidated financial statements. 
A n international listing probably played a role in the funds statement disclosure 
of K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M , which was among the first to disclose. However, 
U N I L E V E R developed a funds statement long before it went to New York and 
before K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M . PHILIPS definitely came in the rear with 
regard to the funds statement, indicating that its foreign listings initially played no 
study deals only with small samples of very large companies, and the results may 
therefore not be comparable with the present study. However, the impact of increasing 
regulation in the United Kingdom is ignored by Barrett even though this would seem to 
account for a considerable share of disclosure expansion in the UK over this period. 
1 0 1
 The income statements of A R M and STOOMVAART ZEELAND, although integrated 
in the late 1940's, represent the final development of the traditional T-shaped profit and 
loss account rather than the modern income statement. 
1 0 2
 By means of their British sister-companies. 
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role in this respect. For current cost accounting a reverse effect could be 
observed. U N I L E V E R and K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M finally started to disclose 
current cost data when they were required to do so by foreign accounting 
standards in the 1970's, even though many Dutch companies had preceded them 
at home. 
Apart from the effect of multiple listings, the US (and to some extent the UK) 
example were effective because of the awareness of foreign practices in the 
Netherlands. This was most clearly seen from the data on segment reporting. A 
few years after that had become an issue in the United States, in the late 1960's, 
the subject began to be discussed quite intensively in the Netherlands as well with 
frequent references to the US situation. This was accompanied by an increase in 
disclosure which also lagged some five years behind that in the United States. 
A certain parallelism between developments in the Netherlands and those in the 
United States and/or the United Kingdom was found for all disclosures that 
developed fully after 1970 (segmentation, current cost data, the funds statement 
and earnings per share). In these cases, the time-lag with respect to the United 
States could be in the order of magnitude of ten to 15 years, whereas the time-lag 
relative to the United Kingdom was typically much shorter. 
In the case of earlier disclosures for which the US example might have been 
relevant (sales, consolidation) developments in the Netherlands lagged behind 
those in the United States to such an extent that a link between the two is hard to 
discern. This would support the conclusion that the direct influence of the US 
example had definitely grown stronger around 1970. This conclusion would be 
in harmony with the opening of the Dutch auditing towards foreign accounting 
and auditing practices that occurred during the 1960's (see also section 3.4.3). 
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Chapter 7 
Summary and discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
This study started with the question of how financial reporting in the Netherlands 
developed during the four decades following the Second World War, given that, 
during that period, financial reporting throughout the Western World was under­
going an important transformation. In conformity with the perceptions of this 
period expressed in the Dutch and international literature, this question was stated 
with particular reference to the development of annual reporting disclosure on a 
voluntary basis. 
A n important aspect of change in financial reporting internationally during this 
period was the large increase in the amount and detail of information disclosed in 
annual reports. In many countries, including, in 1970, the Netherlands, new 
legislation was introduced aimed at increasing mandatory disclosure. The 
distinguishing feature of the Netherlands was that disclosure had remained 
unregulated for longer than in many other countries, but that, nevertheless, the 
quality and extent of disclosure in the Netherlands reputedly had improved not 
significantly less than in leading but more regulated countries like the United 
Kingdom. 
In short, financial reporting in the Netherlands during this period allegedly could 
be seen as an unusually extensive and successful experiment in voluntary finan­
cial reporting reform. The purpose of this study was to arrive at a better 
understanding and appreciation of this episode in the development of Dutch 
financial reporting. This study was based mainly on two sets of primary source 
materials: the contemporary Dutch professional literature, and a sample of 
published annual reports of listed companies. This chapter summarizes the 
results of this study, by discussing the main characteristics of the process of 
annual reporting change in the Netherlands. 
In chapter 1, three levels were distinguished at which the development of 
disclosure in the Netherlands could be studied: the level of individual disclosure 
items, the level of the disclosing company, and the national level. In this 
chapter, the results of this study wil l be summarized with reference to these three 
levels in the sections 7.2 through 7.4. Section 7.5 discusses the limitations of 
this study and possibilities for further research. 
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7.2 Individual disclosure items 
7.2.1 General features 
In chapter 2, a general framework was provided for the interpretation of disclos­
ure phenomena. This framework relies heavily on the economic rationality of 
disclosure decisions in order to summarize some of the 'universal' aspects of 
disclosure that apply in any financial reporting situation in a modern market 
economy. It was found that, on this basis, a case can be made a priori for the 
existence of forces pushing for the non-mandatory disclosure of all information 
relevant for investment decisions and for the ordering of corporate governance. 
This tendency to disclose is tempered by a number of complicating factors, 
notably the issue of information structure knowledge and the existence of 
disclosure costs. 
It was also found that a translation of these economic interpretations of disclosure 
from a signalling or agency perspective to the context of routine financial 
statement disclosure required some additional steps that are not frequently taken 
in the analytical literature. In chapter 4, an innovation diffusion framework was 
suggested as a possible approach to fill this lacuna. 
In chapter 6, the actual disclosures made by sample companies in the 1945-1983 
period with regard to nine different disclosure areas were studied in some detail. 
At a most elementary level, it was found that there was, in fact, a rather substan­
tial extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports studied. Throughout the 
period, companies continuously expanded their disclosure with the result that 
many items were already being disclosed by about half or a majority of com­
panies before disclosure was made mandatory by changes in the law in 1970 or 
1983. 
Especially with regard to the period before 1970, there seems to be no room for 
excessively pessimistic assessments. While it is obvious that the extent of 
disclosure was still far removed from current levels, there was definite progress. 
Mueller's (1972) impression of the 'sad state' of European financial reporting in 
the late 1950's, cited in chapter 1, should at least for the Netherlands be qualified 
by the remark that there was no stagnation but rather constant improvement in 
the direction of the US example posited by Mueller. 
As might be expected from any detailed study, the process of voluntary disclosu­
re extensions was found to be highly complex, and to vary considerably in its 
particulars across disclosure items. Yet, it was also found that the main outlines 
of disclosure development in the Netherlands were quite clearly discernible, and 
that these outlines were amenable to interpretation within the broad frame of 
reference of 'universal' disclosure characteristics outlined above. It seems 
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reasonable to interpret the process of disclosure expansion largely in terms of 
actively managed disclosure. This conclusion is based primarily on the following 
observations. 
- Differences in rapidity and extent of voluntary disclosure among items can be 
related to features of the information such as perceived costs, the certainty 
with which outside parties can assume that information is available within the 
company and the complexity of the disclosure. 
- Already early in the period, companies were quite responsive to stimuli for 
disclosure extension. 
Quite careful use was made of interim formats of disclosure, which indicates 
an active interest in balancing costs and benefits of disclosure. Use of 'low 
cost' solutions to demands for more disclosure (e.g. disclosure of insured 
value as an approximation of current cost of assets, disclosure of index 
figures rather than absolute amounts of sales) was frequently observed. 
Hence, to understand the process of voluntary disclosure expansion in the 
postwar Netherlands, it is not necessary to assume that the working of 'ordinary' 
factors influencing disclosure was largely suspended. In particular, there appears 
to be no need to assume an unusually large concentration of managerial goodwill 
in the Netherlands during this period. While, as noted above, it would be 
incorrect to view the 1950's and 1960's as an era of stagnation, it would be 
equally incorrect to assume a 'golden age' in which voluntary improvements in 
reporting were brought about for no other reason than a detached desire to 
further the cause of good financial reporting. Changes in the law were required 
to persuade sometimes substantial numbers of remaining nondisclosing com­
panies, or to impose some uniformity on disclosure practices. 
The general conclusion that the process of disclosure expansion was, in very 
general terms, characterized by a considerable degree of apparent rational 
disclosure management can be refined or modified on the basis of more detailed 
results of this study. The more important observations include the following. 
7.2.2 Sources of new disclosures 
New disclosures can be introduced into the array of relevant potential disclosures 
in a variety of ways. Sources of new disclosures found in this study include 
changes in taxation laws (resulting in potential disclosures of deferred tax items), 
changes in Stock Exchange practice and the language of financial analysis (the 
introduction of price/earnings ratio's and earnings per share in the course of the 
1950's) and the movement towards enterprise democratization in the 1950's and 
1960's (resulting in demands for wage cost disclosures). 
267 
Foreign reporting practices, especially in the United States, also played an 
important role as sources of new disclosures. Awareness of foreign practices 
could turn existing theoretical knowledge of potential disclosures into effective 
demand for the disclosure of these items. This was observed in the case of sales 
disclosure and the introduction of consolidated information. Both items were 
recognized as theoretically conceivable but, for the time being, impracticable 
disclosures long before the US and/or U K examples made them part of the 
regular disclosure array. 
Foreign practices could also be an immediate source of new disclosures. In this 
way, the segment reporting issue was transplanted from the United States to the 
Netherlands in a relatively short period around 1970. 
7.2.3 Changes over time 
A question that must be considered in this context is whether the nature of the 
disclosure process changed in the course of the postwar period. It is unmista­
kable that 1970 marks a watershed in the development of financial reporting. As 
was pointed out in chapter 3, this is not merely because of the 1970 Act, but also 
because of a number of other developments occurring more or less simultane­
ously: the mergers and acquisition wave of the late 1960's which altered the 
corporate landscape, the corresponding merger wave in the audit profession, the 
advent of accounting standard setting at home and abroad, and finally, the advent 
of the Fourth Directive. It would have been surprising if these developments had 
not left their mark on the process of disclosure change. Yet to point out the 
difference of pre- and post-1970 disclosure on the basis of the detailed studies of 
disclosure items in chapter 6 is not a straightforward task, because it involves the 
comparison of disclosure behaviour with respect to quite different items (e.g. 
earnings per share versus tax cost disclosure). 
Two indications that might point in the direction of change are: 
The more widespread occurrence of 'incidental' disclosures and reversions to 
nondisclosure before 1970. This might indicate a growing rationalization or 
self-consciousness of the disclosure process in the course of the period, which 
would in turn leave less room for experiment. 
- Time lags between the 'invention' of an item and its acceptance in the regular 
disclosure array appear to diminish towards the end of the period. This 
becomes clear when the transmission from theory to practice is compared of 
consolidated reporting (spanning the 1920-1950 period) and of segment 
reporting (from the late 1960's to the early 1970's). A possible explanation 
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for this tendency towards more rapid dissemination of new disclosures might 
be a growing awareness of disclosure practices of other companies, or more 
intense mutual observation. However, on the basis of developments sketched 
in chapter 3, it is also plausible to attribute some influence to a growing 
awareness of developments abroad. 
It cannot, however, confidently be concluded that all changes in disclosure were 
effected more rapidly in the 1970*8 than, say, in the 1950's. It is true that the 
disclosure of earnings per share and the funds statement (both occurring in the 
1970's) were models of rapid and smooth diffusion processes. But on the other 
hand, so was the spread of comparative figures in the early 1950's. And the 
examples of current cost and segmental disclosures suggest that after 1970 there 
might still be considerable reluctance to disclose new items. 
7.3 Companies 
The second level of analysis is that of the disclosing company. The particular 
question asked hère is to what extent companies differed in their participation in 
the process of disclosure expansion, and what company characteristics were 
associated with these differences. This question was addressed in particular in 
chapter 5. 
The relationship between company characteristics and disclosure has received 
extensive attention in the existing literature on empirical disclosure research. A 
review of this literature was provided in chapter 4. From this review, it appea-
red that previous studies had largely been confined to cross-sectional studies. 
From the longitudinal data on Dutch companies, it appeared that companies were 
not necessarily consistent in their disclosure over time. That is, early disclosure 
of one item by a particular company was not always associated by early disclos-
ure of other items. Even though a general tendency towards to consistent 
disclosure could be established, a number of companies went through quite 
distinct phases in terms of apparent willingness to increase disclosure. A n 
approach was developed to capture the entire disclosure performance of a 
company over a longer period of time in a single number. 
On the basis of these measurements, it was found that there were clear differen-
ces among companies with regard to the participation in the overall process of 
disclosure expansion. Not all companies shared in the disclosure improvement 
reported in the preceding section. 
These differences among companies could to some extent be related to company 
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characteristics that were found to be relevant in earlier empirical work. In some 
instances, the longitudinal nature of this study allowed some refinements or 
extensions of previous results. 
7.3.1 Company characteristics 
Previous studies of voluntary disclosure have consistently found that size was the 
most important covariate of extent of disclosure. This was clearly confirmed by 
the present study, even though size was measured by the rather crude accounting 
data that were available. A refinement of the general association between size 
and disclosure was introduced by the finding that changes in (relative) size were 
associated with changes in (relative) disclosure. In particular, large but slow-
growing companies did on the whole disclose better than average, but were 
gradually falling behind in the extent of their disclosure. 
Differences in capital market activity appeared to be a second important charac­
teristic, although the importance of this factor declined with the overall tendency, 
manifest from 1970 onward, to rely less on issues of risk-bearing capital. 
Differences over time in overall capital market activity may obviously play a role 
in explaining differences across empirical studies with regard to the significance 
of this covariate. 
A particular combination of size and capital market activity was displayed by the 
small group of four multinational enterprises with listings on foreign exchanges 
( A K U / A K Z O , K O N I N K L I J K E P E T R O L E U M (Shell), PHILIPS and U N I L E V E R . A S 
might be expected, these companies tended to be among the best disclosing 
companies. However, it was found that these companies were not necessarily the 
first to disclose new items. A typical pattern was for one or two of the four to 
be among the very first disclosing companies while the others would follow later, 
sometimes after considerable numbers of smaller companies had preceded them. 
In terms of disclosure innovation during the postwar period, it would presumably 
be fair to give more credit to U N I L E V E R than it usually receives. 
Differences in disclosure among industries could only be established in general 
terms. Trading companies tended to disclose less than manufacturing companies, 
and within the group of manufacturing companies there was a slight association 
between industry 'strength' and extent of disclosure. 
As an alternative to a grouping of companies by industry, this study attempted a 
grouping on the basis of intercompany link through multiple directorships. It was 
found that, especially for the earlier part of the period, such links do provide 
insight in disclosure behaviour even though further work needs to be done to 
refine these measures. 
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7.3.2 Generational effect 
Another way of looking at the relationship between company characteristics and 
disclosure is to consider the changes in the Dutch corporate landscape during this 
period. By the end of the period, the population of listed companies had changed 
in important respects because of strong size growth, new listings, financial 
distress and a veritable mergers and acquisitions wave during the 1965-1975 
period. It could be argued that corporate demographics were an important 
mechanism of disclosure change during this period. It was found that new 
listings typically conformed to 'average' disclosure practices in the year of their 
listing, whereas delisting companies tended to disclose less than average. A 
clear generational effect is discernible in the disappearance of large numbers of 
older companies, typically listed from well before the war and active in tra­
ditional sectors as shipping and international trade. These companies tended to 
be less innovative in their financial reporting, and their delisting contributed to 
the overall impression of disclosure improvement. The company perspective, 
therefore, reinforces the tentative conclusion of change in the disclosure process 
indicated in section 7.2. 
7.4 National level 
In the preceding sections, it was indicated that the process of disclosure extension 
in the Netherlands could be interpreted to a large extent in 'universal' terms of 
disclosure management, dissemination of knowledge, group behaviour and 
economic considerations. Any differences between the Netherlands and other 
countries must be seen, therefore, largely as differences in degree rather than 
kind. 
The question whether financial reporting in the Netherlands did show unusually 
early or high levels of voluntary disclosure was addressed in chapter 6. Unfortu­
nately, limited data availability prevented the systematic comparison across 
disclosure items of the Netherlands with countries other than the United Kingdom 
and the United States. 
Compared with the United States, disclosure in the Netherlands typically lagged 
behind. However, as indicated above, the gap appeared to be narrowing in the 
course of the period, from roughly 40 years in the case of sales disclosure, to 
about fifteen years in the case of the funds statement and less than ten years with 
regard to segment disclosures. 
No great differences in voluntary disclosure were apparent with regard to the 
United Kingdom. Clear examples of more or less simultaneous development are 
provided by the data on the funds statement and earnings per share disclosure. In 
the course of the 1970's, disclosure in the U K began to grow more rapidly than 
271 
in the Netherlands, but this difference can probably largely be attributed to the 
more rigorous accounting standards introduced in the U K . 
The fragmented data available for other European countries do not indicate that 
these were significantly ahead of the Netherlands in terms of voluntary disclosu­
re. 
The conclusion that, in many respects, financial reporting in the Netherlands 
developed parallel to that in the United Kingdom is important for two reasons. 
First, the United Kingdom has generally been regarded as being ahead of other 
European countries in terms of the development of financial reporting. In the 
Netherlands itself, British reporting was before the war perceived as the most 
relevant example to follow. 
Second, as documented in chapter 3, even though the Netherlands mirrored the 
British approach to reporting regulation until the Second World War, the 1948 
(UK) Companies Act was not followed by comparable Dutch legislation until 
1970. Therefore, from the late 1940's to the late 1960's, Dutch financial repor­
ting was in fact able to match or approximate British standards of reporting, even 
though the regulatory regime was lighter in the Netherlands. 
A somewhat similar pattern is observable in the 1970's, with particular reference 
to segment reporting. Despite the absence of a requirement similar to that in 
force in the United Kingdom since 1967, segmentation by line of business was 
clearly spreading in the Netherlands during the first half of the 1970's. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the fact that Dutch financial reporting was developing 
largely in line with international developments but without the support of regula­
tion was recognized in the Netherlands during the 1950's and 1960's. The fact 
that disclosure continued to lag behind that in the United States was, for some 
observers, a reason to call for increased regulation. To others, however, the fact 
that financial reporting was improving on a voluntary basis was a sign of the 
effectiveness of a peculiarly Dutch approach to financial reporting. In chapter 3, 
the development of this notion of a 'Dutch system' of financial reporting and 
reporting regulation was investigated. It was found that its main trait was a 
belief in the beneficial working of the free interaction between company manage­
ments who where willing to comply with reasonable demands for disclosure, and 
a competent auditing profession that could interpret these continuously changing 
demands. The sample of financial reports in this study justifies the contemporary 
belief that this voluntary system was in fact resulting in a continuous expansion 
of disclosure on a voluntary basis. In this sense, the existence and working of a 
'Dutch system' can be considered to have their basis in facts. 
However, the adoption of a wider perspective allowed by the time elapsed since 
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the end of the 1945-1983 period results in some qualifying remarks concerning 
the uniqueness of this 'Dutch system'. 
In chapter 3, it was found that the period of relatively light regulation in the 
Netherlands could be seen as a temporary interval. Taking the period from the 
middle 19th century to the later 20th century as a whole, it can be observed that 
company law, in sofar as it impinged on annual report disclosure, was developing 
under the influence of basically similar forces throughout Western Europe. In 
most countries, mandatory publication of financial statements was introduced into 
the law during the 1870-1930 period, in order to replace earlier systems of 
preventive government supervision of limited liability companies. Later during 
the 20th century, reporting laws were changed in countries like the United 
Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands to reflect social concerns over the role 
of large enterprises in a democratizing society. Still later, the harmonization of 
company law in the context of European union became another common cause of 
change. The Netherlands participated in all these developments, but timing 
differences attributable largely to factors operating in the legal sphere (and not 
primarily germane to financial reporting) resulted in a period of relatively 
unregulated financial reporting from circa 1930 to 1970. 
During the interval of light regulation, some forces influencing financial reporting 
practice that were active elsewhere as well were given a relatively free rein, and 
could therefore play a more conspicuous role than elsewhere. One of the most 
important of these forces was the role of the organized Dutch employers. This 
study has found that many of their 1955 and 1962 recommendations were in fact 
considerably ahead of contemporary practice. Even though immediate changes in 
practices could only be discerned in a small number of cases (notably tax 
disclosures), the claim that their recommendations did indeed play a unique and 
effective role in the changing of Dutch financial reporting seems not unreason­
able. 
A summary assessment of Dutch financial report disclosure in the postwar period 
would therefore be that it was different from that in other countries, but in a 
more limited sense than in the area of income determination and valuation. 
Whereas in the latter two areas fundamental differences did and still do exist (for 
instance in the influence of taxation on financial reporting), differences in attitude 
towards disclosure regulation were of a more transitory nature. The Netherlands 
temporarily set itself apart from neighbouring countries because of timing 
differences in the long-term development of company law, which was moving in 
the same general direction as that in other European countries. This resulted in 
'window of opportunity' for voluntary financial reporting. This opportunity was 
not wasted. A process of voluntary improvements in disclosure was brought 
about, that was, however, governed by common, that is, not typically Dutch, 
factors. 
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7.5 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
The limitations of this study flow to a large extent from its exploratory character. 
As indicated in chapter 1, an amount of detail or precision in the investigation of 
particular aspects of disclosure was sacrificed in order to obtain a wide view of 
the development of disclosure in the Netherlands. This implies that further 
research is possible along a number of lines that could only briefly be touched, or 
dealt with in a less than exhaustive manner in this study. The most important 
limitations, and hence, areas for further research are related to: 
The focus on listed companies. A n important reason for this limitation, which 
can probably not easily be undone, is the limited availability of annual report 
data for unlisted companies. This limitation is important when possible 
influences on disclosure are discussed that may work differently for unlisted 
companies. In the present study, this may apply in particular to the role of 
the auditor and the influence of the guidance on annual reporting produced by 
the Council on Annual Reporting (RJ) and its predecessor. A n extension of 
this study to the area of unlisted companies might be desirable, but would 
probably have to be preceded by a separate research effort directed at 
opening up and documenting the existing collections of annual reports of 
these companies held at various locations in the Netherlands. 
- The selection of disclosure items. Essentially, the items studied here are all 
examples of items that were introduced with at least moderate success in the 
course of the 1945-1983 period. That is, no items were included that were 
already being disclosed on a large scale at the beginning of the period, that 
only began to be disclosed at the end of the period or that enjoyed only a 
brief spell of popularity before disappearing from published annual reports. 
This may have introduced a certain 'innovation bias' into the study. Discon­
tinued disclosures have received some attention in this study, but might well 
be an object of further study. 
- Measurement and analysis. In general, this study has relied on rather simple 
measurements and techniques. The extent to which information was given on 
the various disclosure items was measured by binary scales or by three- or 
four-point ordinal scales. Aggregation of these data to measures of aggregate 
disclosure also followed simple procedures. Finally, explanatory variables, 
such as size, capital market activity or industry were also measured by 
unsophisticated procedures. Further research might well make considerable 
progress in measurement issues of this kind. In particular, more refined 
ways may be sought to make operational the notion of 'innovation character-
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istics' imported from diffusion theory. In this study, these characteristics 
were assessed in a very general way on the basis of the historical materials 
described in chapter 6. More sophisticated assessments of costs and benefits 
of disclosure, complexity and trialability might well result in a better under­
standing of the unmistakable differences in the disclosure process among 
items. A particular 'innovation characteristic' that ought to be further 
explored is the degree of 'fineness' of disclosures: since it is possible to 
disclose particular items at varying levels of detail, the relationship between 
the 'quality' of disclosure and the willingness to disclose can be further 
explored. 
Despite a small number of multivariate analyses, this study consists in general 
of univariate analyses. One type of interaction effect that is neglected in this 
way is the interaction among disclosure elements. A simple example of 
interaction found in this study is that disclosure of segment information does 
not precede the disclosure of consolidated data. More subtle interactions 
include the observed effect that changes in the law with respect to one 
disclosure item may coincide with non-mandatory disclosure extensions in 
related areas. In the same way, interaction between numerical and verbal, or 
between annual report disclosure and other disclosure channels, can be 
investigated. 
Finally, a particular concern would be the resolution of problems involved in 
applying standard analytical techniques, such as survival analysis, to company 
data that are seriously disturbed by mergers and acquisitions. 
The preceding limitations and research suggestions relate to the empirical study 
of annual report data. Other areas where future research may be fruitful include: 
- The process by which knowledge of new disclosures is spread among the 
potential disclosers. The effects of education, the financial press and the role 
of the auditor in this respect can be further investigated. This would presum­
ably require a different type of approach in which in-company case studies, 
surveys or 'oral history' approaches might be used. 
- The international background. This study has relied heavily on materials 
from English-speaking countries, with regard to both the historical back­
ground sketched in chapter 3 and the published data on the extent of disclos­
ure in other countries used for comparative purposes in chapter 6. While 
even the comparison between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in 
terms of the development of attitudes towards reporting and reporting 
regulation might bear further inquiry, this is certainly true with respect to 
other continental European countries. The production of comparable time 
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series on the development of reporting practices in the main European 
countries seems to offer an hitherto unexplored area of research in accounting 
history. 
276 
Appendix A 
List of disclosure items 
This appendix contains particulars on disclosure items on which data have been collected 
from company financial statements. A general discussion of the process by which these 
items have been selected can be found in chapter 4. 
Definitions 
The disclosures described in this appendix are referred to in the main body of this book 
by three different expressions: 
The basic element in this study is the disclosure item. A total of 13 disclosure items have 
been distinguished. The data collected for each company in this study consist of a string 
of 13 scores for each year during which the company was included in the sample. 
Some of these disclosure items are fairly closely related. For this reason, the 13 items 
can be grouped into nine disclosure areas. These nine areas correspond to the nine 
sections of chapter 6. They are listed here in the same broadly chronological order in 
which they are discussed in chapter 6. 
The annual scores for each of the 13 items were either binary (disclosure or 
nondisclosure), or based on a larger number of possible scores. For instance, for the 
disclosure item 'sales', four different modes of disclosure (apart from nondisclosure) 
were distinguished. In this way, a total of 30 different disclosure positions were distin­
guished for these items. 
Scoring 
Specific issues in scoring are indicated in 'remarks' following the description of each 
item. An important general issue is the difference between consolidated versus parent-
company data. In general, a company has been credited with a disclosure when either 
consolidated or parent-company data on a particular item (e.g. sales) were disclosed. 
Binary scoring 
In some cases (notably in chapter 5), it was found useful to reduce the scores on all items 
to a binary scoring. Where this has been done, the definitions of binary disclosures listed 
below have been used, unless otherwise indicated. 
Disclosure: 
Area Item Name & disclosure positions 
1 
1 Sales 
0. no disclosure 
1. disclosure of quantities/physical units sold 
2. indexed values or growth rates of revenues 
3. absolute sales figure, not reconciled to operating income in income state­
ment 
4. absolute sales figure, reconciled to operating income in income statement. 
Binary score: 0-2 nondisclosure; 3-4 disclosure 
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Remarks: 
Position 1, 'quantities sold' is applicable only in case of relatively 
undiversified bulk production or in case of a relatively small number of 
construction-type projects that can be enumerated. 
Disclosure of change on previous year (rather than multi-period data) is 
considered as disclosure of 'index or growth rate' . 
A score of '3' in most cases refers to a sales disclosure in the directors' 
report or the note to the financial statements. Only in rare cases was the 
sales figure provided on the face of the income statement without a re-
concilliation of sales to net income. 
Comparative figures 
0. no disclosure 
1. disclosure 
Remark: 
Disclosure is assumed to occur when both balance sheet and income statement 
contain comparative figures for major groupings (in a few instances, companies 
started to provide comparative figures for one of the two main statements. This 
practice was never continued for more than two years). 
Taxation 
Tax costs 
0. disclosure 
1. no disclosure 
Remark: 
In case of losses and carry forward of losses, tax costs may be zero. In such 
cases, a note on the effect of losses explaining the absence of a tax item is 
considerd as disclosure of tax costs. 
Tax liabilities 
0. no disclosure of tax item 
1. disclosure of tax item of unspecified composition 
2. disclosure of one tax item with notes indicating mixed (current/deferred) 
composition 
3. separate disclosure of either deferred or current liabilities 
4. separate disclosure of both current and deferred liabilities. 
Binary scores: 0 no disclosure, 1-4 disclosure. 
Remark: 
Deferred liabilities are assumed to be disclosed even if only the temporary tax-
free reserves based on the tax-regime of the 1940's and 1950's are disclosed 
(see also section 6.4.1). 
Employment data 
Labour cost data 
0. no disclosure 
1. disclosure of total costs 
2. labour costs subdivided into categories as pension costs or social security 
contributions. 
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Binary score: 0 nondisclosure; 1-2 disclosure 
Remark: 
Disclosure of labour costs as a percentage of total costs when total costs are 
given at another location in the financial statements is considered as disclosure. 
Number of employees 
0. no disclosure 
1. disclosure 
Remark: 
Employee data for part of the enterprise only count as disclosure if it can be 
assumed that the employees referred to are not the staff of a mere holding 
company and therefore amount to a more than négligeable fraction of total staff. 
This issue arises mainly when the number of Dutch staff is disclosed, but not 
the number of staff overseas. 
Consolidated financial statements. 
0. no disclosure 
1. disclosure of separate financial statements of major subsidiaries 
2. disclosure of either consolidated balance sheet or consolidated income 
statement 
3. disclosure of both balance sheet and income statement. 
9. not applicable 
Binary score: 0-1 no disclosure, 2-3 disclosure 
Remark: 
Consolidation is considered to be not applicable when there is no indication of 
'Investments' in the parent balance sheet. When 'Investments' are included in 
the parent balance sheet, consolidation is considered to be in order unless the 
investments are explicitly presented as minority holdings. 
Funds statement 
0. no disclosure 
1. disclosure 
Remark: 
Includes any analysis in tabular format that relates income statement data to 
cash-flow figures or changes in working capital. 
Current cost data 
Income statement 
0. no disclosure of current cost data 
1. indication of current cost equivalents of selected cost items 
in notes 
2. selected cost items in income statement on current cost 
basis 
3. income statement (main or supplementary) fully on current 
cost basis. 
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Balance sheet 
0. no disclosure of current cost data 
1. indication of current costs of selected assets in notes 
2. selected assets in balance sheet valued at current cost 
3. balance sheet (main or supplementary) fully on current cost 
basis. 
Binary scores: 0 no disclosure, 1-3 disclosure 
Remarks: 
Disclosure of insured value (verzekerde waarde) is considered as 'indication 
of current costs of selected assets in notes'. 
Accelerated depreciation or additional credits to 'replacement provisions' are 
not considered as current cost figures without an indication that the amount 
of these charges has been determined with some reference to current costs. 
Use of the base-stock method does not count as current cost basis for costs 
of goods sold. 
One-off revaluations of assets result in a 'no disclosure' score for years 
following the revaluation unless the revaluation is yearly referred to. 
Earnings per share 
0. no disclosure 
1. disclosure 
Remark: 
Disclosure is assumed to occur when a per share figure is given for an 
actually outstanding type of share (Eg: per ordinary share of ƒ 25,-) rather 
than for a round number of share capital (Eg: per ƒ 1000,- of share capital). 
Segment data 
Industry (line of business) segments 
0. no disclosure 
1. segmentation of sales only 
2. segmentation of (operating) income only 
3. segmentation of sales and (operating) income 
9. not applicable 
Geographical segments 
0. no disclosure 
1. segmentation of sales only 
2. segmentation of (operating) income only 
3. segmentation of sales and (operating) income 
9. not applicable 
Binary scores: 0 no disclosure; 1-3 disclosure 
Remarks: 
Even if absolute sales are not disclosed, a percentagewise breakdown of 
sales nevertheless counts as disclosure of segmented sales. 
Geographical disclosure is considered to be applicable as soon as 'exports' 
are referred to in the financial statements. Hence, a break-down between 
'domestic' and 'export' is considered sufficient to count as 'segmentation'. 
280 
Appendix B 
Company sample 
This appendix lists the companies of which the financial statements were studied. 
For each company, the following data are presented. In S M A L L C A P I T A L S the 
label used to refer to the company in the text. Labels like these are used rather 
than the more cumbersome and sometimes changing full names. The next two 
collumns present information on the financial years for which financial statements 
were surveyed, the full names of the companies (including major name changes) 
and information on predecessor (Pr) or successor (Sc) companies included in the 
sample. 
Company label Years surveyed Full name and affiliations 
A C F 1967-1983 
A D A M 1945-1970 
AIR 1958-1983 
A K U 1944/45-1968 
A K Z O 1969-1983 
A L B A T R O S 1945/46-1958/59 
A L B E R T H E Y N 1948-1983 
A L B E R T S 1945-1959 
A L G E M E N E E X P L O R A T I E 1940/46-1967 
A M S T E L H O T E L 1948-1968 
A P E L D O O R N Z E P P E L I N 1950/51-1965 
A R M 1945-1983 
A S S E L B E R G 1954-1979 
A S W 1945-1975 
A U D E T 1973-1983 
A V I S 1945-1965 
B A L L A S T - N E D A M 1968-1983 
B A N D O E N G K I N I N E 1958-1965 
B A T E N B U R G 1955-1983 
BEERS 1961-1983 
B E G E M A N N 1954-1983 
BENSDORP 1960-1971 
ACF Amsterdam Chemie Farmacie NV. Pr: 
BANDOENG KININE 
NV Delftsche Leerlooierij en Drijfriemenfabriek 
v/h Alex Adam (since 1962: Koninklijke Fabrie­
ken Adam NV) 
Automobiel Industrie Rotterdam NV 
Algemene Kunstzijde Unie NV. Sc: AKZO 
Akzo NV. Pr: A K U 
Albatros Superfosfaatfabrieken NV 
Albert Heyn NV (since 1973: Ahold NV) 
NV Houthandel v/h G. Alberts Lzn & Co 
NV Algemeene Exploratie Maatschappij 
NV Amstel Hotel Maatschappij 
Apeldoornse Nettenfabriek Von Zeppelin & Co 
NV 
NV Amsterdamsche Rijtuigmaatschappij 
Asselberg's IJzerindustrie en Handelmaatschappij 
NV (Since 1976: Asselbergs Holland NV) 
A.S.W. Apparatenfabriek NV 
NV Associatie van Uitgevers van Dagbladen en 
Tijdschriften 
NV Verffabrieken Avis 
Ballast-Nedam Groep NV. Pr: N A M 
Bandoengsche Kininefabriek Holland NV. Sc: 
ACF 
NV Electrotechnisch Installatiebedrijf en Han­
delsbureau v/h P. Batenburg (Since 1982: Baten­
burg Beheer NV) 
Beers' Zonen NV 
NV Koninklijke Nederlandsche Machinefabriek 
v/h E.H. Begemann 
Bensdorp Internationaal NV 
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BERGOSS 
BEYNES 
BLAAUWHOED 
BLIKMAN SARTORIUS 
1964-1980 
1945-1957 
1945-1966 
1949/50-1956/57 
BOSKALIS 1970-1983 
BUTTINGER 1959-1969 
BYENKORF 1956-1983 
CARP 1944-1969 
CETECO 1945-1983 
DESSEAUX 1959/60-1983/84 
DOMANIALE MIJN 
DORP 1946-1983 
DRU 1948-1969 
DUIKER 1961-1981 
ECONOSTO 1970-1983 
ELECTROLASCH 1954-1966 
ENOT 1954-1972 
ERIKS 1978-1983 
FEARNLEY 1975-1979 
FURNESS 1944/45-1983 
FRANSCH SOUDAN 1947/48-1957/58 
GAMMA 1972-1983 
GERZON 1940/41-1947/48 
GIESSEN 1957-1983 
GROENHOEDENVEEM 1945-1954 
GROFSMEDERIJ 1944/45-1976 
HOLDOH 1956-1983 
HANDELSCOMPAGNIE 1950-1966 
HAVENWERKEN 1946-1967 
HBG 1968-1983 
HBM 1945-1967 
HCG 1966-1967 
HCW 1944/45-1965 
V A N DER HEEM 1949-1963 
HEINEKEN 1944/45-1983 
HOEK 1945-1983 
HOLLAND HANDEL 1946-1960 
Koninklijke Tapijtfabrieken Bergoss NV 
Koninklijke Fabrieken van Rijtuigen en Spoor­
wagens J.J. Beynes NV 
NV Blaauwhoedenveem-Vriesseveem (Since 
1954: Blaauwhoed NV) Sc: PAKHOED 
Blikman & Sartorius NV 
(Since 1977: Koninklijke) Boskalis Westminster 
(Since 1980) Group NV 
Buttinger NV 
NV Magazijn "de Bijenkorf" (Since 1965: Bij­
enkorf Beheer NV; since 1971 KBB NV) 
NV J.A. Carp's Garenfabrieken 
Curacaosche Handel-Maatschappij NV (Since 
1970: NV Handel- en Industriemaatschappij 
"Ceteco") 
Taptijfabriek H . Desseaux NV 
1944/45-1964/65 Domaniale Mijn-
Maatschappij NV 
NV v/h G.C.T. van Dorp & Co 
Koninklijke Fabrieken Diepenbrock & Reigers 
NV 
Duiker Apparatenfabriek NV 
Econosto NV 
NV Nederlandsche Electrolasch Maatschappij. 
Sc: HCG 
NV Nederlandsche Optische Industrie E.N.O.T. 
Eriks NV 
Fearnley NV. Pr: OOSTZEE 
Furness' Scheepvaart- en Agentuur Maatschappij 
NV (Since 1968: Furness NV) 
NV Société Commerciale du Soudan Francais 
(Fransen Soudan Handel Maatschappij) 
Gamma Holding NV. Pr: TEXOPRINT 
Gebroeders Gerzon's Modemagazijnen NV 
C. van der Giessen & Zonen's Scheepswerven 
NV (Since 1962: Van der Giessen - de Noord 
NV) 
NV Groenhoedenveem 
NV Koninklijke Nederlandsche Grofsmederij 
NV Drentsch-Overijsselsche Houthandel (Since 
1979: NV Holdoh, since 1982: NV Holdoh-
Houtunie) 
Handelscompagnie NV 
(Koninklijke) Nederlandsche Maatschappij voor 
Havenwerken NV 
Hollandsche Beton Groep NV. Pr: HBG, HCG 
Hollandsche Beton Maatschappij NV. Sc: HBG 
Hollandse Constructie Groep NV. Pr. ELEC­
TROLASCH, HCW Sc: HBG 
NV Hollandsche Constructiewerkplaatsen. Sc: 
HCG 
Van der Heem NV. Sc: INDOHEEM 
Heineken's Bierbrouwerij Maatschappij NV 
NV W.A. Hoek's Machine- en Zuurstoffabriek 
NV Handelsvereeniging "Holland" 
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HOLLAND MEEL 
HOLLANDIA 
HOLL. MELKSUIKER 
HOOIMEUER 
HOUTVAART 
HVA 
HV ROTTERDAM 
IJSFABRIEKEN 
INDOHEEM 
INTERNATIO-MÜLLER 
JAVA-CHINA PAKET 
JONGENEEL 
KAISER 
KEY 
KLENE 
KNP 
KONINKLIJKE PETROLEUM 1945-1983 
KORENSCHOOF 
KOUDUS 
KROMHOUT 
LINDETEVES 
LOHUIZEN 
MAINTZ 
MARUNEN 
MATUBEL 
MULLER 
N A M 
NBM 
NBT 
NDSM 
NKF 
NETAM 
NIEAF 
1945-1956 Stoom-Meelfabriek "Holland" NV 
1949- 1961 Koninklijke Hollandia Fabrieken van Melkpro­
ducten en Voedingsmiddelen NV 
1948- 1969 NV Hollandsche Melksuikerfabriek 
1951-1971 A. Hooimeijer & Zonen NV 
1945-1973 NV Houvaart 
1941/47-1982 NV Handelsvereeniging "Amsterdam" (since 
1959: Verenigde H.V.A.-Maatschappijen NV) 
1940/47-1969 NV Internationale Crediet- en Handelsvereeni­
ging "Rotterdam". Sc: INTERN MULLER 
1940/46-1956 NV Unie van Ijsfabrieken 
1964-1968 Indoheem NV (since 1968: Indola NV) Pr: 
V A N DER HEEM 
1970-1983 Internatio-Müller NV. Pr: HV ROTTERDAM, 
MULLER 
1940/46-1969 Koninklijke Java-China-Paketvaartlijnen NV. Sc: 
NSU 
1945-1970 NV Houthandel v/h P.M. & J. Jongeneel (since 
1970: Jongeneel NV) 
1950- 1956 Nederlandsche Kaiser-Frazer Fabrieken NV 
1945-1982 NV Houthandel v/h G. Key. Sc: PONT 
1945-1983 NV Fabriek van Chocolade en Suikerwerken 
J.C. Kiene & Co (since 1950: Klene's Suiker-
werkfabrieken NV) 
1945-1983 Koninklijke Nederlandsche Papierfabriek NV 
(since 1973: Koninklijke Nederlandse Papierfa­
brieken NV) 
NV Koninklijke Nederlandsche Petroleum Maat­
schappij 
"De Korenschoof" NV 
NV Koudijs' Voederfabrieken B.K. 
Kromhout Motoren Fabriek D. Goedkoop Jr NV 
Lindeteves NV (since 1958: Lindeteves-Jacoberg 
NV) 
NV "Industrie" v/h van Lohuizen en Co. 
NV Handelsvennootschap v/h Maintz & Co 
NV Technisch Bureau Marijnen 
Matabel NV 
Wm. H . Muller & Co NV. Sc:INTERNATIO-
MÜLLER 
NV Nederlandsche Aanneming Maatschappij. Sc: 
BALLAST-NEDAM 
NV Verenigde NBM-Bedrijven 
NV Nederlandsche Bioscoop Trust (since 1953: 
NV Nederlandsche Bioscoop Theaters). Sc: 
MATUBEL 
Nederlandsche Dok en Scheepsbouw Maatschap­
pij Vof (Annual report jointly issued by the 
listing vehicles NV Nederlandsche Scheepsbouw 
Maatschappij and Nederlandsche Dok Maat­
schappij NV) 
1945-1969 NV Nederlandsche Kabelfabrieken 
1949- 1976 NV Nederlandsche Tank- Apparaten- en Machi­
nefabriek "Netam" 
1948-1975 NV Nederlandsche Instrumenten- en Electrische 
1944/45-1969/70 
1944- 1971/72 
1944/45-1964 
1940/47-1974 
1945- 1963 
1946/47-1969 
1945-1971 
1965-1972 
1940/45-1969 
1945-1967 
1971-1983 
1940/53-1964 
1945-1967 
283 
NIERSTRASZ 
NSU 
NUVERDAL 
OGEM 
V A N OMMEREN 
OOSZTEE 
OVING 
PAKHOED 
PAPIER GELDERLAND 
PARKHOTEL 
PHILIPS 
PONT 
REEUWIJK 
1954-1983 
1948-1980 
1947- 1983 
1940/46-1974 
1964-1977 
1967-1983 
1957-1971 
1952-1970 
1944/45-1983 
1948- 1983 
1945-1980 
REINEVELD 1945-1971 
REISS 1948-1978 
ROTTERDAMSCHE LLOYD 1940/46-1969 
ROMMENHOLLER 
REESINK 
SCHOKBETON 
SCHUITEMA 
SIMPLEX 
SMITS KLEDING 
STEVIN 
STOOMVAART NEDERLAND 
1940/46-1969 
STOOMVAART ZEELAND 1945-1983 
STORK 
SWAAY 
TELS 
TEXOPRINT 
Apparatenfabriek "NIEAF" 
1947-1983 NV v/h Nierstrasz (since 1969: Nierstrasz NV) 
1969-1983 NV Nederlandsche Scheepvaart Unie (Since 
197.: Koninklijke Nedlloyd Groep NV) Listed 
since 1915 but only since 1969 as a company 
with operational activities. Pr: JAVA CHINA 
PAKET, ROTTERDAMSCHE LLOYD, 
STOOMVAART NEDERLAND 
Koninklijke Stoomweverij te Nijverdal NV (since 
1957: Koninklijke Textielfabrieken Nijverdal-ten 
Cate NV) 
NV Overzese Gas- en Electriciteitsmaatschappij 
(until 1949 Nederlandsen-Indische Gas-
Maatschappij) 
PHs van Ommeren NV 
NV Stoomvaartmaatschappij "Oostzee". Sc: 
FEARNLEY 
Oving NV (since 1970: Oving-Diepeveen NV; 
since 1972: Oving-Diepeveen-Struycken NV) 
Pakhoed Holding NV. Pr: BLAAUWHOED 
NV Papierfabriek "Gelderland" (since 1963: 
Gelderland-Tielens Papierfabrieken NV) 
NV Parkhotel en -Restaurant 
NV Philips' Gloeilampenfabrieken 
NV Houthandel v/h William Pont (since 1969: 
Koninklijke Houthandel William Pont NV) 
NV Maatschappij voor woninginrichting P. van 
Reeuwijk 
Machinefabriek Reineveld NV 
NV Handelsvereeniging v/h Reiss & Co 
Koninklijke Rotterdamsche Lloyd NV (since 
1968: NV Koninklijke Rotterdamsche Lloyd-
Wm Ruys & Zonen) Sc: NSU 
NV Maatschappij tot Exploitatie der C.G. Rom-
menhöller'sche Koolzuur- en Zuurstofwerken 
(since 1973: Maatschappij Rommenhöller NV) 
H.J. Reesink & Co NV (since 1973: Reesink 
NV) 
NV Schokbeton 
NV Gebr. D. Schuitema (since 1977: Schuitema 
NV) 
NV Simplex Machine- en Rijwielfabrieken 
Kledingindustrie H. Smits & Co NV 
Stevin Groep NV (until 1971: Van Hattum en 
Blankevoort Beheer NV). Sc: VOLKER STEVIN 
Stoomvaart Maatschappij "Nederland" NV 
Stoomvaart Maatschappij "Zeeland" Koninklijke 
Nederlandsche Paketvaart NV 
1945-1953 Koninklijke Machinefabriek Gebr. Stork & Co 
NV. Sc: VMF 
1961-1967 Maatschappij voor Industriële Ondernemingen 
Gebr. van Swaay NV. Sc: HV ROTTERDAM 
1947-1962 L.E. Tels & Co's Handelmaatschappij NV 
1964-1971 Texoprint NV (since 1969: Hatéma-Texoprint 
1945-1983 
1958/59-1983 
1946-1980 
1959-1983 
1947/48-1963/64 
1956-1967 
1968-1977 
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TEXTIEL UNIE 
THOMASSEN DRIJVER 
TWENTSCHE KABEL 
TWENTSCHE HANDEL 
UNILEVER 
VAROSSIEAU 
VERSCHURE 
VERTO 
VIHAMU BUTTINGER 
VLISSINGENS KATOEN 
VMF 
VOLKER STEVIN 
VRIES TEXTIEL 
VULCAANSOORD 
WALVISVAART 
WERNINK 
WIJK & HERINGA 
ZEEVAART 
ZUID HOLLAND BIER 
1966-1971 
1948- 1969 
1953- 1983 
1949- 1968 
1945-1983 
1961-1968 
1945-1964 
1945-1983 
1970-1981 
1945/46-1963 
1954- 1983 
1978-1983 
1948-1965 
1950- 1975/76 
1946/47-1965/66 
1951- 1979 
1949-1983 
1940/45-1976 
1945-1960 
NV) Pr: VLISSINGENS KATOEN Sc: 
GAMMA 
Koninklijke Nederlandse Textiel-Unie NV 
Blikemballagefabriek Thomassen en Drijver NV 
(since 1965: Thomassen & Drijver-Verblifa NV) 
NV Twentsche Kabelfabriek (since 1980: NV 
Twentsche Kabel Holding) 
NV Twentsche Overzee Handel Maatschappij 
Unilever NV (until 1951: Lever Brothers & 
Unilever NV 
Varossieau & Cie NV Lakfabrieken 
Verschure & Co's Scheepswerf en Machinefa­
briek NV 
NV Vereenigde Touwfabrieken (since 1972: NV 
Verto) 
Vihamij-Buttinger NV 
NV P.F. van Vlissingen & Co's Katoen-
fabrieken. Sc: TEXOPRINT 
Verenigde Machinefabrieken NV Stork-
Werkspoor. Pr: STORK 
Volker Stevin NV. Pr: STEVIN 
B.I. de Vries & Co Textiel NV 
NV Vulcaansoord 
Nederlandse Maatschappij voor de Walvisvaart 
NV 
NV Wernink's Beton Maatschappij NV (since 
1960: Wernink's Beton- en Aanneming Maat­
schappij NV; since 1970: Vandervliet Wernink 
NV) 
Van Wijk & Heringa NV (until 1959: Leidsche 
Textielfabriek Gebrs. van Wijk & Co NV) 
NV Maatschappij Zeevaart 
NV Zuid-Hollandsche Bierbrouwerij NV 
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Nederlandse samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch) 
Vrijwillige informatieverstrekking in de jaarverslaggeving van Nederlandse 
beursgenoteerde ondernemingen 1945-1983 
Deze studie heeft betrekking op de ontwikkeling van de jaarverslaggeving van 
Nederlandse ondernemingen gedurende de eerste veertig jaar na de Tweede 
Wereldoorlog. Gedurende deze periode nam de informatieve waarde van door 
ondernemingen openbaar gemaakte jaarverslagen1 in de gehele westerse wereld 
belangrijk toe. Deze ontwikkeling ging in veel landen gepaard met een uitbrei­
ding van wettelijke of andere voorschriften omtrent de jaarverslaggeving waarin 
een meer uitgebreide informatieverstrekking verplicht werd gesteld. 
Uit de bestaande binnen- en buitenlandse literatuur blijkt dat omtrent deze 
ontwikkeling een beeld bestaat waarin de gang van zaken in Nederland enigszins 
afwijkt van die in andere Europese landen. Deze afwijking heeft met name 
betrekking op het relatieve belang van wet- en regelgeving enerzijds, en vrijwil­
ligheid anderzijds. In het bestaande beeld van het Nederlandse verleden speelt 
vrijwillige verbetering van de verslaggeving een belangrijke rol. Tot de aanpas­
sing van de Nederlandse wetgeving in verband met de Europese harmonisatie van 
het vennootschapsrecht werd de functie van de wet hoofdzakelijk gezien als het 
vastleggen van hetgeen in de praktijk reeds op vrijwillige basis was bereikt. 
Deze beeldvorming kon echter slechts in beperkte mate steunen op gepubliceerd 
onderzoek naar wijzigingen in de verslaggeving op langere termijn. Gezien de 
beperkte beschikbaarheid van eerder empirisch onderzoek, en gezien de kennelij­
ke afwijking van de Nederlandse ontwikkelingen van een elders gangbaar 
patroon, werd het doel van deze studie geformuleerd als: het beschrijven en 
karakteriseren van de rol van vrijwillige uitbreiding van de informatieverstrekking 
in de ontwikkeling van de na-oorlogse Nederlandse verslaggeving. 
Deze studie is bedoeld als een verkennend onderzoek van dit brede terrein, 
waarmee getracht wordt de hoofdlijnen van bedoelde ontwikkeling aan te geven. 
De kern van het onderzoek bestaat uit een longitudinaal onderzoek van de 
jaarverslagen van een steekproef van beursgenoteerde ondernemingen. De 
jaarverslagen van 140 ondernemingen werden onderzocht op de mate van 
informatieverstrekking met betrekking tot negen onderdelen van de totale 
fmancieel-economische berichtgeving. Deze gegevens werden verzameld voor 
1
 Het woord jaarverslag wordt hier niet gebruikt in de zin van artikel 391 boek 2 BW, 
maar in de traditionele betekenis. Bedoeld is hier het document waarvan de jaarrekening 
en het directieverslag de kern uitmaken. 
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alle jaren waarin deze ondernemingen in de periode 1945-1983 genoteerd waren 
aan de Amsterdamse Effectenbeurs. 
Het kader van deze empirische analyse wordt geschetst in de hoofdstukken 2 en 
3. Hoofdstuk 2 bevat een overzicht van recente economische theorievorming op 
het gebied van informatieverstrekking. Uitgangspunt hierbij is dat een onderne-
ming waarin eigendomsrechten worden verhandeld belang heeft bij het openbaar-
maken van informatie met betrekking tot de waarde van de onderneming, omdat 
hierdoor de prijsvorming van de eigendomsrechten gunstig wordt beïnvloed. 
Hiertegenover staat dat aan informatieverstrekking kosten verbonden kunnen zijn 
omdat derden, bijvoorbeeld concurrenten, op basis van deze informatie in het 
nadeel van de onderneming kunnen handelen. Informatieverstrekking kan 
derhalve geanalyseerd in termen van een afweging van voor- en nadelige invloe-
den op de (markt)waarde van de onderneming. 
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt de geschiedenis van de Nederlandse verslaggeving in de na-
oorlogse periode geschetst. In deze periode overheerste de gedachte dat voor 
wetgeving slechts een zeer beperkte functie was weggelegd in de informatiever-
strekking door ondernemingen. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt beschreven hoe de oor-
sprongen van deze gedachte te vinden zijn in de ontwikkeling van het vennoot-
schapsrecht sedert het einde van de negentiende eeuw. Voorts wordt beschreven 
hoe in kringen van Nederlandse accountants deze gedachte nader werd uitgewerkt 
tot een vrij concrete visie van een specifiek Nederlandse benadering van de 
externe verslaggeving waarin de vrijheid van onderneming en accountant centraal 
stond. In hoofdstuk 3 wordt betoogd dat deze visie eerder gradueel dan princi-
pieel verschilde van de verslaggevingssystemen in omringende landen, en dat de 
ontwikkelingen en opvattingen in Nederland met name grote overeenkomst 
vertoonden met die in het Verenigd Koninkrijk. 
Hoofdstuk 4 bevat een overzicht van eerder empirisch onderzoek naar vrijwillige 
informatieverstrekking in de jaarrekening. Dit betreft met name "cross-sectional" 
onderzoek naar de samenhang tussen ondernemingskenmerken en de mate van 
vrijwillige informatieverstrekking. Longitudinaal onderzoek heeft slechts op 
beperkte schaal plaatsgevonden. Om de stap naar longitudinaal onderzoek te 
kunnen maken wordt in deze studie een beroep gedaan op het algemene theoreti-
sche kader met betrekking tot adoptie en diffusie van innovaties. Dit kader biedt 
aanknopingspunten voor zowel een analyse gericht op kenmerken van innovaties 
(in dit geval de kenmerken van nieuwe informatie-elementen in het jaarverslag) 
als voor een analyse gericht op kenmerken van de eenheden die deze innovaties 
adopteren (de ondernemingen die deze elementen in hun jaarverslag opnemen). 
In de hoofdstukken 5 en 6 wordt het gegevensmateriaal geanalyseerd. In 
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hoofdstuk 5 wordt aandacht geschonken aan het verband tussen in-
formatieverstrekking en ondernemingskenmerken, terwijl in hoofdstuk 6 de 
verschillen tussen informatie-elementen wordt onderzocht. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt bevestigd dat er sprake was van aanzienlijke vrijwillige 
informatieverstrekking gedurende de gehele na-oorlogse periode. De mate van 
informatieverstrekking werd weliswaar belangrijk beïnvloed door de Wet op de 
Jaarrekening van Ondernemingen van 1970, maar in de voorliggende jaren was 
reeds sprake van een gestage uitbreiding van de informatieverstrekking. 
Er was echter sprake van aanzienlijke verschillen in de mate waarin onder-
nemingen in deze ontwikkeling deelnamen. Deze verschillen kunnen, in de lijn 
met eerder onderzoek, gerelateerd worden aan de omvang en groei van de 
onderneming, aan kapitaalmarktactiviteit en in beperkte mate aan de bedrijfstak. 
Ook worden aanwijzingen gevonden dat relaties tussen ondernemingen, al dan 
niet over de grenzen van bedrijfstakken heen, correspondeerden met vergelijkbare 
informatieverstrekking. Hierbij wordt het bestaan van dergelijke relaties afgeleid 
van het bestaan van personele unies in de besturen en raden van commissarissen 
van de betrokken ondernemingen. Verschillen in informatieverstrekking kunnen 
niet worden gerelateerd aan accountantskantoren. 
Aan de grote multinationale ondernemingen wordt in de bestaande literatuur een 
leidende rol wordt toegeschreven in de ontwikkeling van de Nederlandse verslag-
geving. In dit onderzoek wordt bevestigd dat doorgaans één of twee van deze 
ondernemingen voorgingen in het opnemen van nieuwe informatie-elementen, 
maar dat kleinere ondernemingen geregeld sneller waren in het volgen van deze 
innovaties dan de andere multinationale ondernemingen. 
Ten slotte blijkt dat veranderingen in de populatie van genoteerde ondernemingen 
gevolgen hadden voor de ontwikkeling van de verslaggeving. In deze periode 
vonden vele fusies en overnames plaats, terwijl ook voortdurend sprake was van 
nieuwe en beëindigde noteringen. In het algemeen pasten nieuw genoteerde 
ondernemingen zich goed aan aan de bestaande praktijk, zodat van hen geen 
directe invloed uitging op het peil van de verslaggeving. Tegelijkertijd verdwe-
nen kleinere, minder renderende of verliesgevende ondernemingen uit de note-
ring. Aangezien hun informatieverstrekking relatief beperkt was, leidde dit tot 
een stijging van het gemiddelde peil van de resterende ondernemingen. 
In hoofdstuk 6 wordt, in de vorm van afzonderlijke casusbeschrijvingen, weerge-
geven hoe de introductie van negen verslaggevingselementen in de jaarverslagge-
vingspraktijk is verlopen. Hierbij wordt eveneens aandacht besteed aan de 
historische achtergrond in de vorm van de opvattingen in de literatuur over deze 
onderwerpen en ontwikkelingen in de buitenlandse praktijk en regelgeving. 
Hieruit worden onder meer de volgende algemene conclusies getrokken. 
Verschillen tussen de diffusieprocessen van de verschillende elementen lijken 
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goed vatbaar te zijn voor interpretatie in termen van algemene innovatie-diffusie 
theorieën. In het bijzonder kan een verband worden vastgesteld tussen enerzijds 
de snelheid en volledigheid waarmee een nieuw element door de onderzochte 
ondernemingen wordt overgenomen en anderzijds de kenmerken van het informa-
tie-element beschreven in termen van relatief voor- of nadeel, complexiteit en 
zichtbaarheid van de nieuwe informatie. Hierbij blijkt dat met name een percep-
tie van hoge kosten van informatieverstrekking (met name concurrentienadeel), 
samengaat met een relatief traag diffusieproces. 
De wijze waarop nieuwe informatie-elementen worden opgenomen in de verza-
meling van voor publicatie in aanmerking komende gegevens kan sterk verschil-
len. Het bestaan van sommige gegevens (zoals het omzetcijfer) was reeds lang 
bekend voordat geregelde publicatie plaatsvond. Bij uitstel van publicatie waren 
met name kostenoverwegingen van belang. In andere gevallen (belastingge-
gevens) werd nieuwe informatieverstrekking relevant door een wijziging van 
omstandigheden. Bij weer andere gegevens (de staat van herkomst en besteding 
der middelen, winst per aandeel) fungeerde het buitenland als voorbeeld. 
De snelheid waarmee nieuwe gegevens in de jaarverslaggeving werden opgeno-
men werd beïnvloed door externe factoren. 
In de literatuur worden de aanbevelingen voor de verslaggeving van de gezamen-
lijke werkgeversorganisaties uit 1955 en 1962 vaak genoemd als belangrijke 
invloeden op de verslaggeving. Deze rapporten waren tevens de hoeksteen van 
de specifiek Nederlandse, op vrijwilligheid gebaseerde benadering van de 
verslaggeving welke beschreven werd in hoofdstuk 3. Deze studie toont aan dat 
deze aanbevelingen (en met name het rapport van 1955) inderdaad substantieel 
vooruitliepen op de toenmalige praktijk, en dat hun publicatie gevolgd werd door 
een merkbare uitbreiding van de informatieverstrekking. 
De Wet op de Jaarrekening van 1970 had grote invloed op de verslaggeving. 
Ondanks de eerdere vrijwillige uitbreiding van de informatieverstrekking, waren 
veel ondernemingen genoodzaakt hun jaarverslaggeving te herzien. Opmerkelijk 
is hierbij dat veel ondernemingen bij deze herziening over gingen tot het verstrek-
ken van informatie die ook onder de nieuwe voorschriften niet vereist was. 
Sinds 1971 worden in Nederland aanvullingen op de wettelijke bepalingen inzake 
de jaarverslaggeving door, in eerste instantie, het Tripartiete Overleg en, sinds 
1982, de Raad voor de Jaarverslaggeving. Met betrekking tot de in deze studie 
onderzochte informatie-elementen weerspiegelden de uitspraken van deze organi-
saties de meerderheidspraktijk van de onderzochte ondernemingen, zodat de 
betekenis van deze uitspraken voor deze periode waarschijnlijk vooral gezocht 
moet worden in de groep van niet genoteerde ondernemingen. 
In hoofdstuk 7 worden de bevindingen samengevat en worden suggesties gegeven 
voor verder onderzoek. 
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